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what was then the Schauspielhaus, or Theater (center)— now the concert house of the 
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Thirty years ago, the late Nathan A. Scott Jr. observed, “Certainly Western 
philosophy .  .  . has only very rarely permitted itself to be fructified by the 
poetic imagination.”1 Among modern theologians, he added, Søren Kier ke-
gaard and John Henry Newman were the sole exceptions in “hav[ing] been 
influenced in any decisive way by poetic methods and modalities” and in 
taking literature and the arts “to be fecundating materials for theological 
reflection,” rather than employing them— as did Paul Tillich, Nikolai Ber-
dyaev, and Jacques Maritain— mainly as “cultural barometers of the cultural 
situation requiring to be addressed by Christian theology.”2 Today, Scott’s 
observation may not elicit raised eyebrows. George Pattison, in opening his 
essay in the present volume, rightly notes that it is “no new discovery” to 
realize “that Kierkegaard might be read in the perspective of literature and 
the arts.” On the contrary, this insight was first registered in Kierkegaard’s 
own time and has found expression off and on to the present day, though it 
has never held a dominant sway.
Generally speaking, with some notable exceptions, the reception of Kierke-
gaard over the past century and a half has tended to emphasize the philosophical 
and theological dimensions of his writings at the expense of the literary and 
artistic. This is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to his extreme anomalous-
ness as an author. As Edward F. Mooney puts it in his own contribution to this 
volume, Kierkegaard “enacts a kind of disordered, anomalous, hybrid status 
for himself,” serving as “a literary philosopher (or philosophical littérateur) 
and a cultural and existential provocateur,” an inventor of “countergenres, 
parabooks, unclassifiable publications.” Confronted with such an anomaly 
as Kierkegaard, readers have often not known what to make of his and his 
pseudonyms’ pervasive literary and artistic concerns. This is largely because 
the sequential progression of the existential stages charted and plumbed in 
his writings appears to promote a movement from the aesthetic, through the 
ethical, and into the religious— what Hans Urs von Balthasar termed Kier ke-
gaard’s “banishment of the aesthetic from the realm of theology.”3 The present 
volume focuses on the reverse direction of that movement, that is, backward 
toward the aesthetic, and to the formal media of expression associated with it, 
presenting a wide, variegated array of perspectives on Kierkegaard in relation 
to literature, music, opera, theater, dance, visual art, and film.
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Here, an immediate qualification is in order. Despite the concentration 
of this volume on the relation of Kierkegaard to literature and the arts, he 
himself cannot be categorized as a poet, novelist, or story writer in any con-
ventional sense. Nor was he a practitioner of any of the other arts. For all 
his and his pseudonyms’ manifest love of music, particularly of Mozart, 
Kierkegaard played no musical instrument, nor sang, nor does he or any 
of his pseudonyms, when discussing music, broach the sorts of questions 
that musicologists and music theorists conventionally treat— that is, concern-
ing key, harmony, rhythm, and so forth; indeed, there is no evidence that he 
could read music. Dance and the visual arts, as the essays by Anne Margrete 
Fiskvik and Ragni Linnet demonstrate, likewise bear significantly upon Kier-
ke gaard’s writings (in ways unappreciated heretofore). Yet he wrote relatively 
little about dance and visual arts and set forth no theory of them. Moreover, 
his artistic skill, in Pattison’s words, “seems to have been limited to some 
rather primitive caricatures in the margins of the journals,” and he never 
performed ballet. As Fiskvik suggests, despite his personal acquaintance with 
the ballet master August Bournonville, it would be difficult even to imagine 
Kierkegaard on the ballroom floor.
As for his pervasively literary nature,4 his self- image as “only a singu-
lar kind of poet [en egen Art Digter]” (SKS 12:281  / WA 165) or “hardly 
anything but a poet [næsten kun en Digter]” (SKS 13:25 / PV 18), and his 
predilection for the theater, which led him to contemplate “transform[ing] 
[his personal] struggle into literary works, even present[ing] it on the stage as 
straight drama” (SKS 24:193, NB22:164, n.d. 1851 / JP 6:6718), his compul-
sion to engage in “creative writing” is undeniable. His journals and papers up 
through the 1840s record any number of ideas and plans for, and occasion-
ally sketches or drafts (none of them completed) of, stories, novels, dramas, 
and various other literary- artistic writing projects, the most fully developed 
of which is an Aristophanic burlesque play (SKS 17:280– 97, DD:208, n.d. 
1837  / KJN 1:272– 89).5 Consistent with certain hints by the pseudonyms, 
some of the pseudonymous writings have previously been read as novels,6 and 
in the present volume Pattison and Joakim Garff read Either/Or and Prac-
tice in Christianity as Bildungsromane; Howard Pickett ascribes a “theatrical 
form” to the entire pseudonymous corpus, especially Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript; and Martijn Boven finds the whole authorship, especially Repeti-
tion, functioning as a “theater of ideas.” However, the fact remains, none of 
Kierkegaard’s published works was written for the stage, and none presents 
itself as a traditional novel. In the final analysis, if there could ever be such 
an analysis of Kierkegaard, we would have to agree with Mooney: “Kierke-
gaard did not deliver novels or plays or poems, but he easily could have. He 
had other fish to fry. Something diverts his attention from becoming only a 
literary figure.”
There is another point to acknowledge before examining Kierkegaard in 
his relation to literature and the arts. Ultimately, those writings, let alone that 
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relation, cannot be considered in isolation from the life of Kierkegaard, a life 
that was overtly none too exciting. To be sure, there were his painful break 
on August 11, 1841, from the single love of his life, Regine Olsen, and then, 
five years later, his publicly humiliating, yearlong imbroglio with the local 
tabloid, The Corsair (Corsaren), whose cartoonist caricatured him as both 
a cruel cad and a skinny hunchback, a kind of foppish Quasimodo in a top 
hat, overcoat, and trousers with uneven legs.7 Closing out the twilight of his 
relatively brief life, there was also his fierce, bold attack upon his nation’s 
established church, homing in on Denmark’s twin ecclesiastical icons at that 
time, the recently deceased bishop Jakob Peter Mynster and his episcopal suc-
cessor, Hans Lassen Martensen. Still today, imposing, larger- than- life busts of 
these two clerics flank the north side of Copenhagen’s Church of Our Lady 
(Vor Frue Kirke), statuary centurions on guard, as if to assure their flock of 
protection against the likes of Kierkegaard. The latter’s own most conspicu-
ous memorial, a full- body statue of him seated and writing, is situated blocks 
away, in the somewhat secluded, innocuously secular, tree- shadowed space of 
the Royal Library garden.
Nonetheless, Kierkegaard’s life seems rather undramatic, unless one per-
ceives in it, as Mircea Eliade did (rightly or wrongly), the recurrence of an 
ancient mythic pattern. The Romanian- born novelist, story writer, and his-
torian of religions likened Kierkegaard to, of all people, Achilles, on the 
grounds that both men were lifelong bachelors. In Eliade’s view, Achilles 
resisted the happy, fruitful life that had been predicted for him, had he mar-
ried, because in that case he would have given up his becoming a hero and 
his uniqueness and immortality that came with that status: “Kierkegaard 
passes through exactly the same existential drama with regard to Regina 
[sic] Olsen: he refuses marriage in order to remain himself, ‘the unique,’ to be 
able to hope for the eternal, by rejecting the modality of a happy existence 
in the ‘general.’ ”8 Otherwise, aside from the highly public Corsair debacle 
and assault on Christendom, Kierkegaard’s life offers little external drama, 
nor even much physical movement outside the chambers of the successive 
Copenhagen houses and apartments he inhabited over the years. Aside from 
his daily walks about the city, his random chats with people on the streets (his 
“people baths,” as he called them), his theater and concert- going, his occa-
sional carriage rides through the nearby countryside, and his five trips abroad 
(once to Sweden, in 1835, and four times to Berlin, in 1841– 42, 1843, 1845, 
1846), what confronts us is a most unconventional drama of intensely pri-
vate, introspective, and yet obsessively recorded, inscribed, and transcribed 
existence that revolved around incessant reading, reflecting, and writing. The 
sheer verbosity of Kierkegaard, a basic and at times perhaps irritating aspect 
of his work, justifies Garff’s diagnosis of him as a graphomaniac, a sufferer 
of hypergraphia.9 This led Johan Ludvig Heiberg to characterize the “two 
big, thick volumes” constituting Either/Or as “a monster [Monstrum] of a 
book,”10 introducing several size- related associations— bigness, thickness, 
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monstrosity— that became standard tropes in reviews and critical discus-
sions of Kierkegaard’s published writings. Martensen harked back to these 
associations in an article published in 1854, where he dismissed “the whole 
prolix [or longwinded, vidtløftige] Kierkegaardian literature,”11 averring that 
Kierkegaard produced more books, both signed and pseudonymous, than 
was divinely warranted.12
The indissoluble link between the personal existence of Kierkegaard and 
his literary art is suggested by an observation made by the Swiss writer Denis 
de Rougemont in 1934, that heyday of fascism, Nazism, communism, and 
what he disparaged as mass rule. Among the writers whose thought had 
transformed “the data of [people’s] lives” by that time, Rougemont distin-
guished two main “families.” The first, to which Hegel, Marx, and Georges 
Sorel belong, “acts only by the objective content of its theories, not by its 
indifferent style. On the other hand,” wrote Rougemont regarding the second 
“family,” the one by which he claimed to have been personally inspired: “a 
Pascal, a Kierkegaard, a Rimbaud act less by virtue of their conclusions than 
by that of their personal drama made ‘flesh’ by the turns of their language, 
the movement of their thought.”13 We might add, not only are aspects of the 
persona of Kierkegaard incarnated into his writings, but also material objects 
from his immediate physical surroundings are reflected, sometimes betraying 
his attraction to other arts. For example, as Roger Poole has shown, several 
of the Discourses at Friday Communion (1849, 1851), at least two of which 
Kierkegaard evidently delivered in the Church of Our Lady, allude to Bertel 
Thorvaldsen’s celebrated statue of Christ, which stands at the altar there, fac-
ing Thorvaldsen’s sculptured renditions of the twelve disciples, six on each 
side of the nave. In several instances in his delivery of those discourses, it 
seems probable that Kierkegaard even gestured with his hand toward the 
Christ statue, connecting his words directly with it. Moreover, the inscrip-
tion from Matthew 11:28 above the statue, “Come here, all you who labor 
and are burdened, and I will give you rest” (SKS 12:13 / PC 5), is the text 
for the entirety of Practice in Christianity, which Kierkegaard published in 
1850 under the pseudonym Anti- Climacus: “All those mediations are full 
of implicit and often explicit reference to the figure of Christ, standing in 
marble at the altar of Vor Frue Kirke.”14 Another, earlier example occurs in 
Kierkegaard’s Repetition, published in 1843 under the pseudonym Constan-
tin Constantius, whose account of his arrival back in Berlin for a return visit 
places him in the same apartment building, Jägerstrasse 57, on the corner 
with Charlottenstrasse, where Kierkegaard had resided on his first sojourn 
in Berlin (see Kierkegaard to Emil Boesen, January 1, 1842, SKS 28:156, 
Brev 83 / LD 116, letter 60)— and where, in fact, he wrote Repetition on his 
second visit, in 1843.15 “So I arrived in Berlin,” writes Constantin Constan-
tius: “I hurried at once to my old lodgings to ascertain whether a repetition 
is possible. May I assure any commiserating reader that the previous time I 
managed to get one of the most pleasant apartments in Berlin; may I now 
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give even more emphatic assurance. . . . Gensd’arme [sic] Square is certainly 
the most beautiful in Berlin; das Schauspielhaus [the theater] and the two 
churches are superb, especially when viewed from a window by moonlight” 
(SKS 4:27  / R 151). Later in life, Kierkegaard would satirically analogize 
the contemporary church to the theater as an institution, likening priests to 
“stage performers” (Skuespillere; SKS 24:71, NB21:119, n.d. 1850  / KJN 
8:67). Priests, he suggested, would be the first to condemn any believer who 
dared to act in accord with the New Testament; they would regard it “as 
ridiculous as if a person were to act according to what he sees or hears in the 
theater” (SKS 23:485, NB20:172, n.d. 1850 / KJN 7:493). Further, in a state-
ment quoted in part by Pickett, he wryly noted, “In the theater, if one notices 
the prompter [Souffleuren],” that is, the hidden person who whispers forgot-
ten lines to actors onstage, “the illusion is disturbed. In church, the illusion 
would be perfect only if the prompter were present” (SKS 24:252, NB23:88, 
n.d. 1851 / KJN 8:251). Nonetheless, the scene evoked above of “das Schaus-
pielhaus and the two churches” is emblematic of the life of Kier ke gaard in a 
way that even he may not have recognized. This can be appreciated by any-
one familiar with the Gendarmenmarkt, whether from visiting there today 
(as its basic layout remains the same as in Kierkegaard’s time, despite the 
severe damage it suffered during the Second World War) or by perusing the 
frontispiece of this volume, an engraving from about 1837 that shows the 
Gendarmenmarkt in the decade prior to Kierkegaard’s first Berlin stay, with 
Kierkegaard’s building visible in the background.16 As though concretized 
upon that celebrated square to mirror materially and architecturally one of 
the basic tensions in his own existence, aesthetic existence (in the form of the 
theater Kierkegaard attended, now the concert house for the Konzerthausor-
chester Berlin) is literally flanked on either side by institutional religion (in 
the form of the German Cathedral and the French Cathedral). When viewed 
at night by moonlight, Constantin Constantius goes on to comment, this 
whole scene “is transformed into a stage setting [en scenisk Decoration]. A 
dream world [En drømmende Virkelighed] glimmers in the background of 
the soul” (SKS 4:28 / R 152).
The linguistic, reflective incarnating of Kierkegaard’s personal drama is 
rendered immeasurably more complex by what Pattison, in his essay herein, 
calls the “moving kaleidoscope of [Kierkegaard’s] works, styles, and genres.” 
Any reader of Kierkegaard’s so- called aesthetic writings published under 
exotic, often amusingly Latinate noms de plume is acquainted with the ver-
tiginous array of pseudonymous voices that speak from them. As much as 
any literary artist ever, Kierkegaard exists, as I have put it elsewhere, “largely 
in, or even as, a dialectic between his (and his pseudonyms’) reading of lit-
erature and his (and their) production of literature— literature, that is, in 
the conventional sense of poetic or literary art.”17 Thus, we know, to bor-
row Mooney’s words, that Kierkegaard “inherits genetic material from his 
ancestors”: Socrates, Plato, Kant, Hegel, and other philosophers, as well as, 
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no less profoundly, Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Goethe, Hamann, 
and German Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel, Jean Paul, Novalis, Lud-
wig Tieck, E. T. A. Hoffmann; the post- Romantic Heinrich Heine; and Adam 
Oehlenschlæger, Jens Baggesen, and other Danish writers. The extensive, 
standard- setting series of several dozen volumes edited by Jon Stewart at 
the Kierkegaard Research Centre in Copenhagen, “Kierkegaard Research: 
Sources, Reception and Resources,” offers what is as close as possible to a 
comprehensive scholarly accounting of the manifold major thinkers, writers, 
poets, and others who influenced Kierkegaard, and also of those around the 
globe whom he in turn influenced. His works are, to echo Mooney again, 
“like lively biological specimens . . . self- replicating,” passing on their “genes” 
to Ibsen, Kafka, Rilke, and countless others up through John Updike and 
Woody Allen.
Yet even the notion of “influence” becomes problematic when applied to 
Kierkegaard, given his insistence on distinguishing himself from his pseudo-
nyms: “That is, I am impersonally or personally in the third person a souffleur 
[prompter] who has poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces in turn 
are their productions, as their names are also. Thus in the pseudonymous 
books there is not a single word by me. I have no opinion about them except 
as a third party [Trediemand], no knowledge of their meaning except as a 
reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since it is impossible to have 
that to a doubly reflected communication” (SKS 7:569– 70  / CUP 1:625– 
26). Such a severance of author from authorship, a feature of his that has 
endeared Kierkegaard to postmodernists, among others, was not entirely new 
with him. For example, Kant, in his first critique, where he suggests that our 
understanding of Plato’s expression “idea” may differ from Plato’s under-
standing of it, observes “that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the 
thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in 
ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better 
than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his 
concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own 
intention.”18 Kierkegaard, in claiming to relate to his pseudonyms as a “third 
party” or reader, in effect— whether wittingly or not— takes Kant’s point a 
step further, distancing himself as author from his own pseudonyms whose 
works Kant would have us believe we might understand “better than” they 
(and also “better than” Kierkegaard).
In a number of places in his journal, Kierkegaard characterizes the rela-
tionship between his pseudonymous and signed writings with a memorable 
analogy to one of the great rivers of the Iberian peninsula, renowned since 
ancient times for the geologically peculiar fact that, not far from its source, the 
river dives below the earth’s surface and follows a subterranean course before 
resurfacing some ten miles farther. “Just as the Guadalquibir [sic] plunges 
underground at one point and then emerges later,” writes Kierkegaard, “I 
must now plunge into pseudonymity; but I have now also understood where I 
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will emerge again in my own name” (SKS 22:70, NB11:123, n.d. 1849 / KJN 
6:65). It is a marvelous analogy, almost surely derived from his reading of 
Don Quixote, but there is a problem: Kierkegaard cites the wrong river— that 
is, the Spanish waterway famous for its subterranean plunge is not the Gua-
dalquivir (which never goes underground) but the Guadiana, as mentioned 
in Cervantes’s novel.19 Aside from this confusion of the rivers, Kierkegaard’s 
analogy can also seem misleading, for it might distract us from remembering 
that all of Kierkegaard’s numerous Guadiana- like plunges “into pseudonym-
ity” were accompanied by the surfacing and, quite often, resurfacing of his 
various literary personae, all of whom must be regarded as separate, distinct 
writers as well as separate, distinct readers in their own right, with attitudes, 
convictions, worldviews, and interpretive proclivities that cannot necessarily 
be equated with Kierkegaard’s own or with those of each other.
The question of how to construe Kierkegaard, especially in relation to 
literature and the arts, becomes more complicated if we consider him in the 
light of two seemingly opposed conceptualizations of the human being: Ellen 
Dissanayake’s notion of homo aestheticus and Eliade’s, of homo religiosus. 
These two notions encapsulate the human being, or what Dissanayake and 
Eliade posit to be two essential aspects of the human being, within the two 
categories that stand opposed as the first and third of Kierkegaard’s and his 
pseudonyms’ existential stages: the aesthetic and the religious. Although the 
cognitive distinction between art and religion is a relatively recent, peculiarly 
Western development,20 Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms separate the aes-
thetic stage and the religious stage so radically as to locate the ethical, as well 
as the transitional phases of irony and humor that border it, as a separate 
stage in between (e.g., SKS 7:455  / CUP 1:501– 2). Dissanayake takes art 
to be “a biologically evolved element in human nature,” that is, “a natural, 
general proclivity that manifests itself in culturally learned specifics such as 
dances, songs, performances, visual display, and poetic speech”— hence her 
coinage, homo aestheticus.21 At the same time, although Eliade applies the 
term homo religiosus in some instances to “the man of the traditional soci-
eties,”22 as opposed to modern, “secularized” humans, it is evident that he 
conceives of homo religiosus also, perhaps even primarily, as an essentialist 
description of the entire human race at any and all times and places.23
Are Dissanayake’s and Eliade’s conceptions of the human being reconcil-
able with the Kierkegaardian conception of the aesthetic and the religious? 
On the one hand, whatever else Kierkegaard might have thought of the 
Darwinian theory of biological evolutionism had he lived to be acquainted 
with it, he would have recognized the affinity between Dissanayake’s view 
of human beings as “inherently aesthetic and artistic creatures”24 and his 
(and his pseudonyms’) own association of the aesthetic stage with natural, 
instinctual existence and the arts. For Dissanayake, the human being is homo 
aestheticus because it is in human nature to be so; likewise, Kierkegaard and 
at least some of his pseudonyms seem to recognize that the movement of the 
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individual into the ethical stage or even, finally, into the religious can never 
entail an absolute transcendence of, or evolvement from, the aesthetic. He 
allows that the poetic and aesthetic dimensions of life are not confined to 
the aesthetic stage but, in Sylvia Walsh’s words, “are crucial to and may be 
integrated with an ethical or religious orientation.”25 As Christopher Barnett 
observes in the present volume, echoing a suggestion made also by C. Stephen 
Evans, all three Kierkegaardian stages— the aesthetic, ethical, and religious— 
“are permanent domains within the self, which, like a Venn diagram, overlap 
one another at certain key junctures.” On the other hand, Eliade’s under-
standing of the human being as inherently religious cannot be squared with 
Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the religious as an existential stage into which 
only the ethically qualified individual might enter by means of a decision and 
“leap” that is, as Fiskvik reminds us, expressly conceived by Kierkegaard as 
ballet- like.
Notwithstanding the allowance by his pseudonym Johannes Climacus 
for the presence of Religiousness A “in paganism [i Hedenskabet]” (see SKS 
5:506 / CUP 1:557), Kierkegaard’s primary association of religion with Abra-
hamic faith and Christianity does not square with Eliade’s recognition of 
“archaic”— that is, pre- Christian and also “pagan”— peoples as epitomizing 
homo religiosus. If the notion of homo aestheticus seems to suit Kier ke gaard’s 
anthropology more closely than does that of homo religiosus (because for 
Kierkegaard, whereas the individual may conceivably retain residual aes-
thetic traits after entering the ethical or the religious stage, a person can 
bear no trace of the religious stage before having entered it), there would 
seem in turn a natural affinity between this aesthetic anthropology and the 
bourgeois, “post- Romantic” age Kierkegaard inhabited, an age described by 
Pattison as “permeated through and through by the Romantics’ valorization 
of art as a, if not the, central mode of human beings’ self- experience and 
self- understanding.”
Still, there is yet another category in which Kierkegaard, his literary and 
aesthetic proclivities, and his aforementioned graphomania might most suit-
ably be construed. In a little book published not much over a decade ago in 
Cali, Columbia, Diego Gil Parra submits that in the same way as there exists 
homo ludens (the human who plays), homo faber (the human who makes), 
and homo sapiens (the human who thinks), and, we might add, homo reli-
giosus, whom Gil Parra does not mention, there are legitimate reasons to 
speak of the existence of homo litterarius (the literary human), who is human 
inasmuch as he or she writes and reads.26 This idea gives pause because, for 
an obvious reason, the argument could never be made, as Dissanayake and 
Eliade do make it for homo aestheticus and homo religiosus, that the con-
dition of homo litterarius is inherent or essential to the human race. Why? 
Because as Dissanayake reminds us in a different context, “literacy is a recent 
human invention and an even more recent widespread accomplishment. It 
can be reasonably claimed that 99 percent of the humans who ever existed 
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could not have read the Great Books, or any books, indeed anything at all.”27 
Thus, for Gil Parra, who seems aware of this consideration, homo litterarius 
“is not a permanent condition . . . a professional attribute, for example,” but 
rather “a moment, a stage [un estado], perhaps a trance” that is “purely an 
infinitive verb, purely to make, purely to grasp.”28 Epitomes of homo litter-
arius include Homer, Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, 
Baudelaire, Kafka, and Borges, while Don Quixote is the consummate homo 
litterarius of “living flesh and body.”29 Kierkegaard, who fancied himself a 
latter- day Don Quixote (SKS 22:199, NB12:103, n.d. 1849  / KJN 6:199) 
and who reportedly dubbed himself “the greatest prose stylist Denmark had 
produced,”30 should naturally be added to Gil Parra’s list.
With the aspects of the litterarius, aestheticus, and religiosus in Kier ke-
gaard as its three main focal points in approaching his writings, the present 
volume is structured to consider his relation and pertinence to literature and 
the arts from a broad range of angles.
This volume of fourteen essays divides into four main parts, the first two of 
which consist of four essays each, and the last two parts, three essays each. 
The essays in part I focus on Kierkegaard in relationship to literature, his 
own main medium of expression; part II, to the performing arts, including 
theater, music, and dance; part III, to visual arts and film; while the essays of 
part IV are comparative in nature, considering Kierkegaard in juxtaposition 
with a Romantic poet, a modern composer, and a contemporary musician, 
singer, and songwriter.
The first two essays offer overarching perspectives on Kierkegaard’s whole 
literary project, each with a different emphasis. The opening essay, George 
Pattison’s “The Bonfire of the Genres: Kierkegaard’s Literary Kaleidoscope,” 
pursues the twofold task of examining Kierkegaard as reader or recipient in 
relation to literature and other arts contemporaneous with him, and then 
of gauging his contribution as a writer to his cultural world. The second 
essay, Edward F. Mooney’s “Kierkegaard’s Disruptions of Literature and 
Philosophy: Freedom, Anxiety, and Existential Contributions,” considers 
Kierkegaard likewise in relation to literature, but then also to philosophy as 
well as to his native city, Copenhagen.
Pattison stresses “the sheer scale and variety of [Kierkegaard’s] engagement 
with literature and the arts,” ranging from the early, extensively informed 
interests Kierkegaard developed in Faust, Don Juan, the Wandering Jew, folk 
literature, the troubadours, and children’s stories, to mention but a few of the 
more prominent of those interests, onward through his deep engagements 
with drama and opera and his evident fascination with guitar playing and 
ballet. It is only with the visual arts, both classic and contemporary, that Kier-
ke gaard seems “lacking an all- round and in- depth familiarity”— although, as 
Ragni Linnet’s essay will reveal, there runs throughout Kierkegaard’s writ-
ings a detectable “ontology of pictorial art.” Most important, Pattison urges 
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us to resist the temptation to view Kierkegaard’s relation to literature mainly 
within the context of all the many authors we know he read. Not to be 
overlooked is the fact of Kierkegaard’s regular and frequent attendance at 
the theater, both in Copenhagen and in Berlin during his stays there: “Kier ke-
gaard is not just sitting at home or in the library reading books: he is out there 
in the theater and writing not just on what he has read but on what he has 
seen and heard.” This point resonates in self- evident ways with the focus of 
more than one other essay in this volume, most notably Martijn Boven’s, on 
Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a “theater of ideas” and the roles of performance and 
performativity particularly in Repetition, and Nils Holger Petersen’s, which 
extends the discussion to Kierkegaard’s ideas on specifically musical theater 
and opera. Likewise, Pattison’s further comments on Kierkegaard’s fascina-
tion with the phenomenon of “live performance, which, in an age before film 
and sound reproduction, was by definition an ephemeral art,” anticipate the 
essay by Ronald M. Green, who, in bringing several of Kierkegaard’s writings 
to bear on Denis Villeneuve’s film Incendies, expresses his conviction that 
Kierkegaard would have appreciated the cinematic medium.
Setting the tone, in a sense, for this entire volume is the titular metaphor 
Pattison offers to sum up Kierkegaard’s oeuvre: “a kind of moving kaleido-
scope of works, styles, and genres,” the only sufficient representation of the 
“present age” described in Kierkegaard’s Two Ages, a time whose many and 
diverse self- representations are perpetually “on the edge of falling away into 
incoherence.” Pattison invokes Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the modern novel, 
with its ability to incorporate multiple genres, as an analogue to Kierkegaard. 
Accordingly, we might look to that novelist whose works Bakhtin deemed 
the peerless epitome of the novel’s “polyphonic” potentialities, Dostoevsky, 
for an expression of that same sense of the telltale contemporary uncentered, 
cultural multifariousness that Pattison ascribes to Kierkegaard. I have in 
mind the scene in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, published in 1869, less than a 
decade and half after Kierkegaard’s death, where the rogue Lebedev enrages 
the other guests at Prince Myshkin’s birthday party by sharing his drunken 
cogitations about the current age’s lack of a “binding idea” like that which 
“bound and guided men’s hearts and fructified the waters of life” in medieval 
Europe.31 Later, Myshkin reiterates Lebedev’s theory when he distinguishes 
between the “one idea” by which people were “animated” during the reign 
of Peter the Great and the ideological diffusion— and, some might say today, 
increasingly compulsive and frivolous “multitasking”— of modern humans: 
“In those days people seem to have been animated by one idea, but now 
they are much more nervous, more developed, more sensitive— they seem to 
be animated by two or three ideas at a time— modern man is more diffuse 
and, I assure you, it is this that prevents him from being such a complete 
human being as they were in those days.”32 In negotiating his way through 
the same era of ideological diffusion, Kierkegaard, as Pattison puts it, “held 
a kaleidoscope to a kaleidoscopic time” and thereby “gamble[d]  .  .  . that 
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his efforts would be kept from falling into formlessness by the ‘great, uplift-
ing, simple, elementary thoughts’ [SKS 8:286 / UDVS 189] that he sought to 
keep in constant view.” In this regard, perhaps the closest musical analogy 
to Kierkegaard’s writings is found in the symphonies and song collections of 
Mahler. Although regarding his work, as Leonard Bernstein noted, there is 
much “carping about how derivative the music is of Mozart, Schubert, Wag-
ner and the lot”33 (including Beethoven and Bruckner, we might add), it has 
become platitudinous to observe that Mahler extended the conventional key 
system of tonality to the edge of atonality.
Another of Pattison’s points, about Kierkegaard’s literary penchant for 
satire, pastiche, and spoofing, and the attendant question about whether the 
pseudonymous works are to be taken “seriously,” overlap with a concern 
taken up in Mooney’s essay. Mooney considers whether Kierkegaard, in 
establishing his “disordered” or “hybrid status,” is “just playing around” and 
at times “pulling our leg” in his writings, making them “just flippant, a wise-
crack,” or “all a joke.” Whatever the case, as Mooney points out, the effect of 
the writings on readers can be seducing, stinging, and confusing all at once, as 
Kierkegaard stops, interrogates, and often abandons his audience “without 
answers.” This applies even to the question of what Kierkegaard, as “a kind of 
philosophical poet,” really was. Pursuing the via negativa, Mooney observes 
that Kierkegaard is not a dramatist, an essayist, a “man of letters,” a jour-
nalist, a historian, or a biographer, though his writings yield examples and 
elements of the sorts of works produced by all those different types of writer. 
Complicating this quandary, Mooney notes, is the fact that in Kierkegaard, 
not only a philosophical vocation but a religious vocation as well competes 
with the literary one, making his writer’s identity a “three- part” one “in the 
trifold identity of his works: religious, aesthetic, and philosophical— all of the 
above, and hence not simply any of the above.” At the same time, Mooney 
contends, the refusal by Kierkegaard to “settle” exclusively “into” any one 
of those three areas, that is, philosophy, theology, or “literature” per se, has 
the “existential rationale” of allowing him— and presumably his readers— to 
remain free for “new life.” Thus Mooney distills from Kierkegaard the lesson 
that reading is, as an activity, “an ethical venture” by which “we expose who 
we are— I expose who I am (existentially) in ‘the what’ and ‘the how’ of my 
writing and reading.”
No less so than Mooney’s essay, the third essay in part I, Marcia C. Rob-
inson’s “Kierkegaard’s Existential Play: Storytelling and the Development of 
the Religious Imagination in the Authorship,” is concerned with the effect 
of Kierkegaard’s writings on readers. Robinson aims both to demonstrate 
how Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms cultivate a religious imagination in 
readers by “heighten[ing] their abilities to ‘feel’ and to ‘know’ the ideality 
and actuality of faith” and to show that the development of this imagina-
tion through stories in particular is not a one- time process, any more so than 
reading the Bible is for a devout religious person. Drawing upon Pattison’s 
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2002 monographic study of Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses,34 she 
agrees with Pattison that Kierkegaard’s imagery has an ethical purpose and 
she further attempts to develop a kind of dialectic of the image that balances 
the kataphatic/phenomenal and the apophatic/noumenal. Her suggestion is 
that an ever developing or maturing religious imagination is essential for a 
vibrant and engaged spiritual and ethical life because such an imagination 
makes sense of the divine in its power to be compelling.
Robinson is especially interested in how the tempering of imagination 
with actual experience in Kierkegaard occurs through his carefully worked- 
out method of “faith- oriented storytelling,” which presupposes a deep 
understanding of his readers’ “actual circumstances, values, fears, concerns, 
and conceptions of and attitudes toward faith.” While acknowledging the 
usefulness of Pattison’s construal of Kierkegaard’s authorship as a “magic 
theatre” (an image drawn from Kierkegaard’s Constantin Constantius) and 
Martin Thust’s construal of it as a “marionette theatre,” Robinson, inspired 
by Fellini’s 1954 film, La Strada, proposes that we view it as a “ ‘funhouse’ 
of existential activity”— albeit a funhouse that “is not a simple matter of fun 
and games, but more like a fairy tale that uses the comic, the charming, the 
seductive, or the magical, in order to draw the reader into the anxiety, the 
suffering, the terror, and the death that dog human existence.” Robinson dem-
onstrates the crucial role played by works of the German Romantic Johann 
Ludwig Tieck in helping to shape the understanding at which Kierkegaard 
arrived during his student years of the inseparability of the moral- religious 
ideal from the feeling it instills or from the aesthetic medium through which 
it is communicated. Of all the cast of pseudonyms Kierkegaard later devel-
oped to act on this understanding, Climacus, that “dialectical poet” of both 
Philosophical Fragments (or Philosophical Crumbs) and Concluding Unsci-
entific Postscript, is the one whom Robinson identifies as his most exemplary 
storyteller.
The last essay of part I, Joakim Garff’s “Kierkegaard’s Christian Bildungs-
roman,” and the first essay of part II, Howard Pickett’s “Beyond the Mask: 
Kierkegaard’s Postscript as Antitheatrical, Anti- Hegelian Drama,” have in 
common that they each single out a specific one of Kierkegaard’s pseudony-
mous writings to examine it as exemplifying a particular literary genre: in 
Garff’s case, Practice in Christianity, as a Christian Bildungsroman; in Pick-
ett’s case, as his subtitle indicates, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as what 
Pickett calls an antitheatrical drama.
Connecting provocatively with Linnet’s essay on Kierkegaard’s treatment 
of visual art later in this volume, Garff suggests that Kierkegaard’s philo-
sophical discourse, with its constant oscillation between concept and image, 
is a “discourse of visualization,” while his theological discourse, with its 
effort to suspend the eighteen hundred years that separate the modern reader 
from Jesus, is a “discourse of autopsy.” Appealing to the Kantian distinction 
between the beautiful, as that which merely pleases, and the sublime, as that 
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which “arouses satisfaction, but with dread [erregen Wohlgefallen, aber mit 
Grausen],”35 Garff further observes that the aim of each of Kierkegaard’s 
writings is precisely to “imitate or mimic the sublime by shaking its reader 
rhetorically.” Of the innumerable instances of this tendency in the authorship 
to evoke the sublime, which dovetails with Kierkegaard’s “frequent appeal to 
the reader’s readiness to visualize,” Garff holds up for analysis as a perfect 
example Anti- Climacus’s chronicling of the lingering, gradually transforma-
tional effect that the strange and horrifying sight of the crucified Jesus, as 
represented in a picture, has on the unnamed youth in Practice in Christianity.
This crystallizes the aspects of Practice in Christianity that make it what 
Garff calls Kierkegaard’s billeddannelsesroman, literally an “image forma-
tion novel” but more accurately, albeit loosely, as Garff prefers to render it, 
“visualizing Bildungsroman.” The Bildungsroman (novel of education, edu-
cational novel, or, more precisely, novel of cultivation), a term coined by 
Karl Morgenstern in the early 1820s for a genre that portrays the mental 
and intellectual development of the protagonist from childhood to maturity 
and thus contributes to the reader’s own education or cultivation (Bildung), 
finds its prototype in C. M. Wieland’s Geschichte des Agathon (1766– 67, 
The Story of Agathon) and reaches its literary apogee with Goethe’s Wil-
helm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795– 96, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship). As 
developed in such masterpieces as these, the Bildungsroman as a genre is 
not distinctly Christian in orientation. Yet, whereas Wieland’s novel is set in 
ancient (pagan) Greece and Goethe’s is wholly secular in it ambience, Kier-
ke gaard departs from, or innovates upon, that literary tradition in two main 
ways in his oeuvre as a whole and in Anti- Climacus’s Practice in Christian-
ity in particular: first, by making specifically “Christian identity- formation,” 
to borrow Garff’s terms, the crux of the narrative; second, by not so much 
focusing on the moral, intellectual, and psychological development of the 
protagonist as seeking to actualize the individual reader’s own relationship 
to self and to the God of the New Testament narrative. (In this regard, we 
might note, the story of the youth’s Christian identity- formation in Prac-
tice in Christianity inverts the little narrative that closes the fourth and final 
chapter of Kierkegaard’s unpublished “Book on Adler,” drafted between the 
fall of 1846 and January 1847: namely, what might be described as the mini- 
Bildungsroman of the upbringing of a pseudo- Christian within Christendom; 
SKS 15:287– 95 / BA 134– 42.)
Thus, as Garff points out, while the conventional Bildungsroman traces “a 
process of individuation, the sequential structure of which follows the topog-
raphy of the formation journey and can therefore be reproduced with the 
phrases at home— homeless— home,” the visualizing Bildungsroman alters 
this sequence by “add[ing] a dialectical Christian qualification to the second 
phase, and postpon[ing] the third phase to a . . . metaphorical eternity.” In 
this way, through Garff’s analysis, an unexpected connection becomes per-
ceptible between the aim of Christian edification underlying Kierkegaard’s 
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(or Anti- Climacus’s) billeddannelsesroman and the medieval mystical sensi-
bility of Hugh of St. Victor. At that phase in the narrative when the youth has 
developed the sense of being “a stranger among people, but . . . nonetheless 
at home because he was at home with the image he so passionately wanted to 
resemble,” we might be reminded of Hugh’s adage from the late 1120s: Per-
fectus vero cui mundus totus exsilium est (He is perfect to whom the entire 
world is as a foreign land [or place of exile]).36
With the transition from Garff’s essay to the first of the four essays of part 
II, our focus shifts from the relation of Kierkegaard to literature to his rela-
tion to the performing arts. While Garff also found Practice in Christianity 
as a visualizing Bildungsroman to reflect “Kierkegaard’s highly ambivalent 
relationship toward art” (my emphasis), a relationship that Linnet’s essay 
will later explore in depth, Pickett investigates an equally intense ambiva-
lence toward theater reflected in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, a text 
Pickett regards as “essentially theatrical” in form but “also antitheatrical” in 
content. Climacus disparages and dismisses the abstract, speculative thought 
of Hegelianism as a mere Schattenspiel, or “shadow play” (SKS 7:323 / CUP 
1:353). As Pickett points out, Hegel himself, in his Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of History (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, delivered 
in Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831; published posthumously in 1837), 
routinely deploys theatrical terminology to describe the Spirit’s concrete 
self- manifestation “on the stage [auf dem Theater]” of “Universal History.” 
Schelling, we might add, likewise posits human history as “a play” (Schaus-
piel) in which the deity “reveals and discloses himself successively,”37 and this 
idea— known also as the theatrum mundi— evidently struck Kierkegaard. In 
Either/Or, II, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym speaks of the person who “feels him-
self present as a character in a drama the deity is writing [der føler sig med 
som en Person i det Skuespil, Guddommen digter]” (SKS 3:136 / EO 2:137). 
Perhaps hovering in the background of all such conceptions, albeit not in a 
lineage of direct influence, is Calvin’s notion of the cosmos as “a dazzling 
theater [theatrum].”38
Kierkegaard’s stance toward the theater, as Pickett points out, sets him and 
Climacus in very different relationships to two of the most seminal thinkers 
of the ancient West. While Climacus is bothered that actual ethical agents 
are ethically obliged to engage in actuality, not possibility, it was Aristotle 
who, in valuating possibility above actuality, viewed the theater positively 
as dealing in possibility. At the same time, Kierkegaard, in viewing theater 
negatively, joins Augustine, who in his Confessions (3.2.2) lamented that the 
audience at a theater play (spectaculum theatricum) is encouraged to enjoy 
observing the sufferings of characters onstage without feeling an inclination 
to assist them.39 Further, Climacus charges Hegelian philosophers not only 
with hypocrisy and charlatanry for pretending to be merely spectators (look-
ing on outwardly and as though they had God’s vantage) in the theater of the 
world, rather than actors (engaged inwardly) within the world, but also with 
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being naively theatrical in their tendency to act as though they can envision 
life and the world as a total, complete “system.”
On the other hand, despite his having cast the theater and the theatrical 
Hegelian subject in so negative a light, Climacus also elaborates his own the-
atrical metaphor for “becoming subjective.” Whereas the Hegelian “shadow 
play,” in relying upon an objective form of thought that Kierkegaard and 
Climacus viewed as artificial and illusory, amounts in Pickett’s words to “a 
‘philosophy of the spectacle’ focused on detached spectators and mere exter-
nal appearances,” Climacus favors “an inward, subjective ‘philosophy of the 
actor,’ with its defining emphasis on action and internal effort.” Despite his 
denunciation of the theatrical Hegelian subject, Climacus comes to construe 
the individual’s ethical development as a “private theater” (Privat- Theater) 
in which not only God is the “spectator” (Tilskuer) but the individual, too, 
is a spectator and is also supposed to be an “actor” (Skuespilleren), albeit 
“not . . . one who deceives [bedrager] but one who discloses” (SKS 7:146 / 
CUP 1:157; quoted by Pickett). To be sure, Postscript lacks the typical fea-
tures of a theatrical play, such as acts, scenes, stage directions, and dialogue. 
Yet Pickett demonstrates that Postscript “signals its theatricality,” with Cli-
macus himself emerging as its “most theatrical feature” as he delivers one long 
soliloquy. In this way, Pickett concludes, Kierkegaard’s theatrical technique 
in Postscript counters Climacus’s antitheatrical rhetoric, and the spectacle of 
Postscript distinguishes itself from its counterpart in Hegel by “admit[ting] 
its own theatricality.” By transcending the bipolarity of antitheatrical versus 
pro- theatrical to the point of being what Pickett calls metatheatrical, and by 
anticipating the Verfremdungseffekt, or alienation effect, cultivated in the 
theater by Brecht, Climacus’s work “awakens its readers to the challenges 
posed by their own inward subjectivity.”
Part II’s second essay, Martijn Boven’s “A Theater of Ideas: Performance 
and Performativity in Kierkegaard’s Repetition,” in a sense picks up where 
Pickett’s essay left off, though Boven concentrates his attention on Repeti-
tion, which appeared a little more than two and a half years before Postscript. 
Submitting that Kierkegaard’s whole oeuvre, and Repetition in particular, 
may be viewed as a “theater of ideas,” Boven first establishes a theoretical 
framework on the distinction between “performative writing strategies” and 
“categories of performativity,” an approach informed by the theory of J. L. 
Austin and the earlier investigations of Kierkegaard by Sylviane Agacinski, 
Samuel Weber, and Gilles Deleuze. For Boven, Kierkegaard is a writer who 
diverges from the Aristotelian tradition of mimetic representation by devel-
oping his oeuvre as a conceptual “theater” in which performance, rather than 
representation, of philosophical and existential problems occurs: “His works 
not only say something; they also attempt to do something, to have a perfor-
mative effect.”
Boven’s next step is to demonstrate that the titular concept of Constantin 
Constantius’s Repetition is a category meant to trigger the reader’s subjectivity 
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into action by compelling the reader to confront a vaguely articulated, con-
fusing, contradictory, “unresolved” existential problem. Here, we might be 
reminded of Mooney’s wondering whether Kierkegaard’s writings might be 
ultimately a “wisecrack” or “joke.” Yet, as Boven suggests, there is method to 
the seeming madness, as Constantius achieves this active effect in the reader 
by means of a performative writing strategy involving a “dialectic of advance 
and withdrawal,” whereby the reader is confused by the constant oscillation 
in the senses of the term repetition that are evoked in the text— between rep-
etition in the “ordinary” sense of “an event that occurs for a second, a third, 
or any other time,” as with a rehearsal, and repetition in the “existential” 
sense of an occurrence that “will always emerge as a unique event.” This 
latter notion points to Boven’s reminder that Kierkegaard regarded subjectiv-
ity itself as repetition, inasmuch as he viewed subjectivity— somewhat, we 
might note, as Buddhists regard the individual self— as lacking any essential, 
unchangeable, or unchanging core. Finally, considering Repetition as “philo-
sophical theater,” Boven uncovers three specific “clues” left by Constantin 
Constantius, each of which hints at his consciously developed performative 
writing strategy: the subtitling of his book as a “venture,” which implies an 
outcome that cannot be known in advance; his indication in his letter to his 
book’s “real reader” that he is seeking a reader willing to make an effort to 
understand the book; and the digressive mise en abyme that reveals how to 
perform the book we are reading through two examples of kitsch, one involv-
ing a Nürnberg print (of the sort discussed also by Linnet) and the other, a 
type of popular play, a Posse (or farce, burlesque, or vaudeville). Perhaps, we 
might add, a fourth “clue” to the compositional plan behind Repetition as 
“philosophical theater” is the mention by Constantius of the Schauspielhaus 
on the Gendarmenmarkt, visible by moonlight from his Jägerstrasse apart-
ment, together with his elaborative description shortly afterward of the three 
theaters in Berlin at that time: the Gendarmenmarkt Schauspielhaus; the 
opera house for ballet and opera, that is, the Staatsoper, or the State Opera, 
located on the boulevard Unter den Linden, not far from the Gendarmen-
markt, and still operative; and the Königsstädtisches Theater, or Königstädter 
Theater, which stood on Alexanderplatz, a fair distance from the Jägerstrasse 
lodgings of Kierkegaard/Constantin Constantius.
Another aspect of the deep- seated concern of Kierkegaard with the theater, 
his theatrical aesthetics, together with his theory of music, is the focus of the 
next essay, by Nils Holger Petersen, “Kierkegaard’s Notions of Drama and 
Opera: Molière’s Don Juan, Mozart’s Don Giovanni, and the Question of 
Music and Sensuousness.” Petersen’s interest is in the treatise on Mozart’s 
Don Giovanni, “The Immediate Erotic Stages or The Musical- Erotic,” in 
Either/Or, I, ascribed to the aesthetical pseudonym “A.” In probing “A’s” 
understanding of drama and the medium of music and how that understand-
ing relates to more general questions of worldview, Petersen considers closely 
the distinction “A” draws between language as the authentic medium of the 
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idea, absolutely qualified by spirit, and music as the medium through which 
sensuous immediacy finds expression and which exists only while it is being 
performed. Petersen suspects that “A’s” ranking of language above music, 
viewing language as more precise and reflective than music, may express 
Kierkegaard’s polemical attitude toward the early Romantics, such as Wil-
helm Heinrich Wackenroder and E. T. A. Hoffmann, who exalted music 
as the loftiest of the arts. This conception of music underlies “A’s” discus-
sion of Molière’s Don Juan and Heiberg’s version of that drama, to both of 
which Petersen devotes considerable attention. Yet the theological implica-
tions of “A’s” aesthetics are what most intrigue Petersen, who draws from 
Ettore Rocca’s reading of “The Immediate Erotic Stages” as a Christian text. 
Rocca challenges “A’s” argument that music, as the medium of the sensu-
ous erotic, is the “devil’s work” and that music is therefore excluded from 
Christianity. For Rocca, the function of music is to act under the power of 
the spirit. As Petersen points out, this same function carries over to Mozart’s 
Don Giovanni, inasmuch as the idea of this work is so intimately linked with 
its form. In Mozart’s opera, the conflict between the spirit and the sensu-
ous is encapsulated in that between the Commendatore qua spirit and Don 
Giovanni qua sensuous immediacy.
The Don Juan– like seductiveness of “A’s” rhetoric could make it easy for 
the reader to lose sight of precisely that aspect of “The Immediate Erotic 
Stages” about which Petersen reminds us when he cautions about the need “to 
be careful about drawing overly strict musical- philosophical implications out 
of a treatise that, after all, is written in a literary, associative style rather than 
based on a consistent theoretical construction.” On this point, Petersen, like 
Boven, might almost seem to approach Mooney’s view of Kierkegaard/“A” 
as engaging in a sort of joke. Nonetheless, Petersen takes “A’s” music phi-
losophy seriously enough to consider the implications of its being “based 
on notions of ephemerality and of music being silenced by reflection and 
memory,” especially as the memory of Don Giovanni’s past sins and wrongs 
is brought by the statue of the Commendatore. Through further appeals to 
Augustine’s deconstruction of the present moment of a musical tone in book 
11 of the Confessions; to the late Danish thinker K. E. Løgstrup’s argument 
that perception of time occurs through comparison with at least momen-
tarily unaltered objects, or fictional space; and to Theodor Adorno’s notion 
of music as the condensing of suffering into a moment— through these and 
other appeals, Petersen demonstrates that “A’s” music philosophy collapses, 
or “annihilates itself,” through its own inherent contradictions (e.g., by find-
ing that Mozart’s opera expresses “what cannot be retained”) and also as the 
result of our taking it at face value.
A fitting segue to the final essay in part II is afforded by “A’s” own summa-
tion of Don Giovanni’s life, a summation whose latter portion is referenced 
several times by Petersen, as having developed “in the dancing strains of the 
violin [i de dandsende Violintoner], in which he lightly, fleetingly . . . dances 
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over the abyss [dandser han over Afgrunden], jubilating during his brief 
span” (SKS 2:131  / EO 1:130). In her essay “ ‘Let No One Invite Me, for 
I Do Not Dance’: Kierkegaard’s Attitudes toward Dance,” Anne Margrete 
Fiskvik examines the surprising number of allusions to dance and movement 
in Either/Or (both parts), Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, The 
Concept of Anxiety, and Works of Love, analyzing the concern these works 
express with both the ballroom dancer and the ballet dancer; the contrasts 
between male and females dancers; the dancing master who choreographs 
and designs the ballet; the expressionistic, emotive aspects and potentialities 
of dance; the question of what sorts of plots and subjects are suitable for 
ballet; as well as the use made of dance as a metaphor or allusion for the 
enrichment of the philosophical or theological discussions in these works. 
This essay is groundbreaking, for Fiskvik has no scholarly precursor in con-
sidering these various uses of dance in Kierkegaard’s writings together in any 
sort of systematic way.
Just as Garff and Pickett found Kierkegaard ambivalent toward art and 
theater in Practice in Christianity and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
respectively, so Fiskvik finds Kierkegaard betraying an ambivalence toward 
dance, despite his admiration of it as an art form and despite his personal 
acquaintance with the ballet master August Bournonville, whom he admired 
as a dancer— though not so much as a choreographer or poet. Although, as 
Petersen reminds us, Either/Or’s “A” stresses that it is through the audial 
medium of music that the demonic being of Don Juan is best captured (“Lis-
ten to the beginning of his life  .  .  . hear the whisper of temptation, hear 
the vortex of seduction, hear the stillness of the moment— hear, hear, hear 
Mozart’s Don Giovanni”; SKS 2:106– 7 / EO 1:103, my emphasis), Fiskvik 
calls attention to passages in Concept of Anxiety as well as in Kierkegaard’s 
journal that explicitly reflect the deep and favorable visual impression left 
on Kierkegaard by the dramatic leaps he had seen Bournonville execute on 
stage, especially in the role of another, even more explicitly demonic char-
acter: Mephistopheles. Still, while briefly entertaining the thought that the 
best way to portray Don Juan’s story might be to stage it as a ballet, “A” 
then rejects that idea (SKS 2:109 / EO 1:106) because, in Fiskvik’s words, he 
clearly “feels that the deepest and most profound thoughts of humans can-
not be portrayed through bodily movement.” The fact that “A” conveys this 
attitude in what Fiskvik characterizes as a didactic manner is but one more 
symptom of what Boven describes as the “performative” strategy of Kier ke-
gaard’s pseudonymous writings. Their aim, to paraphrase Boven, is not only 
to say something but also to try to do something, to have a performative 
effect— in this case, to cause the reader, as Fiskvik puts it, “to contemplate 
balletic plots and the usefulness of bodily movement and dance as aesthetic 
expressions.”
It is indicative of Kierkegaard’s irrepressible habit of transforming the 
materials of both art and life into philosophically or theologically useful 
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images and metaphors that he or one of his post– Either/Or pseudonyms will 
often convey thoughts through dance metaphors, thus seeming to contradict 
the uncomplimentary remarks made in Either/Or about Bournonville’s cho-
reographic skill or the dramatic capacities of ballet. Among the dance- related 
metaphors in Kierkegaard’s writings that Fiskvik considers in demonstrating 
this point are those having to do with loneliness in mortal life (= refraining 
from dancing with anyone, hence the title of Fiskvik’s essay); the concealment 
by Kierkegaard of his own efforts as an author (= the balletic ideal of the con-
cealment by the dancer of his or her panting and exertion); the “leap” of faith 
(= the dancer’s leap) and the constant flux of faith (= the twisting of a tight-
rope dancer); lost love (= the dancer who remains in the stance expressive of 
bowing toward one who is not seen); and so forth. In the case of Johannes de 
Silentio’s use of the ballet dancer as a metaphor for the “knight of infinity,” 
the pseudonym’s point that the dancer’s momentary wavering upon landing 
from a leap “shows that they are aliens in the world” (SKS 4:135– 36 / FT 41; 
quoted by Fiskvik) might again call to mind Anti- Climacus’s discussion of 
the developing Christian youth who “walks like a stranger, and yet . . . seems 
to be at home” (SKS 12:188 / PC 189)— a discussion which, in connection 
with Garff’s notion of Anti- Climacus’s “visualizing Bildungsroman,” I earlier 
related to Hugh of St. Victor’s adage about the perfection of the person to 
whom the whole world is as a foreign land. As Kierkegaard puts it in “The 
Book on Adler,” the young person who hopes earnestly to live a Christian 
life must stand in solitude “like an alien,” totally aloof from “the glad gospel 
that is proclaimed on the dance floor of youth [Ungdommens Dandseplads]” 
(SKS 15:294, Cap. IV, §5 / BA 141).
The “high” art of ballet is one thing; the social realm of the “dance floor,” 
or the ballroom, is quite another. Mooney, in his own application of a dance 
metaphor to Kierkegaard, may be right to conclude that the Dane’s “writ-
ings bring us to the dance, and perhaps demonstrate some steps, but the rest 
is up to us— to me.” In contrast, Fiskvik points out that, with regard to the 
ballroom, Kierkegaard seems to have held a conservative view that belies his 
role otherwise as an “intellectual rebel.” He apparently believed that a gentle-
man should dance well, but not so well as to be confused with a professional 
ballet dancer.
Like the relationship of Kierkegaard to dance, the subjects of this volume’s 
third part, his relationships to visual arts and film, have heretofore remained 
largely unexplored. The first of part III’s three essays, Christopher B. Bar-
nett’s “Painting with Words: Kierkegaard and the Aesthetics of the Icon,” 
opens with a discussion of the “rupture” between Kierkegaard’s religious 
and aesthetic commitments, with references to the contrasting assessments 
of that rupture by Pattison, who sympathizes with Kierkegaard’s vision, and 
by Hans Urs von Balthasar, who does not. Despite the seeming unlikelihood 
that a favorable appraisal of aesthetics might be developed from Kierke-
gaard’s writings, Barnett detects an “ ‘aesthetics of the icon’ .  .  . implicit in 
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Kierkegaard’s own copious employment of aesthetic imagery,” his conten-
tion being that Kierkegaard does not rupture the two spheres but rather 
“has a dialectical view of the matter: aesthetic imagery can function either 
in the manner of icons or in that of idols.” Barnett pursues this thesis in a 
threefold manner. First, he examines the variety of ways, both positive and 
negative, in which the concept of Billede (image or picture) is employed in 
Kierkegaard’s writings. For example, on the one hand, Kierkegaard and his 
pseudonyms regard Billede as a dangerous concept, knowing all too well 
that an image can entice someone to become fatally enraptured, like Nar-
cissus, with what is not real. On the other hand, in some places, especially 
his upbuilding discourses, Kierkegaard characterizes certain biblical heroes, 
such as the prophetess Anna (Luke 2:36– 38) and the woman who was a sin-
ner (Luke 7:37– 50), as “images.” Second, Barnett argues that this dialectic 
use of Billede enables Kierkegaard potentially to integrate the aesthetic and 
the religious in his thinking, in that he not only applauds but employs the 
aesthetic to draw readers to seek the religious in their concrete existence. 
Third, Barnett demonstrates that the distinction drawn by Jean- Luc Marion 
between the idol, which absorbs the observer’s gaze, and the icon, which 
redirects it, can illuminate the “pictures” that crop up throughout Kierke-
gaard’s oeuvre. The “aesthetics of the icon” that emerges from Barnett’s 
analysis of Kier ke gaard’s writings thus “points beyond itself, viewing art not 
as an end in itself but as a means toward religious and, with it, existential 
fulfillment.”
This positive aesthetics, in enabling Kierkegaard to present images of holi-
ness, is a far cry from his wariness of the negative, dangerous aspects of 
Billede, epitomized by the representation of Johannes the Seducer’s prefer-
ence for fantasizing about Cordelia rather than being in a relationship with 
her. Such wariness, ingrained in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions 
through the second Mosaic commandment (Exodus 20:4) and the messages 
against shirk, or idolatry, conveyed by the prophet Muḥammad (Qur’ān 13:13 
and 31:13, to mention but two of the many pertinent qur’ānic verses), is not 
limited to cultures conditioned by those moral teachings. Perhaps no work 
of literature outside Kierkegaard’s writings illustrates more vividly the per-
ceived danger of image making, whether through art or through the purely 
mental processes of the imagination, than Yukio Mishima’s The Temple of 
the Golden Pavilion (Kinkakuji, 1956). Set in Kyoto in the period leading up 
to, during, and following the Second World War, the novel recounts the life 
of the young Zen acolyte Mizoguchi, a deeply traumatized and suffering neu-
rotic but also a consummate aesthete in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term, 
whose obsession with the image of the celebrated temple named in the novel’s 
title passes through a series of modes, each one more divergent from reality 
than the one preceding it. The image is first formed for him, before he ever 
sees the temple, from his father’s exalted descriptions, but then is challenged 
by his disappointment with the sight of the actual temple when he first visits 
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it; later it is restored when the thought that the temple might be destroyed by 
an Allied bombing leads
my image of the Golden Temple gradually . . . to be superimposed on 
the real temple . . . just as the copy that one has made through a piece 
of drawing- silk comes to be superimposed on the original painting: 
the roof in my image was superimposed on the real roof, the Sosei on 
the Sosei that extended over the pond, the railings and the windows 
of the Kukyocho on those railings and windows. The Golden Tem-
ple was no longer an immovable structure. It had, so to speak, been 
transformed into a symbol of the real world’s evanescence. Owing 
to this process of thought, the real temple had now become no less 
beautiful than that of my mental image.40
In the end, to rid himself once and for all of the problem posed by the temple, 
its beauty, and its image, Mizoguchi burns it down. Given the merely coin-
cidental but manifest impact that the pyrophobia from which Kierkegaard 
suffered from childhood had on his writings, there can be little doubt that he 
would have read Mishima’s novel with great interest.41
The second essay of the third part offers a kind of counterpoint to the 
focus of Petersen’s essay on Kierkegaard’s notion of music as the demonic, 
sensual medium expressive of passion, as embodied by Mozart’s antihero, 
Don Giovanni. Ragni Linnet’s “Kierkegaard’s Approach to Pictorial Art, and 
to Specimens of Contemporary Visual Culture” takes as its subject Kier ke-
gaard’s much less often discussed understanding of pictorial art as emblematic 
of the reflective aesthetic, which she finds represented by Either/Or’s “A” and 
Johannes the Seducer, who considers this passion detachedly from a dis-
tance. Linnet observes that Either/Or’s opening sentence, in broaching the 
question of the relationship between the “inner” and the “outer,” pinpoints 
“the essence and nature, and the limits and potentials, of the concrete image, 
because a picture, if anything, is the medium of ‘the outer’— that is, the exter-
nal presentation of its subject.”She also notes how important this definitive 
aspect of pictorial art was for Kierkegaard, because only “academic, idealistic 
painting,” as opposed to “popular pictorial art,” is assessed by a congruence 
of the “inner” and the “outer.” And whereas “The Immediate Erotic Stages or 
The Musical- Erotic” was the obvious text for Petersen to concentrate on as 
an exposition of “A’s” (and implicitly Kierkegaard’s) theory of music, Linnet 
turns to another, short essay in Either/Or’s first part, “Silhouettes,” for an 
exposition of what she calls the “beautiful image.”
Much like Fiskvik in her exploration of the place of dance in Kierkegaard’s 
thinking and writings, Linnet is, for the most part, unprecedented in explor-
ing the multifaceted bearing of the visual arts upon them.42 Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym Inter et Inter might even seem to discourage such exploration 
when he speaks disparagingly of the art critic’s profession: “Most people’s 
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art criticism [Konstkritik] has categories and thought- patterns essentially 
in common with every butcher’s assistant, national guardsman, and store 
clerk, who talk enthusiastically about a damned pretty and devilishly pert 
wench of eighteen years. These eighteen years, this damned prettiness and 
this devilish pertness— this is art criticism” (SKS 14:94 / CD 305). Yet, while 
acknowledging that Kierkegaard set forth no cohesive pictorial theory and 
made relatively few references to statues, pictures, and artists, Linnet finds 
that “Silhouettes” presents the primary means for reconstructing “the picto-
rial theory that remains by and large unchanged throughout all Kierkegaard’s 
work: the picture’s relation to time, including the past (recollection), the pres-
ent (presence), and the future (self- appropriation), and to the spirit, the body, 
existence, the self and subjectivity, and love.” “Silhouettes,” she shows, bifur-
cates into halves Kierkegaard’s own pictorial thinking over two questions: the 
question of the relation between the inner and the outer, and of whether the 
inner can be objectified into an outer, visible manifestation; and the question 
of the nature of sight. For Kierkegaard, the inner and the outer are funda-
mentally incommensurable, and the picture is capable not of encompassing 
but of affecting the individual’s innermost being. As for the relation between 
form and appropriation, “Silhouettes” carefully exposes the limitations of 
pictorial art. Invoking the examples of the three jilted women in “Silhou-
ettes,” Goethe’s Marie Beaumarchais, Mozart’s Donna Elvira, and Goethe’s 
Margaret, “Silhouettes” suggests that once their immediate sorrow becomes 
reflective, it ceases to be expressible through pictorial art— a suggestion that 
counters the famous theory of Lessing in his Laocoon (Laokoon, 1766) that, 
because art depicts repose while poetry depicts motion, the subject of artistic 
portrayal must have, as “A” puts it, “a quiet transparency so that the interior 
rests in the corresponding exterior” (SKS 2:167 / EO 1:169).
The bulk of Linnet’s essay consists of a systematic analysis of a selection of 
seven “appropriations” of pictorial artworks and specimens of visual culture 
that figure in various writings of Kierkegaard, whether ekphrastically or as 
the grist for theoretical discussions, ranging from Veronica’s Veil, Ferdinand 
Piloty’s lithograph of Romeo and Juliet’s “kiss,” and an “ancient” painting 
of Ariadne and Theseus, to the popular one- sheet prints of the time known 
as Neuruppiner Bilderbogen or Nürnbergs (mentioned also by Boven) and 
a reproduction of Raphael’s Sistine Madonna, to mention but some of Lin-
net’s examples. In contrast, Ronald M. Green’s essay “Kierkegaard’s Concept 
of Inherited Sin: A Cinematic Illustration,” which completes the third sec-
tion, uses the discussions of hereditary sin in three pseudonymous writings 
by Kierkegaard as lenses through which to analyze a single work in “the most 
modern of all the arts,”43 cinema.
Those writings are the essays “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected 
in the Tragic in Modern Drama” and “The Balance between the Esthetic 
and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality” by Either/Or’s “A” 
and Judge William, respectively (SKS 2:137– 62; 3:155– 314 / EO 1:137–64; 
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2:155– 333), and The Concept of Anxiety, “written by” Vigilius Haufniensis. 
The theory of original sin that Green distills from these texts is threefold: we 
are shaped by our past and the actions of our predecessors; we participate 
in and are responsible for those actions, both good and bad, and therefore, 
in choosing ourselves, we must repent for our predecessors’ wrongful deeds; 
and our moral and psychological links to our parents are ineluctably bound 
up with sexuality. The film to which Green applies this theory is the Quebec 
director Denis Villeneuve’s Incendies (2010, literally “Fires”), an adaptation 
of the Lebanese Canadian playwright Wajdi Mouawad’s 2003 drama of the 
same title, known in English as Scorched.44 Before turning to that film, after 
noting Kierkegaard’s pioneering employment of fictional materials such as 
operas, plays, and novels in the development of philosophical and theological 
concepts, Green makes an extraordinarily pregnant claim to support the use 
of a film to illustrate Kierkegaard’s ideas: “If Kierkegaard were alive today, 
there is no doubt in my mind that he would be entranced with contemporary 
cinema, and that Incendies, if he viewed it, would be among the creative 
works that would draw his interest.” The first part of that claim is worth 
considering for a moment.
Despite the significant influence he has exerted on film directors rang-
ing from Carl Theodor Dreyer to Woody Allen, the bearing of Kierkegaard’s 
writings upon the film medium is rarely considered.45 Yet it seems certain 
that, in support of Green’s claim, the theory and underlying technology of 
cinematography would have fascinated Kierkegaard. Bona fide “series pho-
tography,” which paved the way to the first projection of motion pictures for 
public viewing in December 1895, was not developed until over a decade 
and a half after his death. Yet, inspired largely by discussions of the illu-
sory “persistence of vision” for which Peter Mark Roget had proffered a 
seminal— albeit, we now know, false— explanation in 1825,46 the inventing 
of the various oddly named machines and devices designed to create the illu-
sion of moving pictures began during Kierkegaard’s lifetime.47
Although there is no evidence that Kierkegaard knew of Roget, or of the 
Thaumatrope, the “Wheel of Life,” the Phenakistoscope, the Stroboscope, or 
the Daedalum,48 there are remarkable affinities between certain interests of 
Kierkegaard’s and various developments whose eventual coalescence made 
possible the birth of cinema. In one of his polemics against Christendom 
in 1854, Kierkegaard urges, “Away, away, away with all optical illusions 
[Øienforblindelse], forward with the truth . . . : We are incapable of being 
Christians in the New Testament sense” (SKS 14:159 / MLW 34). Here, his 
use of the analogy of an optical illusion corresponds to Roget’s concern, 
expressed in a different context, with a “curious optical deception” or “visual 
deception”49 that involved the spokes of a rolling carriage wheel appearing 
curved when glimpsed through a series of vertical apertures such as venetian 
blinds. It is also not impossible that Kierkegaard was to some extent aware 
of the two separate but parallel lines of development on which, as Jack C. 
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Ellis points out, the discoveries and inventions leading to motion pictures 
occurred: first, the notion, stemming from the discussion of persistence of 
vision, that a succession of related still images could create an illusion of 
movement; second, the invention of a process of still photography and, later, 
of a technical means by which to take and show photographs fast enough 
to employ fully the image- succession theory.50 Regarding the first of these 
developments, Kierkegaard notably characterized his own times as “an age 
of movement” (Pap. VII1 B 195:373 / MLW, Suppl., 384). His enduring pre-
occupation with “illusions,” “imaginary constructions,” and— as noted by 
Fiskvik in connection with dance— “movements” and “motions”51 entitles 
us to suspect that he would have been captivated by the ability film grants 
us “to see a series of static images as a single continuous movement,” which 
makes cinema the first form of art “to rely solely on psycho- perceptual illu-
sions generated by machine.”52
Like the developments that led to the invention of film, the beginning of 
the second line of development mentioned by Ellis coincided with Kier ke-
gaard’s youth, as photography finds its earliest precursors in the invention 
of heliography by the Frenchman Nicéphore Niépce in the 1820s and of the 
daguerreotype by his countryman Louis Daguerre toward the end of the next 
decade. As Linnet points out, the daguerreotype arrived in Denmark in 1840, 
and by 1844 there were three “photo” studios, two of which were already 
there in 1842. Kierkegaard’s own awareness of the technology behind the 
daguerreotype, she notes, is reflected in Judge William’s estimation that the 
daguerreotype process took a half- minute to record an image.
There are still more reasons why the cinema would likely have entranced 
Kierkegaard. For example, the theatrical quality that Green, like Pattison, 
Pickett, and Boven, perceives in some of Kierkegaard’s writings, together with 
Kierkegaard’s and some of his pseudonyms’ musings upon the existential per-
tinence of theater, is noteworthy because the incorporation of pictorial and 
realistic staging in the popular nineteenth- century theater “offered extraor-
dinarily precise models for what . . . films would become.”53 Moreover, given 
his disdain for “rabble- barbarianism” (Pøbelagtighed; see SKS 20:19– 20, 
NB7 and 7d, March 1846 / Cor., Suppl., 213– 14; Pap.VII1 B 123, n.d. 1845– 
46 / TA, Suppl., 136; SKS 20:258, NB3:28, n.d. 1847 / CD, Suppl. 360; SKS 
16:45, 47 / PV 64, 67) and for the “crowd” (Mængde), which he equated with 
cowardliness (Feigheden) and untruth (Usandheden; see, e.g., SKS 16:88  / 
PV 108), Kierkegaard would supposedly have been wary of the association 
Walter Benjamin perceived between the cinematic medium and the increas-
ingly emergent “masses” (die Masse).54 Nonetheless, although the “discreet 
but decisive role” that Kierkegaard is found to have played “in Benjamin’s 
thought in general”55 seems not to have extended to that German thinker’s 
pioneering theory of film, two other aspects of cinema that Benjamin identi-
fies as definitive of the medium correspond with some of Kierkegaard’s central 
preoccupations. First, Kierkegaard, the consummate dialectician, might be 
Introduction 27
expected to feel an affinity with the “dialectical structure” of film, whereby 
“discontinuous images replace one another in a continuous sequence.”56 Sec-
ond, as “the first art form whose artistic character is entirely determined by 
its reproducibility,” film might seem— in its capacity not only to be “tech-
nologically reproducible”57 but to be replayed, rewatched or re- viewed, and 
hence experienced over and over— to bring about an experience akin to what 
Constantin Constantius unsuccessfully sought to achieve upon returning to 
Berlin to take up lodgings in his former quarters next to Gendarmenmarkt: 
repetition.
The natural affinity Green discerns between the film Incendies and the 
several Kierkegaardian texts he considers on hereditary sin might seem 
strengthened when we consider that repetition, that technical hallmark of 
cinema, is a category invoked in one of those texts, The Concept of Anxiety, 
whose pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, repeatedly draws upon Constan-
tin’s Repetition (see SKS 4:324fn.– 325, 340, 351, 393fn., 408, 415, 449fn., 
451fn. / CA 17fn.– 18, 34, 46, 90fn., 106, 113, 149fn., 151fn.). As it happens, 
the plot of Villeneuve’s film, like the plots of so many great movies, hinges 
not so much on repetition as on what Constantin and hence Vigilius construe 
as a category that complements repetition: recollection, a notion crucial to 
ancient Greek, and particularly Platonic, epistemology. “Repetition and rec-
ollection,” Constantin observes, “are the same movement, except in opposite 
directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas 
genuine repetition is recollected forward” (SKS 4:9  / R 131; compare SKS 
4:393, including 393fn.  / CA 89– 90, 90fn.). Even more to the point is yet 
another category crucial to the Greeks, and especially the exposition of trag-
edy by Aristotle in his Poetics. This other category, recognition (ἀναγνώρισις), 
is discussed by the pseudonym of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, Johannes 
de Silentio.
Although neither Johannes de Silentio nor Constantin nor Vigilius 
ever discusses all three of these terms together in relation to one another, 
recognition— which always presupposes and dispels some “prior hiddenness” 
(SKS 4:174 / FT 83)— clearly must precede both recollection and repetition 
inasmuch as each of the latter, in order actually to occur, would have to 
presuppose some form of recognition: that is, what remains “hidden” and 
is not first recognized can be neither meaningfully recollected nor mean-
ingfully repeated. The focus of Incendies switches back and forth between 
contemporary Montreal and an unnamed Western Asian country in the past, 
torn by interreligious warfare and savagery (presumably Lebanon during its 
civil war), as the film employs successive flashbacks— a cinematic form of 
recollection— to link scenes from the life of a now deceased Western Asian 
woman who had immigrated to Canada with the lives of her three offspring. 
Through a series of tragic recognitions, one of these offspring is revealed 
to have been unwittingly the torturer and rapist of his own mother and the 
father of her other two children, his siblings. In turn, these recognitions touch 
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upon what Green deems a fundamental point in the Kierkegaardian analysis 
of hereditary sin: “We must all ask to what extent, by accepting, affirming, 
and sexually reproducing our identities within warring families, ethnicities, 
and communities, we are complicit in the crimes of our ancestors.”
The fourth and last part of this volume comprises three essays that consider 
Kierkegaard in juxtaposition with several other creative figures in literature 
and the arts: the English poet and visual artist William Blake (1757– 1827) 
in “The Moravian Origins of Kierkegaard’s and Blake’s Socratic Literature,” 
by James Rovira; the German composer Arnold Schoenberg (1874– 1951) in 
“Don Giovanni and Moses and Aaron: The Possibility of a Kierkegaardian 
Affirmation of Music,” by Peder Jothen; and the contemporary American 
singer, songwriter, and 2016 Nobel laureate (for literature), Bob Dylan (b. 
1941) in “Kierkegaard, Dylan, and Masked and Anonymous Neighbor- 
Love,” by Jamie A. Lorentzen. Kierkegaard, as I have elsewhere discussed,58 
disparaged the act of comparison (Sammenligning) as dangerous and mis-
guided, arguing that it distracts the individual from focusing on eternal truth. 
The overriding assumption of each of these three essays, however, is that 
thoughtful comparison, equally attentive to similarities and differences, and 
with “a clear articulation of purpose,”59 can enhance our understanding of 
both figures (and their works) under consideration.
Regarding Kierkegaard’s relation to Blake, Schoenberg, and Dylan, the 
three essays acknowledge that Blake, who died when Kierkegaard was four-
teen, could not have known of him; that there is, by the same token, no 
evidence that Kierkegaard knew of or was influenced by Blake, though it is 
not impossible that he encountered some of his poetry in German transla-
tion; and that there is no reason to suspect that Schoenberg, who was born 
almost twenty years after Kierkegaard’s death, or Dylan, was influenced by 
Kierkegaard, or even that either of them read him. So what is the purpose 
of these three comparisons by Rovira, Jothen, and Lorentzen? For Rovira, 
Kierkegaard and Blake, despite their obvious national, vocational, and other 
differences, “are mutually illuminating figures not only because they simi-
larly appropriated Socratic thought but also because their works respond 
to very similar, and mutually influential, cultural milieux.” In both cases, an 
upbringing by Moravian parents had the probable consequence that Blake 
and Kierkegaard were influenced in their views of Socrates by that found-
ing Moravian figure and self- styled Socratic figure Count Nikolaus Ludwig 
von Zinzendorf and as a result regarded Socrates with “some ambivalence.” 
Because the “literary qualities” of Kierkegaard stem from the Socratic nature 
of his philosophical enterprise, which “favors dialogic contemplation of sig-
nificant questions over the systematic, discursive presentation of conceptual 
truths,” Rovira contends that a comparison of him and Blake in their engage-
ments with Socrates can shed light on Kierkegaard’s literary qualities.
Jothen, too, is concerned with a particular ambivalence in Kierkegaard, 
but with regard to music rather than to Socrates. Arguing that Kierkegaard’s 
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musical aesthetic has less to do with music itself than with the formative 
role music plays in relation to desire, thought, and the form of one’s life, 
particularly in the aesthetic stage, Jothen does two things. First, he shows 
that whereas music serves for Either/Or’s “A” to disclose sensuous, abstract 
immediacy rather than clear, comprehensible truth to the listener, Kier ke-
gaard himself elsewhere suggests that music, especially gospel- related hymns, 
can valuably serve to guide the listener to cultivating a self- consciousness 
shaped by Christian truth. Then, pursuing the implications of this ambiv-
alence, Jothen uses his comparison of Schoenberg’s Moses and Aaron and 
Mozart’s Don Giovanni to demonstrate that the atonal, de- sensualizing 
subversion by Schoenberg’s opera of the harmonic tradition epitomized by 
Mozart’s opera, which so allured “A,” exposes both the limitations of “A’s” 
conception of music (as did the analysis of it in Petersen’s essay) and the pos-
sibility of regarding music as an aid to Christian self- cultivation.
This last point is especially suggestive when considered in relation 
to Bob Dylan, for whom music, and songs in particular, are not so much 
aids to religious self- cultivation as constitutive of a kind of religion itself. 
In a statement quoted by Lorentzen, Dylan denies heeding rabbis, preach-
ers, evangelists, or any other religious clerical figures. Instead, he declares 
“songs” to be his “religion,” his “lexicon,” and the objects of his belief, as 
he finds “the religiosity and philosophy” exclusively “in the music.” Lorent-
zen’s comparison of Kierkegaard with Dylan is therefore a fitting subject on 
which to close this volume. For Dylan’s equation of religion with songs, a 
medium that fuses word and music, offers a possible resolution to the hier-
archizing by Kierkegaard’s “A” of poetry over music and the other arts— a 
hierarchizing done under the influence not only of the Lutheran axiom sola 
scriptura, as Jothen points out, but also of Lessing’s Laocoon, as touched 
upon by Linnet. “A’s” suggestion is that art grows more perfect the more 
it grows free of space and turns to time, transitioning from sculpture to 
painting, as Lessing already indicated; then to music, whose element is time, 
but which exists only in the moment; and ultimately to poetry, “the high-
est of all the arts and therefore also the art that best knows how to affirm 
the meaning of time” (SKS 3:135  / EO 2:136).60 That the composer and 
singer of “The Times They Are a- Changin’ ” suggests otherwise is all the 
more provocative in view of Lorentzen’s observation that one of the affini-
ties shared by Kierkegaard and Dylan lies in Kierkegaard’s deeply informed, 
long- standing fascination with the medieval troubadour tradition and 
Dylan’s musical- ethical ambition “to serve as a performing artist qua modern 
troubadour.”
Considered together, the essays by Green and Lorentzen point to a tension, 
if not ultimately an impasse, in Kierkegaard’s thinking when considered in 
the light of Incendies and Dylan’s songs. With Dylan, as Lorentzen points 
out, Kierkegaard shares the sense that becoming fully human requires loving 
the neighbor and the development of the “self- as- relational phenomenon.” 
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As Judge William tells “A,” “You are a nonentity and are something only 
in relation to others, and what you are you are only through this relation” 
(SKS 2:157  / EO 2:159). Yet, as Green demonstrates through the lens of 
Incendies, Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms also expose the formidable if not 
fatal impediment posed to neighbor- love by the perpetuation and accentua-
tion of human sin through human sexuality and procreation. It is perhaps 
this conceptual tension or impasse in Kierkegaard that makes contemplating 
his relation to literature and the arts so fascinating and yet challenging. For 
surely no other thinker casts the stage of existence epitomized by Johannes 
the Seducer in so seductive a light, revealing its ultimate rootedness in the 
inherently erotic, sexual disposition of the human being, while at the same 
time indirectly cautioning against the fatal danger of what Bakhtin termed— 
arguably under Kierkegaard’s influence— the “temptation of aestheticism.”61 
If this notion of temptation seems to hark back to the biblical myth of the 
Fall, despite the definitive lack of a sense of guilt consciousness in the aes-
thetic stage, it is not surprising that, as Tatiana Shchyttsova has suggested, 
Bakhtin should have followed Kierkegaard in associating the preference for 
the aesthetic mode of existence with sin, or in Bakhtin’s words, with “a fall (a 
lapse into sin) that is immanent to being.”62 Though not an overriding theme 
of this volume, this implicit association of the aesthetic with sin in Kier ke-
gaard’s thinking perhaps lies somewhat in the background of the following 
essays on Kierkegaard, literature, and the arts.
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The Bonfire of the Genres
Kierkegaard’s Literary Kaleidoscope
George Pattison
In reflecting on Kierkegaard’s relation to literature and the arts, two tasks 
immediately present themselves. The first is to see how he himself related to 
the literature and other arts of his own time as reader or recipient. The second 
is to see how he then contributed to his cultural world, specifically as a writer. 
It is to these two tasks that this essay offers a preliminary contribution.
That Kierkegaard might be read in the perspective of literature and the 
arts is no new discovery. An early reviewer of Either/Or commented that its 
message would be clear to those “who have followed the many branchings of 
modern literature, not so much in the realm of pure academic study, but in the 
sphere of belles- lettres,” while another compared it (favorably) with the nov-
els of Edward Bulwer- Lytton and Eugène Sue.1 Subsequent commentators in 
the Danish and German traditions have always been well placed to recognize 
that many of the questions addressed in various of Kierkegaard’s writings 
were precisely the kinds of questions that constituted the core agendas of 
Romanticism and literary modernism in their own traditions, and it was 
no accident that the first significant monograph on Kierkegaard, Brandes’s 
1877 “Critical Presentation,” was the work of a literary critic rather than 
of a philosopher or theologian.2 In English, too, the earliest articles about 
Kierkegaard situated him in relation to literary modernism, primarily Ibsen 
and Nietzsche, but with references also to Flaubert, Renan, Carlyle, Emerson, 
Dostoevsky, and Wagner.3 This last name reminds us of the importance of 
music to Kierkegaard, evidenced not least by the essay in Either/Or on Don 
Giovanni, which, recent research has shown, was curiously influenced by 
none other than Richard Wagner!4 Subsequently, Kierkegaard has not only 
been compared with one or another literary figure or claimed for one or 
another literary movement but has himself entered into the symbolic world 
of several major modern novelists, including Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann. 
(In the latter’s Doctor Faustus, it is while the composer Adrian Leverkühn 
is reading Kierkegaard’s essay on Don Giovanni that Mephistopheles first 
appears, and Kierkegaardian themes of angst and the demonic permeate the 
novel.) Several major poets too have been receptive to a certain Kierkegaard-
ian influence, notably W. H. Auden and R. S. Thomas.5
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Kierkegaard’s Response to the Arts of Denmark’s Golden Age
Turning to Kierkegaard himself, what gradually become more and more 
apparent are the sheer scale and variety of his engagement with literature and 
the arts. The early studies on Faust, Don Juan, the Wandering Jew, and folk 
literature are well known, but the same journals also witness extensive notes 
on the poetry of the troubadours6— among the longest reading notes any-
where in the journals. He also offers an extensive essay on how to tell stories 
to children (SKS 17:122– 33, BB:37, n.d. 1837  / KJN 1:116– 25). Although 
there are few significant discussions of contemporary Danish poetry, notes 
suggest he took a keen interest in this and was especially admiring of Chris-
tian Winther (SKS 20:34, NB32, n.d. 1846  / JP 5:5909).7 Eric Ziolkowski 
has recently drawn attention to the importance of Aristophanes— an enthusi-
asm Kierkegaard shared with Early Romanticism8— while Thomas Miles has 
written of Horace as “one of the earliest and longest lasting of Kier ke gaard’s 
influences.”9 Kierkegaard’s first publication was essentially a review of a 
novel by Hans Christian Andersen (SKS 1:15–57 / FPOSL 61–102), while 
another contemporary Danish novelist, Madame Thomasine Gyllembourg, 
was the focus for the review known by the title of the novel in question, Two 
Ages (To Tidsaldre, 1845). There are also notes for a review of one of Scan-
dinavia’s first feminist novels, Clara Raphael10 (SKS 24:136– 38, NB22:63, 
n.d. 1850  / KJN 8:133– 34). Drama, too, was central to his writing about 
literature. As well as the essay on Scribe’s The First Love in Either/Or and 
the justly celebrated eulogy of Mme Heiberg’s stagecraft (SKS 14: 93– 107 / 
CCLA 301– 25), the journals contain a more or less complete celebration of 
another contemporary giant of the Danish stage, J. L. Phister, in the comic 
role of Captain Scipio, a tipsy Vatican police captain (SKS 16:125– 43 / “PCS” 
327– 44). Published and unpublished works also contain a vast number of 
brief allusions, full- blown references, and occasional extensive discussions of 
plays and playwrights. The great Danish playwright Ludvig Holberg is among 
the most cited of all Kierkegaard’s sources, and such contemporaries as Johan 
Ludvig Heiberg are also frequently mentioned.11 Sophocles and Shakespeare 
provide occasions for extensive reflections on the nature of tragedy, as well 
as images and scenarios with which to explore psychological traumas that 
may have been Kierkegaard’s own.12 In a quite different register, the farces 
of the Austrian writer Johann Nestroy provide the pseudonym Constantin 
Constantius with an opportunity to test whether repetition is possible (SKS 
4:29– 43  / R 154– 69). The essay on Don Giovanni has already been men-
tioned, but Kierkegaard published a further short review of a contemporary 
performance of the opera, and there are passing references to, for example, 
guitar playing and ballet.
It is only in the case of the visual arts that Kierkegaard seems to have been 
lacking an all- around and in- depth familiarity with classic and contemporary 
material. When pictures do enter his work, they are not, for the most part, 
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examples of great art. We might think of the use of the trick picture of Napo-
leon’s grave in The Concept of Irony (SKS 1:80– 81 / CI 19; see SKS K1:169 
for illustration) or the reference to a copperplate print of sea- maidens (i.e., 
waves that seem to take the shape of female figures) in the essay on Don 
Giovanni (SKS 2:97 / EO 1:92; see SKS K2:129 for illustration). Of course, 
the Church of Our Lady, where he regularly worshipped and occasionally 
spoke, housed a collection of statues of the apostles by Europe’s greatest 
living sculptor, Bertel Thorvaldsen, but although many passages of his later 
religious writings seem unmistakably to allude to the all- dominating statue of 
Christ, this is never commented on with regard to its artistic quality.13 Here, 
however, we should be mindful of André Malraux’s caution that, until the 
advent of quality color reproductions in the mid- nineteenth century and of 
easier travel access to the great sites and museums of Western art, even the 
most influential critics and theorists were, by our contemporary standards, 
familiar with only a few great works or with black- and- white reproduc-
tions.14 Had Kierkegaard, like many of his artist contemporaries, traveled to 
Italy, we might have had some very different visual records from his pen.15 
His keen observation of scenes from daily life, his ability to conjure forth 
word pictures, and the extraordinary plasticity of his style in both aesthetic 
and religious works are well known, while notes from 1846 offer a remark-
able meditation on the nature of color (SKS 27:369, Papir 344:3 / JP 3:2844). 
It is therefore clear that he was not lacking in visual intelligence, only that, 
in this case, he did not find a corresponding range of artistic works through 
which to develop, express, and interpret what and how he saw.
It is very tempting to scholars to see Kierkegaard’s relation to literature 
primarily in terms of reading, and the roll call of writers whom he read is 
impressive. He cites Holberg, Goethe, Shakespeare, and other great drama-
tists at will. But we must also remember that he was an avid theatergoer. 
When, as he describes in The Point of View, he let himself be seen nightly 
at the theater so as to give the impression that he was nothing but a flâneur 
and lounger, the ruse could work only in a context in which he was known 
to be a regular member of the audience at Copenhagen’s Royal Theater, and 
it is in relation to performances at this theater that the review of The First 
Love, the note on the seduction of Zerlina, the commentary on Madame 
Heiberg’s stagecraft, and the portrayal of Captain Scipio by Herr Phister 
were all written. This theater therefore deserves special mention in relation 
to Kierkegaard’s experience of literature and the arts.16 By modern standards, 
it staged an extraordinary range of productions. In the 1831 season, from 
September 1 to May 31, there were approximately one hundred different 
productions, from across the whole range of theatrical genres, including both 
works by “the greats” and contemporary light entertainments. Performances 
were held on Sundays and public holidays, with rest days only on Christmas 
Day, Easter, and Whit Sunday. A Copenhagen resident such as Kierkegaard 
could therefore soon build up a rather rich stock of theatrical experiences.17
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As in the case of the visual arts, theater, too, was in a golden age. Frederikke 
Bremer, a Swedish novelist who visited Copenhagen in the late 1840s (but was 
rebuffed by Kierkegaard when she proposed calling on him; see SKS 28:467– 
69, Brev 308– 10 / LD 286– 88, letters 201, 203– 4), wrote of Danish theater:
It is the Danes’ most favored form of enjoyment. And, in truth, here 
we find fresh life: there is life in what is put on, life in the acting, life 
in the audience’s participation. It is only small, this theater, where so 
many great plays have been played and so many artists have trodden 
the boards in recent times, but how friendly, how lively it is! There is 
life in these boxes full of people, and the public involuntarily reveals 
its involvement by a rapid buzz and a sympathetic movement. And 
there we see the front stalls, where the poets sit, where people can see 
their favorites, where Thorvaldsen died while listening to a Beethoven 
symphony and where, each evening still, people whisper to each other 
“Look! There’s Øhlenslæger, Hertz, Hauch, Andersen . . .” etc.
“Not just for pleasure” is written above the entrance to Copen-
hagen’s Temple of Thalia. And those who have seen Øhlenslæger’s 
tragedies, the comedies of Holberg, Hertz, and Overskou, who have 
seen them played by Nielsen and his wife, Rosenkilde, and his daugh-
ter, Phister, the young Wiehe, and the enchanting Mme Heiberg, the 
pearl of the Danish stage (talents that are rare in any land), those 
who have seen Bournonville’s ballets, consummate works of art of 
their kind— they will have to acknowledge that the moral spirit of 
the North has ennobled the magical powers of the stage and that here 
the theater is indeed “not just for pleasure.” We do not merely enjoy 
ourselves here, we become better while we enjoy ourselves, and the 
mind is raised to a noble longing for higher, more noble dramas than 
those of everyday life, to intimations of what human glory is, both in 
its greatest sufferings as well as in its greatest pleasures.18
In a work of exceptional scholarly microscopy, Peter Tudvad has tracked 
possible references in Kierkegaard’s writing to live theater by working 
through the performance schedules of the Theater Royal for the period of 
Kierkegaard’s possible theatergoing life.19 There is some uncertainty as to 
when this began. Children under ten were not allowed in the Danish theater 
until 1849, and Tudvad consequently guesses that Kierkegaard, having been 
born in 1813 (and coming from a rather conservative family), is unlikely 
to have started attending the theater until the late 1820s, which, as Tud-
vad suggests, makes it just possible for him to have seen Mme Heiberg’s 
reputation- making performance as Juliet in the 1828– 29 season (when he 
would have been fifteen or sixteen years old). The first clear reference to a 
contemporary performance is from September 1834— among the earliest of 
all Kierkegaard’s journal notes— to a comedy by Scribe, Fra Diavolo.
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In a small but significant way, Tudvad’s work changes or at least shifts 
our view of Kierkegaard’s own creative writing process. To take one example 
among many: a journal note from November 1834 contains references to 
yet another play by Scribe,20 to Goethe’s Egmont, and to a comedy by Hol-
berg. It might seem natural to assume that these references were based on 
Kierkegaard’s private reading, but since Tudvad shows that these were all 
performed at the Theater Royal earlier in the year, Kierkegaard is as likely as 
not drawing on his memories of live theatrical performances. In other words, 
Kierkegaard is not just sitting at home or in the library reading books: he is 
out there in the theater and writing not just on what he has read but on what 
he has seen and heard. Even in Berlin, it is actual performances that are the 
focus of his interest in theater.21 And while notes on Hegel’s Aesthetics and 
on a German translation of Antigone from his first Berlin visit indicate the 
seeds of the essay on ancient and modern tragedy that would be included in 
Either/Or (SKS 2:137– 62 / EO1:137– 64), it is probably not coincidental that 
a much- publicized production of Antigone, with music by Mendelssohn and 
the translation used by Kierkegaard in his notes (SKS 19:286– 87, Notesbog 
10:2– 4 / KJN 3:282– 83), was staged at Potsdam in the days after his arrival. 
As in the case of the visual arts, we therefore need to take the material con-
text of Kierkegaard’s relation to literature and the arts rather more seriously 
than earlier scholarship has done. Further testimony of a rather different 
kind to the kinship between Kierkegaard and the theater is the fact that he 
was even represented as a character, the theology student Søren Kirk (later 
changed to Søren Torp), in the musical comedy The Neighbors (Gjenboerne) 
by J. C. Hostrup, first performed in 1844 in Copenhagen’s Court Theater and 
later going on tour to Norway, where, in December 1847, it was greeted with 
“rapturous applause,” one Mr. Smith playing the Kierkegaard character (SKS 
K27:776– 77).
In this bourgeois age that is “post- Romantic” in the specific sense of hav-
ing been permeated through and through by the Romantics’ valorization 
of art as a, if not the, central mode of human beings’ self- experience and 
self- understanding, the world of the arts is not just a matter of intellectual 
inquiry but is, effectively, the living body of both individual and social self- 
representation. When Kierkegaard describes his age as “aesthetic,” he is not 
just alluding to the proliferation of dreamy poetic types (such as his own 
“A”) but pointing to the most immediate testimony to how the age and its 
people feel about themselves or to who and how they experience themselves 
as being. It is not just about a professed faith in beauty, truth, and goodness 
(which was often lacking) or the “aesthetic” values of later nineteenth- 
century aesthetes, but— as idealist theory in fact emphasized— the immediate 
and spontaneous self- expression of lived life. Or, to look at it from a different 
theoretical angle, the aesthetic provided a symbolic order or semiosphere that 
could be collectively and individually appropriated and enacted as showing 
how life in this emergent modern world felt.
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It is for this reason— not in the sense of some carefully calculated program, 
but as the “reason” in his own intuitive relation to his age— that Kier ke-
gaard’s own writing about literature and the arts engages as often with what 
posterity has judged to be ephemeral and minor as with the great. Of course, 
there are discussions of Aristophanes, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Lessing, 
Mozart, and Goethe as well as of the great figures of Romantic literature. 
But Kierkegaard is just as ready to write about light comedies by contem-
porary writers such as Scribe and Vernoy de St. Georges (author of Ludovic, 
in which the character of Captain Scipio appears), popular women’s novels 
(Two Ages), and commonplace book illustrations as he is capable of analyz-
ing and extolling “classic” works. Even the humble art of the street musician 
was not outside his range of interest (SKS 2:39  / EO 1:30).22 And, as his 
writings about theater show, he was also fascinated by the phenomenon of 
live performance, which, in an age before film and sound reproduction,23 was 
by definition an ephemeral art that could live on only in the memories and 
memoirs of those who had, as it is said, “been there.”24
Kierkegaard’s reception of literature and art, then, was marked by an 
openness to a more than usual range of sources, genres, and styles, and he 
was no less willing to engage what we might regard as low art than the 
kind of “fine art” that was the subject of, for example, Hegel’s lectures on 
aesthetics. Like Hegel, however, Kierkegaard seems to have subscribed to 
an “end of art” thesis, in the sense that, to use Hegel’s words, “the peculiar 
nature  .  .  . of works of art no longer fills our highest need,”25 a develop-
ment indicated by the fact that, as in ancient Athens, art had abandoned 
the task of representing gods and heroes and turned instead to depictions 
of everyday social reality. Indeed, this was precisely one of the aims of J. L. 
Heiberg’s promotion of contemporary musical comedies (or “vaudevilles,” 
as Heiberg called them) instead of the historical costume dramas favored 
by the previous Romantic generation.26 Kierkegaard himself would say that 
the task of a modern religious writer was to show what the Christian life 
would look like if lived today, on any weekday, “on Amagertorv [Amager 
Square]” (SKS 12:72 / PC 59), a conception that correlates closely with his 
receptiveness to the whole range of literary and artistic forms in which the 
ongoing self- interpretation of “the present age” took shape. I have elsewhere 
written of the carnivalesque aspect of Kierkegaard’s authorship, and that is 
relevant here too.27 For what is at issue is precisely, as Kierkegaard complains 
in Two Ages, that the present age lacks any single defining form or great idea 
and is in the process of disintegrating into an ever- increasing multiplicity of 
diverse and disconnected forms, ideas, and values.28 Consequently, the only 
adequate representation of the age will have to be a kind of moving kaleido-
scope of works, styles, and genres, which is also to say that there is no single 
adequate representation of the age and that its manifold self- representations 
are therefore always on the edge of falling away into incoherence. Mikhail 
Bakhtin, writing in a distinctively post- Hegelian idiom, saw the emergence of 
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the modern, nineteenth- century novel as the most faithful means available of 
representing such an age to itself, precisely because the extreme flexibility of 
the novel allows it to incorporate a whole range of genres and even carnival 
elements, as well as to become a forum for the political, sexual, and theologi-
cal debates in which the nineteenth century struggles to find and articulate its 
own identity. The novel does not merely represent life but becomes a player 
in life, attacking, shifting, and remaking opinions and sensibilities.
What Bakhtin sees occurring in the novel applies fairly directly to Kierke-
gaard. Again, the early reviews of Either/Or were alert to just this “engaged” 
aspect of the book, comparing and contrasting it with works by Young Ger-
many that promoted sexual liberation, political radicalism, and emancipation 
from established religion. Either/Or did not just set up opposing life views 
in order to adjudicate between them on their philosophical merits; it offered 
a set of choices about personal, cultural, and religious values that related to 
the life situation of its likely readers. And, of course, few books have been 
as genre- busting as this debut work, bested only by the succession of other 
extraordinary pseudonymous works, journalism, and religious writings that 
followed.
Kierkegaard as Writer
I have been considering Kierkegaard’s relation to his own sources and how he 
absorbed the hugely varied range of cultural forms in which his age not only 
sought to express its identity but, simply, sought its identity, preeminently in 
literature, theater, and music. But I have already made a start on the second 
task of this essay, namely, to see how what Kierkegaard himself wrote might 
be regarded as a contribution to the world of literature and the arts.
Here, we immediately note a significant narrowing of the field. It is true 
that, as a writer, Kierkegaard worked in an exceptionally carnivalesque mul-
tiplicity of styles and genres, and I shall be exploring further how this is 
manifested in the works collected under his name. But where I have been 
emphasizing how his reception of literature and the arts was not just a mat-
ter of reading but of going to the theater and experiencing live drama, opera, 
music, and ballet, and, perhaps, albeit in a much lesser degree, of looking 
at paintings and book illustrations, Kierkegaard himself never acted or 
performed ballet and he did not play the piano or guitar, while his artistic 
skill seems to have been limited to some rather primitive caricatures in the 
margins of the journals. Even within literature, his writing falls within the 
admittedly broad parameters of conventional prose. Appreciative of poetry 
as he is, he never writes and seems never to have attempted to write poetry, 
although his writing is often intensely poetic, rising to moments of intense 
lyrical concentration.29 As a student he wrote a draft for an Aristophanic 
spoof on contemporary speculative philosophy, “The Conflict between the 
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Old and New Soap- Cellar” (SKS 17:280– 97, DD:208, n.d. 1837  / KJN 
1:272– 89), which, despite being treated rather disdainfully by many com-
mentators, does show some potential for comic dramatic writing, although 
this is never further developed. At various points in the journals he writes 
short dialogues, including the famous encounter between Socrates and Hegel 
in the underworld (SKS 27:323, Papir 315:1– 3 / JP 3:3306, n.d. 1845). He 
writes up the public response to his encounter with The Corsair in a short 
dramatic scene (SKS 27:376– 77, Papir 347, n.d. 1846),30 and in a scene run-
ning to several pages he lampoons a priest who, despite being employed by a 
Temperance Society, is partial to a schnapps or two— or, in fact, three or four 
(SKS 27:465– 68, Papir 391, n.d. 1849 / JP 3:3138). However, after “Soap- 
Cellar” he never attempted a full- blown work in this genre.
Yet if the prose literature that Kierkegaard himself produced represents 
a certain narrowing in relation to all that fed into his creative process, this 
still leaves him with an unusually broad range of literary possibilities. Sev-
eral times I have mentioned his work of literary and dramatic criticism, of 
which the review articles on Andersen’s novel Only a Fiddler, The First Love, 
Mme Gyllembourg’s Two Ages, and the eulogies of Mme Heiberg and Herr 
Phister are the best- known. Although several of these stretch the limits of 
the genre in terms of content (Heiberg, translator and director of The First 
Love, thought Kierkegaard’s praise was entirely out of proportion) and size 
(both the Andersen and the Gyllembourg review had been intended as arti-
cles, not free- standing books), they are, nevertheless, recognizable for what 
they are. Similarly, the upbuilding discourses, though generally much longer 
than the published sermons that were a major part of nineteenth- century 
religious literature, were accessible to early readers, and no less an author-
ity than Bishop Mynster refused to accept Kierkegaard’s disclaimer that 
they were not sermons.31 As a thesis submitted for the degree of Master of 
Philosophy, The Concept of Irony was constrained by the requirements of 
academic discourse, even though there are clear signs of how awkward this 
was for Kierkegaard, as he himself seems to concede in craving the reader’s 
indulgence in his eulogy of Plato (SKS 1:89 / CI 27– 28), while the panel of 
examiners was not slow to censure his tendency, as the classicist J. N. Mad-
vig put it, to “a self- indulgent search for what is piquant and witty” that can 
sometimes end up in “simple tastelessness” (SKS K1:134). The Concept of 
Anxiety comes close to the form of an academic treatise, and there is some 
evidence for the view that Kierkegaard had originally planned to publish it 
under his own name (SKS K4:323). Here too, however, the work as written, 
though drawing on contemporary works of psychology, veers away from 
academic rigor.
Nevertheless, even if several works are closely affiliated with one or another 
recognizable genre, Either/Or and subsequent works proved bewildering to 
many readers. To be sure, Either/Or itself was, as we have seen, perceived as 
belonging to an influential stream of contemporary literature. It had many 
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of the features of the contemporary Bildungsroman, or novel of formation,32 
even if it lacked a clear narrative structure and resolution. From Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister (generally regarded at the time as the paradigmatic work of 
the genre) through works like Tieck’s Kater Murr or Jean Paul’s humorous 
novels, it had become acceptable, if not universal, for novels to incorporate 
other genres, including criticism, poetry, and, in the case of later versions 
of Wilhelm Meister, scientific treatises. Remoter models from the eighteenth 
century, notably Swift and Hamann, also provided points of orientation for 
bemused readers. What was overwhelming in Kierkegaard’s case was the 
sheer multitude of kinds of writing and the scale of it all— “monstrous,” 
as J. L. Heiberg observed of Either/Or.33 Individual elements were familiar 
enough. Kierkegaard borrowed freely from the repertoire of mysteriously dis-
covered or misappropriated manuscripts (Either/Or, Stages on Life’s Way), 
the epistolary novella (Either/Or, part 2 of Repetition), and the diary (“The 
Seducer’s Diary,” Stages on Life’s Way), and Either/Or famously concludes 
with a sermon.34 “The Seducer’s Diary” and Quidam’s Diary do tell a story, 
and the latter also incorporates an urban “Gothic tale” anticipating Baude-
laire’s Parisian prose poems. Philosophical Fragments has a five- act structure 
borrowed from the theater, complete with interlude, but while some inspira-
tion from Plato35 and even Descartes may be discernible, it is “philosophy in a 
new key” (to borrow Suzanne Langer’s phrase)36 if it is philosophy at all. The 
same could be said with perhaps even greater force of the Concluding Unsci-
entific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. Here, Kierkegaard inserts 
both reflections on how philosophical writing might benefit from including 
humorous or other nonscholarly elements, referring to his own teacher Poul 
Martin Møller’s treatise on immortality and providing plentiful illustration 
as to how this might be done in the Postscript itself (which also includes a 
lengthy survey and discussion of all his own pseudonymous and signed writ-
ings from 1843 onward). And how might one even begin to classify Fear and 
Trembling?
Kierkegaard could, it seems, write in many different genres and many dif-
ferent styles, and often did so in the compass of a single book. But this also 
points to another feature of his literary persona: a penchant for satire and 
pastiche. I have already referred to the student satire “The Conflict between 
the Old and New Soap- Cellar,” and later work such as Prefaces and the 
incomplete Writing Sampler are explicitly parodic, spoofing different aspects 
of contemporary literary culture. Either/Or’s aesthete, of course, ended his 
Diapsalmata with the plea that he might always have laughter on his side 
(SKS 2:52 / EO 1:43), although, apart from the essay on boredom, Either/
Or as a whole is one of his least funny books. Johannes Climacus is certainly 
witty and has a surer and lighter touch than “A.” Satire— including, as it is 
wont to include, satirical misrepresentation— is a key weapon in his battle 
against what he sees as the comically self- forgetful fantasies of speculative 
thought.37 So pervasive is this satirical tone that some have seen what others 
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regard as Kierkegaard’s most rigorously Hegelian work, The Sickness unto 
Death, as a spoof.38 One might say that, irony being irony, this is as things 
should be, although one might also claim that, on the whole, we know irony 
when we see it— at least in literature. (Life, being a bit more fast- moving, 
can make it more difficult to spot: “I found your essay interesting,” says the 
professor, and the student goes away smiling.)
But Kierkegaard’s virtuosity in writing in multiple styles and genres brings 
with it what for some is the disturbing question of whether or how far we 
are to take “seriously” any of the pseudonymous works. “Seriousness” is, of 
course, urged not only by Assessor Vilhelm (Judge William) and Vigilius Hauf-
niensis but also by Kierkegaard himself, as in the discourse “At a Graveside” 
(SKS 5:442–69 / TDIO 69–102), often taken as anticipating if not inaugurat-
ing the “seriousness” of twentieth- century existential philosophy’s pursuit of 
authenticity.39 Is Kierkegaard just having fun at our expense, or does he mean 
it? And if he means it, which bits of it does he mean? All? Much? Some? A 
little? Would it, for example, be right to partition the works according to 
whether they are “aesthetic” or “religious,” assigning the aesthetic works to 
humor and irony and the religious and Christian to seriousness? But that 
does not seem quite right either, since, even as a Christian writer, Kierke-
gaard writes as one “without authority” and practices a kind of self- effacing 
Socratic irony aimed at keeping the reader’s own spiritual needs at the center 
of the process. Even the final attack on the Church, what some might see as 
the “most direct” piece of communication in Kierkegaard’s entire authorship, 
marks a powerful return to the satirical mode, as well as a condensing of the 
voluminous prolixity of much earlier work into the “short and sharp” focus 
of the polemical pamphlet.40
I suggest that the first half of this essay has some implications for how 
we might consider such questions. The exuberant and often excessive car-
nivalesque play of genres and styles that is constitutive of Kierkegaard’s 
authorship is not just a sign of its author’s quirkiness, though it may be that 
as well. It is also a sign of how he experienced the culture of his present age 
in its aesthetic self- manifestation, a manifestation that was postaesthetic in 
Hegel’s sense of having passed from the sphere of the beautiful and ideal 
into the prose of everyday life. As such it was also a culture in which the 
clear contours of classical forms were chronically unable to hold the creative 
and destructive forces of the age in check, with the result that often— and I 
am continuing to speak of Kierkegaard’s experience— it seemed on the edge 
of falling away from the kind of moral seriousness that could still inform 
Mme Gyllembourg’s Tales of Everyday Life into the meaningless “chatter” 
that he saw as more characteristic of his own generation, a process carefully 
analyzed in his review of her Two Ages. Carnival collapses into chaos, and 
chaos into formlessness— and formlessness means a kind of proneness to any 
new form- giving power no matter how arbitrary or violent, a will to power, 
for example. The aesthete’s invocation of a blind vortex as the ground of 
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cosmogenesis (SKS 2:166 / EO 1:168) plays out in the violence of the Seducer 
and, in Kierkegaard’s view, the revolutionary politics of 1848.
The Point of View signals Kierkegaard’s intention to meet his age on its 
own ground, “the aesthetic.” And this seems broadly to make sense both of 
the work itself and of how it was perceived by contemporaries, even if there 
is much to question regarding the “directness” of this work. Yet, parodying 
his time’s wastage of inherited literary forms, Kierkegaard also constantly 
risks collapsing into “chatter,” into endless and pointless verbiage. As is often 
the case, the satirist and those he satirizes are interdependent, and Kierke-
gaard sometimes seems too close to what he attacks. This is not only in the 
sense that his portrayals of the aesthetic life have often been more appealing 
to many readers than the admonitions of Assessor Vilhelm, but also because, 
as he often complains of his contemporaries, he too does not always seem 
to know when to stop.41 Some readers, at least, have found it so.42 But then 
again, what is a serious authorship that does not take any risks? Kierkegaard 
had to go into the literary equivalent of the “human swarm” if he was to 
speak to those within it. Loss of form was then the risk he had to take.
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Everydayness
These comments invite a concluding reflection on one of the most significant 
twentieth- century responses to Kierkegaard, namely, the philosophy of exis-
tence of Heidegger. For many twentieth- century readers, Heidegger was to be 
understood as having rendered Kierkegaard’s carnivalesque and sometimes 
chaotic engagement with his age into the somber prose of phenomenologi-
cal philosophy, using Kierkegaardian insights in order to reopen the ancient 
metaphysical question as to the meaning of Being. As Heidegger portrays 
the situation, modern human beings are congenitally incapable of attend-
ing to this question, which would require them to cease fleeing from the 
acknowledgment of their own mortality and anxiously and resolutely to “run 
toward” death, accepting their ineluctable temporality. There is undoubtedly 
much Kierkegaard in this, both pseudonymous and “edifying.”43 And pre-
cisely by starting with average everydayness rather than (like Plato) with 
the philosopher or (like Nietzsche) with the artist, Heidegger repeats Kierke-
gaard’s Socratic willingness to plunge into the human swarm. Yet, in the end, 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard prove to be authors of two very different kinds. 
Heidegger turns away from the concrete issues of how people are to commit 
to specific life options in order to meditate on the basic relationship between 
Being and beings. Kierkegaard, however, no less critical than Heidegger of 
the inauthenticity of the average everydayness of his own time, accepted that 
this— “Amager Square”— was where the decision for or against Christ had to 
be worked through. Consequently, Heidegger writes in the rigorous “scien-
tific” (wissenschaftlich) style of fundamental phenomenology. Kierkegaard’s 
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strategy, I am suggesting, was virtually the opposite. Instead of wresting a 
contrary interpretation of existence from the chatter of the age, he expends 
all the lavish wealth of his literary talent on plunging into that same chatter 
so as to engage those incapable of philosophy, “the common man” whom he 
claimed as his intended reader. Literature is sometimes said to hold a mirror 
to its time, but Kierkegaard held a kaleidoscope to a kaleidoscopic time. His 
gamble was that his efforts would be kept from falling into formlessness by 
the “great, uplifting, simple, elementary thoughts” that he sought to keep in 
constant view and that, he hoped, his contemporaries and, no less impor-
tantly, posterity44 would also see— at first in their fragmentary reflection in 
the literary kaleidoscope, but then more and more clearly in their own con-
tinuing rediscovery of “the glory of being human.”45
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Kierkegaard’s Disruptions of 
Literature and Philosophy
Freedom, Anxiety, and Existential Contributions
Edward F. Mooney
I will address Kierkegaard’s anomalous relations to literature and to philoso-
phy. In addition, I consider Kierkegaard’s relations, as a Socratic philosopher, 
both to his community and to specific individuals, the readers whom he 
meets one by one and challenges to effect an existential resolution, given the 
impersonal drift of their lives. It is not easy to disentangle these matters of 
literature, philosophy, and existential challenge. Each knits into the others. As 
a literary figure and as a philosopher, Kierkegaard disrupts the conventions 
of literature and philosophy, and as a person he enacts a kind of disordered, 
anomalous, hybrid status for himself. He becomes, simultaneously, a liter-
ary philosopher (or philosophical littérateur) and a cultural and existential 
provocateur.
Kierkegaard is precariously poised in Copenhagen in the way that Socrates 
is precariously poised in Athens: obeying the law, yet, through interrogations, 
challenging the law; a good citizen, yet not a good citizen. Socrates models a 
kind of existential heroism. He resolves the issue of who he will be in Athens, 
an issue with no conventional answer. This prods his admirers to resolve who 
they shall be. The full title of Kierkegaard’s Postscript crescendos toward an 
enigmatic finale: the tome, we read, makes “an Existential Contribution.” 
The contribution is to awaken me to the urgency of resolving who I will be.
Socrates disrupts Athens. Kierkegaard disrupts Copenhagen, its staid 
patterns of literature, philosophy, and personal life. Through face- to- face 
encounters, Plato’s Socrates, especially in the early dialogues, makes existen-
tial, philosophical interventions. He stings his listeners, stops to interrogate 
them, and as often as not, abandons them— seduced but confused and with-
out answers. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous texts are crafted to replicate the 
sting of Socratic face- to- face encounters. Postscript or the earlier Philosophi-
cal Crumbs,1 comes close to being overtly Socratic, yet the apparently more 
literary works (Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Repetition, for instance) 
are also Socratic. I begin with Kierkegaard as a disruptive littérateur.
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A Kind of Philosophical Poet?
Kierkegaard is not a novelist, though “The Seducer’s Diary,” from the first 
volume of Either/Or, reads like a novella. He is not a dramatist, though Stages 
on Life’s Way restages Plato’s drama, the Symposium. Kierkegaard’s not an 
essayist, a “man of letters,” a journalist, nor a historian or biographer with 
a remarkable literary flair. His reputation does not rest on producing apho-
risms or inventing pseudonyms under which he writes.2 There is a tradition 
that claims Kierkegaard as a kind of poet, though we would be hard- pressed 
to find a poem in his work.3 That seems to exhaust the usual ways of being 
a literary figure.
If a field biologist is lucky enough to encounter strange plants or insects that 
are neither this nor that, that do not fit existing taxonomies, she might get to 
name her finds as a new species. We do not like to leave quirky things off the 
map, without a name, especially if they are terribly interesting. The brilliance 
of Kierkegaard’s sentences and paragraphs and the endlessly innovative and 
ever- increasing bulk of his publications make his specimens terribly inter-
esting. His works, like lively biological specimens, are even self- replicating. 
One strange invention spawns successors with family resemblances to earlier 
family specimens, and the extended family spawns successors. Kierkegaard’s 
genes reappear in Ibsen and Kafka, for instance. Literature has an evolu-
tionary history.4 Kierkegaard becomes an Ur- text for Ibsen, Rilke, Auden, 
Dinesen, Kafka, and (perhaps in a different league) Ingmar Bergman, John 
Updike, and Woody Allen. And it is clear that Kierkegaard inherits genetic 
material from his ancestors, Dante, Plato, Aristophanes, Cervantes, and 
Goethe (to name a few).5
Kierkegaard did not deliver novels or plays or poems, but he easily could 
have. He had other fish to fry. Something diverts his attention from becoming 
only a literary figure, and a clue lies in the fact that he has sprouts, or siblings, 
in the gardens of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Ortega and Sartre. A philo-
sophical vocation competes in his breast with a literary one, making him 
both (and neither). To complicate matters, he has a religious vocation, too. 
The result is an anomalous mix, evident existentially in the writer’s three- 
part identity and in the trifold identity of his works: religious, aesthetic, and 
philosophical— all of the above and hence not simply any of the above.
Kierkegaard is his anomalous, hyphenated, elusive yet irresistible progeny. 
We face the riddle of the Mona Lisa or the Socrates who primarily tells us he 
knows nothing, leaving us smitten but empty- handed. It is hard to do phi-
losophy, and harder to do Socratic philosophy. The Socratic task requires that 
you forgo the “objective” rigors of adding new paragraphs to the history of 
the subject, even paragraphs that are a critique of the subject. It requires that 
you “become subjective,” that you place the quite particular human being 
that you are smack in the middle of the picture. If you are Socrates, you are 
not an objective QED machine, and you question other “subjectivities” in 
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your path. You battle, sting, and nurse these into birth. Socrates is a midwife, 
not an expositor of old, or inventor of new, philosophical results. He sees us 
naked, in labor, and steps in to help, however painful the process. Kierke-
gaard sees us naked, too, and would push and pull us toward birth.
Having a Kierkegaard book arrive at our door is like having Socrates 
arrive there. If in beard and sandals he knocked and announced that he was 
a midwife come to assist, and you had expected an Amazon.com delivery, 
his arrival would be anomalous, out of bounds. Kierkegaard knows he can-
not announce himself directly as our local midwife. He sticks to delivering 
strange books, half- philosophy, half- literature (and the religious ones sing 
from the side).6 We do not need an encyclopedia salesman hawking books of 
knowledge and wisdom, nor do we need a literary dilettante hawking film 
scripts or novels. We need his anomalous, pseudonymous books because, like 
Socrates, they administer to our souls, and our souls yearn.
Of course, the whole thing can backfire. We want to know what brand of 
writing confronts us, and if the answer evades us, we will be anxious, perhaps 
unbearably anxious, and we may just shut down. We are creatures who like 
to know what’s going on. Responding to the knock at the door, if a Socratic 
voice spoke up— “I’m here as a midwife. . . . You didn’t notice you were in 
difficult labor?”— we would slam the door. Or perhaps humor him a bit, hop-
ing he’d move on. And if that failed, call psychiatric services.
Can Philosophy Abide Poetry?
After completing an apprenticeship in the university, earning the equivalent 
of a modern Ph.D., Kierkegaard never put his training to work in a recog-
nized profession or career. He did not become a parson, professor, or lawyer, 
an editor, journalist, or dramatist. If he became a writer, it was perhaps in the 
style of a “freelancer” (it is the self- ascription Johannes de Silentio adopts 
in Fear and Trembling). But what, exactly, is that, other than a refusal to be 
tied down as a dramatist, novelist, poet, or critic? He might have become a 
professor and the author of philosophical tracts.
Now you might counter that Kierkegaard has a genre: he is a poet, at least 
“a kind of poet” (of course, not a straightforward poet, someone who writes 
poetry). Calling him one lets him be figurative, evocative, allusive, elusive, 
and enigmatic in a way denied to a standard essayist or philosopher. Yet 
being “a kind of poet,” however alluring, can also be off- putting, much in the 
way Kierkegaard’s texts can be.7 We might envy the freedom that comes with 
release from the demands of strict philosophical categories and a consequent 
permission to explore the unknown in a carefree way, with imagination and 
passions given plenty of line. On the other hand we might resent a care-
less way with cultural requirements of discipline and order. Plato warned 
against this hybrid, banishing poets from the state ordered by philosophy (or 
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so it seems: he did not rule out of order his own poetry). Logical positivists 
wanted to exile nonsense, and that nonsense included all that we call “poetry. 
For them, a poetic philosopher was an oxymoron: Nietzsche’s aspiration to 
be a “Music Playing Socrates” was madness.8
On the other hand, Jamie Ferreira finds two writers who prefer a volatile 
mix, and she cites them to introduce Kierkegaard— Robert Frost: “a poetic 
philosopher or  .  .  . a philosophical poet, my favorite kind of both,”9 and 
then Wittgenstein: “philosophy ought only to be written as a poetic composi-
tion.”10 If poetry loosens straitlaced philosophy, philosophy can focus poetry 
beyond the everyday, transient, and local. Why not enjoy disruption of expec-
tations, enjoy hybridity, its ambiguity and amorphousness? Border crossing 
and border erasing are attractive for they are daring, even if we dread the 
attendant insecurity.
Should We Suffer Misfits?
A book titled Prefaces that contains nothing but prefaces is not poetry or 
short story or political polemic. Odd creatures, like Prefaces, Either/Or, and 
Postscript, are full of brilliant writing bent on breaking up literary cubbyholes. 
They are Socratic irritants that can teach us Socratic ignorance, bafflement 
viscerally conveyed in a mix of annoyance, helplessness, and allure. Socrates’s 
interlocutors are left puzzling over missing definitions. Kierkegaard’s readers 
are left puzzling over texts missing their identifying labels and purposes. The 
job of sorting new arrivals for the library shelves was to have been simple and 
straightforward. But how did I come to expect that all proper books have 
proper places, simple niches, on my shelves? Perhaps I expect too much order 
from the world, or the wrong kind of order.
Books that are evasive about their genre can be evasive about their 
authorship. Neither Prefaces nor Either/Or has a straightforward author. 
They are pseudonymous: we both do and do not know who authors them. 
Is Middlemarch to be filed under George Eliot or Mary Anne Evans? Evans 
used a pseudonym so her work would be taken seriously. Kierkegaard used 
pseudonyms for less evident reasons. One might see them alternately as 
fluffy devices to provoke public interest, as suspect means to deflect per-
sonal responsibility for opinions or positions, or as tools to incite Socratic 
self- awareness and interpretative alertness. And apart from the motivations 
for using pseudonyms, there remains the issue of power. Can “Kierkegaard” 
overrule the claims to authorship made by Climacus, Johannes de Silentio, or 
Nicolaus Notabene?11
If you wanted to shelve by genre, would the books end up under litera-
ture, philosophy, essays, or personal meditations? Perhaps (heaven forbid!) 
Kierkegaard is just “playing around” as an afternoon’s amusement. He says 
that his Prefaces are “like tuning a guitar, like talking with a child, like spitting 
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out of the window” (SKS 4:469 / P 5). But I suspect he is pulling our leg. After 
all, we might equally think that the Postscript or Fear and Trembling was not 
entirely serious, was like “tuning a guitar.” In fact, an early section of Fear 
and Trembling is called— exactly— “attunement.”12 His feints, his intimating 
that it is all a joke, provoke our anxious parries. He calls Prefaces the work 
of “a light- minded ne’er- do- well [en letsindig Døgenicht]” (SKS 4:470 / P 6). 
But that’s just flippant, a wisecrack.
Fear and Trembling is perhaps Kierkegaard’s best- known book. We think 
of Abraham bringing his son to Mount Moriah. Kierkegaard must be defend-
ing Abraham’s shocking and even servile compliance, we suppose. But why 
assume this book is out to make a case for Abraham (or against him)? Does 
it look like a book with a thesis to defend? The first part looks like a set of 
fables or mood swings and nightmarish dreams, and the second, like logi-
cal machinations of a deluded scholastic.13 Well, if it is not that disjointed, 
perhaps it is another hybrid, defined apophatically by what it is not: neither 
essay nor fable, nor sermon nor poem, nor polemic— but just possibly a dash 
of each of these in a strange stew.
Kierkegaard calls the book a “dialectical lyric,” which is a stab at two 
of its stylistic features. But it is also pure unprecedented invention, a col-
lage of fable, biblical exegesis, social commentary, dialectical investigation 
of concepts like “the ethical,” “the tragic,” and barely concealed farce. It is 
burlesque, or what Bakhtin calls “the carnivalesque.”14
Kierkegaard is a literary genius, not just an astute philosopher, a withering 
social critic, and a profound diagnostician of the soul. He endlessly invents 
countergenres, parabooks, unclassifiable publications that question our sense 
of what forms a piece of writing can take. He gives us the vertiginous sense 
that there may be no end to such inventiveness— that under his spell, we live 
and read in infinite possibility.
What Is a Postscript?
Like Prefaces, the title Postscript names a section of a book’s interior and 
can only anomalously fit as a title. Why do we divide interiors into prefaces, 
acknowledgments, chapters, postscripts, indexes, and so forth? If Kierke-
gaard gives us Prefaces or Postscript, will the next book be Footnotes? Or 
Epigraphs, or Dedications? Note that this tome, numbering nearly six hun-
dred pages in its standard English edition, dwarfs the slim volume to which 
it is an appendage.
The slim parent- book is Philosophical Crumbs, or a Crumb of Philosophy. 
What is it to publish philosophical crumbs,15 trifles, or crumbling remains, 
especially in an age of philosophical structures and systems? The full title 
utterly dwarfs the shorthand Postscript: Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
to “Philosophical Crumbs”: A Mimic- Pathetic- Dialectic Compilation— an 
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Existential Contribution.16 Open it, and you’ll discover what looks like a 
scholarly tome, full of sections and subsections, appearing systematic and 
self- important, hardly “mere crumbs” or “fragments.” In his masterful biog-
raphy, Alastair Hannay suggests “Concluding Unscholarly Addendum.”17
However we render the title, Kierkegaard is bending literary expectations 
to a breaking point. Is this title (not to mention what follows) some sort of 
insider’s joke?18 Kierkegaard ensures— or hopes to ensure— that if we go on 
reading, we cannot be blasé, as if canvassing this sort of thing were routine, 
an everyday encounter. Unfortunately for many readers, I suspect, the shock 
of the title has ceased to make trouble. We dash on, ever eager to get to 
the business at hand: What positions are advanced or attacked, and with 
what arguments? Unfortunately, Postscript is not just about QEDs. The heart 
of its mission is forecast in the rest of the title. What is a “mimic- pathetic- 
dialectic compilation— an existential contribution”? (This does not sound 
like a promise of arguments.) A “postscript to crumbs of philosophy” seems 
troubling enough, and a “mimic- pathetic- dialectic compilation” only ups the 
ante. To mime or mimic is to engage in the comic, while to evoke pathos 
engages the tragic, and “dialectic” brings philosophy on stage. What sort of 
book, or genre, lets tragedy, comedy, and philosophy play equal and simul-
taneous parts?
Why Get off the Map?
Thoreau and Nietzsche were unreservedly literary writers and philosophers. 
Kierkegaard is not alone in being both philosopher and literary figure, work-
ing out a collaborative, hyphenated cultural and personal identity— off the 
map of standard vocational cubbyholes. There is a tradition, as it were, of 
defying traditions. Kierkegaard’s Socratic, existential motivations drive him 
to defy classification. He artfully dodges our trapping moves. He has no wish 
that a new genre be inaugurated in his honor, and no wish to found a new 
philosophical style. To focus on classification— natural enough for orderly 
persons— distracts from our deeper needs and yearnings. Knowing where 
Kierkegaard belongs on philosophical or literary maps does not answer our 
existential anxieties about who we are and where we are going. The sub-
title declares that the author makes an existential contribution. Mapping 
his oeuvre onto larger conventional cultural frameworks is a nonexistential 
objective project.
The Postscript’s author contributes, if he does, by leading me away from 
classifications to the quality of my singular life, here and now, a life ready 
to be shaped, as I alone can shape it. Failing to settle objective matters of 
genre spins me out of objectivity toward emptiness. The books refuse to tell 
me which way to turn. I’m thrown into existential space wherein I anxiously 
realize that any resolution, any step forward is a step taken on my own. As 
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if to highlight this abandonment to my own devices, and the withdrawal of 
helping hands, in its final pages, Postscript invites me to leave it, relinquish 
it, as if its six hundred pages, like Prefaces, were the work of “a light- hearted 
do- nothing.”19 Like Socrates, the book stings and sings and departs.
Kierkegaard is attractive- unattractive, ordered- disordered, sober- comedic, 
and discomposes with a passion. He is an enfant terrible, a misfit who took 
pleasure in not fitting in and was just as nonconformist when it came to the 
shape of his literary production. He does not trade in the coin of the land.20 
If he eludes standard literary cubicles, he does no better when it comes to 
standard ways of writing philosophy. He can hold forth on the philosophi-
cal themes of subjectivity and objectivity, the individual and the crowd, the 
anguish of faith and the false assurance of careerism and church. But the faux 
genres he adopts are amusingly bizarre. Kant gives us titles without banners 
and whistles: The Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics. In full- dress regalia, Kierkegaard gives us Concluding Unsci-
entific Postscript to “Philosophical Crumbs”: A Mimic- Pathetic- Dialectic 
Compilation— an Existential Contribution, authored by Johannes Climacus, 
with S. Kierkegaard responsible for publication. He won’t settle into a liter-
ary, philosophical, or theological scene, or into essays or poetry, novellas, 
treatises, or history. These refusals have an existential rationale. They serve 
freedom and new life. He creates anxiety, that forerunner of change of self 
or recovery of soul.
To follow routine expectations is to idle one’s freedom. We know from The 
Concept of Anxiety that freedom requires passage through “a sympathetic 
antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy” (SKS 4:348 / CA 42, emphasis in 
text). The amorphous nonshapes of his literary products induce and repli-
cate the anxiety that is part and parcel of freedom. As Gordon Marino slyly 
dubs him, Kierkegaard is a “doctor of dread.”21 We undergo mild, or scream-
ing, vertigo, and controlled, or terrifying, prescribed doses of “sympathetic 
antipathy and antipathetic sympathy.” Of course the doctor has our deep 
yearnings, our true interests at heart. This is all a forerunner and companion 
to my freedom.
What Is an Existential Contribution?
Postscript has a final tag in its amusing- disquieting subtitle. This “mimic- 
pathetic- dialectic compilation,” we are told, is “an existential contribution.” 
This is the first time in European philosophy, to my knowledge, that the adjec-
tive “existential” is used to signify a concern for one’s personal existence.
Kierkegaard wants his literary philosophy to address readers intimately, 
existentially, to call out from them their sense of the meanings and directions 
of their life. Persons have complex social identities, but that is not the end of 
the matter. One may be identified as a judge or an aesthete, a shopkeeper or 
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a priest, an uncle, a hero, or a rogue. Kierkegaard’s literary genius in its first 
phase is to give compelling portraits of social ways of being, as a public might 
construe and misconstrue them.
There are different ways to describe the role of a parson or professor. 
Kierkegaard critiques commonplace ways of taking these social identities, 
but he typically moves from social critique to soul diagnostics. Even as he 
provides provocative sketches of how a parson might appear on Sunday (for 
just one example), he moves simultaneously into more private landscapes of 
identity. In the second phase (or level) the question “How does one, in general, 
exist as a proper parson, or typically lose one’s soul as a parson?” becomes 
quite another question. I now ask, “Have I, as a parson, lost my soul?” In 
this second phase of questioning, a general query about social identity gets 
transformed. I modulate the question, hearing it existentially, hearing it as 
addressing me and requiring my answer or response (and general questions 
drop away).
How do we know if Climacus has fulfilled his promise to provide an 
“existential contribution”? Well, I have to ask whether the register of my 
questioning has shifted. I have to ask whether I have modulated from the 
excellent but nonintimate, objective question “What is it to exist as a soul 
in love?” to another question, perhaps light years away. Do I find myself 
wandering toward or right in the middle of the question “Am I in love?” If 
that modulation takes place, Johannes Climacus has pushed or pulled me to 
consider an identity I might assume that is deeper than an array of possible 
social identities, generally considered. That is his “existential contribution.”
A judge may play out his courtroom role, making brilliant legal points (or 
being only banal and routine), performing (or not performing) his social role. 
We might ask, if he falters, if he has his heart in his work, has sold his soul 
to the devil, or finds anything august in the office he holds. But these are not 
yet existential questions. They are still evaluations of social identity. To per-
form a role adequately can require that one put one’s heart into it. A Socratic 
existential contribution does not ask us to assess whether someone fulfills a 
social identity, even fulfills the requirement that one does what one does with 
passion. Instead, the Socratic contribution elicits from a particular someone, 
from this very judge in question, a self- evaluation. An existential intervention 
succeeds when this very judge is startled or unnerved or disquieted by the 
existential address of another, and is then moved decisively to resolve or close 
down a just- opened field of possibilities. This very judge decides to reform, 
or resign, or prefer to do nothing, and then cashes out the decision in action.
I can now bring out subphases within this phase of considering my exis-
tence. I no longer focus on what someone in my circumstance does to achieve 
an identity, say, as a judge. I focus on what I alone must do to achieve this 
identity, and that cannot be a matter of rote imitation of what is generally 
done in that role. I move to the brink of existential commitment, my own 
forging of what that role uniquely will be for me, and then move through 
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the resolutions and actions that secure (however precariously) that unique 
existential identity, my reality. I move to the brink of the pond, dive into 
the pond, and come up swimming (or not). At the brink I no longer attend 
to existential reality in general. Diving in means leaping from a pond’s- edge 
view of what an existential reality requires (say, that I must choose myself, 
dive in or not, as every human must)— to full immersion in another question. 
Who will I, in particular, be? And in the midst of immersion, I must settle the 
matter. Will I rise to the surface (or stay under longer, or forever)? Subsurface, 
how will I move, with what speed, and to what end? Will I rise to the occa-
sion to do what I must do to be the minister or parson I must be? How, and 
with what style, and to what end?
Kierkegaard makes an existential contribution that only I can complete. 
His contribution is to offer me an existential space distinct from social space. 
If I accept this offer, I accept the open space where existential possibilities are 
vividly acknowledged, and then I close that radical openness through decisive 
resolution and action. Kierkegaard cannot complete the process he initi-
ates. He can offer possibilities, but he cannot determine which of these will 
become mine. A contribution to charity is realized only when it is accepted, 
and Kierkegaard’s existential contribution is realized only when I resolve 
first- personally to accept it by taking this step rather than that, thus resolving 
my anomalous situation this way rather than that. Accepting an existential 
contribution allows me to become who I am by allowing me to become who 
I will be.22
It is hard to grasp the uncanny magnitude of the Postscript’s intention. 
The comic, dialectic, and tragic are in the service of an infinite demand. It is 
a demand that can be fulfilled or rejected in any number of ways, and there 
are no guidelines included. So I can refuse the Climacus offer. I might be 
entertained by his comic wit, impressed by his dialectical finesse, or moved 
by the pathos of his descriptions. But his contribution is realized only if I am 
transformed, turned around. It is realized only if I am undone and then do 
myself up again (or find myself graciously restored— and not reject that).
You might reasonably think that it is enough for a literary figure to make a 
significant contribution to the canon or to stretch the canon or to win acclaim 
in her age. You might think it enough for a philosopher to better understand 
a classical philosophical puzzle or text or to win acclaim as a critic of the arts 
or politics, of gender relations or religious intolerance, or become a critic of 
insensitivity to the natural world. But none of this, laudable as it is, would be 
enough for Socrates, or for Kierkegaard.
Socrates engaged in enigmatic, unfinished conversations. Kierkegaard 
writes enigmatic, unfinished books. The aim is not to advance philosophy 
or literature as a discipline but to alter listeners and readers existentially, 
one by one. Both Socrates and Kierkegaard want to make headway toward 
the salvation of souls, or at least to remove vanities that obstruct that ven-
ture. Kierkegaard is the Socrates who “makes [those in his presence] ill 
64 Edward F. Mooney
at ease, and inflicts upon them the unpardonable offense of making them 
doubt themselves.”23 Kierkegaard writes late in life that his mission has 
always been Socratic.24 His pseudonymous authorship especially is an end-
lessly unsettling Socratic installation of self- doubt offered as a preliminary to 
self- transformation.
Do We Need Cultural Credentials?
Kierkegaard is nonconforming. He will resist falling into conventional slots, 
and even a set of slots custom- made for him. Let me consider this indetermi-
nacy of identity by reflecting on Henri Bergson in the last days of his life.25 
His life is not exactly a text, but he has an identity at stake; he lives out the 
inadequacy of social identity and the necessity of existential identity. The 
question he faces in his last days is not unlike the question facing Socrates in 
his last days in Athens, under trial and under arrest.
When Jews in Paris were required to wear yellow armbands after the Nazi 
takeover, Bergson was not exactly required to identify himself as such, ethi-
cally or religiously or existentially. He was close to converting to Roman 
Catholicism, as his friends had known, years before the Nazi invasion. His 
world renown as a philosopher would have earned him the exemption from 
persecution offered to Freud or negotiated by Wittgenstein for his sisters. 
(The Nazis were not entirely deaf to the onus of appearing to be cultural 
barbarians.) Yet Bergson, now a frail man in his eighties, chose to line up 
outside in a cold drizzle, wearing the armband marking his identification 
with the Jews already facing a horror that would only grow. He determined 
his identity, an existential identity, at that moment, when his social identity 
was indeterminate.
As outsiders we could wonder whether Bergson fit into social reality as 
a Jew, as a world- famous intellectual, as a soon- to- be- Catholic convert, or 
as a frail old man. Of course he was all of these. But social identity merely 
poses the question of his existential identity. Bergson’s final days bring into 
prominence the need for an existential determination: Will he resolve to have 
it end this way or that, in keeping with these of his espoused values and com-
mitments, or those? Will he skirt the tempting but ultimately self- betraying 
alternatives?
Kierkegaard’s corpus stands to us roughly as Bergson’s life does. We rec-
ognize that the corpus or the life could be focused this way or that. The big 
difference is that we can revel in the choice Bergson made. He lined up in a 
cold drizzle. But the large Kierkegaard community has not yet resolved the 
field of possibilities that interpreters of Kierkegaard’s must work. It is rela-
tively easy to make the case that Bergson is a hero. Is it as easy to make the 
case that Kierkegaard is Socratic and passes the existential task of response 
to me? My reading of his corpus can have this sort of life, this sort of identity, 
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rather than that. The focus is up to me (and to you). If I am right, Kierkegaard 
intends to put the ball in my court, if I exercise only my scholarly resources in 
order to find his cultural niche that will silence his voice— his Socratic voice.
We might say, “Look, Bergson had a moment of existential anguish, and 
thank God he came out of it a hero. That’s what matters, not the array of 
possibilities that we see preceding his decision to walk into the rain and line 
up.” Likewise, we might say, scanning the possibilities for shelving Kierke-
gaard’s texts, “Look, here I am in a moment of anguish, and thank God I now 
come out of it taking the author as a serious, Socratic philosopher (not as a 
perpetual adolescent misusing great talent).” Thus I cease searching in the 
grid of objective possibilities for his literary- philosophic niche. Kierkegaard 
enacts Socratic parries and feints, delivering texts that escape our nets. Slip-
ping our nets is more than an exhibition of skill, as if his contribution were 
to excel at child’s play, hide- and- seek, or magical tomfoolery.26 Having an 
objective cultural slot for him would defeat his aim. By repeatedly slipping 
our nets, he hopes to make a Socratic, existential contribution.
How Does a Socratic Sting Change Me?
If I am the recipient of an existential contribution, I should gather more than 
the information that people like me can be stung. I am humbled. I realize 
that what I make of the text is up to me. I can throw it aside, be slapdash, 
or struggle with it. If I decide to struggle, there are options. One possibility 
is a strategy of suspicion or resentment. Another is to follow what Kierke-
gaard calls “love, that lenient interpreter.” That is, I can adopt a strategy of 
charity.27 Which way I resolve this crux shapes the interpreter I will be. If I 
interpret generously, I am being generous and will be grateful for insights 
bequeathed. If I interpret suspiciously, as a master unmasker, I will feel myself 
proud, above being fooled, and grateful for little. If I interpret resentfully, I 
will take offense that someone has attempted to pull the wool over my eyes. 
I will not be grateful that texts or words or images have come my way. A 
grateful person is different from an indifferent or self- righteous or haughty 
and condescending one.
A reader willing to praise the beauty and worth of a range of appearances 
or partial realities is different from one who filters all appearances through 
an ideological lens that reduces them, deflating them to a status where they 
are helpless pawns in a play of power or money, or pawns in a war of genders 
or ethnicities or classes or religions or sexual orientations. A debunker enjoys 
domination over appearances, texts, or partial realities at hand. I might learn 
from such a lordly hermeneuticist that museums are extensions of colonial 
aggression (nothing more), that concert halls are monuments to wealth 
extracted from the poor (nothing more), that writing is a sublimation of 
sexual desire (nothing more), that Kierkegaard’s oeuvre is a vain attempt to 
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assuage guilt (nothing more), that because his stature was unimpressive, his 
writing is working out a Napoleon complex (nothing more), that his father’s 
confession of guilt made him an emotional cripple. Things are dispraised for 
what they mask rather than praised for any gift they might bring and for any 
occasion they might provide for thanksgiving.
I am a different person depending on the interpretative approach I accept 
and follow. How much of the world of texts is a world I can love? Is it within 
my purview to love many or few? How large is the world I must despise or 
wish dead? What powers my writing? Is it wonder or competitive adrenalin, 
tender, sympathetic appreciation, or disgust and resentment? I can (to some 
extent) tilt different interpretative postures this way or that, thus constituting 
an interpretative personality. Do I face texts or art or historical periods and 
events with indifferent royal aplomb? How much do I value my own halting 
or imperious voice?
I become this sort of interpreting person or that as I take my cues for inter-
pretation this way or that. In the broadest sense, reading is an ethical venture, 
an activity that reveals something of what I take to be good and take to be 
part of the good life and take to be beyond the pale, and my quickness to find 
fault with texts can be a stain on my reading character just as my quickness 
to find fault with persons can be. We are our labor, and if our labor is writ-
ing and reading, we expose who we are— I expose who I am (existentially) in 
“the what” and “the how” of my writing and reading.
Kierkegaard’s Words
It is of interest to Socrates how he lives, how he relates to the truth, and how 
his life and his connection to the truth can have a saving effect on his inter-
locutors. Kelly Jolley writes, “[Philosophy] does not exist [for Socrates] as a 
sort of idol of which [Socrates] would be the guardian and which he must 
defend. It exists rather in its living relevance to the Athenians.”28 Just so, the 
literature Kierkegaard produces in varied profusion does not exist as a trib-
ute to “the literary life” or as a gift to “the great tradition of literature” or to 
“the great tradition of philosophy.” These are not temples in which he wished 
to enshrine his texts and himself. On the best interpretation, his words were 
to exist in their “living relevance” to his townsfolk or, more accurately, in 
their “living relevance” to single individuals in whose souls they lodged as 
a provocation, judge, and inspiration. Although he writes in veins that are 
in turn literary or aesthetic, ethical or philosophical, religious or counter-
religious, and writes to bring these into conflict and repose, these are not 
ultimate categories of exploration or veneration for him.
Kierkegaard is Socratic. First and last he worships at no single shrine but 
inaugurates, for each reader, a trial of self- knowledge, self- resolution, self- 
realization, and selflessness. (The trial both is and is not “all about me.”) He 
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conducts trials of existence, where his subjectivity meets mine around love 
and responsibility, urgency, delight, and suffering. It is a trial of my existence, 
and yours, or in another of his favorite images, an invitation to sweep onto 
the floor for a solo dance before God, before such presence as can be pleased 
or displeased with the tilt of my soul. Kierkegaard’s writings bring us to the 
dance, and perhaps demonstrate some steps,29 but the rest is up to us— to me. 
So his manner of writing is in our service, in my service. In its poetry and phi-
losophy, its comic mimicry and tearful pathos, it is a great gift, an existential 
contribution.
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Storytelling and the Development of the 
Religious Imagination in the Authorship
Marcia C. Robinson
Søren Kierkegaard’s polyphonous authorship is replete with imagery. From 
the early polemical writings to the late attack on the established Church, 
analogies, figures, and stories of all sorts pervade his reflections on God and 
human existence. Indeed, the prominence and prevalence of stories as bibli-
cal, mythical, fictional, or historical accounts of human situations suggest 
a deliberate desire to make religious philosophy poetry. Kierkegaard does 
not use all of this imagery, however, just to create philosophical or theologi-
cal art. Rather, as George Pattison rightly notes, Kierkegaard uses imagery 
for rhetorical and ethical purposes.1 That is, in good Ciceronian fashion, he 
offers his modern cultured readers an imaginative philosophy in a narrative 
and conversational style in order to persuade them to become persons of 
faith or “selves before God” (SKS 11:129–32, 143, 225–27  / SUD 13–16, 
26–27, 113–14)— an attitudinal ethic that Pattison convincingly presents as 
a “regulative ideal.”2 This suggests that for Kierkegaard, faith not only has 
intrinsic value— as a way of seeing and being in the world that defines human 
being as human being, which is precisely what makes it the ethical purpose 
driving his rhetorical aesthetic— but as such, faith also has the capacity to 
incite deep feeling and desire, and so to serve as its own incentive for action.3 
In other words, faith addresses itself to the whole person— head, heart, and 
soul, not just head; therefore, the presentation or communication of faith 
must do likewise. For Kierkegaard, this means that faith requires artistry, not 
just prose.
Kierkegaard’s logician- humorist pseudonym Johannes Climacus con-
firms this in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where he discusses “the 
subjective thinker” or person of faith “as an artist” and faith as an “existence- 
communication” (SKS 7:317–20, 346–47 / CUP 1:348–51, 379–80). There, 
after presenting faith as “an objective uncertainty” on which to stake one’s 
whole life, Climacus says that the person of faith or subjective thinker real-
izes that “imagination and feeling,” not just “dialectical thinking,” are needed 
to exist in, and to communicate, faith because such an existence involves 
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“passion . . . difficulty and contradiction” (SKS 7:186–87, 317–20, 346–47 / 
CUP 1:204, 348–51, 379–80). In other words, reason and prose are not suf-
ficient for addressing or relaying passion and life’s challenges and paradoxes 
as they are experienced; poetry is sufficient— that is, a dialectical poetry that 
speaks to head, heart, and soul. Climacus concludes, then, that “to exist is 
an art” and to communicate the art of living is also an art because the whole 
person must be involved and addressed in both.
Storytelling and Human Nature
All of this suggests that Kierkegaard’s rhetorical strategy depends upon some 
kind of holistic conception of human nature, a conception that goes hand 
in glove with the ethical- religious ideal he promotes. This understanding of 
human nature, though, should not be viewed primarily as a formal or fully 
developed anthropology or ontology, concerned with objective certainty. 
Rather, it should be viewed, as Pattison observes, as a practical or “experi-
mental” anthropology, concerned primarily with faith and life.4 As such, we 
might see Kierkegaard sketching this “experimental” anthropology in order 
to identify aspects of human nature that he thinks are central to becoming and 
being a faithful self and that he thinks must be engaged in order to persuade 
his readers to pursue such selfhood. That is, with both his own experience and 
the long Western tradition of conceiving human nature in mind, including the 
Idealist and Romantic anthropologies of his day, we might see Kierkegaard 
setting out a working conception of human nature for his “art of living” that 
considers humans to be sentient, rational, and free beings (“feeling, know-
ing, and willing”), defined by time, place, and circumstance (“finitude”), yet 
able to transcend and transform these limitations in problematic situations, 
at least to some degree, by means of imagination’s “infinitizing reflection” 
(SKS 11:145–47, 154–57 / SUD 29–31, 38–41). If we take this perspective, 
we might then see Kierkegaard to be assuming that if his readers possess 
sufficient imagination, as his premier Christian pseudonym, Anti- Climacus, 
puts it, he might be able to awaken and develop this capacity in them by 
presenting narratives of moral and religious conflict that would allow them 
to envision life’s potentiality or ideality in direct relation to its problematic or 
difficult actuality (SKS 12:186 / PC 186; SKS 11:146–47 / SUD 30–31). The 
tension created by these opposites might in turn “intensify” or sharpen his 
readers’ abilities to “feel” and to “know” the issues at stake and, if they are 
receptive to the paradigm shift introduced, “to long for” and “to seek” the 
moral and religious ideal presented (SKS 11:147 / SUD 30–31). This in effect 
would make their imaginations’ capacities “instar omnium” since their whole 
persons would be “transformed” by its vision (SKS 11:147 / SUD 30–31).5
With regard to faith, this would mean that Kierkegaard tells stories 
because he assumes they can awaken his readers’ imaginations and heighten 
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their abilities to “feel” and to “know” the ideality and actuality of faith itself. 
If they are receptive, they will fall in love with faith’s goodness and beauty, 
in spite of its challenges and risks, and be moved to “seek” its possibility 
and plenitude in the midst of life’s difficulties, just as Anti- Climacus’s earnest 
youth does in Practice in Christianity (SKS 11:146–47  / SUD 30–31; SKS 
12:186–94 / PC 186–96). The capacity of the imagination to do this, how-
ever, suggests that for Kierkegaard, it cannot be awakened just once. As the 
capacity for a high level of ethical and religious reflection that influences how 
one views and responds to existential challenges, the imagination must be 
cultivated throughout a person’s life, indeed always in relation to a person’s 
experiences (SKS 12:186–88  / PC 187–88). We might conclude, then, that 
Kierkegaard tells stories about faith and life throughout the authorship, from 
multiple perspectives, and particularly with actual experiences in mind in the 
religious discourses, because he wants to help his readers to develop mature 
religious imaginations, controlled powers for envisioning divine possibility 
that can keep them “awakened” to, in love with, and thankful for life as 
divine gift, grace, and task (SKS 11:146–47 / SUD 30–31; SKS 12:186–88 / 
PC 187–88; SKS 10:73–75, 138–40, 142–43, 209–10 / CD 64–66, 127–129, 
131–33, 200; SKS 1:312–16 / CI 276–80).
Kierkegaard’s tempering of imagination with actual experience in this 
careful union of storytelling and faith suggests that his rhetorical strategy 
assumes more than a broad, working conception of human nature. His faith- 
oriented storytelling also assumes that he possesses a good understanding 
of his audience’s actual circumstances, values, fears, concerns, and concep-
tions of and attitudes toward faith, since these kinds of particularities are 
the “premises,” as he puts it in The Concept of Irony, of any type of effective 
communication (SKS 1:313 / CI 277).
Audience and Storytelling Method
As is well known, in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierke-
gaard indicates that his primary audience is modern Danish Christians, who, 
he believes, live in illusions about faith and life (SKS 13:15–17; 16:23–38 / 
PV 9–11, 41–56). According to him, ecclesiastical and cultural leaders such as 
Hans Lassen Martensen and Johan Ludvig Heiberg are largely to blame. As 
advocates of a right- wing or conservative Hegelianism, a popular intellectual 
and cultural movement of the day, Martensen and Heiberg encourage their 
bourgeois followers to believe that the difficulties of faith and the anxieties 
of modern life are easily resolved in institutional expressions of a divinized 
reason and in triumphs of artistic genius. In other words, as Kierkegaard sees 
it, Martensen and Heiberg wrongfully encourage their followers to bury their 
anxiety and despair in the false security of the Church, the state, the univer-
sity, and the arts community— a democratized absolutism, or “leveling,” as 
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Kierkegaard puts it— rather than face life in earnest as genuine “selves before 
God” who learn to be faithful “out over 70,000 fathoms” (SKS 20:187– 
88, NB2:119, n.d. 1847  / KJN 4:186– 87; SKS 8:74–89  / TA 77–93; SKS 
11:117–18  / SUD 5–6; SKS 7:131, 187, 212, 263  / CUP 1:140, 204, 232, 
288). For Kierkegaard, Martensen’s participation in this activity is particu-
larly disturbing because he is a minister of the Gospel (SKS 20:205, NB2:160, 
n.d. 1847 / KJN 4:204; SKS 23:179– 80, NB17:23, n.d. 1850 / KJN 7:182– 83; 
SKS 25:28– 29, NB26:21, n.d. 1852 / JP 6:6807). As such, says Kierkegaard, 
he should be helping modern Danes to deal with their troubles and to find 
more honest and authentic ways to live in a disorienting, frightening, uncer-
tain, and fragmented world, not to sneak out of it or to deceive themselves 
into thinking that all is well (SKS 7:402–403 / CUP 1:443).6
Kierkegaard sees it as his task, then, to call Martensen, Heiberg, and their 
followers back to a serious engagement of faith and life. He does not do this 
with loud protestations or direct and vociferous attacks— at least not at first 
(SKS 16:24–29 / PV 42–47; Pap. X6 B 171, n.d. 1851 / JP 6:6748; compare 
SKS 14:123–217; 13:127–68 / MLW 3–126). Rather, realizing the power of 
Martensen’s and Heiberg’s eloquence, he pursues an indirect or aesthetically 
sophisticated course that he believes is appropriate for, and immediately 
attractive to, his art- loving, theatergoing audience— an approach that he 
maintains is driven by Socratic purpose and Christian love (SKS 16:25–28, 
35–36 / PV 43–46, 53–55; compare SKS 27:334, Papir 323:1, n.d. 1845 / JP 
1:631; SKS 25:83, NB26:80, n.d. 1853 / JP 1:824; and SKS 23:322, NB18:99, 
n.d. 1850 / KJN 7:328– 29). Kierkegaard testifies to this in a journal entry 
on his now famous tangle with the editor of the Corsair, where he refers in 
Hamlet- fashion to a vision of his dead father: “It seemed to me that my dead 
father put this demand to me: You must present Christianity in its utmost 
rigorousness, but you must keep it poetic, you may attack no one, and on 
no account may you make yourself out to be better than the most insignifi-
cant person” (Pap. X6 B 171, pp. 264– 65, n.d. 1851/ JP 6:6748, p. 397, my 
emphasis).
Thus, styling himself “a peculiar kind of poet” (a dialectical poet, we 
might say), Kierkegaard takes on the role of a Socratic troubadour or court 
jester, a master storyteller leading a troupe of “actors,” or pseudonyms, rep-
resenting a wide array of lifestyles and perspectives. This allows him to meet 
his avowedly Christian audience where they take their cultured, and not so 
cultured, ease in illusions: at Our Lady Church, at the Royal Danish Theater, 
in the halls of the university, in the galleries of Charlottenborg and the Thor-
valdsen Museum, and at Copenhagen’s mass attractions and distractions, 
namely, Tivoli, the Deer Park, and the pages of popular newspapers and scan-
dal sheets (SKS 12:281 / WA 165; with SKS 7:569– 73 / CUP 1: 625–30; SKS 
22:250, NB12:178, n.d. 1849 / JP 6:6498; SKS 25:44, NB26:38, n.d. 1852 / 
JP 6:6809; Pap. XI3 B 53, n.d. 1854 / JP 6:6943). In doing so, he not only 
accommodates them by creating his own eloquence, as Erasmus (Aristotle) 
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says a good orator should (SKS 18:236, JJ:305, n.d. 1845 / KJN 2:217).7 But 
he also sets the stage for “deceiving” them in a “godly” way, as M. Holmes 
Hartshorne notes, a way that allows his readers to recognize privately what 
faith truly is and who they truly are, so that they might acknowledge, or per-
haps even become receptive to, faith as a risky, but healthy way of living (SKS 
16:25–29, 35–36 / PV 43–47, 53–55).8
Pattison’s characterization of Kierkegaard’s authorship as a “magic the-
atre,” an image he borrows from Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantin 
Constantius, is quite apropos (SKS 4:30 / R 154).9 For by qualifying his char-
acterization with Martin Thust’s older interpretation of the authorship as a 
“marionette theatre,” Pattison not only indicates how Kierkegaard deploys 
the poetic by appropriating nineteenth- century dramaturgical theory in 
constructing the pseudonyms and other figures— that is, by making them per-
sonifications of ideas, attitudes, or perspectives rather than three- dimensional 
characters, something familiar to his cultured Christian audience.10 But he 
also illuminates the nature of Kierkegaard’s role as a Socratic poet. With 
Thust’s assistance, he helps us to see Kierkegaard as a master manipulator 
of existential dialogue, a “puppeteer” who gives his figural “assistants” or 
“marionettes” the right words, sensibilities, and timing so that they might 
engage the reader in just enough Socratic conversation to make themselves 
and their ethical and religious issues personally compelling.
However, in order to understand more about the rhetorical impact that 
Kierkegaard makes on his reader, it might also help us to view the author-
ship as a veritable funhouse of existential activity, teeming at every turn, like 
a Fellini film, with opportunities for self- exploration, self- examination, and 
self- assessment.11 Such a funhouse is not a simple matter of fun and games but 
more like a fairy tale that uses the comic, the charming, the seductive, or the 
magical in order to draw the reader into the anxiety, the suffering, the terror, 
and the death that dog human existence. By viewing Kierkegaard’s artistry in 
this way, our analytical focus shifts away from what he does behind the scenes 
to the impact of his manipulations on the psyche of the reader experiencing 
them. This allows us to be attentive to the often strange but attractive nature 
of his personified ideas, attitudes, and perspectives, something that makes 
them akin to clowns who know how to unite levity and earnestness. Viewing 
the authorship as a funhouse also allows us to be attentive to the way he uses 
imaginative existential situations to induce a free and personally invested 
response from his readers.12 Hence, as we follow Kierkegaard’s receptive, 
nineteenth- century Danish readers, running like children through the cre-
ative corridors of his literary, yet interactive, Christo- Socratic theater, we too 
are put in a position to respond to the uncanny voices, strange sounds, and 
unexpected happenings emerging and reverberating around every corner. All 
of this puts us in a better position to see the significance of the psychological 
and experiential for illuminating, enlivening, and instantiating Kierkegaard’s 
ethical or regulative ideal “before God.” For such an imaginative situation 
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tells us that the moral and religious ideal cannot be separated from the feeling 
it induces or the aesthetic form through which it is communicated, since this 
very feeling and this very form are what allow the reader to be alive to the 
compelling power of this ideal.13 The German Romantic poet and playwright 
Johann Ludwig Tieck helped Kierkegaard to see this early on in the 1830s 
and early 1840s, while he was developing ideas about good writing and a life 
view.14
As with other Romantics, Kierkegaard was both openly critical and qui-
etly appreciative of Tieck. In his dissertation of 1841, he openly criticizes 
Tieck for failing to deploy his insights about poetry for moral and religious 
purposes (SKS 1:330–31, 337–39 / CI 296–97, 304–6).15 In his journals and 
papers from the mid- to late 1830s, though, he appreciates and appropri-
ates Tieck’s insights about allegories and fairy tales because they help him to 
see that storytelling is a kind of Socratic play in which a master storyteller 
weaves existential themes and issues into the magic and immediacy of a nar-
rative’s details, so that an audience might have an entertaining, engaging, yet 
nonthreatening way to deal with their fears and questions about life and to 
develop morally and religiously.16 Tieck’s remarks in several works to which 
Kierkegaard refers, cites, and/or responds make this apparent.
For example, in The Old Book and the Voyage into the Blue (Das alte 
Buch und die Reise ins Blaue hinein, 1835), a novella to which Kierkegaard 
refers in tongue- in- cheek fashion (SKS 1:133 / CI 74; SKS 3:246 / EO 2:258), 
Tieck writes, “The true fairy- tale . . . opens up with its child- like tone and 
its play with the wondrous, an area of our spirit into which other kinds 
of art and poetry cannot find their way.”17 In doing so, Tieck continues, it 
allows us to experience— that is, to see, to sense, to feel, to know— matters 
that pertain to “our first, and most sacred, relations with nature and the 
invisible world, the basis of our faith, the elements of our perception, birth, 
and grave . . . and . . . the origin of good and evil,” all things that “cannot 
be resolved into what we call rational or consequent.”18 This, though, is not 
the only thing that fairy tales do for us, says Tieck in a fascinating passage 
from the Phantasus (1812– 16), a self- selected collection and interpretation 
of his works that Kierkegaard quotes at length in an 1836 journal entry. As 
an “allegory” attending to the “double phenomenon” of “good and evil,” a 
fairy tale (Märchen) “moves us anew . . . appeals to us in the most diverse 
forms in every enigma, and . . .— through a struggle— wants to disclose itself 
to the understanding” (SKS 17:76, BB:6 / KJN 1:69, as translated at 1:388). 
Kierkegaard underscores these remarks himself in another journal entry from 
1836, where he says, “Does not 1 Corinthians 13:12 . . . imply a recognition 
of the necessity of allegory for our present condition . . . since the whole idea 
[of life] cannot be contained in the  .  .  . expression.— metaphor— [?]” (SKS 
27:108, Papir 77 / JP 3:3807).19
Kierkegaard absorbs all of this in an 1837 journal entry, where he basi-
cally credits Tieck for pointing out the significance of storytelling. “Not 
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telling children tales and legends capable of occupying their imaginations,” 
he declares, “leaves room precisely for an anxiety that, not moderated by 
such narratives, returns with all the greater strength. (Cf. ‘Die Verlobung,’ 
short story by Tieck, Dresden 1823, pp. 63 below, 64 and 65.  .  .  .)” (SKS 
17:131n10, BB:37, n.d. 1837  / KJN 1:124n10, continued from previous 
page). In other words, as products of the imagination (the storyteller’s in 
concert with the readers’), fairy tales deal with life’s problems, absurdities, 
and paradoxes, and seek to unite sense, head, and heart in a magical explora-
tion of these experiences that is at first both wondrous and unnerving, as they 
re- present them; then cathartic, as they facilitate working through them; and 
ultimately educative, as they encourage respect for the mystery, fragility, and 
beauty of life.20
It comes as no surprise, then, that in the same journal entry, Kierkegaard 
immediately puts this insight to work sketching a procedure for telling chil-
dren stories. Indeed, we can already see in this appropriation of Tieck a way 
for him to address an adult audience that is equally reticent about growing 
up spiritually. The procedure of storytelling, writes Kierkegaard, “should be 
Socratic. One must awaken an appetite in [children] to ask questions.  .  .  . 
What matters is to bring the poetic to bear on their lives in every way, to 
exert a magical influence; when least expected, suddenly to let in a glimpse 
and then to have it vanish again . . . so that the child’s soul is electrified by it” 
(SKS 17:124–25, BB:37 / KJN 1:118, 119). In other words, as Tieck indicates, 
“the poetic,” as the tale “capable of occupying [children’s] imaginations,” 
should naturally and powerfully evoke the “Socratic,” as existential ques-
tions. Yet “the poetic,” as Kierkegaard indicates in this same passage, should 
also be the exploratory space around the tale that the storyteller creates in 
order to set the right tone and to keep the audience in the right frame of mind 
to identify with the story’s issues. Tieck helps Kierkegaard to see, then, that 
“the poetic” and “the Socratic” are of a piece in good storytelling, for the 
creation of an ethical- religious situation within an inviting, exploratory space 
gives an audience the opportunity, confidence, and distance it needs to deal 
with life’s difficulties (SKS 1:338–40 / CI 306–7).21
Johannes Climacus, Dialectical Poet: Kierkegaard’s Model Storyteller
Kierkegaard immediately puts these insights to work, along with his ideas of 
good writing and a life view, in the construction of a polyvocal authorship, 
in which he creates narrative situations that make both his pseudonymous 
and his signed writings function individually and cooperatively as poetic 
confessionals, so to speak— that is, as a series of imaginative spaces able 
to metamorphose into private places for assessing self and life (SKS 16:26, 
35–36 / PV 43–44, 53–55; Pap. X6 B 171, n.d. 1851 / JP 6:6748).22 Johannes 
Climacus’s king and maiden story in the Philosophical Fragments (or 
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Philosophical Crumbs) is particularly exemplary of this unique appropria-
tion of Tieck’s storytelling theory.23 This is not only because Climacus is 
easily recognizable as the most Socratic of all of Kierkegaard’s voices. It is 
also and primarily because Climacus’s king and maiden story functions as 
the very dialogical poetry or expository- interactive drama of divine love that 
is needed to awaken the moral and religious imaginations of his Hegelian- 
Christian audience and to guide them effortlessly into the self- examination 
and confession needed to develop those imaginations for authentic living.
Climacus takes on the role of Kierkegaard’s Socratic- Tieckian storyteller 
in the preface and first two chapters of the Fragments. There “the poetic” 
becomes both the farce of philosophy and theology that he puts on to relax 
and to entertain his urbane audience, and the fairy tale that he deploys at the 
center of this farce in order to get that same audience to question the meaning 
of God and faith existentially or “Socratically.” Climacus stages his farce by 
offering only “crumbs” of philosophy and “scraps” of theology in comparison 
to the intellectual “feast” that his Hegelian colleagues Heiberg and Martensen 
provide. This bit of fun is his way of entering their intellectual and cultural 
space and establishing himself as someone in need of their expertise so that 
they will not feel threatened by the questions about God and faith he will 
ultimately raise. That is, Climacus knows that he cannot disabuse Heiberg, 
Martensen, and their followers of their “superior” knowledge about God and 
faith all at once, so he takes the indirect road that Kierkegaard sketches in The 
Point of View, a path that requires a little deception, as indicated earlier (SKS 
16:24–26, 32, 35–36 / PV 42–44, 50, 53–54). Knowing that neither Heiberg 
nor Martensen considers farce to be a particularly refined form of comedy, 
he starts appropriately with its unrestrained joking and laughter so that he 
can appear to be lower than they and they can appear to be higher than 
he— that is, where aesthetics, not to mention philosophy and theology, are 
concerned.24 Farce is also particularly appropriate for Climacus’s purposes 
because, as his pseudonymous colleague Constantin Constantius explains, it 
requires an audience to participate; precludes it from responding convention-
ally, particularly in a refined manner; and leaves open- ended the audience’s 
resulting mood (SKS 4:34–35  / R 159–61; SKS 4:218–42  / PF 9–36; SKS 
7:263–64 / CUP 1:289). Climacus’s strategy is to make the members of his 
audience comfortable in their intellectual and cultural superiority, in spite of 
his little taunts, so that they will not suspect there is a personal tragedy hidden 
in the comedic form of the medieval fairy tale at the heart of his play.25
Climacus starts his farce and sets the tone and the context for his storytell-
ing in chapter 2 by characterizing the Fragments in the preface as a ridiculous 
“pamphlet” with no “claim to being a part of the scientific- scholarly endeavor 
in which one acquires legitimacy . . . as a co- worker, . . . volunteer attendant, 
. . . a hero or . . . an absolute trumpeter” (SKS 4:215 / PF 5). This bit of fun 
and games, with an edge, continues into chapter 1, where he presents the doc-
trine of the incarnation as the central moral problem of his “thought- project” 
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(SKS 4:218 / PF 9). There he appropriates the language of Hamlet’s soliloquy 
in a punning manner, reminiscent of Shakespeare’s comedies, in order to offer 
his audience “crumbs” from Plato’s dialogues and “scraps” from doctrinal 
Christianity, before plagiarizing outright the God- man of the Gospels (SKS 
4:218–30  / PF 9–22). Anticipating his audience’s irritation at his flippant 
treatment of Socrates’s reflection on how one knows the truth, and at his 
even more flippant treatment of Christianity’s doctrines of the incarnation 
and of salvation, Climacus immediately releases the tension by admitting in a 
self- deprecating manner that he is “the most ludicrous of all project- cranks” 
for trying to pass off the figure of Jesus Christ and the standard conversion 
narrative as his own inventions (SKS 4:229–30 / PF 21–22). This allows him 
in all of his ineptitude to start again, in chapter 2, with a “poetical venture” 
(SKS 4:230–31 / PF 23)— a step down perhaps from trying to be a philoso-
pher of religion to trying to be a simple poet of the religious.
Taking on the role of poet, however, does not preclude Climacus from 
continuing to be a comic or a logician, for he opens chapter 2 of the Frag-
ments with the same jocularity and questioning as in the preface and chapter 
1, by teasing his Hegelian audience about their assumption that everyone 
has surpassed or “goes further” than Socrates (SKS 4:231  / PF 24) with 
their God’s- eye view of existence and “world historical knowledge” (see SKS 
7:124–28, 146, 176  / CUP 1:133–37, 157–58, 192; compare SKS 4:219–
20, 227–28  / PF 10, 19). This time, however, his teasing sets the stage for 
delving more deeply into Christ’s unique plight as teacher- savior. That is, 
Climacus figures that if he can get his readers to see the difficulties involved 
in Socrates’s role as teacher, particularly in regard to Socrates’s attempt to 
create a situation of equality with his students, he might also get his audience 
to see the challenges involved in the God- man’s attempt to achieve equality 
with human beings.
Climacus begins by giving a kind of pseudo- historical account of Socrates 
as an ordinary man who has nothing on his followers where the truth or 
the divine is concerned (SKS 4:230–31  / PF 23). In fact, he says, it is the 
duty of Socrates as teacher to help his pupils see that they must help each 
other to long for and seek the truth (SKS 4:231–32 / PF 24). The situation 
becomes comical, though, when Plato and Alcibiades attempt to “idolize” 
Socrates, who, although a lover of his overzealous followers, must display 
“cold irony [kolde Ironi]” (SKS 4:231–32 / PF 24). With a smile still on his 
face, Climacus shifts the focus to the God- man by rehearsing— or, as he will 
later suggest, “plagiarizing” (see SKS 4:241 / PF 35)— another story familiar 
to his nineteenth- century audience: the ballad of King Cophetua and the beg-
gar maid (SKS 4:233– 37 / PF 26– 30). The point in recounting this story is to 
provide a Christian parallel to the Socratic one that challenges his audience’s 
identification of God with power— that is, as absolute Spirit or Mind.
The ballad of King Cophetua and the beggar maid is a medieval English 
tale of an unconventional, idealized, romantic love between an African prince 
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and an impoverished girl variously called Penelophon or Zenelophon.26 In 
appropriating it from Shakespeare, who himself appropriated it from earlier 
troubadours, Climacus knows that he is fooling no one. Indeed, he expects 
his Hegelian audience to roll their eyes at this, since he is obviously being 
just as much a poet crank as a thought- project crank.27 Climacus, never-
theless, asks them to indulge him because he knows that the best way to 
challenge their conceptions of God as incarnate power and knowledge is to 
take the psychological and moral road of “dialectical” poetry, which does not 
“foreshorten” the difficulties of faith by providing a “reassuring conclusion” 
(SKS 4:229–30, 233–34, 241  / PF 20–21, 26, 35; SKS 7:263–64, 317–21, 
399–403 / CUP 1:289, 347–51, 439–43).
Climacus begins innocently enough by encouraging his sophisticated audi-
ence to act like children. “Suppose,” he says, “there was a king who loved a 
humble maiden” (SKS 4:233 / PF 26).28 That is, imagine that God is a lofty 
and awe- inspiring king like Cophetua in the ballad, who loves human beings 
passionately and wants to be their equal in love. Then, in order to give them a 
sense of human inferiority before God, that is, human sin, which, for Clima-
cus, is more a moral matter than an ontological one, Climacus says: Imagine 
that human beings are like a poor, dirty, but beautiful, young, peasant woman 
like Penelophon who has, amazingly, garnered the king’s favor. Is this not 
something to wonder at? Does this not create a huge dilemma for both par-
ties? Is it not impossible for unequals to be happy in love (SKS 4:233–34 / PF 
26–27)? By setting up such a situation and asking questions that highlight the 
opposition, Climacus immediately creates tension and brings his audience’s 
now awakened imaginations into concert with his own. He then outlines the 
problem for his readers’ consideration, as though it were their job to solve 
it. By doing so, Climacus gives his audience both intimacy with and distance 
from the king’s and the maiden’s dilemma. That is, in accord with the story-
telling procedure that Kierkegaard discusses in the aforementioned journal 
entry from 1837, Climacus gets his audience on board by demonstrating 
that he has confidence in their intellectual abilities to help him to solve this 
intriguing but vexing problem since he is “only a poet” (SKS 4:233 / PF 26; 
see also SKS 17:124–25, BB:37 / KJN 1:118– 19). However, as it is a “poeti-
cal” problem, he initially treats it as though it were a particularly interesting 
parlor game or salon discussion— something with which Heiberg and Mar-
tensen were thoroughly familiar (SKS 4:233–42  / PF 26–36; compare SKS 
10:135–36 / CD 124–26).
Climacus continues by maintaining that the barrier between the divine 
king and his beloved maiden- creation rests in the probability that she will not 
understand him (SKS 4:234–37 / PF 28– 29). In other words, as in the medi-
eval ballad, Climacus’s concern is to foreground the psychological anguish 
and anxiety of both parties. And like the medieval storyteller, Climacus starts 
with God the King’s initial problem of getting the human- maiden to come to 
him in love, which in itself is no mean feat, since regal power is awe- inspiring, 
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and so off- putting. Once the human- maiden is under the sway of the divine 
power, though, the real problem emerges for the king, namely, what kind of 
relationship will facilitate genuine intimacy between them. Climacus imme-
diately divides this second problem into two problems because he realizes 
that there are only two things that God the King can do to help the human- 
maiden to understand him and be truly intimate with him. Either God the 
King must raise her to his regal status or he must lower himself to her humble 
status.
Assuming that his audience is predisposed to value power, Climacus starts 
with the former option, but he realizes immediately that it poses a serious 
problem. He does not get ponderous about it, however; instead, he keeps 
everything light by gently exposing the contradiction with a bit of levity. 
That is, picking up the relationship of the God- man to his disciples as set out 
in chapter 1 of the Fragments, Climacus maintains that the disciple- maiden 
can become “most terribly deceived” only if God the King raises her to his 
level, because she cannot help but be “spellbound by a change of costume” 
(SKS 4:236 / PF 29). That is, like Penelophon and, for that matter, Plato and 
Alcibiades, she cannot help but to overidentify with God’s absolute power to 
the point of rejecting herself as created, since the costume basically reveals 
that she is “nothing” for divine power without it (SKS 10:138–40 / CD 127–
29). She does not realize this immediately, though, because at the moment, 
she is caught up in a dream. Her “prince has come; swept her off her feet; 
and carried her off in style.”29 According to Climacus, the learner- maiden’s 
forgetfulness of herself does not satisfy God the King because he wants her 
glorification, not his own, and delights in her as “something” for his love, 
not his power, as Kierkegaard says elsewhere (SKS 10:138–40 / CD 127–29; 
compare SKS 7:224 / CUP 1:246). Therefore, he must tell her that the ben-
efits of monarchical power are not real benefits— something that can only 
seem like foolishness as long as power is the definition of divinity— and the 
perceived means for well- being. Herein, however, is the crux of the matter, 
for it is difficult for human beings even to recognize God as tenderness and 
vulnerability when the very concept of divinity is synonymous with domina-
tion and power (SKS 4:236–37 / PF 29–30).
Climacus concludes that this option will not lead to genuine intimacy; 
therefore, the path of humility must be considered. On this second path, Cli-
macus divests divinity of the very power that ordinarily defines and makes it 
attractive by showcasing the suffering of the God- man and by bringing his 
audience closer to the God- man’s “wise and unwavering eyes,” as Kierke-
gaard puts it in his discussion of Tieck’s fairy- tale figures in The Concept of 
Irony (SKS 1:339 / CI 306). That is, in this instance, God the King becomes a 
lowly and despised human being so that he might be the equal of all human 
beings. Yet, by doing so, he subjects himself to even graver misunderstanding 
than before, for this time misunderstanding brings with it rejection, abuse, 
and death (SKS 238–40 / PF 31–34). God the King suffers all of the risks of 
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trying to be the equal of his beloved but fragile human creation, while also 
working desperately not to crush or offend them (SKS 4:238–39 / PF 32). 
This makes God an “unhappy,” even tortured “consciousness,” to use Hegel’s 
terms,30 particularly when one gazes at him, in all of the vulnerability of his 
love, as he is brutally beaten and executed by the very ones from whom he 
seeks love (SKS 4:232–33, 238–39 / PF 25–26, 32–33). It is futile, however, 
says Climacus, to try to dissuade this king to give up this position of despised 
and condemned servant, even out of sincere concern for him, for doing so 
will only make one his adversary, so that he will say, “To think that you could 
become so unfaithful to me and grieve love in this way; so you love only the 
omnipotent one . . . not him who humbled himself in equality with you” (SKS 
4:239 / PF 33).
With this subtle shift to the personal pronoun “you,” Climacus brings the 
tension in the story to its climax, for his “imaginary [re]construction” of the 
gospel story has not “slacken[ed] the tension of the conflict in a reassuring 
conclusion, but by means of its teasing form [has made his readers] even 
more contemporary [with it]” (SKS 7:263–64 / CUP 1:289), so that they are 
now confronted with a decisive or “transformative” moment.31 They must 
now admit to themselves how they truly feel about the Christian God. Will 
they view Climacus’s conception of the divine as a thoroughgoing nightmare 
and denounce Climacus for disrupting their dream? Or will they allow his 
little existential play to be the beginning of a new life of faith, fueled by a 
grace- imbued imagination? As Kierkegaard the dialectical poet sees it, these 
are some of the weighty questions that a little storytelling can facilitate.
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He walks like a stranger, and yet he seems to be at home, for 
through the imagination he is always at home with this image, 
which he desires to resemble. (SKS 12:188 / PC 189)
“When it was a matter of boldness, enthusiasm, zeal, almost to the border 
of madness, what was this pen not able to present!” So exclaims Kierke-
gaard, with joyous breathlessness, in The Point of View for My Work as an 
Author (SKS 15:52 / PV 72). As one can see, it is not intractable paradoxes 
he falls into a swoon over, not the silent plains of the conceptual or the infin-
ity of combinations, but rather the pen’s artistic appeal to the senses in a 
thoroughgoing and not insignificant sense. It is hardly a risky claim to make 
that it is precisely thanks to this eminent command of the rhetorical register 
that Kierkegaard is Kierkegaard. Just as Hegel’s thought characteristically 
operates on such a high level of abstraction that association and imagina-
tion must rush to the rescue of readers when they are just about to succumb 
under the strenuousness of the concept, so almost the opposite is the case 
with Kierkegaard.1 No sooner have you been set down in the midst of a 
complicated dialectical operation than you are sent off on a rejuvenating 
jaunt into a text that expounds itself expressively, brightly, and breezily, as all 
the while the compact mass of the concept transforms into images, expands 
allegorically, or dons the down- to- earth form of the fable. One could there-
fore fittingly call Kierkegaard’s philosophical discourse, which continually 
oscillates between concept and image, a discourse of visualization, while his 
theological discourse is a kind of discourse of autopsy, insofar as it attempts 
to suspend the time between Jesus of Nazareth and the modern reader.
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic practice associates him with a famous pair of con-
cepts in the aesthetic tradition: namely, the concepts of the beautiful and 
the sublime, which, particularly since the appearance of Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790), have been a constant part of the 
curriculum in modern aesthetic theory.2 The beautiful, according to Kant, is 
everything that merely pleases but never affects the viewer in a deeper sense, 
and thus awakens neither anxiety nor desire in the viewer but instead engen-
ders a contemplative state that may very well look a little like happiness. 
This experience of beauty stands in contrast to the experience of the sublime, 
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which has an almost violent effect upon the imagination. The sublime is 
the catastrophic, the awesome and anxiety- inducing: mountains in sudden 
motion, a foaming sea, earthquakes, fatal phenomena that completely breach 
the familiarity of civilization and momentarily throw humanity’s self- evident 
place in the world into doubt.3
For obvious reasons, a text cannot be sublime in the Kantian sense, but it 
can imitate or mimic the sublime by shaking its reader rhetorically. Countless 
examples could be used to demonstrate that this is what the Kierkegaard-
ian texts aim to do, but let me just cite a journal entry from 1845, where 
Kier ke gaard, speaking of the ideal of the art of preaching, remarks, “If no 
earthquake, no volcanic eruption, no plague, war, etc., teaches people about 
the uncertainty of everything, then daily use of the religious discourse ought 
to have the same effect” (SKS 18:275, JJ:407 / KJN 2:254). With this, Kierke-
gaard is not merely far- removed from the values of enlightened humanism 
and the norms of cultivated society; he has also announced the discourse 
of sublimity that he practices in his writing. And just as the text mimics the 
sublime, so must the reader mimic the text.
This is confirmed, almost to excess, by the third section of Practice in 
Christianity, which Kierkegaard published on September 27, 1850, and, 
at the last minute, attributed to Anti- Climacus. The work consists of three 
sections or numbers, with three separate title pages and three separate but 
identical prefaces, all of which are signed “S.K.” The third of these sections is 
presented on the chapter title page as “Christian Development” and thereby 
calls to mind formation and the Bildungsroman. In this third section, which is 
divided into seven chapters of varying length, the third chapter is introduced 
with the following prayer:
Lord Jesus Christ! How various are the many things to which a per-
son can feel drawn, but there is one thing to which no one ever felt 
naturally drawn, and that is to suffering and abasement. We human 
beings think that we ought to flee from that as long as possible and 
in any case must be forced into it. But you, our Savior and Redeemer, 
you the abased one, who will not force anyone, and least of all into 
what must be a person’s highest honor: to dare to want to be like 
you— would that the image of you in your abasement might stand 
before us so vividly, so awakening and persuasive, that we will feel 
ourselves drawn to you in lowliness, drawn to want to be like you 
in lowliness, you who from on high will draw all to yourself. (SKS 
12:170 / PC 167)
The prayer is not just a prayer. It also contains elements of the tactic with 
which Kierkegaard intends to overcome the resistance with which the so- 
called natural person meets suffering and abasement. And just as such 
resistance is natural, so too is the resistance of the text to the artistic, the 
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artificial, the cunning. As the text demonstrates, the natural person’s resis-
tance to suffering and abasement is overcome precisely through an “image,” 
one that makes such suffering and humiliation not merely “vivid” and 
“awakening” but also so “persuasive” that the reader is drawn into wanting 
to resemble the abased one.
Although it is imperative for Anti- Climacus to maintain the “prototype’s” 
radical and fundamental difference from an epoch that aestheticizes the Chris-
tian categories, the countermove he initiates against such an aestheticization 
is itself utterly aesthetic, insofar as his text persistently addresses the reader’s 
powers of visualization. Symptomatic in this respect is the marked tendency, 
to which Anti- Climacus is prone, of appealing often and excessively to the 
eyes and the gaze. “Is this sight not able to move you?” (SKS 12:173 / PC 171; 
compare SKS 12:174 / PC 171) he declares after an account of the debased 
savior, an account that is accompanied on its passage through the text by 
persistent comments on the impact this particular “sight” has upon the reader. 
“So look at him once again, him the abased one! What effect does this sight 
produce? Should it not be able to move you in some way to want to suffer in 
a way akin to his suffering?” (SKS 12:176 / PC 174; compare SKS 12:176, 
180 / PC 173, 178). With this iconography the reader will be moved— “not,” 
it should be noted, “to tears” (SKS 12:174 / PC 171) and other sentimental-
ity but rather away from the text and thence to action outside the text. Only 
there, on the outside, is this particular reading concluded in earnest.
In parallel with this frequent appeal to the reader’s readiness to visualize, 
the text sets out to exclude our well- known, all- too- well- known image of 
Christ. Sounding almost like a hypnotist’s patter, it says, “If possible, forget 
for a moment everything you know about him; tear yourself away from the 
perhaps apathetic habitual way in which you know about him; approach 
it as if it were the first time you heard the story of his abasement” (SKS 
12:176 / PC 174). Even if this gesture does not have the desired effect, the 
text promptly offers a radical alternative: “Or if you think you are not able 
to do that, well, then, let us help ourselves in another way, let us use the help 
of a child, a child who is not warped by having learned by rote a simple 
school assignment about Jesus Christ’s suffering and death, a child who for 
the first time hears the story— let us see what the effect will be, if only we tell 
it fairly well” (SKS 12:176 / PC 174). One notes how Anti- Climacus carefully 
maintains that the child is not spoiled by the hackneyed interactions with the 
divine that follow from the mechanical rote learning in schooling but, on the 
contrary, that the child possesses the “primitivity” that is the alpha and omega 
of the religious condition. Anti- Climacus continues, “Imagine a child, and 
then delight this child by showing it some of those artistically insignificant 
but for children very valuable pictures one buys in the shops” (SKS 12:177 / 
PC 174).4 Various pictures are laid out in front of the child— one of Napo-
leon, one of William Tell, and so forth— which the adult accompanies with 
lively, horizon- broadening explanations. Just as the child, with “unspeakable 
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delight,” lets its gaze leap from picture to picture, its eye is suddenly caught 
by one “that you have deliberately placed among the others; it portrays the 
one crucified” (SKS 12:177 / PC 174– 75). At first the child cannot relate to 
the picture, which it puzzles over and asks “why he is hanging from such a 
tree” (SKS 12:177 / PC 175). When the adult explains that the picture depicts 
an execution, the child becomes greatly affected, to such a degree that it 
becomes “anxious and afraid for his parents and the world and himself” and 
forgets all about the other pictures, for “as it says in the ballad, they will all 
turn their backs, so different is this picture” (SKS 12:177 / PC 175).
The sight of one crucified is, in a Kantian sense, a sublime moment, filled 
to the brim with strangeness and horror, and thus capable of carrying the 
child away from the familiar, well- known world that Anti- Climacus has bro-
ken down. Special emphasis is placed on the way this breakdown brings 
about immense alienation within the child, whose shock, understandably 
enough, increases when one tells it “that this crucified one is the Savior of 
the world” (SKS 12:177 / PC 175). Once this one picture (billede) has pushed 
itself in front of all the others and has thereby wholly concretely made itself 
into a prototype (forbillede), the adult must then furnish the child with the 
“prototype’s” more specific religious character:
See, now is the moment; if you have not already made too powerful 
an impression upon the child, then tell him now about the one who 
was lifted up, who from on high will draw all to himself. Tell the child 
that this one who was lifted up is [the crucified]. Tell the child that he 
was love, that he came to the world out of love, took upon himself 
the form of a lowly servant, lived for only one thing— to love and to 
help people, especially all those who were sick and sorrowful and 
suffering and unhappy. Tell the child what happened to him in his 
lifetime, how one of the few who were close to him betrayed him, the 
few others denied him, and everyone else insulted and mocked him, 
until finally they nailed him to the cross— as shown in the picture. . . . 
Tell it very vividly to the child, as if you yourself had never heard it 
before or had never told it to anyone before; tell it as if you yourself 
had composed the whole story, but do not forget any feature of it that 
has been preserved, except that you may forget as you are telling it 
that it is preserved. (SKS 12:178 / PC 176)
Anti- Climacus’s recurring imperatives (“Tell! Tell!”) signify that the occa-
sion is no longer— as with Climacus in Philosophical Fragments5— a laconic, 
world- historical nota bene but rather a dramatically presented narra-
tive sequence, which takes shape through the narrative’s almost feverish 
engagement in what is narrated. Whereas for Climacus the moment was a 
paradoxical point that evades both comprehension and vision, with Anti- 
Climacus it becomes expressive and plastic: the moment (Øieblikket, “the 
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glance of an eye”) unites with the eye’s glance when it is exposed to an image 
that works by grasping, and grasps by making itself present. At the sight of 
this bloody image the child loses its sense of “time and place” (SKS 12:186 / 
PC 186) to such a degree that it quite forgets that the event itself, the crucifix-
ion, took place “over eighteen hundred years [ago]” (SKS 12:179 / PC 177).
Bildungsroman and Visualizing Bildungsroman
The experiment with the child constitutes the first part of the sequence that I, 
in a hybrid translation, call Kierkegaard’s billeddannelsesroman. The hybrid 
is formed by combining the word billeddannelse, which can be translated 
as “image formation,” with the word dannelsesroman, which in English is 
rendered by the German term Bildungsroman. Perhaps one could render 
billeddannelsesroman as “image formation novel” or “picture creation,” but 
in what follows I prefer to use the term “visualizing Bildungsroman.” The 
point is that the images that are formed transform the one who forms these 
images. Hence it is no coincidence that the word Bild, “picture,” occupies 
such a prominent place in Bildung.
Formation novels and visualizing formation novels are both in the 
business of bringing an identity- formation to consummation. Such an 
identity- formation normally depends upon a productive exchange between 
individualization and socialization. A person never becomes herself by herself 
and for herself but always via detours, by historical, cultural, and many other 
detours, in other words, via the world. It is this process that the Bildungsro-
man presents in epic fashion, when it has its protagonist— typically a young, 
intellectual man— go out into the world in order to fulfill his own, natural 
talents and little by little bring himself into balance with himself and his 
surroundings. The Bildungsroman is a diverse and folkloristic undertaking, 
with an extensive gallery of personae— artists, jugglers, magicians, sensual 
women, and other captivating figures— wherein the protagonist (and the 
reader!) can see themselves reflected.6 After an enthusiastic odyssey through 
foreign milieux and cultures, the protagonist returns home as a clarified 
version of himself and has, through his return, carried out the three- phase 
compositional scheme at home— homeless— home by which the Bildungsro-
man is guided and with which it consolidates its capacity to edify.
Kierkegaard never wrote a Bildungsroman; indeed, it is a matter of debate 
whether any text among the mountains of written paper he left behind can 
meaningfully be called a novel. It is indisputable, however, that Kierkegaard 
thinks in character types and populates his work with textual characters that 
he either imports from the rich stock of world literature or single- handedly 
conjures up from the magical darkness of the ink bottle. The presence of 
these textual characters in Kierkegaard’s discourse is not merely due to 
Kierkegaard’s wanting to illustrate his philosophical or theological concerns 
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in them but goes considerably further and reveals the long- neglected fact that 
Kierkegaard understands the person as a being that, in its encounter with sto-
ries— be it in myth, Greek tragedy, or biblical accounts— is endowed with a 
narrative identity, which it is inscribed into and is being interpreted through. 
This is true of the young man in Repetition, whose self- understanding is 
fundamentally altered after reading the book of Job; it is true of a number of 
characters in Fear and Trembling, where the account of Abraham’s willing-
ness to sacrifice Isaac is maintained in the most varied ways, but it is true also 
in the upbuilding production, where the reader is exposed to and enclosed 
by the New Testament narrative, inasmuch as the exposure reflects “the law” 
and the enclosure corresponds to “the gospel.”
The conception of Christian identity- formation that is developed and radi-
calized, work by work, throughout the authorship is also inextricably bound 
up with the New Testament narrative: in Christian identity- formation, one 
receives one’s identity by placing oneself as a narrative possibility at the dis-
posal of the God that came into being in Jesus of Nazareth and has sealed his 
fate. In the comprehensive program of formation that Kierkegaard offers in 
his authorship, there thus stands a theological aim of actualizing, within the 
individual person, the relationship to self and to God given in the Christian 
narrative.
There is thus a double identity- formation in Kierkegaard: first, human 
identity- formation, which implies that the person must relate to himself or 
herself as a more or less realized self- relation; second, Christian identity- 
formation, which entails that the person in such a self- relationship must 
also relate to himself or herself as a not- yet- actualized narrative possibil-
ity. Vigilius Haufniensis and Anti- Climacus represent the double formation 
in their respective programmatic declarations; the former, when he demon-
strates in The Concept of Anxiety that the task is to make a person into “the 
true and the whole man” (SKS 4:325 / CA 18); the latter, when he decrees in 
The Sickness unto Death that “the self must be broken in order to become 
itself” (SKS 11:179 / SUD 65).
The New Testament narrative is the prism through which this breaking of 
the subject takes place, and Anti- Climacus has thereby, with brilliant, anach-
ronistic precision, announced the deconstruction of the subject as practiced in 
the late Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses and the late production overall. 
This deconstruction is practiced in various ways, but if one turns one’s gaze 
toward the next phase in the visualizing Bildungsroman, one will, I think, be 
able to get an impression of this theological praxis.
“The Image of Perfection”
With this background in mind, let me return to the third section of Practice in 
Christianity, whose fourth chapter portrays the child’s further development. 
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The chapter does not refer expressly to the previous one, but it seems evident 
that the two chapters belong together in narrative terms and fall under the 
category “Christian Development” announced by the section heading. The 
child is no longer a child, but a youth. From the stage directions that intro-
duce him, it appears that the earlier “vision” of the abased savior continues 
to work as an indelible afterimage and lies behind the life view the youth goes 
by in the world. The child, hypnotically thrown into his state of contempora-
neity with Jesus of Nazareth, had certainly expressed his astonishment that 
God did not step in and prevent the horrors of the crucifixion, but when the 
adult, by way of response, had spoken of the resurrection on the third day, 
the account made no particular impression on the child, who is absorbed by 
the story of Jesus’s suffering and death to such a degree that it simply “will 
not feel like hearing about the glory that followed” (SKS 12:179 / PC 177). 
After a period of wishing to avenge Jesus and put his tormentors to death, the 
child regained his composure, but he has by no means forgotten that impres-
sion from childhood; now he simply interprets the impression in a different 
way (see SKS 12:180 / PC 178).
Before the next phase of the visualizing Bildungsroman unfolds, Anti- 
Climacus inserts an anthropological statement into his text: “Every human 
being possesses to a higher or lower degree a capability called the power of 
the imagination, a power that is the first condition for what becomes of a 
person” (SKS 12:186 / PC 186). One understands that the youth in the visu-
alizing Bildungsroman we are considering is in possession of precisely such 
an imaginative capacity, thanks to which he is able to comprehend “some 
image of perfection (ideal),” which can either be “handed down by history” 
and thereby have “the actuality of being” or be “formed by the imagina-
tion itself” and thus be a nonactual entity, a mere “thought- actuality” (SKS 
12:186 / PC 186– 87). Anti- Climacus informs us, “To this image . . . the youth 
is now drawn by his imagination, or his imagination draws this image to him. 
He becomes infatuated with this image. . . . He does not abandon it, even in 
sleep, this image that makes him sleepless” (SKS 12:186 / PC 187).7
One of imagination’s strengths is that it is able to suspend time and space, 
but its weakness is that it places the youth at a distance from the sufferings 
that are in fact associated with wanting to actualize the ideal. Anti- Climacus 
explains, “In one sense the imagination’s image or the image that the imagi-
nation depicts or maintains is still nonactuality; with regard to adversities 
and sufferings, it lacks the actuality of time and of temporality and or earthly 
life” (SKS 12:187 / PC 187). How it comes about that the nonactual “image” 
or “picture” depicted by the imagination nonetheless does impose the suf-
ferings of actuality upon the youth is described in the following passage, in 
which the youth experiences a decisive metamorphosis:
His appearance shows it; his eyes see nothing of what lies closest 
around him, they seek only that image; he walks like a dreamer, and 
92 Joakim Garff
yet one can see by the fire and the flame in his eyes that he is wide 
awake; he walks like a stranger, and yet he seems to be at home, for 
through the imagination he is always at home with this image, which 
he desires to resemble. And just as it so beautifully happens with 
lovers that they begin to resemble each other, so the young man is 
transformed in likeness to this image, which imprints or impresses 
itself on all his thought and on every utterance by him, while he, 
to repeat, with his eyes directed to this image— has not watched his 
step, has not paid attention to where he is. He wants to resemble this 
image; he is already beginning to resemble it— and now he suddenly 
discovers the surrounding world of actuality in which he is standing 
and the relation of this surrounding world to himself. (SKS 12:188 / 
PC 189)
It is a subtle fact in the visualizing Bildungsroman that as a result of his 
infatuation with the image, the youth loses his orientation in the empiri-
cal world and is thereby exposed to the very suffering that his “imaginary 
image” had kept at a safe distance from him. Like the lovers who over time 
come to resemble each other, the youth is little by little transformed by his 
“imaginary image,” which has occupied him to such an extent that the image 
visibly “imprints or impresses itself” in his whole appearance, his thought 
and speech: the iconic fixation has brought about his own iconification.
As already mentioned, the typical Bildungsroman brings to fruition a 
process of individuation, the sequential structure of which follows the topog-
raphy of the formation journey and can therefore be reproduced with the 
phrases at home— homeless— home. The visualizing Bildungsroman decon-
structs this schema, inasmuch as it adds a dialectical Christian qualification 
to the second phase and postpones the third phase to a more or less meta-
phorical eternity. We thus came to know of the youth that he went about 
as a stranger among people but was nonetheless at home because he was at 
home with the image he so passionately wanted to resemble (compare SKS 
12:188 / PC 189). Precisely this modality, being a stranger and yet at home, 
is the authentic, Christian modality in this world, a world in which only 
the inauthentic Christian can feel at home: “So the youth goes out into the 
world with this image before his eyes. He does not need to do what piety 
felt the urge to do— to walk the long way to the Holy Land in order to put 
himself back in time, because this image is so vivid to him that in another 
sense he still can be said to have journeyed abroad, although he remains in 
his customary place in the old surroundings— but occupied solely with want-
ing to resemble this image” (SKS 12:192 / PC 193). This allegorization of the 
pilgrimage, which is carried over from the outer, real world to the subject’s 
interiority, corresponds to suspension instituted by the “imaginary image” of 
the time between the youth and Jesus of Nazareth. The youth shall not set out 
on the long journey to the Holy Land, not give himself over to homelessness, 
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because he already is homeless in this world— precisely thanks to the image 
whose existential configuration he increasingly takes on. With a paradoxi-
cal logic of its own, the youth also undergoes a metamorphosis into an “old 
person,” “although not many years have passed” (SKS 12:194  / PC 195). 
The visualizing Bildungsroman’s ontogenetic final stage is a reality, and Anti- 
Climacus can conclude:
In a certain sense the youth’s imagination has deceived him, but 
indeed, if he himself wills, it has not deceived him to his detriment, 
it has deceived him into the truth; by means of a deception, it has, as 
it were, played him into God’s hands. . . . A shudder, it is true, may 
go through him for a moment as he now considers the matter, but 
abandon the image— no, that he cannot persuade himself to do. On 
the other hand, if he cannot persuade himself to abandon the image, 
he cannot escape the suffering either.  .  .  . So he does not abandon 
the image but cheerfully enters the suffering into which he is being 
led. . . . 
He perseveres until he dies: then he passed his test. He himself 
became the image of perfection he loved, and the imagination has 
truly not deceived him any more than Governance. (SKS 12:189– 91 / 
PC 190– 91)
Exit: Brushes, Palette, Pen, Paper
Kierkegaard’s critique of the cultivated society, a critique that gathers strength 
over time and becomes one of the essential preconditions for the so- called 
struggle with the Church, is a chapter in itself but is rooted in a Christian 
quarrel with every nonreligious body of thought that assumes the person 
herself has at her disposal the crucial conditions for emancipating herself 
from her more or less self- imposed immaturity and becoming herself— and 
thus, under her own power, escaping her existential homelessness and coming 
home, as the terminology of the formation novel would have it. Kierkegaard 
wishes to keep existence open, such that every time is accessible for God, who 
is the person’s creator and therefore reserves the sovereign right to compose 
poetically with his creation— terrible, joyful, sublime.
That it is the iconic representation of Christ that is transposed into the 
youth’s imitation should have made it clear how the aesthetic (image) is 
active in the religious (prototype) or, if you will, how deeply mimesis is con-
nected with imitatio. So it is not for nothing that the difference between 
the words “picture” (billede) and “prototype” (forbillede) is only the little 
prefix for- , which Anti- Climacus never remarks upon. Nor does he note that 
the difference between the words “draw” or “attract” (drage) and “deceive” 
(bedrage) is only be- , and that there is thus only a hair’s breadth between the 
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redemptive activity carried out by the divine and the manipulative practice 
characteristic of a seducer.
However, in his portrayal of the movement of the icon- fixated youth 
toward the sufferings of actuality, Anti- Climacus himself presumably senses 
how his portrayal has suddenly acquired an alarming resemblance to a seduc-
tion story. In any case, he finds himself compelled to include this reassuring 
remark: “If the power that governs human life were a seductive power, then at 
this moment it would mockingly say of this youth: Look, now he is trapped” 
(SKS 12:188 / PC 189). Yet Governance does not mock in this way, so long 
as “the power that governs human life is love” (SKS 12:189 / PC 189). This 
is of course an upbuilding thought, but— one may well object— in itself it is 
absolutely no guarantee that the text in which the dangers of seduction are 
repudiated does not itself have seduction within its power and perhaps prac-
tices it most effectively precisely by downplaying it. And perhaps, when all 
is said and done, that is the only way one can seriously play the reader “into 
God’s possession.”
The visualizing Bildungsroman testifies to Kierkegaard’s highly ambiva-
lent relationship toward art, reminiscent of the “sympathetic antipathy” 
that in The Concept of Anxiety is a fundamental determination of anxiety’s 
ambiguous essence. Later in Practice in Christianity this tension between aes-
thetic theory and aesthetic practice becomes dramatically exposed. In the 
work’s penultimate section, Anti- Climacus mocks the sermon that gives in 
to something as aesthetic as “contemplation” and thereby holds itself at an 
existential distance from “the prototype”: “by observing I go into the object 
(I become objective),” with the result that “I leave myself or go away from 
myself (I cease to be subjective)” (SKS 12:228 / PC 234). It is precisely these 
characteristics that the experiment with the child’s gaze, which got lost in 
the image of the crucified one, refutes in the starkest terms. If he were not so 
wrapped up in the image, the youth would never have wished to have become 
subjective.
The opposition between, on the one hand, “observation” or “admiration” 
as the merely objective, and, on the other hand, “imitation” as the subjective, 
true attitude toward the “prototype” gives Anti- Climacus the opportunity to 
speak about “Christian art” (SKS 12:246 / PC 254). In this regard he stresses 
how impossible it would be for him to portray Christ; indeed, as he explains 
further:
[It is] incomprehensible to me from whence an artist would gain the 
calmness, or incomprehensible to me is the calmness with which an 
artist has sat year in and year out occupied in the work of painting 
Christ— without having it occur to him whether Christ would wish 
to be painted, would wish to have his portrait, however idealized it 
became, depicted by his masterly brush. I do not comprehend how 
the artist would maintain his calm, that he would not notice Christ’s 
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displeasure, would not suddenly throw it all out, brushes and paints, 
far, far away, just as Judas did with the thirty pieces of silver, because 
he suddenly understood that Christ has required only imitators [i.e., 
disciples]. . . . I do not comprehend it; the brush would have fallen 
out of my hand the very second I was about to begin; very likely I 
would never have been the same again.
I do not comprehend this calmness of the artist in this kind of 
work. . . . 
Yes, this is incomprehensible to me; I repeat, it is incomprehensible 
to me. (SKS 12:246– 48 / PC 254– 56)
Perhaps what is most incomprehensible is that it all seems so incomprehen-
sible to Anti- Climacus. If the painter must throw out his paints and palettes, 
then Anti- Climacus, too, should throw out his pens and papers, for they are 
both producing “Christian art.” Nonetheless, or perhaps especially because 
of this, he continues indignantly, “Soon it will have gone so far that people 
must make use of art in the most various ways to help get Christendom to 
show at least some sympathy with Christianity” (SKS 12:248 / PC 256).
Anti- Climacus is right. Except that the moment will not come soon, but 
has already long since arrived and has come thanks, among others, to Anti- 
Climacus, who drills Christianity into his unchristian reader.
As art, indeed, can do.
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grafi (Odense: Universitetsforlag, Odense, 1982), 85.
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Kierkegaard’s Postscript as Antitheatrical, 
Anti- Hegelian Drama
Howard Pickett
Several problems take center stage as a reader enters the thick of Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). Perhaps none is as 
daunting or as decisive for the rest of the work as the one Johannes Climacus, 
pseudonymous author of this follow- up to Philosophical Fragments (1844), 
announces near the start of an early section entitled “The Subjective Issue”: 
“The difference between subjective and objective thinking must . . . manifest 
itself in the form of communication” (SKS 7:74 / CUP 1:73). This problem of 
form— how can one communicate outwardly a subjective existence character-
ized by “the isolation of inwardness”?— animates Postscript from beginning 
to end (SKS 7:74 / CUP 1:73). It also animates the present essay, which asks: 
What exactly is the form of Postscript, and how well does that form manifest 
the difference between subjective and objective thought? Alternatively, how 
well does the form of Postscript avoid the problems that arise when describ-
ing outwardly and abstractly (that is, objectively) the inward and particular 
existence of a subjective individual?
Taking my cue from “A First and Last Explanation” (Kierkegaard’s signed 
addendum to Postscript)— in particular, Kierkegaard’s comparison of himself 
to both a dramatic poet and a stage prompter (SKS 7:569 / CUP 1:625)— I 
argue that Postscript is essentially theatrical in form, a point sometimes intu-
ited but rarely tied to the text’s own explicit theatricality.1 Yet Postscript is 
also antitheatrical, at least in content. Tellingly, Climacus condemns abstract, 
speculative thought (“Hegelianism”) as a mere Schattenspiel, or “shadow 
play” (SKS 7:323 / CUP 1:353). Consequently, a theatrical approach is the 
last thing Postscript ought to adopt in its quest to take seriously actual, 
subjective individuals. Nevertheless, by Kierkegaard’s own admission, a thor-
oughly theatrical method is precisely what one finds on display not only in 
Hegel’s works but also in pseudonymous works like Postscript.
As I will argue, Postscript’s ambivalence toward the theatrical is neither 
carelessly inconsistent nor naively self- contradictory. For one thing, a reader 
might observe that Climacus rejects only certain aspects of theatricality while 
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affirming other aspects. As I show, Climacus rejects a Hegelian “philosophy 
of the spectacle” focused on detached spectators and mere external appear-
ances in exchange for an inward, subjective “philosophy of the actor,” with 
its defining emphasis on action and internal effort. In short, Climacus adopts 
a form of theatricality (and a theatrical view of the subject with it) purged 
of Hegelian detachment and deception. For another, Kierkegaard’s use of 
an antitheatrical theatrical persona (Climacus) suits a treatment of the sub-
ject especially well, since it dramatizes the inexpressibility of the essentially 
inward subject, while also highlighting its inevitable theatricality and insin-
cerity. In effect, Johannes Climacus’s reader learns that the subject is not 
amenable to direct external communication; subjective existence is not an 
outward spectacle to contemplate and display but an inward performance to 
enact. Yet, from “S. Kierkegaard,” signed “editor” of Postscript and spokes-
man of its final epilogue (“A First and Last Explanation”), the reader learns 
that the theatrical is inescapable for a philosophy of the subject. The best a 
published work like Postscript can do, then, is not to unmask itself but rather 
to draw attention to its mask as mask, exposing and confessing (metatheatri-
cally, as it were) its own inadequacy and hypocrisy.
Hegel’s Philosophy of the Spectacle
While debate continues over Kierkegaard’s precise relationship to Hegel, 
Postscript’s attack on systems, on the identity of thought and being, and on 
a preoccupation with the world- historical poses a substantial challenge to 
ideas found in the writings of both Hegel and Danish Hegelians (e.g., N. F. S. 
Grundtvig, J.  L. Heiberg, and H.  L. Martensen).2 Climacus’s repeated use 
of theatrical (more accurately, antitheatrical) metaphors not only offers a 
persistent critique of Hegelianism but also borrows the terms of that cri-
tique from Hegel’s own mouth, in particular, his Lectures on the Philosophy 
of History, posthumously published in 1837, nine years before Postscript.3 
There, theatrical terminology serves to describe Hegel’s central concept, the 
self- manifestation of Spirit in history: “On the stage [auf dem Theater] on 
which we are observing it,— Universal History— Spirit displays itself in its 
most concrete reality.”4 So central is this metaphor, the so- called theatrum 
mundi (theater of the world) topos, that it appears repeatedly throughout the 
lectures, in references to “Spirit; which has the History of the World for its 
theatre [Schauplatze, literally ‘scenes,’ ‘theaters’],” “the real theatre [Theater] 
of History,” and “the theatre [Theater] which was on the point of becoming 
the centre of History”— that is, Europe.5 Hegel also uses related metaphors 
from the theater to describe the human observation of Spirit’s self- exhibition. 
Prior to his religiously inflected “slaughter- bench [or altar] of history” 
analogy, Hegel imagines himself, the Spirit- contemplating philosopher, in 
theatrical terms, as one who “stands on the quiet shore, and thence enjoys in 
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safety the distant spectacle [Anblicks] of ‘wrecks confusedly hurled.’ ”6 The 
philosopher is, as Hegel says in the same passage, the one who studies the 
“actions of men . . . in this scene [Schauspiel] of activity.”7
For Johannes Climacus, however, both the outward visibility (even hypoc-
risy) of a theatrical spectacle and the detached, inactive orientation of its 
spectator are ill- suited to the inwardly engaged, subjective ethical agent. In 
effect, Hegel’s theatrical descriptions of his own philosophy quietly confess 
the superficiality and irresponsibility his thought fosters.
Theater’s Illusion
What Climacus wants is a philosophy of actual, subjective existence. Con-
sequently, what he condemns in Hegelian thought is the artificiality and 
illusoriness of objective thought, which bear too strong a resemblance to 
the theatrical arts. In part 2 of Postscript, he complains, “The dubiousness 
of ‘the method’ is already apparent in Hegel’s relation to Kant. . . . To reply 
to Kant within the fantastical Schattenspiel of pure thinking is precisely not 
to reply to him.— The only an sich that cannot be thought is existing, with 
which thinking has nothing at all to do” (SKS 7:299–300  / CUP 1:328). 
While Climacus emphasizes the actuality of the existing subject, Hegel, in 
contrast, emphasizes the phantasm of pure thinking, compared here not only 
to the fictitious illusions of the stage (themselves, in some sense, unreal) but 
also to the insubstantial shadows cast by the mere puppets of a Schattenspiel. 
Moreover, with that analogy, Climacus links Hegelian speculation not only 
with shadow theater’s thoroughly insubstantial illusions but also, because 
his analogy recalls Plato’s allegory of the cave (Republic 7.514a–520e, CDP 
747– 52), with the West’s archetypal image of illusory, erroneous thought.8 As 
Climacus later observes, the centerpiece of a philosophy of the subject is not 
“humanity in general, subjectivity in general, and other such things, whereby 
everything becomes easy inasmuch as the difficulty is removed and the whole 
matter is shifted over into the Schattenspiel of abstraction” (SKS 7:323 / CUP 
1:353). Rather, what matters is the particular lived reality of the existing 
individual: “The difficulty is to exist in them, not abstractly to think oneself 
out of them and abstractly to think about, for example, an eternal divine 
becoming” (SKS 7:323 / CUP 1:354). Simply put, a particular, lived existence 
is real; abstract thought is not.
More to the point, ethical engagement is real; the object of detached con-
templation, a theatrical illusion. In Climacus’s words, “Only in the ethical 
is there immortality and eternal life; understood otherwise, world history is 
perhaps a play, a show [Skuespil]” (SKS 7:143 / CUP 1:154). This antitheatri-
cal distinction between actuality (the ethical) and theatricality (the aesthetic) 
also appears in Kierkegaard’s journals, which highlight “the tension of actu-
ality: that here— unlike the theater— actual hum. beings are playing” (SKS 
23:106, NB16:18, n.d. 1850  / KJN 7:106). Accordingly, Climacus seems 
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unlikely to adopt a theatrical approach to his own subjective, existential 
philosophical project. His is, after all, a philosophy of real existence, not the 
walking shadows of the stage.
Theater’s Detached Spectator
The Hegelian spectacle’s unreality also rests in no small part on the disen-
gaged or detached relationship one has with it. The posture of a spectator is 
wholly unsuitable to the ethical- existential. Again, the ethical has to do with 
the “tension of actuality,” that actual human beings are playing here, not as 
in the theater.” Yet, as already mentioned, the Hegelian philosopher of history 
stands back and observes, as would a spectator at the playhouse, the spec-
tacle of Spirit’s self- manifestation. Climacus voices his ethical objections to 
the objective and the aesthetic by noting, “Esthetically it is altogether appro-
priate that I as a spectator [Tilskuer] am enchanted by the stage scenery, the 
theatrical moonlight, and go home after having spent a very pleasant evening, 
but ethically it holds true that there is no change other than my own” (SKS 
7:358 / CUP 1:393). Whether fair to Hegel or not, Climacus condemns the 
Hegelian for obsessing over the outwardly observable events taking place at 
a distance from oneself and from one’s own inmost, passionately engaged 
decisions.
No matter how powerful onstage examples may be, observable others (in 
their superficial visibility and externality) serve for spectators as mere possibil-
ities. Yet those spectators, insofar as they are living, breathing agents, remain 
ethically obligated to engage not in possibilities alone but in actuality— not 
to spectate but to act.9 In contrast to Aristotle’s (alleged) view that “possibil-
ity, poetic and intellectual, is superior to actuality” (SKS 7:290 / CUP 1:318), 
Climacus contends that actuality is superior. As a result, Aristotle’s notion, 
found influentially in the Poetics (9.1451a, CWA 2:2322– 23) and repeated 
here by Climacus— namely, that theater deals in possibility— urges Clima-
cus’s ready rejection of dramatic metaphors for the ethical (at least, initially). 
In short, the genre of the possible seems altogether unsuitable for the task of 
the actual and the ethical.
Kierkegaard’s journals second that complaint. Specifically, Kierkegaard 
reiterates St. Augustine’s disgust with theater, complaining, in an echo of 
Confessions 3.2.2, that “tragedy is supposed to awaken compassion, ‘but 
what sort of compassion is it in which the spectator is not called upon to 
rush to provide assistance, but is only invited to enjoy the pain [?]’ ” (SKS 
24:282, NB23:156, n.d. 1851 / KJN 8:282).10 Like modern- day psychologists 
who worry that TV violence might desensitize spectators to the suffering 
of others, Augustine condemns the fundamentally unethical, irresponsible 
habits encouraged by the theater. Kierkegaard shares Augustine’s fears both 
here and in a separate, but no less Augustinian, journal entry from 1848: 
“To want to spectate [betragte] and to spectate . . . is essentially sinful and 
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culpable lasciviousness, just as any other lasciviousness— to be uplifted as a 
spectator instead of coming out into the tension of true actuality, spectating 
upon suffering as a good thing instead of suffering, etc. . . . In spectating one 
wants the enjoyment and bids goodbye to earnestness” (SKS 21:13, NB6:4 / 
JP 1:1051; compare KJN 5:9).11 What makes spectatorship so bad is its 
passivity, its aesthetic side, its failure to take seriously the actuality (the “ear-
nestness”) of lived experience, in which subjects ought to be engaged. What is 
wrong with Hegelian speculation is that it is, in effect, Hegelian “spectacula-
tion.”12 Because the human is called not simply to know certain things about 
the world but to participate fully and ethically in that world, the adoption of 
an aesthetic view denies our ethical calling. It also denies our true humanity, 
since it focuses us on an image (mental or theatrical) rather than on the thing 
itself: “One thing continually evaded Hegel: what it is to live; he knew only 
how to reproduce a copy of life” (SKS 20:44, NB42, n.d. 1846 / KJN 4:42).
Theater’s Outwardness and Hypocrisy
The theater is not only ill- suited to Climacus’s interest in actuality and ethics— 
“the very home of existence,” as he says (SKS 7:116 / CUP 1:121)— because 
it involves both shadowy illusions and inactive, disengaged spectators. It is 
also unsuitable as a paradigm for the ethical- existential insofar as it fetishizes 
the visible. Because, in Climacus’s view, subjectivity, ethics, and inwardness 
all align with one another, outward spectacles are, at best, morally irrelevant. 
Even if “Governance [i.e., Providence] arranges things so that a person’s inner 
striving is reflected magically in the shadow play of world history [verden-
shistoriske Skyggespil],” there would be no “merit” in that externality (SKS 
7:130 / CUP 1:139–40). What matters is the inward decision, not its outward 
appearance. Worse, this Hegelian emphasis on the external spectacle is not 
just morally indifferent; it risks being morally illicit as well, since it smacks 
of hypocrisy (not incidentally, from the Greek for “stage actor”). In effect, 
the contagion of theater’s hypocritical side bleeds over into the Hegelian phi-
losopher, who, like an actor, also hypocritically pretends to be something 
he or she is not. Making that criticism explicit, Kierkegaard’s journals regu-
larly associate Hegel with the “hypocrisy of the understanding” (SKS 24:443, 
NB25:7, n.d. 1851  / KJN 8:449). Kierkegaard complains, in particular, of 
the “frightful hypocrisy that has been promoted” by Hegelians, namely “that 
the objective . . . is everything— the subject is a matter of indifference” (SKS 
24:260, NB23:109, n.d. 1851 / KJN 8:259).
As that passage implies, Hegelian philosophers pretend to be something 
they are not when they obsess over the objects out there rather than the 
subjects they are within. The Hegelian is, then, most hypocritical when pre-
tending to be a mere spectator in the theater of the world rather than its 
actor. Therefore, one might say, the Hegelian is most actor- like when being 
least actor- like. By Climacus’s estimation, the Hegelian philosopher is not just 
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theatrical and hypocritical, but also comical: “Now, all in all, there are two 
ways for an existing individual: either he can do everything to forget that he 
is existing and thereby manage to become comic (the comic contradiction of 
wanting to be what one is not . . .), because existence possesses the remarkable 
quality that an existing person exists whether he wants to or not; or he can 
direct all his attention to his existing” (SKS 7:116 / CUP 1:120). In wanting to 
see existence from a vantage point outside of existence, the Hegelian forgets 
who (even what) he is, a forgetting that makes him both a hypocrite and a 
fool (both classic figures for the actor). At best, the Hegelian philosopher is 
the proverbial absent- minded professor: “Modern speculative thought . . . has 
not a false presupposition but a comic presupposition, occasioned by its hav-
ing forgotten in a kind of world- historical absent- mindedness what it means 
to be a human being” (SKS 7:116 / CUP 1:120).
At his worst, the Hegelian philosopher is, as already suggested, a hypo-
crite— a blasphemous one at that. The world- historical point of view is a 
perspective for God alone, not the human: “But who, then, is this systematic 
thinker? Well, it is he who himself is outside existence and yet in exis-
tence. . . . It is God” (SKS 7:115 / CUP 1:119). The Hegelian who pretends 
to see things from the God’s- eye view commits— indeed, becomes— a lie. He 
is, as Climacus later suggests, like a hypocrite who “follows his inclination 
to put on an act [skabe sig] and first transforms himself [skabe sig om] into a 
superrational something, just as alchemists and sorcerers bedizen themselves 
fantastically” (SKS 7:175 / CUP 1:191). As a result of his costumed quackery 
and blasphemy, Hegel, according to whom “truth is the continuous world- 
historical process,” makes himself guilty of hypocrisy— both “charlatanry 
[Charlatanerie]” and “deceptive [svigefuld]” appearances (SKS 7:39–40  / 
CUP 1:33). To the point here, the Hegelian hypocrite also makes herself the-
atrically “comic [Comiske]” (SKS 7:40 / CUP 1:34).
Theater’s Conclusiveness
Finally, Climacus also uses theatrical metaphors to expose the naïveté of 
the Hegelian system’s pretense toward closure. What makes Hegelian phi-
losophers theatrical— and, more than that, hypocritical— is not just their 
tendency to pretend to see things from God’s spectatorial point of view. They 
also have a related tendency to act as if they can see things in their fullness 
and completion. On the contrary, they ought to admit that their view of exis-
tence is limited to their own finite perspective and their own finite existence, 
which is ongoing— at least, as long as they live to consider it. In opposition 
to this Hegelian tendency, Climacus remarks, “In the system and in the fifth 
act of the drama, one has a positive conclusiveness speculatively- fantastically 
and esthetically- fantastically, but such a conclusiveness is only for fantastic 
beings” (SKS 7:117 / CUP 1:121). According to Climacus, the Hegelian sys-
tem, like the classic five- act play, has a certain order, predictability, and (most 
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damningly) a certain totality about it. Yet, just as the classic five- act play is 
a fiction, incapable of doing (perfect) justice to the depth, the complexity, 
the chaos, and the reality of our actual lives, so too, the Hegelian system is 
also fictional and deficient. Such theatrical fictions are fitting, Climacus says, 
“only for fantastic beings” (SKS 7:117 / CUP 1:121). They are fitting, one is 
tempted to add, for liars and hypocrites.
In place of this unrealistic conclusiveness (seen in the simplistic resolutions 
of the deus ex machina of classical drama or, closer to Kierkegaard’s own day, 
in the finale to Eugène Scribe’s “well- made play”), “continued striving is the 
expression of the existing subject’s life- view” (SKS 7:117 / CUP 1:121–22).13 
Climacus applies this antitheatrical inconclusiveness to the religious, specifi-
cally Christian domain when he writes, “Suppose that Christianity was and 
wants to be a mystery, an utter mystery, not a theatrical [theatralsk] mystery 
that is revealed in the fifth act, although the clever spectator [Tilskuer] already 
sees through [gennemskue] it in the course of the exposition” (SKS 7:195 / 
CUP 1:213). The appeal of Christianity to the paradox of the God- man is, 
for Climacus, the surest sign that it “does not at all want to be understood” 
but instead wants to require from its passionate adherent a never- ending— 
and, so, in some sense, a thoroughly untheatrical— striving (SKS 7:196 / CUP 
1:214). Ours is not a life from which one can step back and observe how 
things worked out. There is no conclusion, no well- worked- out final denoue-
ment to be observed— at least, not on this side of the grave. Yet, Climacus 
insinuates, that pretentious, blasphemous grasping at the whole is precisely 
what systematic, Hegelian philosophy characteristically attempts.
Consequently, Hegelian objective philosophy bears more than a little 
resemblance to the theater: (1) Unlike Climacus’s subjective thinker, the 
Hegelian focuses on illusions rather than the lived reality of actual existence. 
(2) What’s worse, he relates to those illusions in a spectatorial way by exam-
ining existence aesthetically as if it did not require his own actual, ethical 
involvement. (3) By failing to recognize his own existence as an actual, finite, 
ethically responsible individual, the Hegelian resembles the actor or, worse, 
the hypocrite, who pretends to be what he is not. (4) In the most hypocriti-
cal move of all, the objective Hegelian plays God and presumes to construct 
a conclusive system though even her own life is not yet concluded. In effect, 
Hegel’s thought is essentially theatrical. In terms provided by Eric Bentley’s 
famous definition of theater— “The theatrical situation, reduced to a min-
imum, is that A impersonates B while C looks on”— Climacus insinuates 
that the Hegelian hypocritically and comically impersonates God, while the 
reader looks on.14
With this thoroughgoing rejection of theater in mind, one would expect 
Climacus to adopt anything but a theatrical approach to his own thought. 
Yet, as the next section demonstrates, Climacus does just that, employing a 
subtler, admittedly different, but thoroughly theatrical paradigm for his own 
philosophy.
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Climacus’s Philosophy of the Actor
Theater’s Action Orientation
Having denounced the theatrical Hegelian subject, Climacus introduces, 
however surprisingly, his own theatrical metaphor for “becoming subjective” 
(SKS 7:121 / CUP 1:129). “Permit me by way of metaphor,” he notes, “to call 
to mind more graphically the difference between the ethical and the world- 
historical, the difference between the ethical relation of the individual to God 
and the relation of the world- historical to God” (SKS 7:146 / CUP 1:157). 
Teasing out that metaphor, Climacus compares the ethical life to a private 
performance: “A king sometimes has a royal theater [kongeligt Theater] 
solely for himself, but this difference, which excludes the ordinary citizens, 
is accidental. Not so when we speak of God and the royal theater he has for 
himself. Accordingly, the individual’s ethical development is the little private 
theater [Privat- Theater] where God certainly is the spectator [Tilskuer], but 
where on occasion the individual also is himself a spectator, although essen-
tially he is supposed to be an actor [Skuespilleren], not, however, one who 
deceives [bedrager] but one who discloses” (SKS 7:146 / CUP 1:157). Again, 
however surprisingly, Hegelian objectivity is not distinguished from ethical- 
existential subjectivity by contrasting Hegelian theatricality with Climacean 
nontheatricality. Rather, Climacus offers his readers a remarkably different 
kind of theater, but a theater nonetheless.
Unlike Hegel’s world- historical spectacle, Climacus’s “little private the-
ater” of ethical development is not open to the onlooking gaze of (other) 
human spectators. Strange as it may sound, ethical development and the 
related internal effort constitute an insistently invisible performance, viewed 
by God certainly, and by oneself occasionally. However, the individual agent 
does not primarily relate to that performance as a detached spectator might, 
but instead as its actor would— “essentially he is supposed to be an actor.” 
In the theater of the ethical- existential, the human moral agent is just that: 
an agent, one who acts (albeit inwardly), not one who merely watches or 
contemplates. Just as important, this inward theatrical performance has been 
(largely) purified of theater’s hypocrisy, since the self, acting here, is decidedly 
not “one who deceives, but one who discloses” (SKS 7:146 / CUP 1:157).
True, the Hegelian world- historical stage remains. In stark opposition to 
the Hegelian formulation, however, Climacus insists that God is its only true 
spectator: “But to God, world history is the royal stage where he, not acci-
dentally but essentially, is the only spectator [Tilskuer]” (SKS 7:146 / CUP 
1:158). Consequently, “admission to this theater is not open to any existing 
spirit” (SKS 7:146  / CUP 1:158). The “existing” individual (including the 
would- be “objective” philosopher) is, therefore, out of line when pretend-
ing to be a spectator in the theatrum mundi. An individual, “if he fancies 
himself a spectator there . . . is simply forgetting that he himself is supposed 
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to be the actor in that little theater and is to leave it to that royal spectator 
and poet [Tilskuer og Digter] how he wants to use him in that royal drama” 
(SKS 7:146 / CUP 1:158). While God remains both spectator and providen-
tial playwright of the world- historical spectacle, the ethical individual should 
concentrate instead on his or her own private performance and leave it to 
God to decide what to do with the “Drama Dramatum” (or “drama of dra-
mas”; SKS 7:146 / CUP 1:158).
Theater’s Strenuousness and Inconclusiveness
This de- emphasis on the visible spectacle and the corresponding emphasis on 
the internal effort of the actor find Climacus’s additional support just a few 
pages later when, in a consideration of the act of praying and the difficulty of 
“becoming subjective,” Climacus compares the subject to a constantly striv-
ing actor: “So one could almost think that to pray is just as difficult as to play 
the role of Hamlet [spille Hamlet], of which the greatest actor [Skuespiller] 
is supposed to have said that only once had he been close to playing it well 
[spille den godt]; nevertheless he would devote all his ability and his entire life 
to the continued study of this role. Should not praying be almost as important 
and significant?” (SKS 7:151  / CUP 1:163). While theatricality is typically 
synonymous with external, public performance, the internal, private efforts 
of the actor (either in private rehearsal or in the internal, subjective struggle 
to learn one’s part) are all- important to that theatricality. What matters is not 
the onstage external show but the offstage (or, at least, internal) striving.
Climacus’s particular theatrical allusion here seems especially apt, since 
Hamlet’s part is not only a difficult one; it is also one of a subject desperately 
trying to figure out how to play his own life. Thus, the “To be or not to be” 
speech provides Climacus the opportunity to reflect on his own philosophy 
of subjective existence. Hamlet’s passionate struggle indicates, at its core, 
that “existence and nonexistence have only subjective significance,” a view 
contrary to “the way of objective reflection” and “abstract thinking” (SKS 
7:177 / CUP 1:193). Hamlet is, by that account, as anti- Hegelian as Clima-
cus himself. The Hegelian philosopher promotes a totalizing objectivity that 
denies the contrasts at the heart of the ethical. In contrast, real “personality,” 
as Kierkegaard notes in his journal, “will for all eternity protest against the 
idea that absolute contradictions are susceptible of mediation  .  .  . [and] it 
will for all eternity repeat its immortal dilemma: to be or not to be, that is 
the question. (Hamlet.)” (SKS 18:35, EE:93, June 14, 1839 / KJN 2:30). In 
other words, the Kierkegaardian subject who plays his part well, as some-
thing other than a mere aesthetic part, has more than a little in common with 
Shakespeare’s prince of Denmark; both confront the life- and- death decisions 
of existence.
Suffice it to say that, if Hegel’s theatricality was rejected not for its 
theatricality per se but rather for its emphasis on the spectacular and its 
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corresponding “mask,” then an alternative theatricality recommends itself 
here because of its emphasis on what lies behind the mask— namely, the truer, 
unobservable actor who acts inwardly. Consequently, though Climacus’s den-
igration of Hegelianism invites a nonspectatorial philosophical form, it need 
not preclude theatrical forms altogether. In lieu of a philosophy of masks 
and spectators, one finds an inward philosophy of the actor, an approach 
reinforced by what Climacus says in his concluding appendix, “An Under-
standing with the Reader.”
In this postscript to Postscript, Climacus imagines the whole work as 
a private, internal performance free of spectators. It is, as he says, both a 
“private enterprise” and “one of life’s  .  .  . quiet joys” (SKS 7:562  / CUP 
1:619–20). It does not “in the remotest manner make an attempt or a gesture 
of wanting to oblige one single actual person to be the reader” (SKS 7:562 / 
CUP 1:620). Instead, Climacus claims to indulge in the “secret fiction,” the 
“private enjoyment” of writing for an “imagined reader” (SKS 7:563 / CUP 
1:621). Indeed, because having an imagined reader is only “permissible” for 
“the author who has no actual reader” (SKS 7:563 / CUP 1:620), the text 
poses as an utterly neglected, wholly private meditation on the inwardness 
of subjectivity. Consequently, Climacus’s performance lacks the unattractive 
externality, the potential hypocrisy, and the aesthetic, unethical spectators 
of Hegelianism. In fact, because it has always already been revoked— “the 
understanding with him [the imagined reader] as the sole reader is indeed the 
revocation of the book” (SKS 7:563 / CUP 1:621)— Postscript also avoids the 
hypocritical conclusiveness of the pretentious Hegelian system. Insofar as it 
is revoked, Climacus’s work is anything but a concluding postscript. By that 
light, Climacus’s work bears little resemblance to the Hegelian philosophy of 
the spectacle and poses instead as the Climacian private performance before 
God and self.
To state the obvious, though, Climacus’s work is no private performance. 
And Postscript is no drama. Unlike Kierkegaard’s earliest attempt at anti- 
Hegelian satire, his play from his university days, “The Conflict between 
the Old and New Soap- Cellar” (SKS 17:280– 97, DD:208, n.d. 1837 / KJN 
1:273– 89), Postscript lacks the usual markers of a stage- play (acts, scenes, 
stage directions, dialogue, and a history of public performance). It is hard 
to imagine how one could ever perform such a monumental work (over five 
hundred pages in most editions). Consequently, one might protest that Cli-
macus’s work is a unique, unprecedented formal innovation— one whose 
formal peculiarity suits the “single individual” it considers. Nevertheless, 
Postscript repeatedly signals its theatricality. Long before the private theater 
metaphor for the subject, Climacus hints at Postscript’s theatrical side in the 
subtitle to the work: “A Mimical- Pathetical- Dialectical Combination: An 
Existential Contribution.” With that self- description, the work announces its 
affinities with three separate genres or, more to the point, with three separate 
forms of drama: (1) ancient mime (e.g., those of Sophron),15 (2) Platonic 
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dialogue (influenced by Sophron’s mimes),16 and (3) tragedy (characterized, 
in Aristotle’s famous analysis, by its focus on pathos; Poetics 11.1452b, CWA 
2:2324). To anyone familiar with Kierkegaard’s earlier anti- Hegelian drama, 
Postscript’s subtitle also bears some resemblance to the hyper- hyphenated 
subtitle to “The Conflict between the Old and New Soap- Cellar: A Heroic- 
Patriotic- Cosmopolitan- Philanthropic- Fatalistic Drama in Several Scenes.” 
To anyone familiar with Shakespeare’s dramatic work about another enig-
matic, philosophical Dane (himself responsible for another influential treatise 
on existence and nonexistence),17 both hyphenated subtitles recall something 
Polonius says to Hamlet about the form of drama to be performed by a 
group of itinerant players on their way to court. They are, in Polonius’s 
words, “the best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, 
pastoral, pastoral- comical, historical- pastoral, tragical- historical, tragical- 
comical- historical- pastoral, scene individable, or poem unlimited” (Hamlet 
2.2.391–94).18
One way or another, Postscript implies, an individual will play a part in 
the theater of the world. Moreover, one way or another, a philosophy of the 
subject will take on a theatrical form. The crucial decision comes when one 
chooses between the options available: on the one hand, the hypocritical 
spectacle of Hegelian philosophy; on the other, the Climacian private, inner 
performance before God and self.
Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of the Mask
To be fair, the most theatrical feature of Postscript is not the work’s sub-
title or Climacus’s theatrical allusions. Postscript’s most theatrical feature is 
Climacus himself. The work is, after all, a dramatic monologue, a solilo-
quy (not unlike Hamlet’s better- known aside on existence and nonexistence), 
or, in light of the subtitle, a philosophical mime, ventriloquized through a 
pseudonymous persona.19 Recalling this fact gives Climacus’s anti- Hegelian 
philosophy of the actor an unexpected twist. As it turns out, this lengthy 
diatribe against hypocritical spectacle has been, not a private inward perfor-
mance of an actual existing subject (as “An Understanding with the Reader” 
insinuates) but, instead, a hypocritical (or, at least, thoroughly theatrical) 
spectacle before a public audience, a fact S. Kierkegaard’s own postscript 
to Postscript makes explicit. In “A First and Last Explanation” (which fol-
lows Climacus’s “Understanding”), Kierkegaard describes his pseudonymous 
philosophical works, including Postscript, in markedly theatrical terms— no 
surprise, perhaps, from a writer who spent much of his time (and much of his 
money) frequenting the Royal Theater of Denmark.20
In this final addendum to Postscript, “S. Kierkegaard” acknowledges that 
his literary- philosophical technique has a hypertheatrical side: “What has 
been written [in the pseudonymous works], then, is mine, but only insofar as 
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I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life- view of the creating, poeti-
cally actual individuality in his mouth, for my relation is even more remote 
than that of a poet [Digters], who poetizes [digter] characters [Personer] and 
yet in the preface is himself the author” (SKS 7:569 / CUP 1:625). Because 
the noun Digter, the verb digter, and the plural noun Personer might just as 
easily read “dramatist,” “dramatizes,” and “dramatic personae,” respectively 
(a consequence of the longstanding prominence of verse drama), Kierke-
gaard’s analogy is not simply artistic or poetic but theatrical. Thus, this 
passage admits a parallel between Postscript and Hegel’s own philosophy of 
the spectacle. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous work may even outdo Hegel’s by 
embodying a more overtly theatrical philosophy of the mask, a term evoked 
here (for Kierkegaard and his classically educated audience, at least) by the 
Danish Personer (from the Latin persona, “mask”).
Even more explicitly theatrical is something Kierkegaard says a line later, 
when he characterizes himself as a souffleur, or dramatic prompter who 
“whispers” forgotten lines to the onstage actor (SKS 7:569 / CUP 1:625).21 
If Climacus, the pseudonymous persona, is the onstage masked actor before 
Postscript’s audience, then Kierkegaard himself is the stage manager feeding 
him his lines and cues from the wings. By that account, Kierkegaard’s work 
is, again, perhaps more theatrical and more “spectacular” than that of Hegel 
himself. Whereas Hegel’s work (e.g., Lectures on the Philosophy of History) 
imagines its content (the world- historical) in theatrical terms, Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous work adopts a theatrical form for treating its subject (the 
single individual). Notwithstanding any pretensions Hegel might have to 
speak for Spirit or “Mind” itself (e.g., in his Phänomenologie des Geistes, 
sometimes known as The Phenomenology of Mind), the “mind” on display in 
Hegel’s works is more or less Hegel’s own.22 In contrast, if we take this final 
postscript to Postscript at its word, “in the pseudonymous books there is not 
a single word by” Kierkegaard himself (SKS 7:570 / CUP 1:626).
What’s more, Postscript may be even more theatrical than actual dramatic 
works composed by playwrights for the stage. In contrast to Shakespeare (or 
Denmark’s Johan Ludvig Heiberg), who remains himself in preface and title 
page, Kierkegaard dramatizes a persona who speaks every line, including 
those on the title page itself. He explains, “My relation is even more remote 
than that of a poet [playwright], who poetizes characters and yet in the pref-
ace is himself the author” (SKS 7:569 / CUP 1:625). Kierkegaard’s work is 
as thoroughly theatrical as Shakespeare’s would have been had Shakespeare 
claimed Hamlet was written by Hamlet himself— or, at least, by the friend 
who survives him, Horatio.
The main problem for the present essay, however, is that Kierkegaard’s 
theatrical technique (apparently) conflicts with Climacus’s antitheatrical sen-
timents. Postscript employs a mask in its discussion about the problems with 
(philosophical) masks. What I now conclude, though, is that this seeming 
contradiction suits the work’s treatment of subjectivity especially well. While 
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Climacus’s deep and persistent criticisms of the Hegelian philosophy of the 
spectator might incline us to think that Postscript would need an alterna-
tive form for writing a philosophy of the subject, that inclination makes a 
notable mistake; it wrongly assumes that philosophy has access to nonspec-
tacular forms of communication. In short, it assumes that a philosophy of 
subjectivity can be written without slipping into objectivity. On the contrary, 
insofar as a philosophical publication always entails a more or less exter-
nal communication of abstract thoughts for a detached group of onlookers, 
a philosophy of subjectivity (including this one by Johannes Climacus) is 
bound to resemble the Hegelian spectacle.
Nevertheless, the Kierkegaardian spectacle differs from its Hegelian coun-
terpart in at least one crucial respect: Postscript admits its own theatricality. 
As a result, Postscript is not just antitheatrical or pro- theatrical; it is, more 
importantly, metatheatrical. What makes Hegelianism so offensive— indeed, 
what makes it a philosophy of the hypocrite as well as the spectacle— is its 
unconfessed theatricality. In other words, what makes the Hegelian account 
of the subject so disturbing is the fact that it pretends to involve no pretense 
at all. As Climacus repeatedly complains, it pretends to offer a fundamentally 
transparent, aesthetic view of the subject, even though actual subjects defy 
easy externalization. What Hegel offers readers, then, is not just a masked 
performance (what all philosophies of the subject must offer) but a masked 
performance that pretends to be mask- less. In yet another attack on “The 
[Hegelian] System,” Kierkegaard complains in one of his journals, “This was 
the swindle. It was just as if an actor wanted to say: It is I who am speaking, 
these are my words— and then, the second the prompter [Souffleuren] falls 
silent, he does not have one single word to say” (SKS 24:192, NB22:161, n.d. 
1851 / KJN 8:191). Like an actor who pretends he is no actor at all, the Hege-
lian philosopher and hypocrite pretends to be something he is not. More, 
like the actor who denies the animating role of the offstage prompter, the 
Hegelian thinker also denies that which remains offstage and hidden from 
view— namely, the actuality and inwardness of the self, which are (some-
what) incommensurable with appearance, thought, and language.
Postscript, on the other hand, is guilty of no such denial. In his final 
confession and curtain call (originally meant to be his last as an author), 
Kierkegaard steps from behind the curtain to highlight his role as prompter 
and playwright. In doing so, he reminds the reader that his has been no trans-
parent revelation of the subject either. Rather, the subject on display here, 
Johannes Climacus, has always been more shadow than self. In pointing out 
that fact, however, Postscript adopts a form of communication especially apt 
for handling the subject. Specifically, the metatheatrical conclusion to Post-
script comes as close as any text can to externalizing the unexternalizable: 
the inexpressibly inward subject. Through its metatheatricality, Postscript 
acknowledges that the best a published philosophy of the subject can do is 
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to point beyond itself, toward the ever- elusive subject.23 If pointing toward 
the subject seems still too much to ask, a work like Postscript can, at least, 
confess its own inadequacy as a representation of that subject.
Little could be both more and less theatrical than the moment an onstage 
actor admits to being, in fact, an actor on the stage; accordingly, Kierkegaard’s 
final metatheatrical confession is both the height of Postscript’s theatricality 
and also the closest it ever comes to genuine sincerity. By pointing out the 
theatricality within its own treatment of the subject, Postscript both confesses 
and atones for that theatricality. Kierkegaard makes clear in another journal 
entry, “In the theater, if one notices the prompter [Souffleuren], the illusion is 
disturbed” (SKS 24:252, NB23:88, n.d. 1851 / KJN 8:251). Thus, by uncover-
ing its own reliance on persona and prompter, Postscript both acknowledges 
its own similarity to a hypocritical Hegelian illusion and simultaneously 
protects itself against that similarity. Like a self- effacing, metatheatrical 
Brechtian drama, Postscript exposes its own theatricality, drawing attention 
to the wires and masks that might otherwise deceive us. In doing so, however, 
it cautions the reader against mistaking Climacus’s lengthy account of the 
subject for the fully transparent subject itself. In effect, it alerts the reader to 
the theatricality and potential hypocrisy that necessarily attach themselves 
to all external and public accounts of the essentially inward subject (includ-
ing this one). More than that, by anticipating the metatheatrical Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekt (alienation effect), Postscript awakens its readers to the 
challenges posed by their own inward subjectivity. By reminding its readers 
that Climacus’s lengthy portrayal of the subject has been more drama than 
reality, Postscript directs each of us through the exit at the back of the play-
house, back home to the central, inward task of becoming actual, and active, 
individuals. Through its ambivalent theatricality and, even more so, through 
its metatheatricality, Postscript ultimately directs its readers to a performance 
not so much before or behind but, better yet, beyond the mask.
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A Theater of Ideas
Performance and Performativity  
in Kierkegaard’s Repetition
Martijn Boven
It has always been one of the tasks of philosophy to develop categories 
that give an intelligible form to knowledge. This is no different for Kierke-
gaard. He has developed important categories such as repetition, the instant, 
anxiety, despair, and so forth. However, there is something odd about these 
categories: it is very hard to find a clear and unequivocal definition of them. 
In different ways, each of them is shrouded in uncertainty. This uncertainty is 
not the result of a lack of talent but a deliberate effect. In Kierkegaard’s view, 
there are two types of categories: logical and existential. Logical categories 
can ideally exhaust their object in such a way that there is no uncertainty 
left. This is different in the case of existential categories. These categories will 
never be able ideally to exhaust their object because they are dependent on 
the person who is using them. Kierkegaard tries to solve this difficulty by pre-
serving the uncertainty inherent in these categories. An example can clarify 
this. One of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms tells about a witty fellow who divided 
humankind into three classes: officers, servant girls, and chimney sweeps. “In 
my opinion,” the pseudonym writes, “this remark is not only witty but also 
profound, and it would take great speculative talent to make a better clas-
sification. If a classification does not ideally exhaust its object, the accidental 
is preferable in every way, because it sets the imagination in motion” (SKS 
4:37 / R 162). The sheer impossibility of establishing an exhaustive classifica-
tion of humankind shows that it makes more sense to rely on an accidental 
and unessential classification than on a serious and essential one. Any clas-
sification will at best approximate the truth, without ever reaching it. But an 
accidental classification has the added advantage of activating the imagina-
tion and forcing the recipient to produce a creative response. This is exactly 
the kind of performative effect that Kierkegaard tries to achieve.
In this essay, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s oeuvre can be seen as a the-
ater of ideas.1 This argument is developed in three steps. First, I will briefly 
introduce a theoretical framework for addressing the theatrical dimension 
of Kierkegaard’s works. This framework is based on a distinction between 
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“performative writing strategies” and “categories of performativity.”2 As a 
second step, I will focus on Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychol-
ogy, “by Constantin Constantius,” one of the best examples of Kierkegaard’s 
innovative way of doing philosophy. This strange and elusive book intro-
duces the difficult and counterintuitive notion of repetition. Repetition is a 
category of performativity that aims to activate the subjectivity of the reader. 
This performative effect is achieved by confronting the reader with an “unre-
solved” existential problem that is not yet drawn into clarity but is staged in 
all its confusions and contradictions. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantius 
relies here on a performative writing strategy that is animated by a dialectic 
of advance and withdrawal. In the last and third step, I will analyze Constan-
tius’s own reflection on the performative dimension of his text. Constantius 
has left several clues behind, each of which suggests that he deliberately 
developed a performative writing strategy.
Theoretical Framework: Performance and Performativity
Many interpreters of Kierkegaard have studied his poetics of indirect com-
munication as a maieutic practice that takes place on the borderline between 
philosophy and literature. Without denying the influence of literature on 
Kierkegaard’s works, I will focus on a different discipline of art: the theater.3 
It is well known that Kierkegaard was an ardent lover of theater and could 
often be found in the Royal Theater in Copenhagen. He composed several 
minor writings about theater and remained fascinated with the subject to 
the end of his life. Although these minor writings have never received much 
attention, they can shed some light on the performative dimension of Kierke-
gaard’s works.4 “Phister as Captain Scipio” is exemplary in this respect. 
In this short essay, the pseudonym Procul analyzes how the Danish actor 
Joachim Ludvig Phister plays the role of Scipio, an alcoholic who is a captain 
in the Papal Police Corps.
To exploit the comic potential of this character, Phister has to make a dou-
ble movement. On the one hand, he has to play Captain Scipio as someone 
who is constantly concealing that he is an alcoholic. On the other hand, he 
has to make sure that the viewer begins to develop a suspicion of this hidden 
condition. Nevertheless, Phister’s aim is not to expose Scipio as a cheat and 
an alcoholic, but to hint at the contradiction between his outer appearance 
as an authoritative figure and the hidden condition that he tries to conceal. 
This contradiction is heightened when it is “his duty to clear out a pub where 
the people are dead drunk” (SKS 16:133 / “PCS” 334). Procul is so impressed 
with Phister’s performance because he is able to keep the concealment and 
the disclosure in tension with each other. The way Phister conceals Captain 
Scipio’s hidden condition betrays that something is not right. By drawing the 
viewer’s attention to the concealment, he discloses that Captain Scipio hides 
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something, but what he hides still has to be uncovered. In other words, the 
disclosure takes place telegraphically, in an indirect and a nonverbal way 
(compare SKS 16:139 / “PCS” 340). Throughout his oeuvre, Kierkegaard is 
fascinated by this tension between concealment and disclosure. Like Phister, 
he tries to communicate something that cannot be shown directly but can 
emerge only as an enigma that still has to be unraveled.
Kierkegaard develops a “theater of ideas” in which philosophical and exis-
tential problems are performed rather than represented. The performative 
dimension of his work ensues from his interpretation of human existence. 
Although Kierkegaard does not have a unified theory of the self, his pseudo-
nyms all start from the same basic premise: the self has a temporal structure 
that is paradoxical in nature. It is established as a relation between several 
elements that cannot be synthesized with each other. This creates a fragile 
equilibrium that is constantly on the verge of breaking apart. An added prob-
lem is that there is a qualitative difference between the inner world of the 
single individual and the external and collective means of communication by 
which he expresses himself. Kierkegaard tries to bridge this chasm between 
the inner and the outer by turning his oeuvre into a theater of ideas. His 
works not only say something; they also attempt to do something, to have a 
performative effect. To analyze this performative mode of communication, 
I will distinguish between the “categories of performativity” that can be 
derived from Kierkegaard’s works and the “performative writing strategies” 
that animate them. The first concerns the conceptual content, the second, the 
literary form. Their distinction indicates a difference in focus rather than in 
substance.
On the level of conceptual content, Kierkegaard introduces several cat-
egories of performativity. These categories address a type of communication 
that constitutes its own reality rather than representing it after the fact. The 
notion of performativity indicates that this type of communication does not 
refer to a preexisting state of affairs that is communicated. Rather, it con-
fronts the readers with an unresolved contradiction, the content of which still 
has to be unraveled. The communication has a meaningful content, but this 
content is neither fixed nor predefined. It emerges only after it has been actu-
alized by the reader. This usually involves a decision that discloses the view of 
the reader rather than that of the communicator. It was J. L. Austin who first 
introduced the notion of performativity. His main argument was that lan-
guage is not just descriptive and reflective but can actually perform an action. 
(When I give an order, I am not describing that action, but I am performing 
it.) In a similar way, a category of performativity signifies a performative 
act that communicates something (analogous to Austin’s locution), but what 
it communicates is a contradiction that aims to activate the subjectivity of 
readers (analogous to the illocutionary force) by forcing them to respond in 
such a way that they disclose their own views on the matter (analogous to 
the perlocutionary effect).5
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Kierkegaard develops a whole series of categories of performativity. These 
categories not only precede Austin’s analyses of performativity; they also add 
to the tradition that emerged in his wake. Each of them is an original invention 
that is developed in reaction to a specific existential problem. In Practice in 
Christianity, for example, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti- Climacus analyzes 
the performative context in which Christ, as the God- man, operates (SKS 
12:81– 151 / PC 69– 144). To make this analysis possible he introduces sev-
eral categories of performativity, such as “the incognito that demands faith” 
and “offense.” If God would appear in all his glory without an incognito to 
hide his divinity, he would become an idol that can be identified and known 
with certainty. This would cancel out the role of subjectivity. For that reason, 
Anti- Climacus argues, Christ hides himself behind the incognito of a lowly 
human being. By deliberately creating a contradiction between his ordinary 
appearance and his claim of being God, Christ makes himself offensive. In 
this way he turns himself into an object of faith and forces the recipient to 
make a choice that will disclose whether he or she believes in him. Notions 
like incognito and offense are introduced to address the unusual performa-
tive structure of the God- man.6
Kierkegaard’s categories of performativity are interesting in their own 
right. However, they will also be helpful for understanding the performative 
writing strategies underlying his works. We find these performative writing 
strategies on the level of literary form. The aim of these writing strategies 
is to confront the reader with an unresolved existential problem that is not 
drawn into clarity yet but is staged in all its confusions and contradictions. 
In other words, Kierkegaard does not represent a solution in which the prob-
lem has already been overcome; instead, he tries to make the reader aware 
of the problem and let him or her struggle with it. By performing ideas as 
unresolved problems rather than representing them as clear and well- defined 
solutions, Kierkegaard breaks with the Aristotelian tradition of mimetic rep-
resentation. His pseudonym Frater Taciturnus, for instance, introduces the 
notion of a psychological experiment to find a performative writing strat-
egy that no longer relies on representation (compare SKS 6:173– 454 / SLW 
185– 494). Hence Taciturnus no longer relies on Aristotelian catharsis as a 
purification of emotion through a process of identification. Instead, he intro-
duces an alternative catharsis that purifies by activating the subjectivity of the 
reader. This is done by dramatizing an unresolved problem without provid-
ing a way out. A fictional protagonist becomes entangled in a contradiction 
between actuality and ideality that is simultaneously essentially comic and 
essentially tragic. The reader has to decide which of these moods prevails.7 It 
would be a mistake, however, to view this performative writing strategy as a 
kind of postmodern “empty play” that destroys meaning rather than creat-
ing it. The unresolved problems are not meaningless. Rather, they imply an 
excess of meaning that has to be narrowed down by the reader. Other pseu-
donyms, such as Johannes de Silentio, Climacus, Anti- Climacus, and Vigilius 
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Haufniensis, develop similar performative writing strategies. In fact, one 
might even argue that— at least to some extent— Kierkegaard also relies on 
these strategies when he writes under his own name as veronymous author.
Repetition as a Category of Performativity
Repetition is not a philosophical treatise in the traditional sense. It introduces 
repetition as one of the most important categories of modern philosophy, 
without clearly explaining how this category should be understood. On the 
contrary, Kierkegaard ensures that its precise meaning remains constantly in 
dispute. This is illustrative for the changing role of categories in his work. 
Instead of providing well- defined concepts that can be applied outside of 
the concrete contexts in which they are introduced, Kierkegaard develops 
categories of performativity that remain unfinished as long as the reader does 
not put them into action. If these categories are too hastily detached from the 
setting in which they emerge, they will become meaningless.
In its ordinary sense, repetition refers to an event that occurs for a second, 
a third, or any other time. This implies a repetition of the same. Examples 
of this ordinary repetition include a rehearsal (i.e., repeated practice to get 
something firmly in one’s head), a relapse (i.e., return to a previous undesir-
able state), and a reprise (i.e., restaging an earlier production), as well as 
Constantius’s own attempt to repeat his earlier trip to Berlin. Kierkegaard is 
not interested in these ordinary repetitions but tries to address a very differ-
ent type of repetition that is existential rather than ordinary. In contrast to its 
ordinary counterpart, an existential repetition will always emerge as a unique 
event. In order to persist, this unique event has to be repeated. However, it 
does not remain the same as it was throughout this repetition but under-
goes a transition that makes it unique again. There is no “first time” that 
repeats itself a “second time” (as with a touchdown that is repeated in the 
replay). On the contrary, the “first time” repeats itself in another “first time.” 
According to Kierkegaard, this is how subjectivity is structured. Subjectivity 
is repetition, but the main characteristic of this repetition is that it is always 
new. It is no longer a repetition of the same but is a repetition of difference. 
Kierkegaard thus develops an existential philosophy in which subjectivity 
is no longer defined by an essential core that remains the same throughout 
change; instead, subjectivity is now seen as a continuous repetition of differ-
ence. As such, he is one of the first philosophers to redefine the concept of 
identity. Later philosophers, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze, will 
follow him in this respect, although they will give a slightly different twist 
to it.
Repetition is structured in such a way that the two manifestations of 
repetition— ordinary and existential— are constantly confused with each 
other. Initially the reader will enter the text as a passive spectator who looks 
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from a distance at the events that happen to the protagonists; however, 
the confusions and misunderstandings will force the reader to become an 
active participant. Constantius achieves this effect by means of a dialectic 
of advance and withdrawal. At several points, a real understanding of exis-
tential repetition is reached. In these moments the category of repetition is 
advanced. However, each time the text will eventually switch back to ordi-
nary repetition, as if the two manifestations of repetition are the same. At 
these moments the category of repetition is withdrawn again. In this way, the 
understanding of repetition is always taken one step forward and two steps 
back. The aim of this dialectic of advance and withdrawal is to activate the 
subjectivity of the reader. In the case of Repetition, this is done by embodying 
repetition in the lives of two protagonists.
The first protagonist is Constantin Constantius, the author- narrator of 
the book who sees himself as a “secret agent in a higher service” whose task 
it is to expose what is hidden (SKS 4:12 / R 135). The second protagonist is 
a young man who has entered into a love relationship with a girl but now 
slowly discovers that he cannot go through with it. Both these protagonists 
become entangled in a discrepancy between the ordinary and the existen-
tial manifestation of repetition. On a theoretical level, Constantius seems to 
understand what existential repetition entails (advance), but when he tries to 
bring it into practice it becomes clear that he has confused it with repetition 
in the ordinary sense (withdrawal). In the case of the young man, the oppo-
site happens. He faces the problem of subjectivity and freedom in practice 
and seeks refuge in the category of existential repetition (advance). However, 
because he lacks a proper understanding of this category, he is satisfied with 
an ordinary repetition (withdrawal). It is the task of the reader to reconstitute 
the category of repetition by taking up the advances and by separating them 
from the withdrawals.
The dialectic of advance and withdrawal can be illustrated by highlighting 
each of its two moments separately. A good example of a withdrawal can 
be found in the Berlin episode, halfway through the first part of the book. 
Instead of analyzing the category of repetition in a systematic way, Constan-
tius decides to conduct an experiment in order “to test the possibility and 
meaning of repetition” (SKS 4:26– 27 / R 150). He does this by undertaking 
an “investigative journey [Opdagelses- Reise]” to Berlin (SKS 4:26 / R 150). 
In his own words: “When I was occupied for some time, at least on occasion, 
with the question of repetition— whether or not it is possible, what impor-
tance it has, whether something gains or loses in being repeated— I suddenly 
had the thought: You can, after all, take a trip to Berlin; you have been there 
once before, and now you can prove to yourself whether a repetition is pos-
sible and what importance it has” (SKS 4:9 / R 131). After many unsuccessful 
attempts to relive his previous experience of the journey to Berlin, Constan-
tius concludes that there is no repetition. This makes him feel ashamed for his 
big words; it seems to him that they “were only a dream from which I awoke 
A Theater of Ideas 121
to have life unremittingly and treacherously retake everything [tage Alt igjen; 
literally ‘take everything back’] it had given without providing a repetition” 
(SKS 4:45 / R 172). In Constantius’s view, repetition should imply a “giving 
again,” whereas the experiment shows that life “takes everything back.” That 
is why Constantius is forced to conclude, “There is no repetition, and my 
earlier conception of life was victorious” (SKS 4:45 / R 171).
The experiment fails, and the category of repetition is abandoned. The 
reader will not be surprised to learn about this failure. The whole effort 
seemed ludicrous to begin with. How could Constantius even think that it 
would be possible to relive his earlier experiences? What is going on here? 
Has he lost his mind? Or is he trying to make a fool of the reader? The sheer 
absurdity of his experiment already indicates that it cannot be accepted at 
face value. The experiment is doomed to fail from the beginning because it is 
the result of a deliberate misunderstanding. This misunderstanding is never 
explicated in the text. It is only in a later, unpublished note of 1843– 44 that 
Constantius identifies it as such.8 He writes there, “The most interior prob-
lem of the possibility of repetition is expressed externally, as if repetition, if 
it were possible, were to be found outside the individual when in fact it must 
be found within the individual” (SKS 15:69  / R, Suppl., 304). The exter-
nal means by which the experiment is conducted are in direct conflict with 
the existential and inward nature of repetition. By animating this conflict 
rather than resolving it, Constantius forces his readers to decide the issue for 
themselves.
As a category of performativity, repetition can emerge only in the middle 
of confusions and misunderstandings. This does not mean, however, that the 
reader is left completely in the dark. On the contrary, the reader can fall 
back on the advances that have already been made by Constantius and the 
young man. In order to get a better grasp of existential repetition, I will 
highlight several of these advances. A first series of advances is made when 
Constantius opposes the worldview of the ancient Greeks to that of the mod-
erns. According to him, the ancient Greeks relied on recollection, whereas 
modern philosophy turns toward repetition as “the new category that will 
be discovered” (SKS 4:25 / R 148). This category is not available yet but still 
has to be discovered. In fact, as a category of performativity, repetition will 
always remain a discovery in the making. When Constantius refers to the 
Greek worldview, he is thinking especially of Plato, who believed that the 
truth lies in the past but can be retrieved with the help of recollection. By 
situating truth in an originary and prior realm, Plato gives it a universal and 
eternal character. Constantius, on the other hand, introduces a new concept 
of truth. For him the truth is always something yet to come rather than a 
lost origin that has to be retrieved. This truth is not universal and eternal 
but is connected to a fleeting instant that constantly has to be repeated. As 
Constantius remarks, “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, 
except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated 
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backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward” (SKS 4:9 / R 
131). From the metaphysical perspective of the ancient Greeks, the truth of 
the individual is understood as a movement that is directed toward the past. 
This truth does not emerge within the individual’s own existence but must be 
conceived as an essence that precedes the individual’s existence. According to 
Constantius, however, this essence is not the truth but is rather the untruth 
of the individual.
Despite the fact that modern philosophy turns toward repetition, it has 
not been able to grasp repetition fully. According to Constantius, this is 
largely due to Hegel and his followers. By reducing repetition to mediation, 
they transferred the problem of subjectivity and freedom from the realm of 
existence to the realm of logic. Constantius rejects this transfer. In his view, 
existence will never comply with the laws of logic. In contrast to the Hegelian 
conception of logical development, Constantius relies on an Aristotelian con-
ception of existential movement. In the aforementioned unpublished note, he 
points out that “when Aristotle long ago said that the transition from possi-
bility to actuality is a κίνησις [motion, change], he was not speaking about the 
possibility and actuality of logic, but about [the possibility and actuality] of 
freedom, and therefore he properly posits movement” (SKS 15:74 / R, Suppl., 
310).9 In Constantius’s reading, κίνησις should not be understood as a medi-
ated progression toward a predetermined goal but as a transition that implies 
a qualitative change. Repetition is the result of such a transition. As Constan-
tius remarks, “The dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated 
has been— otherwise it could not be repeated— but the very fact that it has 
been makes the repetition into something new” (SKS 4:25 / R 149). Rather 
than a return to what was, repetition implies a transition to a new state. In 
this way it ensures that subjectivity comes into existence again.
The young man, the second protagonist of Repetition, also makes some 
advance in understanding repetition by focusing on the biblical figure of Job. 
In his reading, Job truly embodies repetition. Not because he “has received 
everything double” (SKS 4:79  / R 212), as the young man eventually con-
cludes, but because he “qualifies as an exception” (SKS 4:75 / R 207). Job 
lost his whole family and everything he had, and still he is able to say “the 
Lord gave and the Lord took away.” More important, Job does not despair 
over what has happened to him. He is able to say this without losing his faith 
in God and without accepting that God has been punishing him for his sins. 
Despite everything, Job continues to believe that he is in the right. According 
to the young man, it is Job who gives evidence of “the noble, human, bold 
confidence that knows what a human being is, knows that despite his being 
frail, despite his swift withering away like the flower, that in freedom he still 
has something of greatness, has a consciousness that even God cannot wrest 
from him even though he gave it to him” (SKS 4:76 / R 208). Because of his 
freedom, Job is able to resist his friends’ suggestion that his misfortune is 
a punishment from God. At the same time, he is also able to withstand the 
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ordeal that God has imposed upon him as a test. Neither God nor the human 
being is able to take subjectivity and freedom away from him. For the young 
man this extraordinary manifestation of subjectivity becomes the paradigm 
case of repetition. Nevertheless, despite his advance in understanding, the 
young man proves unable to live up to the standard that is set by Job. Instead, 
when he tries to achieve repetition in his own life, he unintentionally turns it 
into a banality.
The dialectic of advance and withdrawal ensures that the reader has to 
struggle through a series of confusions and misunderstandings. In this way, 
Constantius has turned Repetition into an enigma. This enigma will become 
fruitful only when the reader first identifies the confusions and misunder-
standings and then starts to develop the emerging category of repetition on 
his or her own. The outcome of the book becomes the reader’s responsibility. 
This does not mean that Constantius is simply throwing his readers into an 
abyss of ambiguity and uncertainty. To make them aware of the performative 
structure of his text, he has left a few clues. With the help of these clues it 
becomes possible to reconstruct Constantius’s own thoughts about the per-
formative writing strategy that is employed in Repetition.
Repetition as Philosophical Theater: Constantius’s 
Thoughts on His Performative Writing Strategy
Although Constantius has not directly addressed the dialectic of advance and 
withdrawal, he has left certain clues in which this performative writing strat-
egy is announced. I will focus on three of these clues. The first clue is already 
apparent in the subtitle of the book, A Venture in Experimenting Psychol-
ogy. By calling his book a “venture,” Constantius suggests that the outcome 
of the book cannot be known in advance but will emerge only gradually. 
The notion of “experimenting psychology” indicates that Constantius does 
not want to represent a real- life situation but that he tries to open up an 
experimental realm in which a psychological problem is put on the stage. 
Rather than studying repetition from the perspective of an uninvolved out-
sider, Constantius tries to transform it into something inward that has to be 
taken up by the reader. As he later remarks in a note of 1843– 44, “I wanted 
to depict and make visible psychologically and esthetically; in the Greek 
sense, I wanted to let the concept come into being in the individuality and 
the situation, working itself forward through all sorts of misunderstandings” 
(SKS 15:68 / R, Suppl., 302). The venture in experimenting psychology thus 
becomes a philosophical theater in which ideas and categories are performed 
in a state of confusion.
Constantius finds an earlier example of this philosophical theater in a 
well- known anecdote about Diogenes the Cynic: “When the Eleatics denied 
motion, Diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward [optraadte] as an 
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opponent. He literally did come forward [optraadte], because he did not say 
a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that 
he had sufficiently refuted them” (SKS 4:9  / R 131). The Danish verb that 
is used here, optræde, has a clear theatrical connotation. Literally it means 
“stepping up” or “coming forward,” but it also refers to the moment an actor 
“makes an appearance” by entering the scene and giving a performance. In 
the anecdote, Diogenes sees no need to debate whether movement is possible. 
Instead, he simply paces back and forth. This little performance sufficiently 
shows that existence does not comply with logic. By pacing back and forth, 
Diogenes performed the physical movement for which he was arguing. Con-
stantius tries to achieve a similar effect by performing existential repetition as 
a movement that ultimately has to be concluded by the reader.
A second clue can be found in Constantius’s concluding letter “to Mr. X. 
Esq., the real reader of this book” (SKS 4:89 / R 223). The letter opens with 
a few remarks about the art of reading. Constantius indicates that he is look-
ing for a type of reader who is willing to make an effort in understanding 
the book, despite being completely bewildered by it. He follows the dictum 
of Clement of Alexandria, who is said to have written in such a way “that 
the heretics [were] unable to understand it” (SKS 4:91  / R 225). The term 
“heretics” here refers to superficial readers who fail to uncover the deliber-
ate misunderstandings in which the protagonists become entangled. For such 
heretics the category of repetition will remain a strange and hazy notion.
In line with his remark about heretics, Constantius predicts that review-
ers, who will try to measure the book on the basis of certain fixed standards, 
will not get anything out of it. The expectations of these reviewers will be 
frustrated because the composition of Repetition differs from that of most 
books. Constantius develops the story in such a way that the course of events 
“is inverse” (SKS 4:92 / R 226). Inverse? This is an odd expression. Inverse 
in what sense? Does Constantius mean that the book is turned upside down? 
Or is he referring to unexpected turning points or strange revisions? It is not 
entirely clear what he intends, but the context suggests that he is juxtapos-
ing two types of compositions: teleological and paradoxical.10 Teleological 
compositions are initially set in motion by a contradiction, but then progress 
toward a higher unity (the Hegelian 1, 2, 3). Constantius is not interested in 
these teleological compositions. In his view, they privilege the universal (logic) 
over the individual and the exception (existence). That is why Constantius 
has developed a new type of composition that is no longer teleological but 
is paradoxical in nature. This principle behind this paradoxical composition 
is aptly captured in the phrase “to kill a man and let him live” (SKS 4:92 / R 
226). When the same man is killed and left alive, any attempt at reconciliation 
will run aground. In other words, the paradoxical composition ensures that 
the contradictions in the text cannot be overcome. The idea of a paradoxical 
composition already indicates how the dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
is generated. Taking one step forward and two steps back, the paradoxical 
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composition generates a circulating movement that echoes Diogenes’s pacing 
back and forth.
The third and most important clue can be found in the digression that 
forms the heart of the Berlin episode. This digression is best understood as 
an extensive mise en abyme, a story within a story that tells us how to per-
form the book we are reading. It deals with two examples of kitsch. The 
first example concerns a cheap and sentimental type of painting that Con-
stantius calls a Nürnberg print.11 He describes this as follows: “There one 
sees a landscape depicting a rural area in general. This abstraction cannot 
be artistically executed. Therefore the whole thing is achieved by contrast, 
namely, by an accidental concretion. And yet I ask everyone if from such a 
landscape he does not get the impression of a rural area in general” (SKS 
4:33 / R 158). Two elements are of importance here. The effect is achieved 
“by contrast” and with the help of “an accidental concretion.” To understand 
what Constantius means by this, it will be helpful to explicate the distinction 
he makes between art and kitsch. According to Constantius, art derives its 
perfection from the way it balances the actual and the ideal. This balance can 
be achieved by giving a faithful representation of an exceptional panorama 
or by elevating a nondescript tableau in an ideal reproduction. In both cases, 
the painter has made sure that the depicted landscape (actuality) is worthy 
of being transformed into art (ideality). Kitsch, on the other hand, is always 
based on a contradiction between actuality and ideality. Although the rural 
area that is depicted in a Nürnberg print is nothing special (actuality), it is 
still immortalized by being painted (ideality). This creates a contrast that 
defies the aesthetic categories of the educated art critic.
Constantius sees in kitsch a model of artistic production that no longer 
relies on representation but is based on a principle of “accidental concre-
tion.” To my mind, “concretion” should be understood here in the geological 
sense. Like a fossil, the Nürnberg print can be viewed as petrifaction of the 
accidental. It generates enormous and universal categories like “the rural area 
in general,” even though these categories emerge only in a singular and acci-
dental form. Constantius compares this to a child who cuts “out of a piece of 
paper a man and a woman who were man and woman in general in a more 
rigorous sense than Adam and Eve were” (SKS 4:33 / R 158).
A second and more extensive example of kitsch can be found in a specific 
type of popular play, the sole purpose of which is to incite laughter. In Dan-
ish and German this type of popular play is called Posse. Its closest English 
equivalents are farce, burlesque, and vaudeville. As Constantius suggests, a 
farce is not based on a plot that unifies the actions into a meaningful whole 
but relies on accidental instances, the effects of which are wholly dependent 
on the mood of the spectator. Constantius seems to view farce as a paradigm 
of subjectivity. He writes, “Its impact depends largely on self- activity and the 
viewer’s improvisation, the particular individuality comes to assert himself in 
a very individual way and in his enjoyment is emancipated from all esthetic 
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obligations to admire, to laugh, to be moved, etc. in the traditional way” (SKS 
4:34 / R 159). In the same way as a Nürnberg print, a farce no longer com-
plies with the aesthetic categories of the educated public and does not rely 
on the “commensurables of the artistic” (SKS 4:38 / R 163). On the contrary, 
a farce demands an incommensurable response that cannot be shared with 
others but solely depends on the individual viewer.
According to Constantius, a farce “must include two, at most three, very 
talented actors or, more correctly, generative geniuses” (SKS 4:36 / R 161). 
These geniuses do not rely on reflection and deliberation but achieve their 
goal by lyrical improvisation. Their talent is exceptional only insofar as they 
“have the courage to venture what the individual makes bold to do only 
when alone, what the mentally deranged do in the presence of everybody” 
(SKS 4:36  / R 161). Constantius illustrates this talent with a remarkable 
description of how Friedrich Beckmann, the leading actor at the Königstädter 
Theater in Berlin, enters the stage: “What Baggesen says of Sara Nickels, that 
she comes rushing on stage with a rustic scene in tow, is true of B[eckmann] 
in the positive sense, except that he comes walking [komme gaaende]. . . . He 
is not only able to walk [gaae], but he is also able to come walking [komme 
gaaende]” (SKS 4:38  / R 163). A distinction is drawn here between two 
types of dramatic action. Ordinary actors just walk onto the stage. Beck-
mann, on the other hand, “is able to come walking.” What is the difference 
between these two types of movement? To understand this we have to look 
more closely at the Danish phrase komme gaaende. This phrase, which is 
repeated no fewer than five times, literally means something like “coming 
while going.”12 This ambiguous movement goes in two directions at once. 
On the one hand, Beckmann is arriving; on the other, he is already leav-
ing. Constantius seems to indicate here that Beckmann does not represent a 
particular intentional action but embodies movement as such. That is why 
Beckmann can play the role of an apprentice without representing him in 
any way. Instead of fully developing this role, he uses it as an incognito. 
Behind this incognito “dwells the lunatic demon of comedy, who quickly 
extricates himself and carries everything away in sheer abandonment” (SKS 
4:38 / R 164). The phrase “coming while going” echoes the instant of transi-
tion on which existential repetition is based. However, Beckmann embodies 
this ambiguous movement of repetition merely in an external way. By letting 
the meaningful world vanish, he gives an impetus to subjectivity. As such, he 
covers only one half of the transition. The other half of the transition has to 
be carried through by the viewer.
The performance of a farce relies on two or three geniuses like Beck-
mann who have a lyrical talent for invoking laughter. The rest of the cast can 
consist of minor actors who do not need to have any special talent. Constan-
tius describes these minor characters in terms similar to those in which he 
described the Nürnberg print. According to him, “the minor characters have 
their effect through that abstract category ‘in general’ and achieve it by an 
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accidental concretion” (SKS 4:37 / R 163). We already saw that an accidental 
concretion is comparable to a fossil, something unimportant and ordinary 
that is immortalized. In the case of a farce, the accidental concretion makes 
“a claim to be the ideal, which it does by stepping onto the artificial world 
of the stage” (SKS 4:37 / R 163). In this way, the farce defies the laws of seri-
ous theater. Instead of developing concrete characters that are thoroughly 
carried out in ideality, the farce remains stuck in accidental situations by 
highlighting something unessential. In serious theater a concrete actuality is 
translated into an abstract ideality by showing something essential that is not 
only valid for the character in question but applies to everybody. In this way, 
it generates universal templates of action that indicate how a courageous or 
chivalrous person is supposed to behave. Farce, on the other hand, moves 
from the abstract to the concrete. An abstract person in general is embodied 
by highlighting something unimportant that is completely accidental. This 
ensures that a farce never reaches ideality but gets stuck in actuality. By put-
ting the accidental on the stage, the farce achieves a comic effect that destroys 
universal templates of action rather than creating them. Instead, it activates 
the viewers’ own productivity and forces them to develop their own template 
of action.
I have analyzed three clues in which the dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
is announced as a deliberate writing strategy that is based on performance 
rather than representation. The first clue indicated that Repetition opens up 
an experimental realm that functions as a theater of ideas. A second clue was 
found in Constantius’s suggestion that he relies on a paradoxical composi-
tion in which two irreconcilable tendencies are placed in tension with each 
other without providing a way out. These first two clues culminated in a 
digression on two forms of kitsch. This digression can be read as a mise en 
abyme. As such it is exemplary for the performative structure of Repetition 
as a whole. Constantius introduced two important notions there: “accidental 
concretion” and “coming while going.” As we saw, an accidental concretion 
concerns the tension between actuality and ideality. This reveals something 
about Kierkegaard’s categories of performativity. The intention of these cat-
egories is also to resist ideality by letting the reader get stuck in actuality. The 
notion of “coming while going,” on the other hand, tells us something about 
the role of performance in Kierkegaard’s theater of ideas. It embodies the 
ambiguous movement of a simultaneous advance and withdrawal.
To conclude, in this essay I have argued that Constantius invents a new way of 
doing philosophy in Repetition. This allows him to introduce existential rep-
etition as a category of performativity. Rather than clarifying what existential 
repetition is, he lets it emerge in a series of confusions and misunderstand-
ings. In this way, the category is advanced and withdrawn at the same time. 
It is the task of the reader to make this dialectic of advance and withdrawal 
fruitful. This performative demand turns Repetition into a theater of ideas. 
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Rather than representing an already finished argument, Constantius performs 
a problem that still has to be unraveled. In this process he provides several 
clues, suggesting that the dialectic of advance and withdrawal is a deliberate 
writing strategy that can take on several forms.
Notes
1. This essay expands upon and adds to ideas introduced in an earlier essay of 
mine that was published in Dutch, “De herhaling van het onherhaalbare: Con-
stantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit,” Wijsgerig Perspectief 53, no. 
2 (2013): 30– 37.
2. My approach is inspired by and indebted to three important studies on 
Kierkegaard: Sylviane Agacinski, Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren 
Kierkegaard, trans. Kevin Newmark (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 
1988); Samuel Weber, “Kierkegaard’s ‘Posse,’ ” in Theatricality as Medium (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 200– 228; Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Continuum, 2001), 5– 11.
3. Other scholars also have attempted to read Kierkegaard from the perspective 
of theater and performance. Joseph Westfall, for instance, argues “that Kierke-
gaardian authorship is performative, or that the Kierkegaardian author might 
best be understood as a kind of performer.” Westfall therefore focuses on “the 
person, persona or personae to whom authorship of the work is ascribed (author-
ing).” The Kierkegaardian Author: Authorship and Performance in Kierkegaard’s 
Literary and Dramatic Criticism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 145, 146. 
Although I do not disagree with this approach, I will not be focusing on the 
issue of authorship. Instead, I focus on the existential problems that Kierkegaard 
performs and on the categories of performativity that he invents in the process.
4. Minor writings on theater addressing “categories of performativity” include 
“The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an Actress” (SKS 14:93– 107/ CCLA 301– 
26), “Phister as Captain Scipio” (SKS 16:125– 43 / “PCS” 327– 44), and selections 
from the first part of Either/Or (SKS 2 / EO 1). (On these writings by Kierke-
gaard about the theater, and also on his avidness as a theatergoer, see also George 
Pattison’s essay in this volume.— Ed.)
5. J. L. Austin, who first conceptualized “performativity,” introduced a by now 
famous distinction between three aspects of performative communication: the 
locutionary meaning, the illocutionary force, and the perlocutionary effect. The 
locutionary meaning is the sense and reference of an utterance. The illocution-
ary force is the function that the utterance performs when it is being said. For 
example, the phrase “I now pronounce you man and wife” constitutes reality 
as such; it does not refer to a preexisting state of affairs but creates these states 
of affairs; it is self- referential. The perlocutionary effect is the response of the 
listener or reader as a consequence of what is said to him or her, for example, 
anger or fear in response to a threat. This threefold distinction will shed some 
light on the complex movement that is implied in many of Kierkegaard’s perfor-
mative categories. However, Austin’s distinction is too general and too linguistic 
to explain the structure and the intended effect of this complex movement. For 
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instance, this movement is not rule- governed in the limited sense of Austin, and 
it includes fictional statements. Compare J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Austin, Philosophical Papers, 
3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
6. For more on the notion of incognito see my article “Incognito,” in Kierke-
gaard’s Concepts, Tome 3: Envy to Incognito, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William 
McDonald, and Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and 
Resources, vol. 15 (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014), 231– 38.
7. I have analyzed Taciturnus’s theory of the psychological experiment more 
extensively in my article “Psychological Experiment,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts, 
Tome 5: Objectivity to Sacrifice, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, 
and Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 
15 (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2015), 159– 66.
8. This note is part of several sketches (SKS 15:61– 88 / R, Suppl., 283– 324) in 
which Kierkegaard lets Constantius develop a response to J. L. Heiberg’s article 
“Det astronomiske Aar” (1843, “The Astronomical Year”), which discusses Rep-
etition at some length. These sketches were written between December 1843 and 
March 1844 but never published by Kierkegaard.
9. I have slightly modified the English rendering of this sentence to eradicate 
an ungrammaticality that is present in the Danish original and that is preserved 
in the Hongs’ translation.
10. For an interesting but different account of the notion of “inverse,” see Arne 
Melberg, “Repetition (in the Kierkegaardian Sense of the Term),” Diacritics 20, 
no. 3 (1990): 71– 87.
11. For a discussion of the many references to Nürnberg prints in Kierke-
gaard’s writings, see Ragni Linnet’s essay in the present volume. Linnet finds that 
the particular Nürnberg print described by Constantius approximates one of the 
Entombment, inspired by Raphael.— Ed.
12. Agacinski (Aparté, 165) and Weber (“Kierkegaard’s ‘Posse,’ ” 221– 23) have 
also analyzed this particular phrase.
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Kierkegaard’s Notions of Drama and Opera
Molière’s Don Juan, Mozart’s Don Giovanni, 
and the Question of Music and Sensuousness
Nils Holger Petersen
In a recent article, George Pattison discusses Kierkegaard’s theatrical criti-
cism in relation to the particular Danish literary and theatrical context in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. The dominant figure in theater criti-
cism in this period was Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791– 1860), dramatist, poet, 
critic (inspired by Hegel), as well as editor of literary journals and, late in his 
life, director of the Royal Theater in Copenhagen. Heiberg had been helpful 
and encouraging to the very young Kierkegaard and, as Pattison demon-
strates, Kierkegaard in his theater criticism at least up to and including 1845 
remained influenced by Heiberg and his notion of correspondence between 
idea and form, although in many other respects he turned against Heiberg 
(and Hegelian criticism).1 Pattison discusses examples of Kierkegaard’s criti-
cism concerning opera and comedy mainly through texts from Either/Or 
(1843): the essay on Mozart’s Don Giovanni (in Danish German culture of 
the time usually referred to as Don Juan), which I will also discuss, and the 
one on Scribe’s play The First Love in Heiberg’s translation (Den første Kjær-
lighed), supplemented by a few other texts from the years 1840– 45. Pattison 
summarizes Kierkegaard’s aesthetic position as “the life- view of the reflecteur 
who deliberately maintains a critical distance from the immediate object of 
consciousness in order to judge this object in the light of its relationship to 
ideality.” At the same time, Pattison makes clear that Kierkegaard accepts 
this attitude only within a sphere of aesthetics, but not “its application to the 
personal life.”2
In this essay I shall pursue the question of Kierkegaard’s theatrical aesthet-
ics and attempt to come to terms with his treatise on Mozart’s opera Don 
Giovanni and to understand it in relation to broader questions of world-
view.3 As is well known, in the treatise “The Immediate Erotic Stages or The 
Musical- Erotic” in part 1 of Either/Or, Kierkegaard’s aesthetic pseudonym 
“A” discusses Mozart and Don Giovanni, his main object of analysis; he also 
discusses the musical medium as such and further uses his understanding of 
the character of the musical medium to discuss different aesthetic criteria he 
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sets up for opera and spoken theater in connection with the Don Juan theme. 
This discussion is carried out not least by reference to Molière’s Don Juan 
(1665) in K. L. Rahbek’s Danish translation (1813) as well as the free Danish 
version, which Heiberg wrote in 1812 and published (probably in a revised 
form) in 1814 (SKS K2– 3:131– 32). In the first part of this essay I shall pri-
marily focus on the understanding of the musical medium as “A” develops it 
in “The Immediate Erotic Stages” as a basis for his distinctions and aesthetic 
criteria for music drama and spoken theater. In the second part, I shall con-
sider some consequences of this view with respect to its possible meaning in 
a broad context of cultural history and life view.4
Drama and the Medium of Music
In his piece “Other Versions of Don Juan Considered in Relation to the Musi-
cal Interpretation,” which constitutes section 2 of the treatise “The Immediate 
Erotic Stages or The Musical- Erotic” (SKS 2:107– 18  / EO 1:103– 15), “A” 
takes up a claim launched from the very beginning of the treatise for a more 
thorough discussion of the relationship between music drama and spoken 
theater. The assertion is that Mozart’s version of the Don Juan myth cap-
tures the essence of this myth precisely because of the musical medium— in 
combination, of course, with Mozart’s command of this medium. The main 
question elaborated in different ways all through “A’s” treatise concerns the 
relationship between music and language, on the one hand, and between sen-
suousness and spirit, on the other, and how these two pairs are interconnected.
Early in the treatise, “A” uses the idea of Faust, with its rich literary tradi-
tion, as a backdrop for his understanding of the idea of Don Juan, which 
he considers to be more abstract and universal. Don Juan is the firstborn of 
the kingdom of sensuousness, a kingdom expressed in the medieval idea of 
Mount Venus, where sensuousness has its home. Language, however, has no 
home here. “A” argues that for this reason the Don Juan myth has not been 
the object of literary treatment in the same way as Faust has. It is a main 
idea of “A” to associate Faust with language and reflection, and Don Juan 
with music. “A” sees both as demonic, but “Faust is the expression for the 
demonic qualified as the spiritual that the Christian spirit excludes,” whereas 
“Don Juan . . . is the expression for the demonic qualified as the sensuous.” 
It is only when reflection sets in that the realm of the sensuous is identified as 
sinful, “but then Don Juan has been slain, then the music stops” (SKS 2:95 / 
EO 1:90).
Even earlier in the treatise, “A” remarks that “Faust has language as its 
medium, and since it is a much more concrete medium, for that reason, too, 
many works of the same kind are conceivable” (SKS 2:64 / EO 1:57). When 
this idea is brought up again in the section on other versions of Don Juan, 
“A” emphasizes that his discussion of such other versions “is done not for 
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their own sake  .  .  . but only in order to illuminate the significance of the 
musical interpretation more fully” (SKS 2:109 / EO 1:105– 6). The focus is 
on what music can achieve as opposed to words. It is important to have in 
mind, however, that the relationship between the two media, language and 
music, is dialectic: one sets the limits for the other, as will become clear. “An 
interpretation of Faust can merit being called perfect, and yet a later genera-
tion will give rise to a new Faust, whereas Don Juan, because of the abstract 
character of the idea, lives on forever, in every age, and to wish to produce 
a Don Juan after Mozart will always be like wanting to write an Ilias post 
Homerum [Iliad after Homer] in a sense even more profound than is the case 
with Homer” (SKS 2:108 / EO 1:105). This, on the other hand, does not sug-
gest that “a particular gifted nature should not have attempted to interpret 
Don Juan in some other way” (SKS 2:108 / EO 1:105). Here “A” brings in 
Molière, claiming that “not everyone may have noticed that the model for all 
other interpretations is essentially Molière’s Don Juan.” “A” does, however, 
find an exception in Heiberg’s version, judging it to have “a great advantage 
over Molière’s.” While praising Heiberg for his “sure esthetic eye,” he also 
argues that Heiberg may have been indirectly inspired by Mozart to see “how 
Don Juan must be interpreted as soon as music is not made its proper expres-
sion or he is placed in completely different esthetic categories” (SKS 2:109 / 
EO 1:105).
The main point for “A’s” dichotomy between a literary and dramatic (i.e., 
spoken dramatic) treatment of Don Juan and a musical one is made clear in 
the following way: “As soon as he [Don Juan] is given spoken lines, everything 
is changed. That is, the reflection that motivates the lines reflects him out of the 
vagueness in which he is only musically audible” (SKS 2:109 / EO 1:106).5 The 
vagueness, or perhaps rather the obscurity of a musical representation of Don 
Juan is something “A” discusses much earlier in his treatise; in his view, vague-
ness is an important characteristic for musical representations altogether. In 
a sense, this is the main thread running through the whole discussion of Don 
Giovanni. “A” claims Don Giovanni to (be the only one of Mozart’s works to) 
make Mozart a “classic composer” (SKS 2:58 / EO 1:51), an epithet that goes 
far beyond delight or admiration: “With his Don Giovanni, Mozart enters the 
rank of those immortals, of those visibly transfigured ones, whom no cloud 
takes away from the eyes of men; with Don Giovanni he stands supreme 
among them” (SKS 2:59 / EO 1:51). “A’s” panegyric statements about Mozart 
and Don Giovanni in the beginning of the treatise, including the expression 
just cited, are based on enthusiasm for the music Mozart wrote for this opera 
but just as much on an aesthetic notion of correspondence between idea and 
form— and, we might add, medium— as well as on “A’s” general conception 
of music. It is in order to demonstrate that Mozart’s Don Giovanni truly is a 
classic work that “A” establishes this correspondence.
First, “A” claims that the “sensuous in its elemental originality [den sand-
selige Genialitet]” is the most abstract idea conceivable. Asking, “But through 
134 Nils Holger Petersen
which medium can it be presented?,” he immediately gives his answer: “Only 
through music” (SKS 2:64 / EO 1:56). His argument for this assertion lies, 
first, in the relationship between language and music, to which I shall turn in 
a moment; second, in the broader historical idea that it is “first by Christian-
ity” that “sensuality is posited as a principle, as a power, as an independent 
system”; and third, in a formulation that leads into the discussion of the 
relationship between language and music, that “sensuality was placed under 
the qualification of spirit first by Christianity.” However, sensuality is posited 
in such a way as to be excluded, “but precisely because it is to be excluded it 
is defined as a principle” (SKS 2:68 / EO 1:61).
In his discussion of media, “A” insists that “language, regarded as medium, 
is the medium absolutely qualified by spirit, and it is therefore the authen-
tic medium of the idea,” and further that, as opposed to other media, “in 
language, the sensuous as medium is reduced to a mere instrument and is 
continually negated.” The point here seems to be that what is important in 
the use of language is the message that language conveys, not the sounds it 
employs: “If a person spoke in such a way that we heard the flapping of his 
tongue etc., he would be speaking poorly” (SKS 2:74 / EO 1:67). “A” goes on 
to say that “language is the perfect medium precisely when everything sensu-
ous in it is negated” (SKS 2:74 / EO 1:68). The continuation of this sentence 
appears slightly surprising, since the general point “A” is about to establish 
concerns music as the medium for presenting the sensuous: “That is also 
the case with music; that which is really supposed to be heard is continually 
disengaging itself from the sensuous” (SKS 2:74 / EO 1:68). I shall return to 
this point later. For now, however, “A’s” main point must be established: his 
argument for why music is the medium through which sensuous immediacy 
can be expressed.
On the whole, “A” describes music in its contrast with language, although, 
as just pointed out, music also has a common ground with language; indeed, 
“A” emphasizes, more than once (including the sequel to the just cited state-
ment), that music is also a kind of language. His comparison of music and 
language begins with the admission that language is the only medium that 
occurs in time. However, he again admits that this is true also for music, 
except that the musical “occurrence in time is in turn a negation of the feel-
ings dependent upon the senses” (SKS 2:75  / EO 1:68).6 This last remark 
must be read in the context of “A’s” following claim of music’s ephemerality. 
The immediacy of music may be understood to betray the feelings to which 
the music gives rise: “Music does not exist except in the moment it is per-
formed, for even if a person can read notes ever so well and has an ever so 
vivid imagination, he still cannot deny that only in a figurative sense does 
music exist when it is being read. It actually exists only when it is being per-
formed” (SKS 2:75 / EO 1:68). His attempt at explaining the basic relation 
between language and music begins with the assumption that prose language 
is the least musical, while already the rhetorical delivery of an oration “in 
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the sonorous construction of its periods” provides an “echo of the musical.” 
In such ways he can proceed through poetic declamation, metrical construc-
tions, and rhyme until “language leaves off and everything becomes music.” 
However, he also encounters music when moving in the opposite direction 
from prose language, which is “permeated by the concept,” to sheer interjec-
tions “which in turn are musical, just as a child’s first babbling is musical” 
(SKS 2:75– 76 / EO 1:69).
Summing up so far: music is close to language; indeed, “language is 
bounded by music on all sides” (SKS 2:76 / EO 1:69). This claim connects 
music to the sensuous qualities of language on either side of its reflective 
semantic uses, the sophisticated sonorous qualities of poetry on the one hand 
and the spontaneous sound of exclamations, screaming, babbling, and so 
forth on the other. Music in this view, then, is less precise and reflective than 
language. In my trying to come to terms with “A’s” account, I have so far 
avoided commenting on his often confusing ranking of language and music. 
It is a recurring, apparently important point for him to state that music is, in 
the end, inferior to language as a medium. This may to some extent be part 
of a polemic against the early Romantics, for whom music was the highest of 
the arts, an art form that, foremost in music without words (or experienced 
as “pure” music apart from words), could transcend this world and move 
the listener to a higher or a deeper world, as for instance described by the 
young poet Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773−1798) in his Herzenser-
gießungen eines Kunstliebenden Klosterbruders (1797, known in English as 
Confessions from the Heart of an Art- loving Friar or [Heart- felt] Outpour-
ings of an Art- Loving Friar), unfinished at the author’s early death, edited 
(and finalized) by his friend, the poet Ludwig Tieck in 1799.
This work constitutes, among other things, an early example of the new 
Romantic aesthetics of music, surfacing for instance in a fictional letter from 
a young painter to a friend describing an experience of music during a mass 
in Rome. Here “the full Latin song, rising and falling through swelling musi-
cal tones like ships sailing through the waves of the sea, raised my mind ever 
higher,” and a moment later, “trombones and I do not know which almighty 
tones blared and thundered a sublime devotion through all limbs.”7 Albeit 
in a more academic style, a similar approach to music is found in E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s statement “Mozart leads us into the deep layers of the spiritual 
realm. . . . In a similar way Beethoven’s instrumental music opens the realm 
of the immense and immeasurable.”8 Altogether, statements to such effects 
about music as transcending the worldly and as the highest art form are com-
mon among the Romantics.9
The idea that music can express what words are not able to convey has 
deep roots in Western Christian traditions and was possibly first formulated by 
Augustine in his Expositions of the Psalms when explaining and appropriat-
ing theologically the notion of iubilus, or jubilation. The spiritual side of the 
musical medium in Augustine’s view seems to parallel the no longer explicitly 
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theological idea in Romantic aesthetics.10 What I suggest is an indirect polemic 
against such Romantic views in “A’s” account comes to the fore in his com-
parison between language and music. Describing the movement from language 
to music in a poetic direction, as quoted above, “A” contends “that language 
leaves off and everything becomes music.” He continues, “Indeed, this is a pet 
phrase poets use to indicate that they, as it were, abandon the idea; it disap-
pears for them, and everything ends in music. This might seem to imply that 
music is even closer to perfection as a medium than language. But this is one 
of those sentimental misconceptions that sprout only in empty heads” (SKS 
2:75 / EO 1:69). Instead, “A” wants to establish a distinction between language 
and music based on music’s inferiority to language when it comes to reflection 
and precision. As already pointed out, “A” maintains that one arrives at music 
from language by way of moving away from ideas and reflection, either by 
way of poetic rhetorical devices or by way of the movement from conceptual 
formulation to the mentioned interjections, like the child’s babbling: “Here the 
point certainly cannot be that music is closer to perfection as a medium than 
language, or that music is a richer medium than language, unless it is assumed 
that saying ‘Uh’ is more valuable than a complete thought” (SKS 2:76 / EO 
1:69). What music can do is express “the immediate in its immediacy.” How-
ever, for “A,” this primarily shows the limitation of music as a medium in 
relation to language. On the other hand, in the case of “sensuousness in its 
elemental originality,” posited by Christianity outside the realm of spirit, music 
is the perfect medium precisely because of its limitation: “Reflection is implicit 
in language, and therefore language cannot express the immediate. Reflection 
is fatal to the immediate, and therefore it is impossible for language to express 
the musical, but this apparent poverty in language is precisely its wealth. In 
other words, the immediate is the indeterminate, and therefore language can-
not grasp it; but its indeterminacy is not its perfection but rather a defect in 
it” (SKS 2:76 / EO 1:70). Thus, “A” has established that music is especially 
suited to the subject of the sensuous in its immediacy, which is the topic of 
Don Juan as determined by “A” in the section “The Elementary Originality of 
the Sensuous Qualified as Seduction” (SKS 2:92– 107 / EO 1:87– 103). Alto-
gether this substantiates the claim that Mozart’s Don Giovanni is a classic 
work— granted Mozart’s musical genius— because the medium, as mastered by 
Mozart, is in complete correspondence with the idea that the work expresses: 
“In Mozart’s Don Giovanni, we have the perfect unity of this idea and its cor-
responding form. But precisely because the idea is so very abstract and because 
the medium also is abstract, there is no probability that Mozart will ever have 
a competitor. Mozart’s good fortune is that he has found a subject matter that 
is intrinsically altogether musical, and if any other composer were to compete 
with Mozart, there would be nothing for him to do except to compose Don 
Giovanni all over again” (SKS 2:64 / EO 1:57).11
The conceptualization of music established by “A” lies behind the discus-
sion of Molière’s Don Juan and of Heiberg’s free version of that play. The 
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main point, again, is that spoken lines and the reflection behind them change 
Don Juan into a concrete individual, thus removing him from the ideality “A” 
attributes to him (SKS 2:109 / EO 1:106). This point is repeated in the con-
text of the discussion of Molière and Heiberg. Whereas a musical Don Juan 
is a seducer without strategy and does not need any particular means to be 
victorious in his sexual conquests (SKS 2:112 / EO 1:109), a reflective Don 
Juan loses this immediacy:
The musical Don Juan enjoys the satisfaction; the reflective Don Juan 
enjoys the deception, enjoys the craftiness. The immediate pleasure is 
past, and reflection on the enjoyment is enjoyed more. In this respect 
there is a little hint in Molière’s interpretation, except that this can by 
no means be developed, because all the remainder of the interpreta-
tion is a hindrance. Don Juan’s desire is aroused because he sees a girl 
happy in her relation to the one she loves; he begins to be jealous. 
This is an interest that in the opera would not occupy us at all, simply 
because Don Juan is not a reflective individual. As soon as Don Juan 
is interpreted as a reflective individual, an ideality corresponding to 
the musical ideality can be attained only when the matter is shifted 
into the psychological realm. (SKS 2:111 / EO 1:108)
In this context “A” emphasizes the comic effect that can be obtained by deny-
ing Don Juan the means, thus constructing an incongruence; this is partly so 
in Molière’s piece, but “A” makes a point of claiming that Heiberg is more 
consistent in the comical and more “correct” (SKS 2:112– 13 / EO 1:109– 10). 
Two important examples discussed by “A,” however, apply to both Molière’s 
piece and Heiberg’s version. One, which “A” acknowledges is a true comical 
and fitting scene in a spoken Don Juan play, is the scene where Don Juan’s 
creditor M. Dimanche— Hr. Paaske in Heiberg’s version— visits Don Juan in 
order to get his money but is elegantly, politely, and comically diverted. This 
scene makes him lose the ideality he has in the opera with a comical effect. 
This scene would not do in an opera (SKS 2:112– 13 / EO 1:109– 10).12
The other example concerns the judgment scene where the Commander as 
a statue comes to fetch Don Juan. “A” makes the point that this scene is “a 
stumbling block from a dramatic point of view.” If Don Juan is interpreted 
in the ideal way, that is, not as an individual but “as power, as passion”— as 
the idea of the sensuous— “then heaven itself must intervene.” If Don Juan 
is seen as an individual character, it would make much more sense to let him 
confront the juridical system: “It is far more practical for Mr. Paaske to have 
Don Juan put into the debtor’s prison.” “A” suggests that it would be much 
more convincing to let Don Juan “know the commonplace bounds of actual-
ity” (SKS 2:115 / EO 1:112).
Modern interpreters such as Ivan Nagel have made a similar point about 
opera in Mozart’s time, referring to two different musical dramatic genres: 
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opera seria and opera buffa. The first of these belongs to the traditional court 
opera of absolutism, with grace as its most fundamental notion, whereas the 
second belongs to the more recently emergent bourgeois opera of Enlighten-
ment in which conflicts are resolved rationally. For Nagel, Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni can be understood as a play between the two operatic genres.13 
Whereas the same point concerning absolute power versus rational gover-
nance could easily be made concerning spoken theater as for musical theater 
of similarly different social contexts, this, for “A” (who, like Kierkegaard, 
must be assumed to be a child of an absolute monarchy), is a question of the 
musical medium:
In the opera, it is entirely appropriate to have the Commenda-
tore [i.e., the term used for the Commander in the Italian libretto 
of Mozart’s opera] come again, but, after all, his conduct has ideal 
truth. The music immediately makes the Commendatore more than 
a particular individual; his voice is enlarged to the voice of a spirit. 
Therefore, just as Don Juan in the opera is interpreted with esthetic 
earnestness, so also is the Commendatore. In Molière, he comes with 
an ethical solemnity and heaviness that make him almost ludicrous; 
in the opera, he comes with esthetic lightness and metaphysical truth. 
No power in the play, no power on earth, has been able to constrain 
Don Juan; only a spirit, an apparition, is able to do that. Understood 
correctly, this in turn will illuminate the interpretation of Don Juan. 
A spirit, an apparition, is reproduction; this is the secret implicit in 
the coming again. But Don Juan is capable of everything, can with-
stand everything, except the reproduction of life, precisely because he 
is immediate, sensate life, of which spirit is the negation. (SKS 2:115 / 
EO 1:112– 13)
In the following section, where “A” discusses the individual characters 
in Mozart’s opera, he also summarizes his view on the dramatic differences 
between an opera and a drama (spoken theater). The main difference empha-
sized is closely connected to the discussion of the musical medium and its 
capacity in relation to language. “A” demands that a drama should leave a 
total impact that should “be less a mood than a thought, an idea.” Nothing 
should be left over “of the mood from which the drama emerges, that is, 
nothing of the mood qua mood, but everything is converted into the dramatic 
sacred coin: action and situation.” Reflection transfigures mood into action. 
If the mood predominates, the drama becomes lyrical, which “is a defect, 
but . . . is by no means a defect in an opera” (SKS 2:119– 20 / EO 1:117). 
In an opera there must be a dominant tone that produces the unity of mood 
while maintaining the plurality of voices within this unity. “Opera does not 
have so much character delineation and action as its immanent objective; it is 
not sufficiently reflective for that.” Rather, “unreflective, substantial passion” 
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(SKS 2:120 / EO 1:118) is expressed. Therefore the opera does not have the 
same urgency toward action as a drama must have. Instead, “it is character-
ized by a kind of tarrying, a kind of self- extension in time and space. . . . The 
action in an opera can be only immediate action” (SKS 2:121 / EO 1:118).
The descriptions and discussions of the various figures in Don Giovanni 
in agreement with this view emphasize the dependency of all these figures, 
except the Commendatore, on the protagonist Don Giovanni. For all these 
other characters, then, the point is less the action as such than the lyrical 
expression of these dependencies. But the Commendatore is precisely the 
counterpower to Don Juan, the power of spirit or consciousness against 
which Don Juan rebels in vain:
The Commendatore appears only two times. The first time it is night; 
it is in the background of the theater; we cannot see him, but we hear 
him fall before Don Giovanni’s rapier. Already at the very outset his 
earnestness, which is made all the more manifest by Don Giovanni’s 
caricaturing mockery, something Mozart has superbly expressed in 
music— already at the very outset his earnestness is too profound to 
be human; before he dies, he is spirit. The second time he appears 
as spirit, and the thundering voice of heaven sounds in his earnest, 
solemn voice. But just as he himself is transfigured, so his voice is 
transfigured into something more than a human voice; he no longer 
speaks, he passes judgment. (SKS 2:126 / EO 1:124)
It is well known that “A’s” account does not completely fit the opera as it was 
actually written by Mozart and Da Ponte (1787) and generally performed. 
The Commendatore actually appears three times in the opera, not two. In his 
account, Kierkegaard let “A” omit the rather central churchyard scene where 
Don Giovanni invites the statue to dinner. Many scholars have commented on 
the relationship between “A’s” account and the opera, often pointing out that 
“A’s” account has its own purpose and inner logic presenting a literary rewrit-
ing of Mozart’s opera rather than being a straightforward analysis of the 
opera; at the same time it is obviously inspired by and relating to the opera.14
The correspondence between idea and form,15 and medium as well, clearly 
appears as the important criterion in “A’s” theatrical evaluations, in agree-
ment with what was shown by Pattison at the beginning of this essay. The 
appraisal of Heiberg for his improvement of Molière’s piece, possibly through 
the indirect inspiration of Mozart’s opera, also confirms Heiberg’s crucial 
bearing on Kierkegaard’s aesthetics— or, at least, “A’s” aesthetics. However, 
the construction of “A’s” aesthetic universe, and not least the intensity in 
the constant deliberations about the musical medium and the relationship 
between spirit and sensuousness, language, and music, seem to me to reveal 
“A” to be a figure quite different from the “reflecteur” who always maintains 
his critical distance, as Pattison summarized Kierkegaard’s aesthetic position. 
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“A” is more than a critic, although “The Immediate Erotic Stages” is seem-
ingly all about aesthetics. In particular the situation of the musical aesthetics 
and of the figure of Don Juan in relation to Christianity may be read as point-
ing to a grander but also more dangerous perspective.
Music and Existence in “A’s” Treatise
Ettore Rocca has read “The Immediate Erotic Stages” as a Christian text 
claiming that what Christianity in “A’s” discourse posits and excludes is the 
idea of the sensuous, but not therefore necessarily also the medium of sen-
suousness. In addition, regarding a statement about music in “A’s” treatise, 
Rocca observes that it does not follow— in “A’s” words— “that one must 
regard it [music] as the devil’s work,” although it “is an imperfect medium 
and . . . consequently it cannot have its absolute theme in the immediately 
spiritual qualified as spirit” (SKS 2:79 / EO 1:73). Rocca’s argument is based 
on “A’s” discussion of how Christianity first posited the idea of the sensuous 
by excluding it. As we have seen, “A” claims that the medium in which the 
sensuous can be expressed in its immediacy is music, and he therefore under-
stands Don Giovanni as a classic work. In this context, Rocca points to the 
following formulation by “A”:
If the elemental originality of the sensuous- erotic in all its immediacy 
insists on expression, then the question arises as to which medium is 
the most suitable for this. . . . In its immediacy, it can be expressed 
only in music.  .  .  . The significance of music thereby appears in its 
full validity, and in a stricter sense it appears as a Christian art or, 
more correctly, as the art Christianity posits in excluding it from 
itself, as the medium for that which Christianity excludes from itself 
and thereby posits. In other words, music is the demonic. In elemen-
tal sensuous- erotic originality, music has its absolute theme. This, of 
course, does not mean that music cannot express anything else, but 
nevertheless this is its theme proper. (SKS 2:71 / EO 1:64– 65)16
Rocca’s conclusion is that “music can properly express sensuality .  .  . only 
by presupposing spirit, only by presenting it from the point of view of spirit 
or Christianity. . . . Music in its perfection will tell about sensuality, but the 
agent who uses this medium is spirit, as it were.”17 Whether this makes “A’s” 
treatise Christian, I am not sure, but it is important to point out that music, in 
“A’s” construction, fulfills a role in a Christian context, although, as the last 
quotation from “A’s” treatise also makes clear, music, in “A’s” view, is indeed 
excluded from Christianity.
In this connection, one might recall the surprising analogy drawn by “A” 
between music and language, which was cited early in this essay in connection 
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with the comparison between language and music more generally. Although 
the general context was one in which language and music were contrasted, 
language being reflective as opposed to the immediacy of music, “A” asserts 
that “language is the perfect medium precisely when everything sensuous in 
it is negated.” He adds, “That is also the case with music; that which is really 
supposed to be heard is continually disengaging itself from the sensuous” 
(SKS 2:74  / EO 1:68). Possibly this may support Rocca’s contention that 
the function of music— considered in the larger, spiritual context necessary 
for music to be posited as the medium of the sensuous immediacy— is to act 
under the power of the spirit. The quotation certainly seems to be in agree-
ment with the ephemerality of existence, which “A” attributes to music: quite 
physically, by being ephemeral, music disengages itself from itself and leaves 
the stage, as it were, to the spirit.
The same function attributable to music must also be attributable to 
Mozart’s opera as a whole in view of the intimate correspondence between 
the idea and the form of this work. This correspondence comes to the fore 
in “A’s” discussion of the struggle between the powers of the Commendatore 
and Don Juan in his account of the overture (SKS 2:127– 31 / EO 1:125– 30). 
Here he describes the emergence of Don Juan’s power, which is born in anxi-
ety: “There is an anxiety in him, but this anxiety is his energy” (SKS 2:131 / 
EO 1:129). He sees, or rather hears, and, as I have submitted elsewhere, “A’s” 
ears must have been Kierkegaard’s ears, and it is easy to see in the descrip-
tion of the overture, through “A’s” nontechnical, literary descriptions, exactly 
what in the music has made Kierkegaard hear this anxiety, although this 
musical element may be interpreted very differently from the way “A” inter-
prets it.18 In the overture, “A” claims, someone familiar with the opera will 
hear the “forces he has learned to identify in the opera move with a primitive 
power, where they wrestle with one another with all their might.” The power 
of the Commendatore, however, is the victor, even before the battle, and the 
power of Don Juan flees, “but this flight is precisely its passion, its burning 
restlessness in its brief joy of life” (SKS 2:129 / EO 1:127).
It is the struggle between the spirit, the Commendatore, who, as pointed 
out earlier, is spirit from the outset of the opera, even before he dies (killed 
by Don Giovanni in the very first scene of the opera), and Don Juan who 
embodies the idea of the sensuous in its immediacy. For “A,” it is important 
to claim “that the interest of the opera is Don Giovanni, not Don Giovanni 
and the Commendatore” (SKS 2:129 / EO 1:127). This is connected to the 
(distorted) assertion, already mentioned, that the Commendatore appears 
only twice. “The Commendatore is the vigorous antecedent clause and the 
outspoken consequent clause, between which lies Don Giovanni’s intermedi-
ate clause, but the rich content of this intermediate clause is the substance 
of the opera” (SKS 2:126 / EO 1:124). And this again must be so, in “A’s” 
account, because the music precisely is able to express Don Juan’s life even as 
“he dances over the abyss, jubilating during his brief span” (SKS 2:131 / EO 
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1:130), connected again to his claim “The more the Commendatore would 
be drawn to the foreground, the more the opera would cease to be absolutely 
musical” (SKS 2:126 / EO 1:124). As spirit and consciousness, “A” claims the 
Commendatore lies outside the musical medium’s central theme. This is a dif-
ficulty in “A’s” presentation of the opera, and therefore he cannot do justice 
to the musical setting of the lines of the Commendatore, nor mention the 
churchyard scene where the Commendatore warns Don Giovanni in music 
that associates strongly with church music.19
If the earlier quoted statement— in connection with the comparison of 
Molière’s and Mozart’s uses of the statue— that “Don Juan  .  .  . can with-
stand everything, except the reproduction of life, because he is immediate, 
sensate life” is contextualized with the statement, also quoted earlier, that 
music exists only while being performed, then it seems that “A’s” understand-
ing of music is one that does not allow for musical memory because music is 
the medium of sensuous immediacy. One obviously needs to be careful about 
drawing overly strict musical- philosophical implications out of a treatise 
that, after all, is written in a literary, associative style rather than based on a 
consistent theoretical construction. Still, it seems to make sense to think of 
“A’s” musical understanding (and Kierkegaard’s?) as being based on notions 
of ephemerality and of music being silenced by reflection and memory. What 
the statue brings is the memory of what Don Giovanni has done in his dance 
over the abyss, the humans he has hurt or killed or disregarded. This is what 
the opera seems to be about when it is considered in the context of its original 
dramatic history from the first (known) Don Juan play by Tirso de Molina in 
the early seventeenth century, through Molière, to Mozart and Da Ponte, not 
to mention the many others along the way, including the numerous operas 
on this subject written before Mozart’s Don Giovanni in the eighteenth cen-
tury.20 This is what the opera seems to be about when the Commendatore is 
not considered to be outside its main interest.
But if the opera is considered as “A” considers it, then it must vanish like its 
own idea, and like Don Giovanni, into the abyss, so that all that is left is the 
deep voice of the spirit, of the Commendatore, who is not absolutely musical. 
If music is understood radically to be the medium of sensuous immediacy, 
it seems to be contradictory to repeat it, to perform it. The thrice- repeated 
“hear” in “A’s” famous appraisal and exhortation to listen to Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni seems to expose an inherent contradiction in “A’s” overall con-
struction of the opera as a musical work expressing what cannot be retained: 
the immediate, ephemeral, and nonrepeatable sensuousness of the moment. 
In this way, possibly by the author’s intention, the whole treatise annihilates 
itself in order to leave the stage to reflection: “Listen to the beginning of his 
life; just as the lightning is discharged from the darkness of the thunder-
clouds, so he bursts out of the abyss of earnestness, swifter than the lightning’s 
flash, more capricious than lightning and yet just as measured. Hear how he 
plunges down into the multiplicity of life, how he breaks against its solid 
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embankment. Hear these light, dancing violin notes, hear the intimation of 
joy .  .  . hear the whisper of temptation, hear the vortex of seduction, hear 
the stillness of the moment— hear, hear, hear Mozart’s Don Giovanni” (SKS 
2:106– 7 / EO 1:103). But what is the treatise itself, if not reflection? And can 
music exist at all without memory (and repetition)?21
In book 11 of his Confessions, Augustine discusses the notion of time and 
how to measure it through an example in which he imagines that he is about 
to sing a song which at that point is still fully contained in the future, as he 
has not yet started singing. As he sings, Augustine describes how the song 
gradually moves through the singer and how, as the song is finished, it belongs 
completely to the past. During the singing, some of the song belongs to the 
past, some to the future, and only one short part, the tone being sung in the 
moment, belongs to the now. What is important in this context is, first, how 
Augustine deconstructs the idea of the “now” by pointing out that even the 
tone he is singing in the moment can be divided up so that he has already sung 
some of it, while some of it still belongs to the future, and only a small part 
even of that tone is in the “now” or present moment. Because he can go on 
in this way (similar, actually, to the way infinitesimal calculus was invented 
some 1,200 years later) the “now” cannot be seen to have any duration. It 
is the ultra- short moment between the past and the future. Augustine must 
conclude that the only way he can measure time is through memory, since any 
time period to be measured must be said mostly not to exist: part of it lies in 
the past, which no longer exists; part of it, in the future, which does not yet 
exist; while only the ultra- brief present moment exists, ever so fleetingly.22 
For Augustine, all of this concerns the notion of time and how to measure it.
The modern Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905– 81), 
however, has used Augustine’s philosophy of time with a different purpose 
in mind while drawing also upon Heidegger and Husserl, and especially 
employing the notion of retention— specifically retention through memory, 
the attempt at holding on to what is disappearing into the nonexistence of the 
past. In his Skabelse og Tilintetgørelse (1978, Creation and Annihilation),23 
using Augustine’s thought as his basis, Løgstrup argues that perception of 
time arises by comparison with at least temporarily unaltered objects, against 
which the passing of time can be experienced. Such objects are spatial, and 
that is how we can experience them as unchanged in time. In this way time 
and space are connected. Løgstrup further argues that even an object purely 
of time can be retained in what he calls a fictional space. Here he takes up 
Augustine’s example of the melody, claiming that the way we remember a 
melody is by its shape, its structure, its “character.” These are timeless char-
acteristics. “For a melody,” writes Løgstrup, “it is necessary not only that its 
parts follow in the right order; also its character is necessary. But time can-
not grant character to a progress in time; only space can do that.”24 For this 
reason, Løgstrup speaks about the fictional space of the melody, in which it 
is preserved for our memory, as a “timeless” structure.
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Many questions arise out of this construction, and most fall outside the 
scope of this essay.25 Even the notion of a melody in itself is problematic if 
it is not historicized. However, in the context here I need only to apply it to 
the situation in “A’s” construction of music and of Mozart’s Don Giovanni. 
In this context, the notion of melody is unproblematic and is certainly used 
in many places by “A.” If one accepts Løgstrup’s philosophical construction, 
or even just Augustine’s, how can the melody that is sung be perceived as a 
melody if there is no musical memory? Take, for instance, a lyrical scene “A” 
describes poetically: Don Giovanni is singing his so- called champagne aria in 
the first act. “A’s” description is convincing, even touching, with its image of 
Don Giovanni “intoxicated, so to speak, with himself”:
If all the girls in the world encircled him at this moment, he would 
not be dangerous to them, for he is, as it were, too strong to want to 
infatuate them; even the most multifarious pleasures of actuality are 
too little for him compared with what he enjoys in himself.
What it means to say— that Don Giovanni’s essential nature is 
music— is clearly apparent here. He dissolves, as it were, in music for 
us; he unfurls in a world of sounds. . . . What we must see especially 
is that it does not stand in an accidental relation to Don Giovanni. 
Such is his life, effervescing like champagne. And just as the beads in 
this wine, as it simmers with an internal heat, sonorous with its own 
melody, rise and continue to rise, just so the lust for enjoyment reso-
nates in the elemental boiling that is his life. Therefore, the dramatic 
significance of this aria comes not from the situation but from this, 
that here the opera’s dominant tone sounds and resonates in itself. 
(SKS 2:135– 36 / EO 1:134)
But what about this melody? In “A’s” view, if taken at face value, as discussed 
earlier, it would have to dissolve into nothing in order to be consistent with 
the character of music as a medium for the immediacy of sensuousness. To 
remember the melody, to repeat it and to describe its lyrical character, seems 
to contradict the construction of the opera and of the musical medium in 
“A’s” treatise. Apparently Kierkegaard, if not “A,” went to hear (if not see) 
the opera many times,26 but “Don Juan . . . can withstand everything, except 
the reproduction of life, because he is immediate, sensate life” (SKS 2:115 / 
EO 1:113). Since in “A’s” construction, Don Juan is killed by such repetition, 
also the retention of a melody expressive of him, and indeed the retention of 
the whole opera, the very classic work of music drama that celebrates him 
becomes problematic.
Evident here is the same kind of contradiction that would eventually 
emerge in the modernism of the mid- twentieth century, where Adorno in his 
Philosophy of Modern Music (Philosophie der neuen Musik, 1949) wrote 
that “music, compressed into a moment, is valid as an eruptive revelation of 
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negative experience.”27 This idea of music as knowledge, and as true suffering 
condensed into a moment, was part of a rather revolutionary understanding 
of music’s condition in the modern world, seen and understood especially 
through the twelve- tone system of Schoenberg and Webern. The inherent 
contradiction between the idea of artworks and the idea of real suffering 
condensed into a moment was captured and appropriated in Thomas Mann’s 
novel Doktor Faustus (written in 1943– 46; published in 1947), recontex-
tualizing Adorno’s contemporary understanding of music and culture into 
his own large- scale historical view in which Schoenberg’s twelve- tone system 
was adapted (in a somewhat changed perspective) and resignified as a Faust 
pact.28 All this falls outside the scope of this essay, except that precisely this 
Faust pact was made with explicit reference to “A’s” identification of music 
as excluded from Christianity, as stated by the devil in his offer of the pact 
to the composer- protagonist Adrian Leverkühn: “He [the author of the Don 
Juan treatise in Either/Or] knew and understood my particular relation to 
this beautiful art— the most Christian of all arts, he finds— but Christian in 
reverse, as it were: introduced and developed by Christianity indeed, but then 
rejected and banned as the Devil’s Kingdom— so there you are. A highly theo-
logical business, music— the way sin is, the way I am.”29
To conclude, I wish to suggest that the music philosophy of “A” collapses if 
one takes it seriously in detail. His is a brilliant essay, brilliant in provoking 
readers to discuss the meaning of Don Giovanni, and, much more than that, 
the meaning of music as such and of existence seen through the intensity of 
music and drama that engage those who listen, read, and watch. The essay is 
far more than music or theater criticism; just as Mann much later was able 
to use the politicocultural aesthetics of Adorno in a large- scale existential 
confrontation with long- established traditions of Western culture, Kierke-
gaard’s “A” formulated provocative statements to the effect that music would 
seem no longer a harmless, pleasant entertainment but rather something that 
potentially could threaten bourgeois life as well as spiritual life. In doing so, 
he formulated a theory that collapses if one takes its actual statements at face 
value. I believe, however, that one needs to do so in order to get to the point 
where this becomes clear.
Notes
Kierkegaard, as was previously the norm in Danish, refers consistently to Don 
Juan, not Don Giovanni. In modern times, however, the opera and its protago-
nist are always referred to as Don Giovanni. In order to avoid confusion, I have 
consistently used Giovanni whenever I refer explicitly to the opera and only the 
opera, but Juan whenever I refer more generally to the figure. The same seems to 
be true for the English translation in EO 1.
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“Let No One Invite Me, for I Do Not Dance”
Kierkegaard’s Attitudes toward Dance
Anne Margrete Fiskvik
Søren Kierkegaard was a man concerned with many types of artistic expres-
sions and social practices, dance being one of them. He made references to 
dance and movement in several of his writings.1 He was concerned with 
dance both as an art form and as a social practice, commenting on these in 
different ways. Kierkegaard and certain pseudonyms of his often use dance 
as a metaphor or allusion to enrich their philosophical discourses and fine 
points. They often employ dancing images in a didactic manner. They talk 
about the dancer, the ballroom dancer as well as the ballet dancer. They con-
trast the female with the male dancer. Kierkegaard refers to the ballet master 
and the dancing master, the person who choreographs and designs the ballet. 
He was also interested in the expressionistic nature of dance, to what degree 
a ballet can render true human emotions. He was preoccupied with what can 
be expressed in ballet plots, and with what subjects can be deemed suitable 
for a ballet.
Even if the references to dance by Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are 
less extensive than those to other art forms, such as music, he was evidently 
intrigued by the way dance images activate the imagination and deeper reflec-
tion of the reader. The twisted body, the tightrope dancer, the ballet leap— all 
of these have literal meanings while at the same time evoking images and 
meanings beyond the actual dance or dancing. They give the reader wonder-
ful images to ponder, and numerous scholars have discussed some of the 
better known images— for instance, the “twisted dancer.”
This essay does not aim to offer a philosophical interpretation of the dance 
images and allusions in Kierkegaard’s writings. Rather, I am concerned with 
the different ways Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms appeal to dance. I aim 
to contextualize and interpret their references to and comments on dance. I 
do not attempt to catalogue all the mentions of dance or dancing in Kierke-
gaard’s writings, but I do try to bring into focus most of these references, 
both those that are well known and some that are less well known. My per-
spective is that of the dance scholar, and rather than offering philosophical 
or religious interpretations, my main aim is to offer the reader some ideas on 
what could have shaped Kierkegaard’s thoughts and attitudes toward dance. 
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The dance references in his writings have not, to my knowledge, previously 
been studied in the broad manner I attempt in this essay. A few dance scholars 
have been intrigued by the dance references, and I draw upon several of their 
works, for instance, Nathaniel Kramer’s “August Bournonville: Kierkegaard’s 
Leap of Faith and the ‘Noble Art of Terpsichore’ ” and Kimerer LaMothe’s 
“The Poet and the Dancer.”2
Kierkegaard often betrays ambivalence in his attitude toward dancing. He 
admired the art form but considered it limited in its artistic possibilities. This 
ambivalence, which he expresses rather didactically, will be revealed in differ-
ent ways in the three main parts of the essay. The first part, on Kierkegaard 
and dance as an art form, deals with his thoughts on dance as theatrical prac-
tice and his relationship to the ballet master August Bournonville. The second 
part examines his metaphors, and the third, on Kierkegaard and the ballroom 
dancer, deals with his thoughts on dance as social practice.3
Kierkegaard and Dance as an Art Form
Kierkegaard lived in an era that saw rich developments in several artistic 
expressions, not least in classical ballet. The Romantic era in ballet began in 
the early 1830s, somewhat belatedly compared to music and literature but 
lasting more or less to the end of the century. The Romantic ballet was epito-
mized by two types of female ballerina, one of them cherished for her light, 
eerie, and elevated way of moving, and the other appreciated for her sensual, 
down- to- earth dancing. The role of the male dancer, in contrast, was scaled 
down in the European ballet and often reduced the male to a supporter and 
enabler of the ballerina’s steps. However, in Denmark, the dancer and ballet 
master August Bournonville valued the male dancer as equal to the ballerina, 
and it is to Kierkegaard’s relation to this preeminent male Danish dancer of 
his time that we now shall turn.
Kierkegaard and the “Ballet Poet” Bournonville
In Kierkegaard’s home country, Denmark, lived and worked one of the most 
significant figures of Romantic ballet, August Bournonville (1805– 1879). 
The son of the dancer and ballet master Antoine Bournonville, August was 
born into a family of dancers. He started his ballet training at an early age, 
and his extraordinary talent was soon discovered. Bournonville took classes 
with Vincenzo Galeotti (1773–1813), the Italian ballet master who led and 
developed the Danish Royal Ballet for many years. He also studied with well- 
known ballet masters in Paris, such as Auguste Vestris (1760– 1842), and 
quickly developed into a premiere dancer at the Paris Opera. Upon his return 
to Denmark, he started working at the Royal Danish Ballet and soon became 
the main ballet choreographer and leader of the ensemble. Except for some 
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years during which he was expelled from the Royal Danish Theater (in 1841) 
or working in Stockholm or at the Paris Opera, Bournonville ruled the Royal 
Danish Ballet with a firm hand from 1830 to 1877.4
The effort of Bournonville in building the Danish Royal Ballet was of 
great importance to the ballet world, and even though his legacy has grown 
retrospectively, he was already a respected ballet master, choreographer, and 
dancer around 1840. Bournonville lived and worked at the height of the 
Romantic era in ballet, but in contrast to many of his contemporary ballet 
choreographers, he kept up the importance of the male dancer. He cherished 
the male dancer in Denmark when the male dancer’s importance was dimin-
ished in the rest of Europe.5
Bournonville had been the leader of the Royal Danish Ballet for sev-
eral years and was a well- known figure in Copenhagen by 1843, the year 
Kierkegaard published Either/Or (on February 20), Repetition, and Fear 
and Trembling (both of the latter two on October 16), as well as two sets 
of Upbuilding Discourses (on May 16 and October 16). Kierkegaard and 
Bournonville were acquaintances but not close friends.6 Kierkegaard refers 
to Bournonville explicitly in a couple of places in his writings as well as 
indirectly. Bournonville, for his own part, admitted his fascination with 
Kierkegaard’s use of irony retrospectively at a farewell party he held in 1861 
on the occasion of his departure to accept a new position in Stockholm. In 
an unpublished speech, he revealed that the two of them took walks together, 
contemplating matters such as the concept of irony: “An excellent Danish 
philosopher has written a lengthy dissertation on the concept of Irony. I 
admit with modesty that I have not yet read it, since I have only pursued 
and digested very little of the aforesaid author. On the other hand I enjoyed 
the great happiness of often walking with him and refreshing myself with his 
insatiable fount of knowledge and perspicacity.”7 Despite Bornonville’s claim 
that he had not read much, if any, of Kierkegaard’s work, there is evidence of 
the contrary: several of Kierkegaard’s books were in Bournonville’s substan-
tial library, books that are still part of Bournonville’s legacy. However, later 
in life, after Kierkegaard’s attack on Bishop Mynster and the Danish state 
church, Bournonville took a less favorable attitude toward him.8 Bournon-
ville was indeed a very well- read man who kept up with the literary trends 
and discussed these with contemporary writers. Moreover, he saw himself as 
a “Balletdigter”— a ballet poet.9
It is not totally clear during which periods Bournonville and Kierkegaard 
walked together, but according to the Bournonville expert Knud Arne Jür-
gensen, the walks would most likely have taken place in the years before 
and after Bournonville was exiled for half a year in 1841, from March 14, 
for having offended the Danish king. Bournonville returned in September 
1841. On October 25 (two weeks after having broken off his engagement 
with Regine Olsen), Kierkegaard departed for Berlin, where he remained 
for four months, returning to Copenhagen on March 6, 1842. On May 8 
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the following year, he again left Copenhagen, this time for a shorter visit to 
Berlin. This is noteworthy because, according to Jürgensen, Kierkegaard’s 
walks with Bournonville were over by 1843.10 Nor is it clear how these walks 
began, since the two men seem unlikely walking companions. Yet Kierke-
gaard enjoyed his walking tours along the streets of Copenhagen with many 
of the city’s eminent figures, as Kramer points out.11 Bournonville was at this 
point one of the highly respected, “eminent” persons in Copenhagen, a man 
with strong opinions and the courage to speak against the authorities. This 
might have attracted Kierkegaard to Bournonville, who was clearly drawn 
to Kierkegaard’s existentialist outlook. He points out that his walks with 
Kierkegaard helped to clarify his own attitudes toward the use of irony: “One 
thing I did discover, that irony is not identical with ridiculousness, mockery 
or bitterness, but is on the contrary an important element in our spiritual 
existence— the fortification with alcohol that takes away the sickly sweetness 
of wine’s grapes, the jet of cold water that dampens a fever, in short the smile 
through tears that prevents us from becoming lachrymose.”12 Bour nonville’s 
plots were not constructed to be ironic, and therefore this quotation is highly 
relevant, because Kierkegaard would criticize Bournonville for his lack of 
refined libretti. Bournonville himself seems to have been aware that his out-
look on life and art was rather naive compared to Kierkegaard’s, and yet 
he explains and defends his position: “I will not claim that all friends here 
gathered know me to my inner being, but their acquaintance with me is suf-
ficient to realise that it is more feeling than irony that plays the main rôle in 
my life. I and my art belong properly to a sentimental time and direction, I 
have unceasingly lived in a battle with the external influence of irony; and I 
will not deny that it has dominated me so much that I have often felt strange 
and embarrassed in the middle of its atmosphere of self- parody.”13
Bournonville shied away from using irony actively in his own work, but 
through conversations with Kierkegaard he at least felt more at ease with the 
concept: “Today for the first time I have realised its [irony’s] true worth. . . . 
It is certain that after our standards I possess too little irony, but that sup-
ply which I have been able to collect in so many years of this ingredient will 
now be to my benefit.”14 Also, as Jürgensen points out in his discussion of 
Bournonville’s philosophical outlook, he “could certainly be called an exis-
tentialist ante litteram. He based his life on artistic ideals, but moved with 
moral and muscular immediacy both in his art and in many other social 
contexts outside of the theatre.”15 Thus Bournonville openly revealed that he 
had clear ideals for his own works and that he went for the more straightfor-
ward plots that contextualized his choreography, weaving solos, pas de deux, 
and corps de ballet sequences naturally into the story of the ballet. He was 
a prolific choreographer, creating a variety of ballets with stories situated in 
different countries. He was able to convey great happiness, sorrow, and pain 
through movement. Moreover, he was deeply religious and often brought up 
the conflict of good versus evil in his ballets. The plots often have a moral 
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component to them, and most often the stories end happily: God triumphs 
over evil, for instance in Napoli or The Fisherman and His Bride (Napoli 
eller Fiskeren og hans Brud, 1842), in which the heroine, Teresina, captivated 
by an evil sea king, regains her memory and sense by touching the cross she 
wears on a necklace.16
Despite the admiration in which Bournonville held Kierkegaard, there is 
also evidence of his criticizing the philosopher. In an entry of December 29, 
1854, in his unpublished diary, he wrote of an evening party he attended 
where the theater director Frederik Ludvig Høedt defended Kierkegaard 
against Bishop Mynster: “We had a pleasant time, but Høedt displeases me 
by defending Søren Kjerkegaard’s vile attack on Münster.”17 Bournonville 
was thus guided by his deep religious convictions and clearly took a stance 
against Kierkegaard in the Mynster debate.
Kierkegaard’s Views on Balletic Plots
By 1843, when Fear and Trembling was published, Bournonville had created 
the ballets Faust, La Sylphide, and Napoli, all typical of his choreographic 
style and conveying clear moral messages.18 Kierkegaard, although he 
admired Bournonville as a performer, was critical of his libretti and would 
mock Bournonville for his simpleminded plots, either openly or in more dis-
creet ways. His manner of expression was also quite didactic. In Fear and 
Trembling, speaking through his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, Kierke-
gaard mentions dance in several places. In his discussion of the rivalry 
between aesthetics and ethics, he makes a derogatory remark about the 
limited capacity of ballet subjects when discussing the relationship between 
Queen Elizabeth I and her lover Essex. Johannes de Silentio finds this overly 
dramatic story suitable for ballet and ironically writes, “This would be a 
subject for a poet who knew how to pry secrets out of people; otherwise, it 
can best be used by a ballet master, with whom the poet frequently confounds 
himself these days” (SKS 4:183 / FT 94). Elizabeth’s dilemma and dramatic 
decisions are not worthy of being elaborated upon by a real poet, but are 
suitable themes for a ballet master. With this claim Johannes de Silentio is 
implying that movements and gestures cannot replace real words. He also 
states that ballet masters mistakenly think of themselves as poets, referring 
to Bournonville, who called himself a “ballet poet” in several of his writings. 
He once explained, “After my return to my fatherland (in 1830) I occupied 
myself almost wholly with my ballet programmes, which concerning litera-
ture gave only a grievous scanty yield. For if a ballet poet allows himself to 
be tempted to give these outlines a touch of explanatory colouring, he risks 
promising more than he can deliver.”19 Jürgensen points out that Bournon-
ville by no means was against the writing of extensive scenarios and that he 
often provided meticulous programs for his ballets.20 Also, it is important to 
note that Bournonville had secret aspirations to be a poet. Over the years 
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he wrote a large number of poems and songs, most of which he published 
anonymously. He collected them in a handwritten volume that he labeled 
“Poetic attempts.”21
But to the complicated thinker Kierkegaard/Johannes de Silentio, Bour-
nonville’s plots appeared rather too naive: Kierkegaard himself would ponder 
questions of moral nuance and deceit over and over again in several volumes, 
scrutinizing topics from different angles. There were no clear- cut or easy 
solutions for Kierkegaard.22 Hints of two different literary positions can be 
seen here as well: Kierkegaard admired the thoughts and ideas of the French 
dramatist Eugène Scribe, who advocated plots that could be easily told and 
expressed but who rather superficially described human nature.23 Bournon-
ville was interested in human nature and took a more personal approach to 
his characterizations.24
Even if Kierkegaard did not appreciate Bournonville’s poetic effort, he 
clearly admired Bournonville as a performer. He probably saw him dance 
several times. It is known for a fact that he was present when Bournonville 
danced the role of Mephistopheles in his Faust (1832) when it was restaged 
in 1842.25 Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis comments positively 
on Bournonville’s fantastic leap in The Concept of Anxiety (SKS 4:432 / CA 
131). In a journal entry of 1843, Kierkegaard makes direct reference to Bourn-
onville, admiring his diabolical leap in Faust: “It’s a merit of Bournonville’s 
portrayal of Mephistopheles, that leap with which he always appears and 
jumps into a plastic [plastisk, i.e., carefully poised] pose. This leap is a moment 
that should be noted in understanding the demonic. For the demonic is the 
sudden” (SKS 18:172– 73, JJ:104 / KJN 2:160, emphases in original). Bour-
nonville danced the role of Mephistopheles from June 10, 1842, until March 
1843, and it is probably his interpretation that Kierkegaard is referring to as 
being demonic and thus interesting. In fact, the concept of a leap intrigued 
Kierkegaard, and he returns to it in Fear and Trembling, where he uses it 
metaphorically. He saw the ability to leap well as something agreeable and 
admirable, and Bournonville was indeed known as a great jumper. In fact his 
entire ballet technique was built around speed and elevation.26 Kier ke gaard 
appreciated his ability to leap forward into a plastic position. The spring of 
Bournonville was sudden, and implicitly powerful, and, for Kierkegaard, this 
feature stands in contrast to another side of the demonic: the boring.
When choreographing Faust, Bournonville followed typical French ballet 
conventions; for example, male dancers often would leap through an open 
window when making an entrance. Although such leaps were quite common 
in many ballets of the time, Kramer suggests that Kierkegaard was unaware 
of this standard practice of leaping onto the stage and that he therefore mis-
interpreted Bournonville’s initial motivation and portrayal of a demonic 
personality.27 This might be so, but one must not forget that Bournonville 
was an excellent jumper and widely known for his powerful leaps. His leaps 
would probably have astonished his audience. Nevertheless, for Kierkegaard, 
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this particular leap came across as powerful enough that it conjured images of 
the demonic.28 Bournonville as dancer and performer doubtlessly gained more 
respect from Kierkegaard than did Bournonville the choreographer. Whereas 
he found Bournonville’s plot boring and unimaginative, Bournonville’s danc-
ing conjured powerful images to which Kierkegaard’s writings later alluded.
Aside from his admiration for Bournonville the dancer, we are once again 
reminded that Kierkegaard found Bournonville’s choreographic works, and 
also ballet in general as an art form, limited in its expressiveness. This is seen 
in some undated notes of 1844 labeled “Begrepet Angest” (Concept of Anxi-
ety). There he discusses the expressive nature of dance even more extensively 
and elaborates on what can and cannot be expressed in ballet. He writes 
once more about the development of the demonic, and he refers to what he 
previously wrote about the development of the demonic either as sudden 
or as boring, without continuity. Making notes to himself, using keywords 
rather than complete sentences, he states, “The mimetic is the best expression 
for the demonic. Bournonville. Without content. (Elverpigen)” (Pap. V B 58, 
my translation). As if to remind himself of his line of thought, Kierkegaard 
is indicating that he has Bournonville in mind when jotting this down. He 
again is implying that Bournonville as a dancer can portray the demonic, 
which is something positive. “Elverpigen” (elf maiden) is most likely another 
word for one of the characters of the ballet Undine, which Bournonville 
choreographed in 1842.29 Kierkegaard found this five- act ballet, based on a 
dramatic fairy tale, to be “without content.” Again, we see that he was not 
happy with this kind of naive and simple plot.
Don Juan as Ballet
Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with the figure of Don Juan as a “protest against 
the ethical claim of Christianity,” and hence as a “character . . . possible only 
within Christianity,”30 is well known, and sure enough, he also had ideas 
about Don Juan in relation to ballet. In Either/Or, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
“A” spends some time discussing what can be lost and what can be gained 
through the use of movement. As he is pondering various plays that tell the 
story of Don Juan, he points out that as soon as Don Juan is given lines to 
speak, everything changes in his character and makes him come across as 
less vague (see SKS 2:109  / EO 1:106). “A” then surprisingly admits that 
perhaps the best way of portraying this play is by staging it as a ballet, at 
least in the final scene. But again he changes his opinion: “That is, the reflec-
tion that motivates the lines reflects him out of the vagueness in which he is 
only musically audible. This being so, it might seem that Don Juan could be 
interpreted best as ballet. It is indeed well known that he has been interpreted 
in this way. Yet this interpretation must be commended for having known its 
powers, and for this reason it has limited itself to the final scene, where the 
passion in Don Juan would be most readily visible in the pantomimic play 
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of muscles” (SKS 2:109  / EO 1:106). The previous interpretation that “A” 
is referring to is probably the version of the play Don Juan ou Le Festin de 
Pierre (Don Juan, or the Stone Guest’s Banquet), which had been choreo-
graphed in 1761 by the Italian ballet master Gasparo Angiolini (1731– 1803) 
to the music of Christoph Willibald von Gluck (1714– 1787). Contemporary 
audiences found Angiolini’s version of this ballet too expressive; they espe-
cially considered the scene where Don Juan is tortured on his way to Hades 
too literal in its expressiveness.31 Kierkegaard was likely aware of this old 
controversy, thus admitting that the very last scene of Don Juan could be 
suitable for dance. He is letting “A” argue didactically about the “pantomimic 
play of muscles,” and he is willing to admit that certain passages can be 
revealed through movement but that the real strength of the rendering lies in 
the music. Kierkegaard could have seen other balletic versions of Don Juan, 
but it is unclear which version “A” is referring to when he states that the true 
nature of Don Juan’s inner life cannot be sufficiently portrayed in dance. 
Only the outwardly dramatic can be presented, “whereas the ballet presents 
almost nothing more than the torments of despair, the expression of which, 
since it has to be solely in pantomime, he shares with many others who are 
in despair. What is essential in Don Juan cannot be presented in ballet, and 
everyone readily feels how ludicrous it would be to watch Don Juan infatu-
ating a girl by means of dance steps and ingenious gesticulations. Don Juan 
is an inner qualification and thus cannot become visible or appear in bodily 
configurations and movements or in molded harmony” (SKS 2:109  / EO 
1:106).32 “A” obviously feels that the deepest and most profound thoughts 
of humans cannot be portrayed through bodily movement. Note the didactic 
manner in which Kierkegaard lets “A” present his argument: his claim that 
“everyone readily feels” is didactic on the verge of being manipulative. It is a 
way of making the reader who would think otherwise feel insecure for hav-
ing thoughts about the ability of the body to portray inner emotions in dance 
and movement. The didactic writing style is typical of Kierkegaard, and of 
course especially prominent in Either/Or, where the purpose of the book is to 
let the perspectives of multiple characters be presented and analyzed. How-
ever, none of the other characters in Either/Or argues against “A,” nor is an 
alternative view offered on Don Juan as ballet. Kierkegaard purposefully is 
advocating more extreme aesthetic attitudes in order to “awaken” the reader. 
The general aim of the book, taken as a whole, is to place the reader in a posi-
tion of having to choose for himself or herself between the “either” and the 
“or.” Thus the reader is made to contemplate balletic plots and the usefulness 
of bodily movement and dance as aesthetic expressions.
Kierkegaard and Ballet as Art Form
As we saw, Kierkegaard enjoyed watching dance but discerned no literary 
skill or qualities in ballet plots. He admired Bournonville as a dancer, but 
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he and the pseudonymous author of Either/Or’s first part are less respectful 
regarding Bournonville’s choreographic ability and the dramatic possibili-
ties of ballet. Interestingly, such opinions seem to be contradicted in other 
writings of Kierkegaard, where either he or one of his pseudonyms expresses 
thoughts through dance metaphors. When Johannes de Silentio describes 
the knight’s ability to move and to render emotions through dance in 
Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard seems to have forgotten his “prejudice.” 
In Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio has full faith in the power of 
bodily movements and dancing. Again Kierkegaard is showing that his 
interest in dance comes from the multiple meanings the expressive body 
can be interpreted as bearing. Also, in other places in Kierkegaard’s writ-
ings where dance and dancing are used metaphorically, he relies on their 
expressiveness.
Kierkegaard and His Dancing Metaphors
Metaphors of Mortal and Working Life
As I suggested, Kierkegaard sometimes uses images of dancing to explain his 
thoughts, to help readers understand what he is trying to convey. Perhaps he 
used such images when other words seemed to fail him, or perhaps dance 
metaphors expressed his points more precisely. This is curious because he 
clearly was ambivalent toward the physical art of dancing. But the image of 
dancing was powerful to him. For instance, he appealed to it when describing 
human loneliness. In his Philosophical Fragments, which was probably writ-
ten between 1842 and 1843 and was published in its complete, current form 
in 1844, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus goes as far as to liken 
himself to a dancer, treading lightly in life, but at the same time rejecting the 
dance itself. Again we see the ambivalence. When pondering his own opin-
ions, Climacus states, “To have an opinion is to me both too much and too 
little; it presupposes a security and well- being in existence akin to having a 
wife and children in this mortal life” (SKS 4:217 / PF 7). Climacus, by choice, 
is not leading this kind of life. In the mortal, everyday life, he lives alone 
because a family life is unsuitable to his existence, as he is up and about night 
and day with no fixed income. He is dedicated to the spiritual life, which 
must be understood as his inner spiritual world, in which he has trained 
himself “always to be able to dance lightly in the service of thought, as far 
as possible to the honor of the god and for my own enjoyment, renouncing 
domestic bliss and civic esteem” (SKS 4:217 / PF 7).
When reading this, one detects the underlying loneliness of Climacus. Yes, 
he is able to let his thoughts dance about without earthly restrictions, but this 
also means that the ties to earthly life are more fragile. When facing difficult 
times, Climacus is even free to ponder death. He is worried about dancing in 
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real life, and in the text dancing is used as a metaphor for getting involved 
with someone, probably both mentally and physically:
All I have is my life, which I promptly stake every time a difficulty 
appears. Then it is easy to dance, for the thought of death is a good 
dancing partner, my dancing partner. Every human being is too heavy 
for me, and therefore I plead, per deos obsecro [I swear by the gods]: 
Let no one invite me, for I do not dance.
J.C. (SKS 4:217 / PF 8)
This is one of the most beautiful and at the same time ambivalent exclama-
tions about dance in Kierkegaard’s writings. “Let no one invite me, for I 
do not dance”: in this sentence are encompassed the loneliness and perhaps 
also the fear of getting hurt that Kierkegaard himself struggled with in his 
own life. The metaphor is strikingly effective and powerful, and even more 
so when considered in connection with his great ambivalence toward dance. 
On a more speculative note, the quotation could hint at Kierkegaard’s own 
physical body, including his crooked back, which could have made him awk-
ward on the dance floor, making him feel insecure as dancer. Johannes de 
Silentio in Fear and Trembling also addresses the issue of dancing or not 
dancing: “Most people live completely absorbed in worldly joys and sor-
rows; they are benchwarmers who do not take part in the dance” (SKS 
4:135 / FT 41). He is clearly using the metaphor of not taking part in the 
dancing as an example of human beings not really being present in their 
own lives but instead just going through the motions. This is a concept with 
great relevance in today’s busy society. On a more personal level, as Eric 
Ziolkowski has suggested,33 this idea of not taking part in the dance could be 
reflective of Kierkegaard’s own experiences, even though he certainly does, 
in a metaphorical sense, take part in the dance— that is, the dance of the 
spirit that Johannes de Silentio has in mind. Kierkegaard seemed to have 
enjoyed participating in ballroom activities, but more as an observer than as 
participant.
Another of Kierkegaard’s more direct dance allusions is inscribed in the 
margin of the Works of Love manuscript. There, he comments on the efforts 
of human beings and how they are not meant to be seen by others: “In our 
work, which frequently has been beyond a human being’s powers but, God 
be praised, never without his support, we have striven to comply with the 
beautiful rule that one never must detect on a dancer that he is panting. We 
are convinced that, in their judging, people do not follow this rule, because if 
they do not see him pant or hear him groan they have no idea at all that he is 
dancing” (Pap. VIII2 B 73:133, n.d. 1847 / WL, Suppl., 457). Kierkegaard is 
commenting on the fact that people need to show their efforts in their work 
in order to be recognized as hardworking. But more beautiful to Kierke-
gaard is the effort one makes and the hardship one suffers but does not show. 
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He invokes the balletic ideal that a dancer’s effort should not be heard or 
detected; rather, the dancer should come across as moving effortlessly and 
with no audible trace of panting. Indeed, inside the balletic tradition there 
has developed an ideal of the almost supernatural dancer who breathes and 
moves with seeming effortlessness. Always the dancer should conceal all 
signs of his or her exertion, but in real life, Kierkegaard notes, people still 
tend to make loud efforts when working. He shows his social concern when 
he goes on to discuss how, in a small society like Denmark’s, people form 
groups that exclude human beings who are different in some way. As a matter 
of fact, throughout the entire passage, Kierkegaard is talking about his work 
as an author in Denmark, comparing his concealment of his extraordinary 
efforts as an author to the dancer’s concealment of his or her efforts. He is 
thus revealing that the ideal and quiet, hardworking man or woman is a 
tough one (Pap. VIII2 B 73:134– 36, n.d. 1847 / WL, Suppl., 457–60). Engag-
ing in a more didactic mode, Kierkegaard uses the quadrille as metaphor for 
the mastering of basic skills. In Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio 
discusses the need of every man and woman to create his or her own life 
and educational path (SKS 4:140 / FT 45–46). When pointing out that it is 
not wise to start with difficult tasks, he suggests that one must first master 
the basics. To illustrate this point, he makes a reference to learning to dance 
the quadrille: “But in our age people are less concerned about making pure 
movements. If someone who wanted to learn to dance were to say: For cen-
turies, one generation after the other has learned the positions, and it is high 
time that I take advantage of this and promptly begin with the quadrille— 
people would probably laugh a little at him, but in the world of spirit this 
is very plausible” (SKS 4:140 / FT 46). The quadrille (French: quadrille de 
contredanses) is a lively dance for four couples, arranged in the shape of a 
square, with each couple facing the center of that square.34 It first appeared 
around 1750, and by 1820 it was danced among the upper classes and the 
bourgeoisie. The period of its greatest popularity coincided with the later 
period of Kierkegaard’s life, as it was one of the most popular dance forms 
around 1840– 50. However, the tours of the quadrille could sometimes be 
quite complicated, and would- be dancers needed to learn and practice them 
in order not to make a fool of themselves in the ballroom. Thus the message 
is clear: a person must master the basics before engaging in the more com-
plicated. This is the way it goes with all education. Clearly, Kierkegaard saw 
the process of learning the basics as crucial for becoming a civilized person. 
We find him, through Johannes de Silentio, again pursuing his more didactic 
style: the pseudonym explains that education is the course the individual 
goes through in order to refine himself, and this is not being helped by being 
born into the most enlightened age. The dancing metaphor appears to allow 
Johannes de Silentio a way of delving more deeply into problems at hand 
and of suggesting that one must learn to master the problems of life step 
by step.
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The Knight of Faith’s Metaphors: The Twisted 
Image of the Tightrope Dancer
Some of Kierkegaard’s powerful— and also the best- known and most often 
discussed— dancing metaphors are conveyed through Johannes de Silentio in 
Fear and Trembling, some of them also revealing ambivalence toward dance. 
Pondering the dialectics of faith, Johannes de Silentio speaks of movement 
and dancing metaphorically, pondering how it is possible to jump back and 
forth in time. He disputes the common supposition that faith has nothing to 
do with art but that it is “a coarse and boorish piece of work” (SKS 4:131 / 
FT 36). He sees faith as something that is in constant flux, moving like a 
tightrope dancer back and forth: “The dialectic of faith is the finest and the 
most extraordinary of all; it has an elevation of which I can certainly form 
a conception, but no more than that. I can make the mighty trampoline leap 
[Tramplin- Spring] whereby I cross over into infinity; my back is like a tight-
rope dancer’s [en Liniedandsers], twisted in my childhood, and therefore it 
is easy for me. One, two, three— I can walk upside down in existence, but I 
cannot make the next movement, for the marvelous I cannot do— I can only 
be amazed at it” (SKS 4:131 / FT 36). What a wealth of images is contained 
in this quote! Johannes de Silentio’s self- conception as a tightrope dancer 
represents an interesting metaphor. Tightrope dancing was a popular form of 
entertainment during Kierkegaard’s lifetime. Thus the description of the agile 
and traditionally itinerant tightrope dancer would have been suggestive of 
somebody highly skilled but also evasive.
Dancing on ropes or wires, either slack ones or tight, has long and deep 
roots in Europe. The practice was associated with numerous itinerant artists 
who traveled around Europe up through the nineteenth century. These art-
ists specialized in performances that entertained “the people.” According to 
the dancing master Andrea Gallini, these technically demanding styles were 
designed to entertain the audience by showing difficult stunts. The dancing 
was not targeted for the aristocracy. Thus tightrope dancing often carried con-
notations of popular and even less respectable entertainment.35 Many artists 
traveled because of the difficulty of obtaining performance privileges in some 
European countries. The dance historian Marian Hanna Winter, describing the 
period between 1700 and 1830 in particular, notes that those official theaters 
that had obtained privileges from the king or state, or from both, were few and 
highly competitive: “Out on the continent, the theatre companies that enjoyed 
‘official patronage’ jealously watched their smaller rivals, even down to the eeri-
est company of marionettes. The patented or government- sponsored theatres 
might also be called the ‘over- privileged,’ and all others the ‘under- privileged.’ 
The former were allocated complete rights for exploitation of certain types of 
entertainment and prosecuted infringements mercilessly.”36 Traveling artists, 
according to Winter, would be categorized as underprivileged, because it was 
difficult, if not impossible, for them to be accepted into the privileged theaters. 
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Established European theaters would seldom hire an artist who was not within 
their closed circuit, and consequently, many ensembles had to move regularly 
in order to find work. Some probably preferred this, but others likely went in 
search of a safer or more stable work environment.
My research into these practices has revealed that several artists would 
have had to apply to local authorities in order to get permission to perform. 
Typically they would get the permission if they promised to give away to the 
poor the income from their last performances. Source material also shows 
that itinerant artists were admired for their skills. They were often highly 
technically capable, able to twist and turn their bodies, having superb ability 
to balance themselves on the slack or tight rope. In addition to rope or wire 
dancing, they typically performed acrobatics.
Tightrope dancers could in principle perform anywhere; they could tie 
their rope between two trees or poles at a marketplace in a given city and 
start dancing (see Figure 1). In short, they were not sophisticated ballet danc-
ers but danced more in the comic or grotesque style, using acrobatic tricks 
alongside dancing steps in order to thrill their audiences.37
Figure 1. Tightrope dancing with balancing prop from Trondheim, 1751. Detail from a 
poster by De kinesiske kunstnere (The Chinese artists), 1751. State Archives of Trondheim: 
Poster/plakat, Statsarkivet, Magistraten B, bd 3, Offentlige skuespill & forestillinger.
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Itinerant artists were typically not well received in society. From the per-
spective of a contemporary dance scholar like me, the earlier quotation of 
Johannes de Silentio about the tightrope dancer bears associations with an 
itinerant, restless nature. It hints at a person unable or unwilling to settle into 
society. By using the metaphor of a tightrope dancer, Kierkegaard’s pseudo-
nym is conjuring the image of a person technically capable but whose artistic 
nature is unsettled. The itinerant nature of the tightrope dancer makes him 
changeable and adaptable, since he will have to go to a new place when the 
current performance space has been exhausted. Working with these images, 
Johannes de Silentio is suggesting that the tightrope dancer can thus easily 
move into another existence and in a few seconds be able to see the world 
with new eyes. Still, the dancer is unreliable in his movement. The metaphor 
makes sense as a referral to something flexible but unstable.
Johannes de Silentio’s reference to the dancer’s twisted back supports 
this interpretation: tightrope dancers were very flexible, able to bend their 
bodies in all kinds of directions. Nordic sources describe what an itinerant 
performance would have looked like around 1770 and give indications of 
performances that Kierkegaard might have seen outdoors at marketplaces. 
The Nordic tightrope dancer Martin Nürenbach, for example, performed at 
the Humlegården, a park in Stockholm. According to the newspaper Hvad 
Nytt, Hvad Nytt, he did equilibrist tricks and acrobatic stunts while balanc-
ing on a narrow steel tightrope.38 Another of Nürenbach’s specialties was 
his dance with a ladder, which stood perpendicular as he walked up it, then 
he moved or wormed backward, headfirst, through all of its rungs.39 We can 
imagine the agility and strength needed for Nürenbach to be able to twist his 
body in such a way.
Johannes de Silentio’s words evoke even more images. First, the tight-
rope dancer’s back is twisted. In contrast to the idealized tightrope dancer, 
Johannes de Silentio sees himself as being unable to make a real movement, 
for he is unable to make a real decision and can only be stuck in the here and 
now, roaming about in some kind of mental existence. The genius of the met-
aphor lies in how it elicits powerful images for the reader, expressing spiritual 
and religious dimensions that otherwise could not so easily be described.
A little further on in Fear and Trembling there is a long passage where 
Johannes de Silentio again uses dance as a metaphor, this time for infinity. 
Here, it is not a tightrope dancer but rather a ballet dancer that he refers to: 
“It is supposed to be the most difficult feat for a ballet dancer to leap into a 
specific posture in such a way that he never once strains for the posture but 
in the very leap assumes the posture. Perhaps there is no ballet dancer who 
can do it— but this knight does it” (SKS 4:135 / FT 41). Once again, Kierke-
gaard is alluding to the flexibility of dancers that makes it possible for them 
to move in all directions. But only the knight of faith can make the perfect 
leap; not even the knights of infinitude are free of wavering when landing: 
“The knights of infinity are ballet dancers and have elevation. They make the 
“Let No One Invite Me, for I Do Not Dance” 163
upward movement and come down again, and this, too, is not an unhappy 
diversion and is not unlovely to see. But every time they come down, they 
are unable to assume the posture immediately, they waver for a moment, and 
this wavering shows that they are aliens in the world. It is more or less con-
spicuous according to their skill, but even the most skillful of these knights 
cannot hide this wavering” (SKS 4:135– 36 / FT 41). Johannes de Silentio is 
referring to one of the most typical and, as he himself states, difficult tasks 
of a ballet dancer: to be able to do difficult leaps and to land elegantly and 
effortlessly. Following the leap into the air, the landing often involves this 
moment of a dancer’s wavering that causes a slight impression of instability. 
A ballet dancer, when doing elevated jumps and leaps, typically lands in what 
is called the fifth position, which helps to secure maximum stability. But not 
only the landing but also the ability to continue effortlessly, not to waver but 
to go on is the sign of a real professional. As Johannes de Silentio points out, 
the knight of faith can do this: “But to be able to come down in such a way 
that instantaneously one seems to stand and to walk, to change the leap into 
life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian— only 
that knight can do it, and this is the one and only marvel” (SKS 4:136 / FT 
41). It is a sign of good and stable technique when a dancer is able to land 
as effortlessly as possible, with a minimum of wavering, and this can be read 
as a metaphor both for being able to continue in life and not to be rooted in 
previous ways, and for being able to rethink a situation and change direction.
With metaphors such as these, Kierkegaard/Johannes de Silentio reveals 
some knowledge about ballet. Kierkegaard must have observed ballet danc-
ers and recognized the fine- tuning of their bodies into positions in order to 
describe them so well. Even though in the above quotation he does not give 
the specific name for the landing position (the fifth position), in other writings 
he does mention specific ballet steps. For instance, Constantin Constantius in 
Repetition talks about the entrechat, a technically difficult jump.
This again suggests that he was well versed in ballet, albeit perhaps no real 
connoisseur. It could also be that when Johannes de Silentio refers to a bal-
let master, he has Bournonville in mind. As mentioned earlier, Bournonville 
was widely known for his elevation as a dancer, as he could execute various 
leaps and jumps without wavering, and difficult jumps were part of his cho-
reographic style. He would certainly have served as role model for a perfect 
“leap of faith.”
Metaphors of Bodily Movements, Hardships, and Frustrations
Some interesting allusions to dance in Repetition will serve to show Kierke-
gaard’s ability to communicate the hardships and frustrations of life through 
dance metaphors. In Repetition, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantin Con-
stantius ponders the power of bodily movement, as well as dance itself, as a 
possible outlet of frustration as well as of happiness: “There probably is no 
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person who has not gone through a period when no richness of language, 
no passion of interjection was adequate, since no expression, no gesture suf-
ficed, since nothing satisfied him other than breaking into the strangest leaps 
and somersaults [besynderligste Spring og Kolbytter]” (SKS 4:33  / R 158). 
Disorderly somersaults and leaps inhibit the body when words fail. But the 
discipline of dance and of ballet could also be needed: “Perhaps the same 
individual learned to dance. Perhaps he went frequently to the ballet and 
admired the art of the dancer. Perhaps there came a time when ballet no lon-
ger stirred him, and yet he had moments when he could return to his room 
and, indulging himself, find indescribably humorous relief in standing on one 
leg in a picturesque pose or, giving not a damn for the world, settle everything 
with an entrechat” (SKS 4:33– 34 / R 158). This passage has many layers of 
meaning, pertaining both to dancers and to viewers of the dance. The prob-
lem discussed in Repetition is to what degree repetition is possible or even 
meaningful. Learning to dance means disciplining oneself and developing 
one’s technical skills by practicing them over and over again. A human being 
learns to obey the rules of ballet (society), but nevertheless, after a while an 
emptiness sets in, and the strong interests the dancer once could express more 
freely with somersaults and jumps now come under tight control. Anxiety 
sets in but can be controlled by repeating the same entrechat as always. The 
dullness of the mundane also serves to calm anxiety. The dancing metaphors 
may also be seen as a form of playing and living on the surface of life, that is, 
of not being able to root oneself in reality. Constantin Constantius, prior to 
making that statement quoted above, talks about “a depressed person I once 
knew [who] went through life as a dancer and deceived everyone, myself 
included” (SKS 4:17  / R 139). According to Constantius, the person was 
going through his everyday motions but without really being present. He was 
repeating himself, suffering from unrequited love.40 Dancing here becomes a 
metaphor for going in circles, not being present in real life, not making an 
effort to deal with the problem at hand.
Dancing as Metaphor of the Unrepeatable
Toward the end of Repetition, Constantin Constantius describes the won-
derful movements of the actor Friedrich Beckmann (1803– 1866), whom he 
observed at the Königstädter Theater in Berlin.41 Constantius even likens 
Beckmann’s performance to that of an “incomparable dance,” stating, “He 
has sung his couplet, and now the dance begins.” Again, using dance as a 
metaphor becomes an interesting way of describing “Mr. B’s” (Beckmann’s) 
motions and acting, which Constantius thoroughly admires (SKS 4:37– 39 / R 
163– 65). Later, when Constantius revisits the theater, he finds himself deeply 
disappointed in Beckmann’s performance: “Beckmann could not make me 
laugh. I endured it for half an hour and then left the theater, thinking: There is 
no repetition at all” (SKS 4:43 / R 169). Disappointed, he makes yet another 
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attempt, but this one too is futile: “The next evening I went to the König-
städter Theater. The only repetition was the impossibility of a repetition. . . . 
No matter how I turned and shifted, all was futile. The little dancer who last 
time had enchanted me with her gracefulness, who, so to speak, was on the 
verge of a leap, had already made the leap” (SKS 4:44 / R 170). The dance 
he had seen performed by the ballerina earlier could not be repeated satisfac-
torily; she had already leaped forward. A dancer will not be able to give an 
identical experience to the viewer. Again we see Kierkegaard’s preoccupation 
with the leap as a powerful metaphor, this time indicating that once the leap 
has been performed, it can never be seen the same way again. Thus move-
ments and dance are useful for making Climacus’s points: nothing can ever 
be repeated.
Metaphors of Love and Loss
Sometimes Kierkegaard speaks with less ambivalence and gives dance more 
literal meanings. In the “Second Series” of Works of Love is a section called 
“Recollecting One Who Is Dead,” where Kierkegaard is writing about what it 
is like to mourn somebody who is dead. He points out the pure expressiveness 
of the human body: “If you could manage to see someone shadowboxing in 
dead earnest, or if you could prevail upon a dancer to dance solo the dance he 
customarily dances with another, you would be able to observe his motions 
best, better than if he were boxing with another actual person or if he were 
dancing with another actual person” (SKS 9:341  / WL 347). When alone, 
without his partner, the dancer is more expressive and clear and more easily 
interpreted and observed. It could also be that the sorrow of having to dance 
alone sharpens the bodily movements and makes them clearer. Interestingly, 
in this situation Kierkegaard sees the body as expressive, able to reveal and 
signify profound loss and grief. It is perhaps expressive because it is genuine. 
He would probably not think the same expressiveness could be revealed in 
a ballet plot.
In the section called “Love Abides” (from 1 Cor. 13:13), Kierkegaard 
is concerned with the strength of love and uses the dancing of two people 
together as a metaphor of lost love: “Does the dance end because one of the 
dancers has gone away? In a certain sense. But if the other remains stand-
ing in the position that expresses bowing toward the one who is not seen, 
and if you know nothing about the past, you will say, ‘The dance will surely 
begin just as soon as the other one, who is awaited, comes’ ” (SKS 9:305 / 
WL 307). The beauty and power of this metaphor becomes evident when 
we try to interpret it, as the words then come across as much more banal 
than the metaphor itself: when a person has left a relationship, the person 
remaining stands there, frozen in the moment, unable to continue. Anticipa-
tion and longing are reflected in the body language of the person who is left; 
the person is no longer himself or herself. The person seems to be waiting 
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for the lost partner to complete the dance. Maybe the quotation also betrays 
Kierkegaard’s own longing “to start a dance”— that is, his longing for a lost 
partner.
Kierkegaard and His Dancing Metaphors
Kierkegaard skillfully used dance metaphors of many kinds. They engage the 
reader and evoke vivid images that help to convey his (or his pseudonym’s) 
message. At the same time, the metaphors seem sometimes ambivalent, creat-
ing room for different interpretations, which certainly must have been one 
of the goals of Kierkegaard, who so much loved to ponder the nuances of 
life. The didactic nature of his writing style also becomes less obvious when 
he engages in dancing metaphors; instead, he becomes poetic, offering the 
reader wonderful and beautiful ideas to ponder: he offers suggestions that 
may lead the reader’s mind to wander; he engages his reader in creative dia-
logue. As we saw, through his and his pseudonyms’ use of dance metaphors 
in both Repetition and Fear and Trembling, he even hints at his own ambiva-
lence as a dancer in social settings.
Kierkegaard and the Ballroom
The Seductive Nature of Ballroom Dancing
So far, I have discussed Kierkegaard’s thoughts on dance as a theatrical art 
form— that is, on ballet, ballet masters, and ballet plots, as well as his many 
powerful images of dancers and dancing. Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms 
were also concerned with the social aspects of dance, such as the kind of 
dancing that takes place in the ballroom. Some of the references are meta-
phorical; others are more concrete. Most of them are also rather didactic.
The didactic approach is taken, for example, in a comment on the seduc-
tive nature of ballroom dancing in the section called “The Seducer’s Diary,” 
signed by one “Johannes,” in Either/Or’s first part. There, Johannes the 
Seducer reveals, “There are certain times when I admittedly would not want 
to be deprived of a ballroom, deprived of its expensive luxury, its priceless 
overabundance of youth and beauty, its multiple play of powers, but I do not 
enjoy it as much as I revel in possibility” (SKS 2:320 / EO 1:331). The possi-
bilities for social interaction thrill Johannes, as he appreciates the excitement 
of meeting women and the possibilities of making contact. He is making a 
social comment: traditionally, the ballroom was one of the few places where 
men and women could make contact and where those in love could have a 
few moments together. However, these social interactions were governed by 
rules of appropriate conduct. The dancing itself was only a part of a package 
of skills needed to be able to function in middle- and upper- class society.
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Being able to perform the dances well or at least satisfactorily was also 
something required of men and women of the middle and upper classes. Fur-
ther into the “Diary,” Johannes reveals that even he acquired certain skills 
when falling in love with a woman: “For the sake of the first girl, I learned 
to dance; for the sake of the little dancer, I learned to speak French” (SKS 
2:335/ EO 1:346). Apparently, the woman with whom he was in love could 
dance well, and in order to be with her, he felt the need to achieve some of 
the same skills. He forgets to tell us to what degree he was successful in this 
part of the diary. But Johannes begins to reveal a sort of helplessness when 
dealing with a dancing woman, who is also playing with him. He assumes an 
even more philosophical and metaphorical tone when describing his longing 
for his idealized Cordelia. He feels as though he is part of a dance and that 
she is perhaps playing with him, sometimes acknowledging him and at other 
times ignoring him: “My relationship to her is like a dance that is supposed 
to be danced by two people but is danced by only one. That is, I am the 
other dancer, but invisible. She moves as in a dream, and yet she is dancing 
with another, and I am that other one who, insofar as I am visibly present, 
and insofar as I am invisible, is visible” (SKS 2:368– 69 / EO 1:380). If one 
reads Johannes’s statement as somewhat autobiographical of Kierkegaard, 
the insecurities of a man who perhaps does not dance well or does not dare 
to dance, shines through in this passage, as well as the impassiveness he feels 
when confronted with the beautiful but unattainable Cordelia: “The move-
ments require another. She bows to him; she stretches out her hand to him. 
She recedes; she approaches again. I take her hand; I complete her thought, 
which nevertheless is completed within itself. She moves to the melody in 
her own soul: I am merely the occasion for her moving. I am not erotic; that 
would only arouse her; I am flexible, supple, impersonal, almost like a mood” 
(SKS 2:369 / EO 1:380). Movements are used as metaphors for a relationship. 
This quotation beautifully describes the dance of love. Cordelia is moving to 
the melody of her own soul; Johannes is observing her movements, and he 
does so while standing still, but with a flexible mind, trying to be as objective 
as possible, alone on the side. This idealization of love, with Kierkegaard as 
observer of an unobtainable (nonexisting) dream women, can be also be seen 
in other of Kierkegaard’s writings. As Ziolkowski points out, Kierkegaard felt 
“an existential, spiritual affinity” with antiheroes such as Cervantes’s Don 
Quixote: “Like the outspokenly chaste Manchegan knight, he never married, 
possibly remained a lifelong virgin, and had an unhappy relationship with his 
own Dulcinea, a young woman he transformed into an unattainable ideal.”42
Unlike the impulsive, activist Don Quixote, however, Kierkegaard seems 
to have preferred remaining on the side, analyzing the actions of other per-
sons. This can be seen in an interesting dance- related anecdote he relates in a 
journal entry of 1838, the year after he met Regine Olsen. There he records 
an encounter he had one morning with a pair of girls who were dancing to 
the flute music of two boys, and this leads him to identify playfully with the 
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lovesick knight: “I came close to dancing along with them— so there is still 
poetry of that sort in the world.— If I encounter more phenomena of this 
sort I will surely become a D. Quixote who will see such things everywhere” 
(SKS 18:101, FF:137 / KJN 2:93). Again, Kierkegaard remains the analytical 
observer, not daring to participate, but with great ability to render the poetic 
nuances of a dancing body in the ballroom.
The Gentleman as Ballroom Dancer
Kierkegaard had clear opinions on the male dancer in the ballroom. In a 
passage removed from the final draft of “The Seducer’s Diary,” while admit-
ting that a good dancer has certain advantages, the narrator also points out 
that the freedom of dance is rather conventional and somewhat limited for 
men: “The best thing at a dance is all the small advantages the dancers enjoy. 
The conventional freedoms do not signify much precisely because they are 
conventional and because a male dancer ordinarily does not have anything 
special in his favor, and ordinarily it is a very ambiguous compliment to a 
man when a girl says he is a good dancer” (Pap. III B 56:2, n.d. 1841– 42 / EO 
1, Suppl., 563). Kierkegaard’s didactic approach shines through: he appreci-
ates the freedom in the ballroom, but at the same time he warns that it is an 
“ambiguous compliment” for a man to be called “a good dancer.” Any reader 
who might think otherwise is forced to rethink. Kierkegaard’s thoughts on 
male dancers were probably typical of his time. Both in the theater and in 
the ballroom the male dancer was second in importance to the women, even 
though, in Denmark, the male ballet dancer was cultivated and appreciated 
to a much higher degree than in other places in Europe, thanks to Bournon-
ville.43 To what degree these attitudes toward the professional male ballet 
dancer are linked to those found in ballroom dancing is harder to decipher. 
It is clear, however, that above all, a gentleman must not be perceived as 
a professional: society dictated that a man should dance well, but not too 
well. This was because of puritanical opposition and the idea that to dance 
too well suggested the mark of a professional rather than a gentleman. This 
notion is illustrated by the following quotation of 1881 from an English 
dancing society: “For my own part, I do not like to see a gentleman dance 
too well: he does not want to be taken for a dancing master. It is enough if 
he dance like a gentleman.”44 The dancing masters, who trained bourgeois 
men and women, advocated the need for such a social accomplishment as 
dancing, but even they drew a distinction between the professional and the 
amateur. The dance scholar Theresa Buckland points out that there was a 
decline in the performance of gentlemanly masculinity during the nineteenth 
century. This would mean that by the middle of the century, ballroom danc-
ing had become somewhat simplified and less complicated.45 Kierkegaard’s 
thoughts on and behavior in the ballroom could have been colored by sim-
ilar views about the male dancer in Copenhagen society. The importance 
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of dancing fluctuated with fashion and politics.46 Probably men and male 
dancing would have been easily influenced by such changes. Dance would 
have been seen differently in different circles and classes of Danish society, 
so Kierkegaard’s comments might refer to the attitudes pertaining to his own 
social class, where the ideals likely would be similar to those outlined in 
the following observation by Buckland: “The true gentleman, the aristocrat, 
attired in fashionable yet unostentatious dress, was identifiable by his posture 
and gait, ideally characterized by quiet elegance and grace. Early in life he 
had learned how to distinguish his movement range and energy from that 
of his female partner, and how to treat her publicly in a chivalrous yet unaf-
fected manner.”47 Kierkegaard certainly seems to have been occupied with 
treating female dancing partners with chivalry. One final point to be made 
on this issue is related to his obsession with Don Juan. Kierkegaard undoubt-
edly read, in German translation, Lord Byron’s oft- quoted description of his 
hero’s dancing prowess in Don Juan:
He danced without theatrical pretence,
Not like a ballet- master in the van
Of his drill’d nymphs, but like a gentleman.48
Byron emphasizes that all unnecessary affectations should be left out of the 
dancing. The quotation above could also have formed some of Kierkegaard’s 
attitudes toward Bournonville. Too much theatricality would come across 
as dandy- like and flamboyant, traits that were fairly common in the social 
ballroom up to the beginning of the nineteenth century but that gradually 
disappeared: “A man could be graceful, but with minimal efforts being dis-
played.”49 It seems that Kierkegaard adhered to these rules of social conduct.
Kierkegaard as a Social Dancer
Whatever the influence, Kierkegaard was not interested in disobeying the 
rules of the social ballroom. It is curious that he, who in matters of the intel-
lect would not shy away from voicing very unpopular attitudes and views, 
had no interest in challenging the social conventions of the ballroom. Perhaps 
this was because the interaction between men and women was confined to 
the ballroom, where the social norms were reflected. The rules of etiquette 
and manners were strict, even if unspoken. To be a sharp thinker and critic 
made Kierkegaard an intellectual rebel, but his rebelliousness did not extend 
into the social realm of the ballroom. He thus didactically advises his reader 
to behave according to the unspoken rules and, above all, not to behave like 
a professional ballet dancer. A gentleman should dance well, but not too well.
Kierkegaard writes about dance in metaphorical terms and discusses the 
nature and usefulness of dance more directly. His often dialectical way of 
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thinking is also evident in his discussion of dance and dancing. Therefore he 
(or some of his pseudonyms) must frequently, perhaps always, be understood 
as speaking in an indirect mode when making more concrete references and 
allusions. This is, however, less true for several of the allusions he made to 
dance, where he instead creates powerful images for the reader to ponder.
Kierkegaard’s thoughts on dance as a social and theatrical practice often 
contradicted those he revealed when so richly describing the dancer’s abil-
ity to be expressive in more metaphorical terms. He was ambivalent in his 
attitude toward dancing. In fact, his remark “Let no one invite me, for I do 
not dance” is indicative of Kierkegaard’s ambivalence: he wants to dance, but 
cannot or will not let himself be free to do so.
Kierkegaard also displays pure admiration for the creative aspect of danc-
ing, as in Fear and Trembling, where Johannes de Silentio admires the dancer 
for his ability to go places and do things with his body that nobody else can.
Throughout his writing, regardless of whether he or a pseudonym speaks 
positively or negatively about dance and dancers, Kierkegaard never shows 
indifference. His use of metaphorically exciting images and his somewhat 
condescending descriptions of the art of ballet are never boring, and for this 
reason they can be read and reread, interpreted and reinterpreted, again and 
again. This is part of what makes Kierkegaard timeless and relevant not only 
for today’s dancer and dance scholar. His comments and metaphors on dance 
and dancers give all readers pause to think and to ponder issues of human life.
Notes
1. There are allusions to dance and dancers in both parts of Either/Or, as well 
as in Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, Concept of Anxiety, and 
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York: Fordham University Press 2004), 85– 101.
3. Theatrical dance practices include dance primarily seen and performed 
onstage, and in this essay classical ballet is the dance form discussed. Classi-
cal ballet evolved gradually as an art form from the theatrical practices of the 
Renaissance and Baroque courts in Italy and France. By the beginning of the 
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Kierkegaard and the Aesthetics of the Icon
Christopher B. Barnett
Søren Kierkegaard’s dubious relation to aesthetics is, in one sense, one of the 
great ironies of Western intellectual history. After all, Kierkegaard was not 
only a lover of the arts— famously, he was said to have never missed a perfor-
mance of Mozart’s Don Giovanni at Copenhagen’s Royal Theater1— but he 
is widely held to be the finest prose stylist of the Danish language. As Joakim 
Garff puts it, “What Danish writer had ever produced anything so fertile and 
prodigious?”2 And this is to say nothing of Kierkegaard’s remarkable impact 
on twentieth- century art, from the films of Carl Theodor Dreyer to the music 
of Samuel Barber and the paintings of Mark Rothko. W. H. Auden, the out-
standing English poet, himself an admirer of Kierkegaard, once acclaimed 
the “brilliantly poetic” nature of Kierkegaard’s writings, though he quickly 
added that Kierkegaard was not so much a poet as a “preacher, an expounder 
and defender of Christian doctrine and Christian conduct.”3 In this dis-
tinction lies much of the controversy regarding Kierkegaard’s relation to 
aesthetics.
Here “aesthetics” is meant in a general sense— namely, as the study of and/
or reflection on objects of perception. Indeed, the word “aesthetics” itself 
comes from the Greek term aisthanesthai (to perceive), although, through 
Plato and others, it has taken on the additional significance of dealing with 
perceptions that are particularly beautiful or sublime. Kierkegaard adopts 
both usages. For him, aesthetics concerns what one can see, touch, hear, and 
so on, just as “the aesthetic” (det Æsthetiske) refers to a life oriented to the 
senses. On the one hand, these sensory perceptions are simply part of the 
data that make up human life. As Kierkegaard writes in Either/Or, “The 
esthetic is not evil but the indifferent” (SKS 3:165 / EO 2:169). On the other 
hand, such perceptions, especially beautiful and pleasing ones, can wield an 
influence over one’s life, drawing one to this or to that end. It is in this sense 
that, for Kierkegaard, the aesthetic can be dangerous or beneficial. This ten-
sion is reflected in Auden’s suggestion that Kierkegaard’s poetic sensibilities 
ultimately yield to a more severe Christian vein. Kierkegaard’s religious com-
mitments appear to have effected a rupture from his aesthetic ones— a point 
of view that finds plenty of corroboration in the secondary literature.
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A well- known example of this tendency lies in the work of George Pat-
tison, who traces the rift back to Kierkegaard’s 1846 treatise, A Literary 
Review. In that work, Kierkegaard chides “the present age” for its embrace 
of reflection— its tendency to reject authority and tradition in favor of a dis-
position critical of everything but the individual’s self- interest. Consequently, 
in Kierkegaard’s view, social institutions and relations have been reduced 
to instruments of utility. What once stirred the passions of people, whether 
God or country or love, have become objectively meaningless. According to 
Pattison, this insight compels Kierkegaard to divorce the religious from the 
aesthetic, even as both emerge as potential escapes from the abyss of moder-
nity. For the redemption of art is nothing more than a whimsy, especially in 
an epoch of reflection, when the aesthetic preoccupation with form has been 
detached from any meaningful content. Thus art, too, has succumbed to the 
present age: it titillates but does not elevate. As Pattison goes on to explain, 
“The aesthetic may no longer be regarded as a legitimate stage on the path to 
a religious awakening. To stay with the aesthetic is to refuse the religious. . . . 
Although reflection has in one sense destroyed the possibility of great art, an 
age that fails to choose faith with the decisiveness of inward passion is . . . an 
‘aesthetic’ age. The aesthetic has become the inauthentic.”4 The only hope for 
the individual, then, is to seek “the religious in the absolute interiority of the 
self.”5 Even concrete ethical striving in the world has become unrecognizable, 
form- less.
Pattison tenders his reading with somber understanding, adding that 
Kierkegaard’s critique of modern art has served to shape the consciousness 
of modern art. In fact, as Pattison sees it, the “death of art” has come to give 
an almost religious mission to the contemporary artist.6 Other commenta-
tors, however, are not as sympathetic with Kierkegaard’s vision. Perhaps the 
sharpest critique of this sort was issued by the eminent Swiss Catholic thinker 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905– 1988). Critical of the preoccupation of mod-
ern theologians with logic and ethics at the expense of beauty, Balthasar 
commenced one of the breakthrough theological projects of the twentieth 
century: his seven- volume work, The Glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit, 1961– 
69). Its aim, taken as a whole, is “to complement the vision of the true and 
the good with that of the beautiful” and, in turn, to “show how impoverished 
Christian thinking has been by the growing loss of this perspective which 
once strongly informed theology.” For Balthasar, this is an urgent task. Today, 
he says, beauty has become “a mere appearance” in a “world of interests,” 
and thus its fate is to be either exploited or forgotten. But beauty’s loss is also 
humanity’s. As Balthasar goes on to explain, “In a world without beauty . . . 
the good also loses its attractiveness, the self- evidence of why it must be 
carried out. Man stands before the good and asks himself why it must be 
done and not rather its alternative, evil.” This diagnosis bears a theological 
prescription— namely, a return to the form of divine revelation. For it is only 
through form that beauty shines, and “the ray of the Unconditional breaks 
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through, casting a person down to adoration and transforming him into a 
believer and a follower.”7
With this concern established, Balthasar turns to a genealogical account 
of how beauty was torn from the fabric of Western society. It is, for him, 
a theological story, which has its origins in the Protestant Reformation in 
general and in Martin Luther’s teaching in particular. For Balthasar, Luther’s 
insistence on “God’s absolute veiledness”— an emphasis derived from his dis-
taste for Neo- Platonic and Thomist versions of the analogia entis— results in 
a rejection of “every form which man tries to impose on revelation in order to 
achieve an overview that makes comprehension possible.”8 One can no lon-
ger look at a created form— say, a sunset or a sleeping child— and ascertain a 
likeness to the divine. In this way, Luther sunders nature and grace and, with 
it, the aesthetic and the religious.
It is at this point that Balthasar begins to attend to Kierkegaard, who, 
in his view, reaps what Luther had sown several centuries before. By the 
nineteenth century, art had been all but totally uncoupled from its relation-
ship with theology, freeing the Romantics to deem aesthetics the “supreme 
value of any worldview.” From there it was but a short step to the aesthetic 
nihilism of Nietzsche— a development that, according to Balthasar, Kierke-
gaard foresaw and opposed. Realizing that modern aesthetics was “frivolous, 
merely curious and self- indulgent,” Kierkegaard fired back with an emphasis 
on “inwardness and religious subjectivity.” But this response lacked compre-
hensiveness, and it led Kierkegaard to deepen— rather than to overcome— the 
chasm between aesthetics and religion. According to Balthasar, “Kierkegaard 
can no longer achieve a meeting of religion and aesthetics. He is impelled 
to use the concept of ‘the aesthetic’ to stake out and define a basic attitude 
which, for the Christian, is unacceptable . . . thereby eradicating from the-
ology all traces of an aesthetic attitude.  .  .  . This enthusiastic disjunction 
robs man, as it were from within, of all joy in the aesthetic.” Thus Kierke-
gaard stands as both an accomplice to and a victim of Luther’s theology. Even 
worse, the Dane’s influence on twentieth- century ideas worked to popularize 
Lutheran thinking. “The Kierkegaard revival,” as Balthasar puts it, “in vari-
ous ways had an anti- aesthetic effect on theology.”9
In light of Pattison’s and Balthasar’s analyses, it would seem unlikely that 
a positive appraisal of aesthetics can be developed from Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. 
The opposition that he ostensibly establishes between the aesthetic and the reli-
gious, not to mention the fact that he himself never penned a proper treatise on 
the subject, appears to quell any such enterprise. In this essay, however, I will 
argue to the contrary. Specifically, I will show that an “aesthetics of the icon” 
is implicit in Kierkegaard’s own copious employment of aesthetic imagery. 
Rather than rupturing the two spheres, he has a dialectical view of the matter: 
aesthetic imagery can function either in the manner of icons or in that of idols.
I will establish this point in three ways. First, I will explore the concept of 
“image” or “picture” (Billede) in Kierkegaard’s authorship. As will be seen, 
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Kierkegaard uses this term in a variety of contexts, imbuing it with both neg-
ative and positive significance. Next I will argue that this dialectical usage of 
Billede informs his orientation toward the aesthetic in general. An aesthetic 
image either can draw one into its own ambit, or it can deflect one to some-
thing higher— indeed, to godliness. The upshot of this dialectic is a potential 
integration of the aesthetic and the religious in Kierkegaard’s thinking. For 
inasmuch as the aesthetic brings one to seek the religious in one’s concrete 
existence, Kierkegaard not only applauds the aesthetic but employs it. Finally, 
I will attempt to illustrate Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relationship 
between aesthetics and religion by way of the thought of the French philoso-
pher Jean- Luc Marion. In particular, I will point out that Marion’s distinction 
between the idol and the icon— whereby the former aims to absorb the gaze 
of the observer, the latter to redirect it— can shed light on the multitude of 
“pictures” populating Kierkegaard’s writings. This last section is not meant 
to serve as a comprehensive explication of how Kierkegaard and Marion 
stand in relation to one another; rather, it is an attempt to show, however 
provisionally, that Kierkegaard’s approach to aesthetics bears a resemblance 
to that of other prominent thinkers— in this case, Marion.
To be sure, as Marion has forcefully argued, human beings are confronted 
by idols in both image and idea. Yet, with characters such as the woman 
who was a sinner (Synderinden) in Luke 7:37– 50, Kierkegaard also fashions 
icons of faith. In this way, and with a measure of irony, he actually fulfills 
Balthasar’s demand for attention to the form of Christian existence.
The Concept of Billede in Kierkegaard’s Authorship
The term Billede occurs with regularity in Kierkegaard’s authorship. In one 
form or another, it appears more than three hundred times, published as well 
as unpublished. Moreover, its usage spans his corpus, turning up as early as 
1838 in From the Papers of One Still Living and as late as 1855 in articles 
in Fædrelandet. An exhaustive analysis of Billede, then, is neither possible 
nor desirable here. Instead, I will examine a few representative instances of 
the term, showing how Kierkegaard employs it in a variety of contexts and 
senses.
An early and striking example of Kierkegaard’s use of Billede occurs in 
the first part of Either/Or, in its final section, “The Seducer’s Diary.” The 
story’s antihero, the aptly named Johannes the Seducer, has followed his objet 
d’amour into a Copenhagen shop. Her name is Cordelia, a mere girl at seven-
teen years of age. Johannes watches as she makes her way through the store, 
fondling the items for sale with blissful caprice. In order to remain unnoticed, 
he stands across the room, eyeing Cordelia in a large mirror mounted on a 
wall. The mirror, he notes, is at once his rival and collaborator. Its seizure of 
her image is akin to contemplation, to devotion. However, it cannot keep her 
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image all to itself; rather, it must deliver it to others, who are not so unfor-
tunately constituted: “Unhappy mirror, which assuredly can grasp her image 
[Billede] but not her; unhappy mirror, which cannot secretly hide her image 
in itself, hide it from the whole world, but can only disclose it to others as it 
now does to me. What torture if a human being were fashioned that way” 
(SKS 2:305  / EO 1:315). Indeed, Johannes is not fashioned that way. He 
compares Cordelia’s figure to the voluptuousness of a piece of fruit. He can, 
he says, feel her with his eyes. And, accordingly, he aims to consume her. As 
he puts it, “Everything will be relished in slow mouthfuls; she is picked out, 
she will be gathered” (SKS 2:306 / EO 1:317, my translation).
It is noteworthy that Johannes, the aesthete, interacts only with an image 
of Cordelia. Kierkegaard makes this point especially clear by using the mir-
ror as a mediator between the two characters. He relates to her not as a 
three- dimensional human being but rather as a two- dimensional reflection. 
And this reflection, as it were, sucks him in. It consumes him as much as he 
wants to consume it— a detail that hints at why Pattison calls Johannes a 
“pitiable creature” despite his blatant exploitation of others. For “he is inca-
pable of a real meeting, a real encounter with another person, incapable of 
dealing with a situation of mutual responsibility.”10 In this sense, Johannes 
is an antiquated, but no less authentic, version of a pornography addict. For 
him, image and reality have been confused; more precisely, the aesthetic as 
such has become his life. Even when he acts within the continuum of the 
real world, he remains imprisoned in his own world of fantasies, for only 
fantasies are capable of arousing and gratifying him (SKS 2:296 / EO 1:306). 
Pattison sums up Kierkegaard’s point nicely: “What he is showing is what 
happens when one tries to base life on an ‘image.’ ”11
The Seducer’s aesthetic attitude terminates in sexual abuse, but elsewhere 
Kierkegaard points out that the lure of the image can corrupt in differ-
ent ways. Insofar as it effects a break with the real world, aestheticism is 
like a mold that spoils whatever it touches, be it sex, politics, or religion. 
Kierkegaard highlights this point in his 1850 work, Practice in Christianity, 
particularly in the sixth exposition of the section entitled “From on High He 
Will Draw All to Himself.” There Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti- Climacus 
explores the ambiguity of “observing” an object, as when “one shows a 
painting to a person and asks him to observe [betragte] it” (SKS 12:227 / PC 
233). On the one hand, he notes, the observer must come close to the object 
of observation so as to get a better look at it. On the other hand, the observer 
must also remain “infinitely distant” from it since “by observing I go into the 
object (I become objective) but I leave myself or go away from myself (I cease 
to be subjective)” (SKS 12:227– 28  / PC 233– 34). For Anti- Climacus, this 
dialectic captures precisely what is wrong with Christendom in the present 
age. The preacher stands in the pulpit and makes “observations”— a rather 
unsubtle reference to Bishop Mynster’s book, Observations on the Doctrines 
of the Christian Faith (Betragtninger over de christelige Troeslærdomme, 
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1833)12— but neglects to emphasize that “it is Christian truth that is observ-
ing me, whether I am doing what it says I should do” (SKS 12:228 / PC 234).
This is also, Anti- Climacus says, the danger with Christian art. Although 
he admits that he cannot “pass judgment” on all artists, he gives two main 
reasons why he could never paint “the image” (Billedet)13 of Jesus Christ (SKS 
12:246– 47  / PC 254– 55). First, in order to paint Christ’s image, he would 
have to secure a certain amount of “leisure” (Ro; SKS 12:246 / PC 255, my 
translation), which would allow him to shirk what Christ asks of his day- to- 
day life so that, instead, he could paint a picture. Second, he worries that the 
finished product— the painting of Christ as such— would distort the meaning 
of the religious life. For in the painting “the artist admired himself, and every-
body admired the artist” (SKS 12:247 / PC 255). In this scenario, the person 
reflected in the image has been forgotten, eclipsed by the image itself. Anti- 
Climacus explains, “The beholder looked at the picture [Billedet] in the role 
of an art expert: whether it is a success, whether it is a masterpiece, whether 
the play of colors is right, and the shadows, whether blood looks like that, 
whether the suffering expression is artistically true— but the invitation to imi-
tation he did not find” (SKS 12:247– 48 / PC 255– 56). Here Anti- Climacus 
reiterates the trouble with Johannes the Seducer, albeit in a Christian con-
text. The person who views Christ’s image as an end in itself, who allows 
the picture to occupy him or her more than the real thing, has abstracted the 
aesthetic from the religious and, in turn, transformed it into an idol.
Significantly, this critique is not limited to artists or to the bourgeois aes-
thetes of Christendom. In an 1850 journal entry, Kierkegaard chides the 
Moravian Brethren— a major Pietist group, with whom he had both familial 
ties and theological affinities14— for “gazing at Christ’s suffering” rather than 
accentuating the “imitation” of Christ (SKS 23:438, NB20:78, n.d. 1850  / 
JP 2:1874, my translation). Thus he suggests that it is not enough to cel-
ebrate the Passion of Christ with liturgical and artistic pieces— a customary 
and, at times, extravagant feature of Moravian piety, perhaps best captured 
by Christ Scourged (1758),15 a masterpiece of the great Moravian painter 
Johann Valentin Haidt (1700– 1780). Instead, the religious in general, and 
Christianity in particular, are to be distinguished by their concrete realization 
in one’s own life. For Kierkegaard, this is the last word, irrespective of where 
one falls on the ecclesial or theological spectrum. To put it in Anti- Climacus’s 
terms, art may produce people who admire Christianity, but admiration is 
beside the point: “Only the imitator is the true Christian” (SKS 12:246, 248 / 
PC 254, 256).
It is clear, then, that Kierkegaard’s writings treat Billede as a dangerous 
concept. Enticed to gaze at an image, one can, almost like Narcissus, fall 
in love with what is not real and die, in spirit if not in body. But elsewhere 
Kierkegaard takes a different tack. Particularly in his upbuilding discourses, 
he is inclined to describe certain biblical heroes as “images.” He does not just 
call them images; he uses his pen to sketch them in rich, pictorial language.
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A good early example of this tendency turns up in “Patience in Expec-
tancy,” the second address from Two Upbuilding Discourses (1844). There, 
Kierkegaard discusses Anna, the aged prophetess who witnessed the presenta-
tion of the infant Jesus to the Temple authorities in Jerusalem (Luke 2:36– 38). 
What strikes Kierkegaard about Anna is not so much her presence at this 
momentous event as her many years as a widow, during which she appar-
ently remained devoted both to her husband and to God. As he envisions it, 
where another might have sought solace in “multifarious expectancies” (SKS 
5:212 / EUD 211), Anna has passed her long life in quiet fortitude, faithful 
to her husband’s memory and hopeful that God will reunite them— and all 
things— in eternity. Kierkegaard continues, “My listener, let your thoughts 
dwell on this venerable woman, [who] . . . stands as the eternal’s young fian-
cée. This tranquillity in her eyes that nevertheless is expectant, this gentleness 
that is reconciled to life and nevertheless is expectant . . . beyond flowering 
nevertheless still vigorous, forsaken nevertheless not withered, childless nev-
ertheless not barren, bent with years and stooped nevertheless not broken— a 
widow, nevertheless betrothed, ‘she is in silence’ with her expectancy” (SKS 
5:212 / EUD 211– 12). Here he breaks off, adding that this “picture” (Billede) 
of Anna is “beautiful,” so much so that “one could sit and grow old contem-
plating [it], powerless to tear oneself away from it” (SKS 5:212 / EUD 212). 
It is, in fact, “the object of contemplation [Betragtningens Gjenstand]” (SKS 
5:213 / EUD 212) for those who rightly understand that life is replete with 
peril and disappointment but not bereft of hope. In fact, the Billede of Anna 
is more than a picture of a human being; it is a reflection of the eternal. As 
Kierkegaard explains, “The object of expectancy, the more glorious and pre-
cious it is, form[s] the expectant person in its own likeness, because a person 
resembles what he loves with his whole soul” (SKS 5:218 / EUD 219).
With his evocative prose, not to mention his mystically tinged language of 
“contemplation,” Kierkegaard effectively treats Anna as an icon— that is to 
say, as an image of the sacred. Moreover, he invites his “listener” to do the 
same, to see in his rendering of Anna a picture of patient expectancy. But this 
Billede is not to be an end in itself. The one who properly contemplates it 
does so in order to reproduce Anna’s virtue in his or her own life. After all, 
this is an upbuilding discourse. And it is Kierkegaard’s painting of Anna that 
occasions the upbuilding.
Kierkegaard comes back to these themes— in even more pronounced fash-
ion— in his upbuilding discourses on the woman who was a sinner. These 
writings draw on the seventh chapter of the Gospel of Luke, which tells of a 
woman who tearfully anoints Jesus’s feet despite opposition from the Phari-
sees. In turn, Jesus praises the woman’s love and declares her sins, “which 
were many” (Luke 7:47), forgiven. Kierkegaard clearly cherished this biblical 
story. Not only do his discourses from 1849 and 1850 return to it often, but it 
also appears early in his authorship, in “Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins” 
(1843). What drew him to the text was its compressed treatment of several 
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Christian themes, from the mercy of Christ to the hostility of the world. Yet, 
more than anything else, the figure of the sinful woman herself moved him: 
“She has forgotten speech and language and the restlessness of thoughts, has 
forgotten what is even greater restlessness, this self, has forgotten herself— 
she, the lost woman, who is now lost in her Savior, who, lost in him, rests at 
his feet— like a picture [Billede]. It is almost as if the Savior himself momen-
tarily looked at her and the situation that way, as if she were not an actual 
person but a picture” (SKS 11:277 / WA 141). What Kierkegaard sees in this 
moment is an image of the eternal in history. As he clarifies in an 1850 jour-
nal entry, the sinful woman appears in effigie— note that his Latin here means 
“in the form of an image”— precisely because she is “the present one [den 
Nærværende]” (SKS 24:74, NB21:123, n.d. 1850, my translation; compare 
KJN 8:70), wholly open to God. She is more than a human being precisely 
because, in that moment, she is truly a human being. “She is the symbol,” 
stresses Kierkegaard, “like a picture [Billede]” (SKS 11:277 / WA 141).
And yet, as with Anna, Kierkegaard obviates any attempt merely to rest 
one’s eyes on the image of the sinful woman. As he writes in An Upbuild-
ing Discourse (1850), she is best seen “as a prototype of piety,” as a teacher 
of “godliness” (SKS 12:263  / WA 149). Here the term “prototype” does a 
great deal of work for him: in Danish it is Forbillede, literally “an image that 
goes in front.” Her image, then, is a kind of “motion picture.” It invites not 
observation but imitation, calling the observer to strip himself or herself of 
worldly attachments in order to stand naked before God. The devotion of the 
sinful woman, manifested in the form of her encounter with Christ, is to be 
repeated in the lives of others.
For Kierkegaard, Christian faith has a kind of form. It does not issue in 
just any appearance but, rather, has certain contours and features. That is not 
to say, of course, that it is reducible to a particular manner of dress or single 
way of living. Nor is it to forget that even an ideal form, such as Christ’s, 
can be approached in the wrong fashion. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard insists 
that the image of worship signifies the content of faith, including, paradoxi-
cally, the very object of faith. He writes, “In truth, to be able to worship is 
what makes the [human being’s] invisible glory superior to the rest of cre-
ation. The pagan was not aware of God and therefore sought likeness in 
ruling. But the resemblance is not like that. . . . The human being and God do 
not look like each other directly, but inversely; only when God has infinitely 
become the eternal and omnipresent object of worship and the human being 
always the worshiper, only then do they look like each other” (SKS 8:290 / 
UDVS 193, my translation). To see a human being worship God is to see a 
reflection of God himself. This is Kierkegaard’s reformulation of the ancient 
doctrine of analogia entis, which, among other things, states that human 
beings— as creatures— stand in a proportional relationship with their creator. 
They convey the divine being, but, following the Fourth Lateran Council, 
this similarity is nonetheless marked by an infinite dissimilarity. One of the 
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outcomes of this teaching is just what we have seen in Kierkegaard’s treat-
ment of Billede: in the images of Anna and the sinful woman, it is possible, 
indirectly but truly, to perceive the divine. The aesthetic and the religious are 
not necessarily opposed.
Kierkegaard and the Dialectic between  
the Aesthetic and the Religious
Kierkegaardian scholarship is known for its diversity or, as some might put 
it, fragmentation. A quick scroll through a bibliography— or even an online 
bookstore— reveals as much. There are books on Kierkegaard the indi-
vidualist and on Kierkegaard the social commentator, on Kierkegaard the 
postmodern deconstructionist and on Kierkegaard the guardian of Christian 
orthodoxy, just to mention a couple of fault lines. Yet, despite this interpre-
tive range, one point seems to have achieved a wide consensus— namely, that 
Kierkegaard was a master dialectician. This, after all, was how Kierkegaard 
saw himself. In a lengthy 1850 journal passage, after asserting that he is 
neither a religious zealot nor “only a poet,” Kierkegaard underlines the twin 
pillars of his literary career: “What, then— in addition to the main thing, that 
I have been helped by Governance— has helped me? The fact that I am a dia-
lectician” (SKS 23:33, NB15:46, n.d. 1850 / KJN 7:31).
With this in mind, it is surprising that a number of commentators have 
neglected to see this dialectical approach as operative in Kierkegaard’s analy-
sis of the aesthetic and the religious. Consider Balthasar once again. He insists 
that Kierkegaard’s thought inexorably leads to a chasm between beauty and 
faith, between art and religion. This is especially a critique of Kierkegaard’s 
later authorship, with its increasingly strident calls for Christian obedience 
and suffering. But Balthasar omits examples that run counter to his thesis. 
There is no mention, say, of Kierkegaard’s treatment of the woman who was a 
sinner, much less a discussion of his nuanced recognition of a “social role for 
art in the criticism of modern culture.”16 As a result, Kierkegaard’s warnings 
about the misuse of the aesthetic are transformed into categorical rejections 
of art and of beauty. The dialectical tension is cut, replaced by the resounding 
thud of his conception of the religious.
To be sure, as the previous analysis of Billede has made clear, Kierke-
gaard’s approach to the aesthetic is hardly so straightforward. For one thing, 
there is little if any cause for thinking that Kierkegaard believes the aesthetic 
can somehow be expunged from human existence. As C. Stephen Evans 
notes, “it is a universal dimension of human life.”17 The implication here is 
that Kierkegaard’s well- known existential “stages”— the aesthetic, the ethi-
cal, and the religious— are not mere steps on a ladder, arranged in such a way 
that to reach the ethical is to abandon the aesthetic and so on. Rather, these 
stages are permanent domains within the self, which, like a Venn diagram, 
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overlap one another at certain key junctures. To quote Evans again, “The 
ethical must in some way be preserved within the religious sphere, even if it is 
transformed as well, just as the aesthetic must be preserved within the ethical 
and religious spheres.”18
This perichoresis of the existential spheres follows from the analysis of the 
self in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous treatise The Sickness unto Death (1849). 
There the self is understood as a “synthesis” (SKS 11:129 / SUD 13) of a series 
of contrary elements: the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, 
necessity and freedom. As such, the self is not the bare fact that these contrast-
ing elements are in a dialectical relationship; instead, it is “the positive third” 
(SKS 11:129  / SUD 13) that is capable of interacting with its constitutive 
attributes. In the words of Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti- Climacus, the self 
is “the relation that relates itself to itself” (SKS 11:129 / SUD 13).
Much could be (and has been) made of this definition. With regard to 
the present discussion, the decisive point has to do with Anti- Climacus’s 
insistence that the self’s goal is not to give priority to one of its features 
over against the others— for that would be a “misrelation of despair” (SKS 
11:130 / SUD 14)— but, rather, to will to be what it is. For example, in his 
analysis of despair as defined by finitude and infinitude, Anti- Climacus points 
out that the imaginative faculty is the medium by which persons feel, know, 
and will. It presents to the self its own possibilities. This is, as far as it goes, 
good news, because the self is free precisely to the extent that it can envision 
possibilities, for example, the possibility of seeking the good. But the imagi-
nation can become unhinged, leading the self into a kind of “fantasy world,” 
wherein it prefers to associate with potentiality rather than actuality. This is 
the despair of infinitude. Like Johannes the Seducer, such a self is aroused by 
abstract images but cannot bear any real contact with the world. At the same 
time, Anti- Climacus also describes “finitude’s despair,” which is marked by 
an inability to imagine possibilities beyond everyday life. Here the self fails 
to envision its unique potential; it becomes a “number instead of a self” (SKS 
11:149 / SUD 33). The task, then, is to avoid each of these extremes. The 
imagination, with its distinctive ability to create and to appreciate images 
and, in turn, to shape the potential of the self, is an essential component 
of human life. But it must neither dominate nor retreat. As Anti- Climacus 
explains, “To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete 
is neither to become finite nor to become infinite, for that which is to become 
concrete is indeed a synthesis” (SKS 11:146 / SUD 30).
This point sheds light on the status of the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s 
thought. As a dialectician, he does not posit a stark choice between art and 
religion, imagination and reality, the infinite and the finite. In other words, 
the issue is not whether the aesthetic has a role in human life and in the 
development of the self. It is how one relates to the aesthetic that is decisive.
This conclusion again calls to mind the earlier discussion of Billede in 
Kierkegaard’s authorship. As was noted, Kierkegaard cautions against the 
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lure of the image, which can draw the self out of the real world and into its 
own ambit. This type of idolatry— a word that literally means “slavery to an 
image”— is problematic no matter one’s station in life, be it that of a roman-
tic suitor or that of a Christian disciple. On the other hand, Kierkegaard 
both encourages and exemplifies the use of images as a means of spurring 
one to existential authenticity. Here the image does not absorb one’s atten-
tion but, rather, redirects it, providing the observer with an ideal that is met 
only through concrete appropriation. Such is the ideal of faith, embodied in 
Kierkegaard’s pictures of Anna and the sinful woman, which Anti- Climacus 
defines as the opposite of despair (SKS 11:196 / SUD 82).
Thus Kierkegaard leaves the door open for the integration of the aesthetic 
and the religious and makes it a key aspect of his upbuilding literature. For 
him, the life of faith is beautiful, and its beauty can lead one to God. This is 
why, as Sylvia Walsh points out, he frequently “declares in the later journals 
that he is essentially a poet, and in several entries he describes himself more 
specifically as a ‘poet of the religious’ and even more narrowly as a ‘Chris-
tian poet and thinker.’ ”19 As such, his role might be compared to that of any 
religious artist. For example, the business of the painter or, in traditional 
terminology, “writer” of Christian icons is neither to issue dogmatic procla-
mations nor to compose systematic treatises on theology. On the contrary, 
his or her artwork is intended to orient the observer toward holiness, to 
establish contact between the observer and sacred events and/or lives. The 
iconographer, then, may draw on the doctrinal tradition— to be sure, it is 
doctrine, and not the writer per se, that determines the existential ideals— but 
his or her goal is fundamentally existential. Likewise, Kierkegaard under-
stood his artistic task as creating a “passionate impression of expressing the 
ideal existentially,” so that a “pathos for the pathos- filled life” is nurtured 
(SKS 22:329, 331, NB13:88, n.d. 1849 / KJN 6:333). An 1850 journal entry 
puts it in more direct terms:
But now a poetic form will be needed in presenting the religious 
domain itself. This is a step forward compared to the way things 
are now, when insignificance and mediocrity have rlly [sic] taken the 
place of the religious, so that the poet in the more ordinary sense is 
even higher than the religious.
In any case, it is certain that something poetic must be introduced 
into the religious domain simply to get hold of, to come to grips with, 
any existential ideals once again. (SKS 24:82– 83, NB21:132, 1850 / 
KJN 8:78– 79)
This task is implicit in Kierkegaard’s Billeder of Anna, the sinful woman, 
and others. What is esteemed is not artistic representation in and of itself but 
its service to human flourishing and to God. To cite Walsh once more, “In 
Kierkegaard’s view, the highest existential ideality is to be a Christian. Thus, 
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in his religious writings, he is primarily concerned to portray, like an artist, 
the ideal picture of a Christian.”20
The Idol, the Icon, and Kierkegaard
I have sought to establish two overarching points. First, by examining 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of and approach to the concept of “image,” I 
have shown that Kierkegaard does not posit an ultimate decision between 
the aesthetic and the religious but rather exemplifies their careful integra-
tion. Second, I have underlined that Kierkegaard’s dialectical approach to 
this question correlates to the conception of the self developed in The Sick-
ness unto Death, not to mention the way he viewed his task as an author. 
What has emerged is a kind of “aesthetics of the icon”— an aesthetics that 
points beyond itself, viewing art not as an end in itself but as a means toward 
religious and, with it, existential fulfillment.
In conclusion, I want to illustrate these findings by drawing on the work of 
the French thinker Jean- Luc Marion, particularly his well- known text, God 
without Being (Dieu sans l’être, 1982). What follows is by no means a com-
prehensive reading of Marion’s oeuvre nor a suggestion that Kierkegaard’s 
views are somehow identical with Marion’s. The idea is more basic— namely, 
that Marion’s reflections can shed light on the various images populating 
Kierkegaard’s works and, in turn, on the Dane’s dialectical approach to aes-
thetic imagery.
Marion’s interest in the tension between idol and icon developed over 
time. In his early work on Descartes, he launched an attempt “to disconnect 
the link between metaphysics and the divine,” arguing that metaphysics— to 
the extent that it “defines” a supreme being for the sake of understanding 
other beings— always already lapses into idolatry.21 In God without Being, as 
Christina M. Gschwandtner points out, he “pushes his definition of idolatry 
further by explicating a distinction between idol and icon.” Whereas Marion 
had earlier focused on the “specific idolatry of metaphysics,” he now posited 
a variety of idolatries, “moving from visual to conceptual, from simple to 
more complex.”22 What these idols have in common is that they satisfy the 
intentions of those who apprehend them. For example, an image becomes an 
idol whenever “it suggests to the gaze where to rest.”23 This, in fact, is what 
makes the idol charming: it relieves the observer of the burden of seeking 
something beyond it. As Marion puts it, “The gaze settles only inasmuch as 
it rests— from the weight of upholding the sight of an aim without term, rest, 
or end: ‘to sleep with the sleep of the earth.’ ” Idolatry, then, “reveals a sort 
of essential fatigue,” and this fatigue is perilous.24 It wants its desires fulfilled 
on its own terms, and for that reason it is closed off to transcendence and, 
finally, to true divinity. Gschwandtner sums up Marion’s point this way: “The 
idol does indeed provide a vision of the divine, but a precise vision that is 
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fulfilled in the gaze and thus controlled by it. The observer of the idol grasps 
hold of the divine.”25
In contrast, Marion sees the icon as that which “summons the gaze to 
surpass itself.” One never really looks at the icon, since the icon serves as 
a medium through which one’s vision goes “back . . . up the infinite stream 
of the invisible.”26 Hence, where the idol offers a circumscribed deity that is 
effectively a projection of human consciousness, the icon “becomes a kind 
of window through which the gaze travels toward the ‘unenvisageable,’ that 
which cannot ever be contained in a human gaze.”27 This is why Marion refers 
to the icon as “excessive.”28 It does not so much contain its subject matter 
as communicate that its subject matter cannot be contained. “Idols abolish 
distance, while the icon preserves it.”29 With this in mind, Marion points out 
that, before the icon, it is actually the observer who is being observed: “The 
icon regards us— it concerns us, in that it allows the intention of the invisible 
to occur visibly.” The challenge facing the iconographer, then, is to allow for 
this porous quality, to clear the way for the gaze of the invisible while simul-
taneously acknowledging that the invisible emerges “by its aim” alone. As 
Marion explains, “The icon lays out the material of wood and paint in such a 
way that there appears in them the intention of a transpiercing gaze emanat-
ing from them.” As a result, the “aesthetics of the icon” is, in a certain sense, 
the absence of aesthetics. For, according to Marion, the idol “supposes an 
aesthesis that precisely imposes its measure on the idol,” whereas the icon’s 
“depth withdraws [it] from all aesthetics.”30
Here— as in all of the above reflections— Marion walks the dialectical 
tightrope in a way that evokes, or illuminates, Kierkegaard’s own approach 
to aesthetic imagery. For Kierkegaard, we recall, the danger of the image is 
that it will close off the observer from reality. This is true of Johannes the 
Seducer, who would rather fantasize about Cordelia than actually be in a 
relationship with her. But it is also true of religious persons or groups when-
ever they reduce the divine to an artistic or conceptual object, as opposed 
to a living subject. It is this circumscribed and attenuated perspective, so 
deftly portrayed by Kierkegaard, that corresponds to Marion’s analysis of 
idolatry.
And yet, Kierkegaard also uses his pen to paint pictures of holiness. These 
images of holy persons such as Anna and the woman who was a sinner 
communicate the nature of faith— in particular, how it is a movement of 
dispossession, whereby the claims of the believer are renounced for the sake 
of divine adoration— and, in doing so, they echo the divine itself. For Kierke-
gaard’s pictures are indeed “excessive.” They convey that what they convey 
cannot be conveyed. Far from reducing the divine to human categories, they 
depict the great distance between human beings and God— a distance that is 
“closed” only through the paradox of worship, in which the person comes to 
recognize that he or she is beheld by the mysterious Other. Here, in nuce, is a 
type of Marion’s notion of the icon.
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In a well- known remark, Heidegger once said of the god of metaphysics, 
“Before the causi sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play 
music and dance before this god.”31 Kierkegaard would register a similar 
concern about art and its tendency to reproduce gods of pleasure and utility. 
But both in practice and theory he suggests that it need not be so. When the 
aesthetic engenders worship, idolatry is supplanted by doxology. This may 
not be an aesthetics in the classic, Western sense of the term. Rather, it is an 
aesthetics of the icon.
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Kierkegaard’s Approach to Pictorial Art, and to 
Specimens of Contemporary Visual Culture
Ragni Linnet
Sight and Hearing
“It may at times have occurred to you, dear reader, to doubt somewhat the 
accuracy of that familiar philosophical thesis that the outer is the inner and 
the inner is the outer” (SKS 2:11  / EO 1:3). This simple opening sentence 
of Either/Or (1843) outlines the subject of this essay: Kierkegaard’s and his 
various pseudonyms’ pinpointing of the essence and nature, and the limits 
and potentials, of the concrete image, because a picture, if anything, is the 
medium of “the outer”— that is, the external presentation of its subject. We 
shall see how the nature of the picture we are concerned with is decisive for 
Kierkegaard and the pseudonyms, because only academic, idealistic painting 
is measured by such congruence between the inner and the outer. Popular 
pictorial art, on the other hand, plays in a completely different register.
Before I proceed, a word of caution is in order. Kierkegaard would not be 
Kierkegaard if the different statements in his writings about the capacities 
of a picture were formulated in a straightforward manner. Sometimes the 
statements are dressed as agitated showdowns followed by creative appropri-
ations of theories and pictures around him. In other places the assertions are 
made with animated irony and performative twists. And one cannot simply 
presume that Kierkegaard’s different pseudonyms are speaking for Kierke-
gaard himself. They present different points of view that Kierkegaard wants 
us to reflect upon. It is my cautious suggestion that these points of view, con-
sidered together with Kierkegaard’s own use of pictures and with the texts 
published under his own name, form an overall tendency in his approach to 
pictorial art.
The pseudonymous “editor” of Either/Or, Victor Eremita, who gathers the 
papers of “A” and “B” into two separate volumes which he brings to print, 
has no doubt about his own doubt with regard to the visible and to the claim 
that the “inner” is represented by the “outer”:
I myself have always been rather heretically minded on this philo-
sophical point and therefore early in my life developed the habit 
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of making observations and investigations as well as possible. For 
guidance, I have consulted the authors whose view I shared in this 
respect— in brief, I have done all I could to make up for what has 
been left undone in the philosophical writings. Gradually, then, 
hearing became my most cherished sense, for just as the voice is the 
disclosure of inwardness incommensurable with the exterior, so the 
ear is the instrument that apprehends this inwardness, hearing the 
sense by which it is appropriated. Consequently, every time I found a 
contradiction between what I saw and what I heard, my doubt was 
confirmed and my zeal for observation increased. A priest who hears 
confessions is separated by a grillwork from the person making con-
fessions; he does not see him, he only hears. As he listens, he gradually 
forms a picture of the other’s outward appearance corresponding to 
what he hears; thus he finds no contradiction. It is different, however, 
when one sees and hears simultaneously but sees a grillwork between 
oneself and the speaker. (SKS 2:11 / EO 1:3)
In other words, the starting point taken by Kierkegaard/Victor Eremita in 
Either/Or and its view of the aesthetic is the assumption that hearing gives us 
the freedom to form our own complete pictures of the inward. Sight, on the 
other hand, presents a contradiction between a person’s inner, hidden quali-
ties and what appears outwardly, on the surface. Sight cannot penetrate the 
opaque barrier that surrounds what is internal.
Either/Or plays many variations on this theme and takes a clear position 
on sight and hearing. In my view, this is primarily related to the polemics of 
the time. The book is concerned with an excoriation of an “aesthetic” mode 
of existence. The first part of Either/Or is therefore assigned to the aesthetic 
universe of the senses, and the book thus draws a psychogram of Kierke-
gaard’s times with the help of the various forms of art, the senses they each 
appeal to, and the ideas that convey them. The various aesthetic character 
types in Either/Or are musical and concrete images. Music is the demonic, 
immediately sensual aesthete, Mozart’s Don Giovanni, who lives out his pas-
sion. Pictorial art, on the other hand, is the reflective aesthete, Johannes the 
Seducer or “A,” who, ghostlike, exists by parasitically observing his own pas-
sion from afar.
The Veil of Veronica— or the Beautiful Image
According to his own premises, Kierkegaard has good reason for his chal-
lenging of academic art. His aim is to challenge both the idealistic aesthetics 
of the time, including the idea of what I shall call the beautiful image as a 
mimetic picture, and the harmonized (or harmonizing) and distilled pictorial 
art of his time. Some of his grounds seem quite unreasonable when examined 
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in the context of contemporary (Danish) Naturalistic art, which holds far 
more than Kierkegaard is prepared to see.
Kierkegaard has by no means left us with a cohesive pictorial theory, and he 
is sparing with references to concrete works, pictures, and painters. He keeps 
his pictures close to his chest. One text, however, does focus on the beauti-
ful image. This is the essay “Silhouettes” in Either/Or. Kierkegaard research 
does not abound with analyses of “Silhouettes,” and a blinkered close analysis 
warrants a prefatory reservation. Even though assessments of pictorial art 
and reflection on issues of form and presentation are a recurring theme in 
Kierkegaard’s writings and are already exposed to variations in Either/Or, 
Kierkegaard’s approach to identifying the ontology of pictorial art is not based 
on an interest in this ontology per se. Rather, Kierkegaard is concerned with 
the value of art as a kind of psychogram, a schematic outline or diagram that 
in graphic form transmits information about psychological conditions. The 
academic, mimetic painting of the time is thus the bearer of everything Victor 
Eremita attributes to Johannes the Seducer or “A.” Don Giovanni cannot be 
painted. “The most abstract idea conceivable is the sensuous in its elemental 
originality [Genialitet]. . . . It cannot be painted, for it cannot be caught in def-
inite contours. In its lyricism, it is a force, a wind, impatience, passion, etc., yet 
in such a way that it exists not in one instant but in a succession of instants, 
for if it existed in one instant, it could be depicted or painted” (SKS 2:64 / EO 
1:56– 57). Considered as a type, the aesthete is a painting. With variations, 
Either/Or fundamentally states the same about the nature of mimetic pictorial 
art. The book describes what the idealistic picture cannot do and shows how 
its basic characteristics buttress the aesthete’s unreal mode of existence. This 
image is buttressed in the second part of Either/Or by the descriptions of “A” 
offered by Judge William, and by his fatherly admonishments of him.
“Silhouettes” tells the story of the unrequited love of three Romantic 
female figures, but in my reading is primarily about different types of pictures: 
pictures “within,” as pictures of the imagination, and pictures “without”— 
the immaterial wall silhouette, painting, or graphic print, that combines form 
and substance, or the daguerreotype’s fixation of fleeting light. It is not obvi-
ous what “A’s” intentions are with pictorial art, and with the picture in this 
text, which thematizes the incongruence between the inner and the outer. 
Why does he speak in images when his message seems to be to point to what 
lies beyond the picture: the veiled darkness that avoids the picture’s drawing 
things into the light but denotes the essence, the enigmatic? The answer is, 
among other things, that this particular approach to the problem of repre-
sentation and presentation allows Kierkegaard to present the pro et contra of 
creating a picture. What can be “pictorialized” in language? How does this 
relate to what the pictorializing material media can and do achieve? And how 
is meaning created in relation to different types of image?
The hypothesis I present is that, already in this small essay of his, “A” gives 
us the principal terms for reconstruction of the pictorial theory that remains 
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by and large unchanged throughout all Kierkegaard’s work: the picture’s 
relation to time, including the past (recollection), the present (presence), and 
the future (self- appropriation), and to the spirit, the body, existence, the self 
and subjectivity, and love. With this essay by “A” we move into the core of 
Kierkegaard’s own pictorial thought that, like a walnut, is divided into two 
halves over a pair of questions. One is the question of the relation between 
the inner and the outer and of whether the inner can be objectified in an 
outer, visible manifestation. The other question is that of the nature of sight. 
In “Silhouettes,” the question about the nature of sight is answered nega-
tively. A grillwork is set up between the inner and the outer, as in the image 
of the confession box in Either/Or’s prelude, and the outer view is assigned 
an objectifying and reifying nature.1 Later in Kierkegaard’s authorship there 
is a meditation on how outer images become set as a series of inner images, 
but this does not dislodge his fundamental thesis about the incommensurabil-
ity of the inner with the outer. What is added is a new view of the didactic 
significance of pictorial art and of the relation between form and appro-
priation. The picture still cannot encompass the inner but affects one’s own 
innermost being.
The three jilted women in “Silhouettes” are Marie Beaumarchais from 
Goethe’s Clavigo, Donna Elvira from Mozart’s Don Giovanni, and Marga-
ret from Goethe’s Faust. According to Kierkegaard/“A”/Victor Eremita, the 
outright sorrow that first overwhelms these women can be manifested in vis-
ible shape, but this is not the case when this sorrow becomes reflective. The 
question is why their reflective (or reflecting) sorrow cannot be expressed 
within the framework of pictorial art. The argumentation follows Lessing 
and Hegelian sight lines. Lessing is invoked as an authority regarding the 
relation of pictorial art to time and space. Pictorial art is referred to as the 
stasis of space, and thus cannot encompass reflection and the reflective sor-
row that will unfold over time.
Since the time when Lessing defined the boundaries between poetry 
and art in his celebrated treatise Laokoon, it no doubt may be 
regarded as a conclusion unanimously recognized by all estheticians 
that the distinction between them is that art is in the category of 
space, poetry in the category of time, that art depicts repose, poetry 
motion. For this reason, the subject for artistic portrayal must have 
a quiet transparency so that the interior rests in the corresponding 
exterior. The less this is the case, the more difficult becomes the task 
for the artist, until the distinction asserts itself and teaches him that 
this is no task for him at all.
If we apply to the relation between sorrow and joy that which has 
been casually stated but not developed here, it is easy to perceive that 
joy is far easier to depict artistically than sorrow. By no means does 
this deny that grief can be depicted artistically, but it certainly does 
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say that there comes a point where it is essential to posit a contrast 
between the interior and the exterior, which makes a depiction of it 
impossible for art. (SKS 2:167 / EO 1:169)
The point is that the beautiful image, whose existence for Lessing is justified 
by this externalization of the inner, loses any legitimacy from a Kierke-
gaardian perspective.2 On the other hand, Hegel’s image- less contemporary 
horizon, in which inwardness is unfolded so that it breaches the bounds of 
pictorial art and can only be expressed as a concept, is an unspoken premise. 
In what follows, I shall consider seven key appropriations by Kierkegaard of 
pictorial art and other images transmitted to him by the history of images 
and the popular traditions surrounding them. These appropriations show 
Kierkegaard’s mastery of displacement of meaning and his modification of 
pictures and attest to the vital role played by actual visual material in his 
authorship.
First Appropriation: The “Acheiropoieta” Tradition
The point when presentation becomes impossible lies in the precise inter-
face between the immediate and the reflective sorrow. The immediate sorrow 
may still be “a subject for artistic portrayal” (SKS 2:170 / EO 1:172). It is, 
namely, “the immediate imprint and expression of the sorrow’s impression, 
which, just like the picture Veronica preserved on her linen cloth, is perfectly 
congruous, and sorrow’s sacred lettering is stamped on the exterior, beauti-
ful and clear and legible to all” (SKS 2:170 / EO 1:172). This image, which 
in reality is a depiction of the beautiful image, is my key to “Silhouettes.” It 
encompasses the text’s polemical matter and the ideas of the beautiful image 
that it at one and the same time presents and undermines.
The image of the veil takes its significance from the idealistic idea of beau-
tiful pictorial art, which as a symbol seamlessly binds together the inner and 
the outer. Depiction is the outer imprint of the inner. If one wants to poke fun 
at the aesthetics of beauty, the image of the Veil of Veronica is well chosen. 
As an acheiropoieton, or an icon “made without hand,” Veronica’s Veil, or 
sudarium (handkerchief or sweat cloth), literally bears a sweaty impression 
of the inner— namely, the suffering of Christ. Like the inner, the sweat flows 
out into the outer cloth (canvas). We can take this even further. In Latin, 
“to sweat” or “transpire” is trans(s)pirere, from trans (through) and spirare 
(breath) or spiritus (spirit). In Kierkegaard’s time, this word was used as a 
polite, genteel expression for perspiration, but it is not too much to imagine 
that Kierkegaard’s pen also held the association of “inspiring” in the sense 
of “giving spirit to.” Thus the (canvas) cloth literally absorbs the spirit. The 
image of Veronica’s Veil can be seen as a metaphor of how, in one of the 
expressions of the time, beautiful art “makes the idea transparent.”
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The image of Veronica’s Veil also serves to comment on another of the 
theoretical artistic ideas of Kierkegaard’s time, which is related to the contem-
porary interpretation of the concept of mimesis. The mimetic representation 
“resembles” the outer, it was believed, just as the image on the veil bears a 
“likeness” of Christ. Furthermore, it also bears his image or impression. This 
perception of beautiful, mimetic art was accompanied by the belief in the 
ability of the mimetic representation to make the imprint present (or present- 
like) or proximate. The traces of sweat on the veil clearly tell us that “he 
was here.” Yet they also seem to say “here he is.” The faith in the ability of 
the picture to create nearness quickly becomes a sense of the picture “being 
alive.” This was an idea that occupied many people in Kierkegaard’s time and 
is also reflected in the popularity of the Pygmalion theme.
This is a quite innocent example from “A’s” image bank. Yet “A” adds 
irony in two ways. By using this particular picture as a depiction of the beau-
tiful image, “A” draws the aesthetic of beauty into the sphere of magic and 
superstition. The early Church said of this image that it was acheiropoie-
tos, that is, created miraculously, and not by a human painter. On the other 
hand, he assigns the painting to the sphere of the Resurrection. The image of 
Veronica’s Veil transcends death, since Jesus is (literally) resurrected before 
our eyes.
Yet Kierkegaard is double- tongued. One tongue formulates itself with an 
uncritical presentation of the Veil of Veronica in a symbolic- aesthetic Hege-
lian vocabulary, where visual art is viewed in the light of eternally objective 
ideas. In this presentation, what makes a picture art is that it is beautiful, 
and it is beautiful only if it is a reflection of spirituality. The other tongue, 
however, hisses lowly and ironically that this criterion can probably be ful-
filled only by Veronica’s magical veil, which the Catholics have purportedly 
preserved.
“The Interior’s Good- bye”
Let us continue our reading of “Silhouettes.” While the immediate grief thus 
moves outward, like blood flowing to the skin (or the sweat flowing out into 
the cloth and becoming a reverse impression of the beautiful image), the 
reflective sorrow flows inward, like blood fleeing from the surface: “The exte-
rior pallor is, as it were, the interior’s good- bye, and thought and imagination 
hurry after the fugitive, which hides in the secret recesses. . . . This sorrow 
cannot be depicted artistically, for the interior and the exterior are out of 
balance, and thus it does not lie within spatial categories” (SKS 2:167– 68 / 
EO 1:169– 70).
This sorrow is in conflict with Lessing’s demarcations: “In yet another 
respect it cannot be depicted artistically, for it does not have inner stillness 
but is constantly in motion” (SKS 2:168 / EO 1:170). The experience of the 
reflective sorrow and what nourishes it is that it constantly seeks its object 
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and is therefore changing continuously. If one did nonetheless seek to make 
an artistic representation of this sorrow, which “is never really present but 
is continually in the process of becoming” (SKS 2:170  / EO 1:172), and 
therefore— to repeat the phrase from “A’s” comments on Lessing— “in the 
category of time,” this would be in conflict with what Lessing, according to 
“A,” has said so wisely about the forces and limits of the individual medium. 
If we, with Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms, assumed that the outer could 
actually reflect the inner and maintain the inner in each of its movements, 
“then there would have to be a whole series of pictures in order to portray 
reflective sorrow; but no particular picture would express the sorrow, and no 
particular picture would have real artistic value, since it would be not beauti-
ful, but true” (SKS 2:175 / EO 1:178).
This is an ambiguous passage that makes sense only if we interpret the 
text’s use of the concept of truth in conjunction with a scientific concept of 
congruence. On this basis, it can also be understood why the daguerreotype, 
that newly developed photographic method of Kierkegaard’s time, is placed 
outside the sphere of art. The daguerreotype captures the play of light on the 
surface, but does not capture the spirit.
The Picture’s Sensual Moment
“Silhouettes” provides a critique of both the pictorial and the romantic. 
Marie, Elvira, and Margaret are convinced that their love will last forever 
and that they will love their beloveds, and be loved by them, for all eternity. 
This awareness of eternity ennobles their love. In reality, the text tells us, they 
are captured by the illusions of romantic love. According to Kierkegaard’s 
“A,” this shows the three women’s fate. They do not see that their love has 
only the “empty” time of the sensual moment at its disposal.
What connects romantic love or sensual, fleeting love with the picture’s 
moment? They are of the same kin, so that the picture, which stops time in an 
eternal moment, can encapsulate sensual, or romantic, love. In Kierkegaard’s 
description of “A” and of Johannes the Seducer, the aesthete who cultivates 
the senses is apparent. He is also aware of the moment, but in his sensual 
moments disregards the eternal— that is, the truly eternal. He is not warm- 
blooded but bloodless and heartless, and his sensuality and sensual moments 
are “mediate” and completely subject to his manipulative reflectiveness. 
Besides much else, “A”/ Johannes the Seducer and the painting share in com-
mon that they are both reflected sensuality without spirit.
This is an important point and part of the explanation for why “A”/
Johannes must appear as a picture and not as a sculpture or orchestrated 
score (like Don Juan). Whether it is a flat painting or a “spatial surface,” 
a concrete picture is always an abstraction. It depicts a three- dimensional 
world in two dimensions. When an academic painting is, furthermore, as in 
Kierkegaard’s time, arranged in a mathematically based perspective structure, 
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the abstraction merely becomes more condensed. Painting, as Kierkegaard 
knew it— despite his many reductions— is a good image for a reflective treat-
ment of intuition’s sensual material.
When Kierkegaard grafts his perception of romantic love with consider-
ation of the essence and nature of painting or picture, he is, without explicitly 
saying so, further embroidering Pliny, who, in his Natural History, relates the 
myth of Butades and how painting is born from love.3 The beloved of Butades 
has to leave, and to preserve his memory she carves out his silhouette, or pro-
file, in a rock. Kierkegaard comments indirectly on this narrative when he 
shows, with “A,” how the picture replaces reality. It points to the absent and 
represents what is (soon) to be lost. Image formation is thus fundamentally 
nostalgic by nature, and “A,” like Butades, is already lost in recollections 
in the present’s image- forming moment. However, Pliny’s hidden role is not 
thereby exhausted. “A”/Kierkegaard apparently perceives pictorial art as an 
art of the blind. Butades carves out an image without at the same time being 
able to see her model, and “A” blindly overlooks his women’s own nature 
with his reflective skiagraphs.4 Kierkegaard’s view of the marriage of the sen-
sual moment, love, recollection, and image is negative. The qualities that his 
Danish times draw out from Pliny in order to elevate art as a child of love are 
used by “A” to tarnish and denigrate art. He, in fact, seems to say that image 
formation is nurtured by, and nurtures, a life without love.
William’s “On Time”
Let us pursue this trail, still with the relation between love, time, and image 
creation as our wrench. The aesthete “A” is a picture, but he is also a picture 
of the unloving and an active practitioner of the illusion- building of roman-
tic love. With “B,” or rather Judge William, the perspective and perception 
of time change. The line of sight is the ethical aspect or, in brief, the relation 
between the general and the individual.
Two questions are now to be pursued. First, how does William’s percep-
tion of time and his view of marital love affect his view of pictures, whether 
they be paintings, graphics, or daguerreotypes? Second, why does he present 
his ethics as a critique of the pictorial? I shall add an image that highlights 
Kierkegaard’s pictorial theory.
In 1843, Kierkegaard wrote in some notes that the first part of Either/
Or continually gets stranded on time: “This is why the second part strongly 
affirms it, since it is shown in the first discussion that the esthetic is broken 
upon time, and in the second discussion it is shown that the meaning of fini-
tude and temporality, is to be able to become history, to gain a history” (Pap. 
IV A 213, n.d. 1843 / JP 1:907).
It is also the question of time, and of the relation between inner and outer 
time, that leads the judge to think of marriage. He draws a clear distinc-
tion between what is interchangeably called first love, erotic and sensual 
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(or romantic) love, and marital love. The first, erotic and sensual love is the 
momentary (SKS 3:30 /EO 2:21), and its “ ‘mine’  .  .  . resonates  .  .  . in the 
eternity of the seductive moment . . . in the illusory eternity of imagination 
and idea” (SKS 3:64 / EO 2:58). It has an abstract nature, never has inner 
substance, nor has “the law of motion in itself” (SKS 3:99 / EO 2:96). Mari-
tal love, on the other hand, “has the possibility of an inner history and is as 
different from first love as the historical is from the unhistorical” (SKS 3:97 / 
EO 2:94). Marital love “always moves inward” (SKS 3:138 / EO 2:139) and 
spends itself (in the good sense) in time. The inner history, the marital history, 
is thus hidden. This love is realized in life, as it is lived. The outer, on the other 
hand, which is the romantic or sensual love, can be manifested, but only as 
“dead,” visible signs.
As a consequence, marital love cannot be depicted in the “beautiful picture,” 
while the romantic, sensual, and erotic love allows itself to be “admirably” 
depicted in the picture’s moment (SKS 3:134 / EO 2:135). But an aesthetic 
representation always requires “a concentration in the moment [Moment]” 
(SKS 3:132 / EO 2:133). Both art and poetry “concentrate the extensive in 
the intensive” (SKS 3:132 / EO 2:133), but marital love is nurtured by the 
protraction of time and the continuity of creation. For marital love, the pas-
sage of time, the road, is the same as the goal (SKS 3:132– 33 / EO 2:133). 
The truth of marital love is “the temporal sequence” (SKS 3:135 / EO 2:136). 
The relation of art to time, and to time’s extent, which excludes pictorial 
presentations not only of marital love but also of humility and endurance, is 
a perfect match for William’s ethical mission.
For William, pictorial art serves only to pass or to kill time, not for deter-
mining choice, which occurs in time. Pictorial art thus lies outside the sphere 
of the ethical, just as “A” does. Ethics are dependent upon choice and on 
the extended, forward- looking time of repeated actions. In other words, 
William’s pictorial critique is not at all concerned with pictorial art and its 
limitations but is merely another way of saying to “A” that, because of his 
pictoriality, he has no ethics. Under the surface simmers the same Romantic 
critique as expressed by “A.”
Second Appropriation: Ferdinand Piloty’s Kiss
Judge William stands by his viewpoints with surprising tenacity. In what is 
putatively his own monologue, “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer 
to Objections. By a Married Man,” in Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way 
(1845), he reverts to the question of the relation between pictorial art, the 
love that— like the romantic— never develops, and marital love.
William’s starting point is a picture of Romeo and Juliet, “an eternal pic-
ture” (SKS 6:156 / SLW 167; figure 2).5 “The eternal element in the picture is 
that it portrays a pair of lovers and portrays them in an essential expression” 
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(SKS 6:156 / SLW 167), namely Juliet sunk in admiration at her lover’s feet. 
Her gaze at Romeo is filled with heavenly bliss, “but Romeo stops this look 
and with a kiss all the longing of erotic love is set at rest forever, for the reflec-
tion of eternity surrounds the moment with a halo, and no more than Romeo 
and Juliet does anyone who looks at the picture think that there will be a 
next moment, even if it were only to repeat the sacred seal of the kiss” (SKS 
6:157 / SLW 168). The picture of Romeo and Juliet is thus “an eternal pic-
ture” as its tableau depicts an eternal moment that can never change. Yet it is 
also an eternal picture because it is timeless and depicts a universal ideal that 
transcends history: “Do not ask the lovers, for they do not hear your voice, 
but out in the world ask in what century this happened, in what country, at 
what time of the day, at what hour it was— no one replies, for it is an eternal 
picture” (SKS 6:157 / SLW 168). This pair of lovers is “an eternal subject for 
art” (SKS 6:157 / SLW 168).
This is not a married couple— and, strangely enough, the picture fades 
for William when he projects it into the context of marital love. The pic-
ture begins to work and move; she is “in the admiration of love” sinking 
in admiration at her lover’s feet (and we see her sinking movement before 
Figure 2. Romeo and Juliet’s Farewell Kiss, lithograph by Ferdinand Piloty, from William 
Shakespeare, Romeo und Julia, trans. [to German] August Wilhelm von Schlegel (Berlin: 
G. Grote, 1875), facing p. 75.
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us), but she sinks not only before him, the visible, “but before the invisible” 
(SKS 6:157 / SLW 168), and now his strong arm grasps her (and we “see” 
how it is extended to grasp her), and together they are held up by a kiss: 
“This is no picture, there is no repose in the artistic situation, for as one 
looks at her almost sinking in adoration, one sees beyond this interrupted 
posture the necessity of a new one, that she stands upright at his side. One 
has intimations of a new prototype, the authentic prototype of marriage, 
because married people are contiguous angles on the same base. What is it 
that produces that incompleteness in the first picture, what is being sought 
in this faltering— it is the equality of resolution; it is the higher immediacy of 
the religious” (SKS 6:157 / SLW 168– 69, my emphases). With the introduc-
tion of movement and incompleteness, William’s view of the ethical, which 
previously framed the image reflection, is now obviously drawn into the 
picture. Yet the married couple is thereby also drawn out of the picture’s 
world.
Shadow(image)s in the Realm of Death— 
or Mimesis as Negative Existential
Let us pursue this line of inquiry. When Kierkegaard’s fictitious characters 
make explicit the connection between image and death, the disjunction of 
inner and outer in the materialized image becomes even clearer, as does 
also the indissoluble alliance of inwardness with time. Like the picture, the 
corpse- like “A” has no inner. The soul has departed, and there is only a de- 
ontologized outer shell left. This world of shells is “A’s” world— that is, the 
world to which he wants to take his readers in “Silhouettes.”
“Just as Charon took people across from the fullness of life to the shadowy 
land of the underworld” (SKS 1:277 / CI 236), so has “A” shipped both him-
self and those he addresses in “Silhouettes” to a shadow world. “A” addresses 
the co- deceased, the Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι (Symparanekromenoi, Fellowship of 
the Dead), and the silhouette appears if not in the realm of death, then on its 
threshold.
Kierkegaard’s (and “A’s” and Johannes’s) use of the shadow as a metaphor 
of the picture is virtuosic. The shadow is bloodless, in contrast to reality’s 
beating pulse, and belongs to a world of dreams. It is a phantom. A shadow is 
a sham, without flesh or a chest that moves with each breath. As Kierkegaard 
puts it in Works of Love, “The shadow is weak in comparison with the strong 
actuality” (SKS 9:108 / WL 104). It is merely a monochrome, diffuse reflec-
tion, stripped of any individualizing features. But the shadow is also without 
substance and firmness. It takes flight when you reach out for it, and slips 
between your fingers. A shadow cannot contain an interior element because 
it has nothing “inside.” The shadow is pure surface. Like a mirror without 
depth, “a shadow” is “a reflection, a simile [in a double sense], an image [et 
Billede]” (SKS 5:105 / EUD 100).
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Kierkegaard’s connection of the picture with death is already hinted at 
with “A’s” picture of Veronica’s Veil. A veil is also the cloth that the Jews used 
to cover the face of a corpse to absorb bodily emissions. This idea is also 
apparent from this passage in Either/Or’s little interlude, “The Unhappiest 
One.” “A” speaks to his co- deceased about Niobe:
Is this an actual person or is it an image; is it a living person who 
is dying or a dead person who is living— it is Niobe. She lost every-
thing all at once; she lost that to which she gave life; she lost that 
which gave life to her! Look up at her, dear Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι; she 
is standing only a little higher than the world, like a monument on 
a burial mound. But no hope beckons her, no future motivates her, 
no prospect tempts her, no hope perturbs her— hopeless she stands, 
turned to stone in recollection. . . . The world changes, but she knows 
no change, and time comes, but for her there is no future time. (SKS 
2:220 / EO 1:227)
The picture is “like a dead person that is alive.”6
Chemical Shadow Pictures
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms use daguerreotypes to epitomize the absur-
dity of the idealistic claims of a congruence of inner and outer, inwardness 
and outwardness, in the beautiful picture. In the essay “The Esthetic Validity 
of Marriage,” Judge William, or “B,” blames “A” for turning everything into 
shadow pictures (SKS 3:20  / EO 2:10) and, in the same voice, complains 
about “A’s” fascination with daguerreotypes. “A” collects daguerreotypes and 
is a master of both the “study of the lighting” and “magic formulas” (SKS 
3:20 / EO 2:10). He puts these shadow pictures in his pockets, so he has them 
within reach when he wishes to enjoy visible evidence of his conquests.
A Daguerreotype: The Sculptor Bertel Thorvaldsen
At that time, daguerreotypes, which had already come to Denmark in 1840,7 
were connected with superstition and Satanism. The creation of a daguerreo-
type involves the use of mercury fumes and sodium hyposulfite, and the actual 
process by which the photograph was created on an iodized silver plate, or 
an iodized copper plate faced with a thin layer of silver, evoked associations 
with the alchemist’s bubbling, steaming workshop. It was also feared that 
this perceived devilry could steal one’s soul. The camera obscura “took” one’s 
shadow (in the double sense of taking and stealing), and popular superstition 
maintained that the dead did not cast a shadow. While today we are photo-
graphed, at that time people were “drawn off.” The origins of this expression 
may lie in an idea from Balzac (1799– 1850). He believed that the human 
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body consisted of several transparent layers that were successively drawn off 
by the camera with each new exposure.8 Finally, there was a risk of becoming 
as transparent as a ghost and, like a ghost, being left without a soul.
The camera had the evil eye, like a person who brings bad luck (Italian: 
jettatore), and could cast a spell (Latin: fascinum). When Bertel Thorvaldsen, 
who was certainly not “uneducated,” was photographed in the Charlot-
tenborg Gardens in 1844, he found it necessary to ward off Satan in the 
apparatus with a hand movement (the “sign of the horns”), literally to stab 
out its/his evil eyes (figure 3).
From the outset, the relationship between life and death in the photograph 
was disquieting. The daguerreotype, as the relation between the picture’s fro-
zen time and the exposure time (which “B” in Either/Or II’s 1843 universe 
determines to be half a minute; SKS 3:17 / EO 2:7), points to a human- made 
opportunity to freeze time. However, when time stops, our time also stops, 
and we die. While a living person may appear dead in his or her picture, the 
dead picture’s depiction of a person who may now be deceased appears to be 
alive. The photograph, or thanatograph (literally a written account, or, in this 
case, a photograph of a dead person), blurs the border between living and 
dead, the dead and the living.9
Figure 3. A. C. T. Neubourg, Portrait of Bertel Thorvaldsen. Whole- plate daguerreotype, 
1844. Thorvaldsens Museum, Copenhagen.
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In Either/Or, Kierkegaard uses the picture, painting, and daguerreotype to 
describe something else that bears the same characteristics: a life of insignifi-
cance, “a lifelike death,” emptied of life’s inner fluids, without spirit, passion, 
or intensity, as a superficial life, or the aesthete’s “life.” But he also creates 
another relation, which is between image formation and the demonic.
The Mirror’s Image- Forming View
While “A” and the portrait he gives of himself in his papers mainly focus on 
the relation between inner image and outer image, this focus is somewhat dis-
placed by the introduction of Johannes the Seducer in “The Seducer’s Diary.” 
Johannes creatively examines the equation formulated by Plato of mimetic 
image and mirror. The question of inner and outer still resides in the back-
ground, but it is the outward aspect that is developed. The point seems to 
be to present some samples of (faulty) image forming through the deploy-
ment of the metaphor of the mirror. Johannes the mirror and image former 
plays out Plato’s ideographic rules but gives them a Romantic twist. He is 
but a blank mirroring surface, and his image is as devoid of existence as he 
himself is.
In “Silhouettes,” “A” presents his fictive female images from contempo-
rary European culture. Johannes, on the other hand, draws the picture closer, 
in behind the ramparts of Copenhagen. Johannes creates pictures of every-
thing and everyone and forms them in his own image. Moreover, being a 
shadow himself, Johannes also describes himself as a picture. On one of the 
last pages of “The Seducer’s Diary” we see him hurrying to the last meet-
ing with Cordelia, “my work [mit Værk]” (SKS 2:431  / EO 1:445), as he 
confidently and delightedly calls her. Cordelia is his work. And he himself? 
Like his picture (Cordelia), he is himself a metaphor (Billede). “Everything 
is a metaphor [Billede]; I myself am a myth about myself, for is it not as a 
myth that I hasten to this tryst? Who I am is irrelevant; everything finite and 
temporal is forgotten; only the eternal remains, the power of erotic love, its 
longing, its bliss” (SKS 2:431 / EO 1:444). The only love that the metaphor 
(Billede) Johannes knows is rooted in the illusory, metaphorical eternity of 
imagination and dissemblance.
In book 6 of the Republic, Plato describes the picture and the mirror as 
one and the same thing. Johannes the Seducer further develops this union. 
One of his potential victims is reflected in the mirror: “There is a mirror on 
the opposite wall; she is not contemplating it, but the mirror is contemplat-
ing her. How faithfully it has caught her image [Billede], like a humble slave 
who shows his devotion by his faithfulness” (SKS 2:305 / EO 1:315). Yet it is 
an unhappy mirror, which surely dares to frame her but not to embrace her, 
“which assuredly can grasp her image [Billede] but not her” (SKS 2:305 / EO 
1:315). An unhappy mirror, “which cannot secretly hide her image in itself, 
hide it from the whole world, but can only disclose it to others. . . . And yet 
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are there not many people who are like that, who possess nothing except at 
the moment when they are showing it to others, who merely grasp the sur-
face, not the essence, lose everything when this is going to show itself, just 
as this mirror would lose her image if she were to disclose her heart to it by 
a single breath” (SKS 2:305– 6 / EO 1:315). Nor does this mirror manage to 
grasp the essence of existence: the inner element, the heart.
Johannes’s mirror is a remarkable, “living” mirror. The mirror thinks. But 
“what torture if a human being were fashioned that way” (SKS 2:305 / EO 
1:315). It is chilling to note that this is exactly what Johannes, the reflective 
seducer, is. Otherwise, the mirror is just as mirrors are. It is the nature of 
a mirror to remain on the surface, in visuality. The living object it mirrors, 
which has weight and mass before the mirror, is reflected as a “dead” sur-
face, as a mirror image. It can grasp, but not embrace. This is a very precise 
description of Johannes the Seducer, since he is not actually interested in 
his women qua actual women. Cordelia, for example, is not fascinating as 
Cordelia, but only as the image he creates of her for himself.10
Third Appropriation: Theseus and Ariadne
Let me provide a very tangible example of Johannes’s image- forming view. 
In a letter to Cordelia, the hunting trophy in “The Seducer’s Diary,” he 
describes “a painting from ancient times” (SKS 2:391 / EO 1:403) of Ariadne 
and Theseus, but only to create immediately his own very different image 
(“my picture,” he writes), which better communicates his message. Kierke-
gaard had probably not seen “the painting from ancient times.” However, in 
P. F. A. Nitsch’s Neues mythologisches Wörterbuch (1821, New Mythologi-
cal Dictionary), he could find a description of two different wall paintings 
from Herculaneum (figures 4 and 5), which he took the liberty to combine 
into one.11
Here is his “own” painting: “Imagine this picture; imagine it slightly 
changed. Cupid is not weeping and his bow is not unstrung, or would you 
then have become less beautiful, less triumphant, because I had gone out of 
my mind” (SKS 2:391 / EO 1:404, my emphasis). Note how Johannes under-
goes an imperceptible metamorphosis and takes on Theseus’s pictorial form. 
“Cupid smiles and draws the bow. Nemesis does not stand idle at your side; 
she, too, draws her bow” (SKS 2:391 / EO 1:404, my emphasis). And observe 
how Cordelia becomes Ariadne’s image:
In that old painting, we see on the ship a manly figure busy at his 
work. Presumably it is Theseus. Not so in my picture. He is stand-
ing in the stern; he is looking back longingly. He is stretching out his 
arms; he has repented of it or, more correctly, his madness has left 
him, but the ship is carrying him away. Cupid and Nemesis both aim, 
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an arrow flies from each bow, they accurately hit the mark; we see 
and we understand that both have hit one spot in his heart to sym-
bolize that his love was the nemesis that avenged. (SKS 2:391– 92 / 
EO 1:404)
Johannes is like the painter who in reality takes residence in the world he 
himself has created.
What we have just considered is an example of how Johannes the aesthete 
weaves himself, Cordelia, and his readers into a cobweb that transforms real-
ity into intuitions and (outer) perception into (inner) fantasy. Apparently this 
exercise in the art of describing the psychological profile of fictional charac-
ters indirectly and via their image- forming powers and propensities led to a 
search for pictures in which you cannot reside. Kierkegaard, master of style, 
through his pseudonyms, looked for pictures with formal characteristics 
that would cast out the beholder and turn the relationship between picture 
and beholder, outer and inner, upside down. To my mind he asked himself 
how the image- forming of the individual might be turned into a vehicle for 
authentic living. Let us begin with Anti- Climacus’s description of the patterns 
of physical and mental movement evoked by an academic painting of the 
1840s.
Figures 4 and 5. Theseus and Ariadne. Engravings. Illustrations from Le Pitture Antiche 
D’Ercolano e contorni encisi con qualche spiegazione, vol. 2 (Naples: n.p., 1760), 91, 97 
(plates 14, 15).
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The Visual Culture’s Popular Images: Performativity and Temporality
In Practice in Christianity (1850), Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti- Climacus 
claims that the observer is subsumed when he or she observes one of the 
perspective- based paintings of the academic type:
But “to observe” can mean in one sense to come very close to some-
thing, namely, to what one wishes to observe; in another sense, it 
signifies keeping very distant, infinitely distant, that is, personally. 
When one shows a painting to a person and asks him to observe 
it . . . he steps very close to the object . . . in short, he comes as close to 
the object as possible, but in this very same movement he in another 
sense leaves himself entirely, goes away from himself, forgets himself, 
and nothing reminds him of himself, since it is he, after all, who is 
observing the painting and the cloth and not the painting and the 
cloth that are observing him. In other words, by observing I go into 
the object (I become objective) but I leave myself or go away from 
myself (I cease to be subjective). (SKS 12:227– 28 / PC 233– 34; see 
figure 6)
Figure 6. J. Th. Lundbye, Søbyvang. Oil on canvas, 1841. Ordrupgaard.
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With these words, Anti- Climacus’s starting point is the image matrices avail-
able in his time and the expectations people have of them. These paintings 
are assessed according to whether “they are a good likeness,” purify, and 
point upward. This pictorial universe has two roots. One is the perception 
of the experience of art as a disinterested pleasure. The other root is the 
contemporary metaphysics of presence, with the belief in the presence of the 
universal in the beautiful image. In relation to Danish fine arts in the 1830s 
and 1840s, which were governed by a striving for harmony, idealization, 
the “nature- like,” good craftsmanship, perspective theory, and Goethe’s color 
theory, Kierkegaard seems to wish to be at odds. It seems that his pictorial 
aesthetic can be reduced to a “not.” Instead of harmony, for example, Either/
Or’s “A” points to the paradox. Instead of idealization, he opts for reality; 
instead of “nature- like” verisimilitude, abstraction; the sketch replaces “good 
craftsmanship”; two- dimensionality, or a reverse perspective whereby the 
picture falls outward to the viewer, replaces the classical linear perspective; 
and the holistic Goethean palette is replaced with glaring, “striking” colors 
(“light green in yellow,” “yellow- green,” and so forth; compare, for exam-
ple, the description of these in Either/Or’s prefatory “Diapsalmata”; SKS 
2:31 / EO 1:23).12 Kierkegaard, through “A” and some of the other pseudo-
nyms, seems to find his alternative to Danish fine arts in contemporary folk 
art, whether it be the time’s one- sheet prints, including the “Neuruppiner 
Bilderbogen” or “Nürnbergs,” or as he finds it in the petit journalism of the 
time.13
Whereas academic pictorial art tends to invite a wrongly directed bodily 
and mental movement outward, that is, into the picture, along the pathway 
already painted for the viewer to follow, Kierkegaard (through his pseudo-
nyms) attempts to reverse this wrong movement, so that it correctly points 
inward— that is, toward the self. Other picture types create an inverse move-
ment whereby the half- completed picture is pushed back into the body of the 
observer and, enfolded in time, is completed by his or her inner, active eye. 
These pictures function as midwives for the observer. We find them inscribed 
in different elements of the works: folk- like, nonmimetic, and nonperspec-
tivist pictorial impressions that schematize and abstract and leave it to us, 
the viewers, to add body to the image; trick pictures whose middle space 
and empty, unworked areas play a vital role; fragments, an uncompletable 
form, which in the picture’s world are embodied as, for example, sketches 
or studies of fragmented details; outline drawings; and finally a permanent, 
provisional image expression, such as the arabesque. All of these pictorial 
types share a focus on how the original picture is received and on the supple-
mentary pictures it generates— that is, the acquisition process.
In Repetition, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantin Constantius compares 
one of his time’s cheap, template- painted, exaggerated, and very popular 
prints with an academic landscape— he does not name one in particular— 
that functions “as a true copy” or by “ideal reproduction.” The example 
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serves to show us how we are affected by the final, complete, and finished 
form and the incomplete attempt.
Fourth Appropriation: Raphael’s The Entombment
At times we see the more mature individuality who satiates himself 
on the strong food of actuality and is not really influenced by a well- 
executed painting. But he can be stirred by a Nürnberg print, a picture 
of the kind found on the market not long ago. There one sees a land-
scape depicting a rural area in general. This abstraction cannot be 
artistically executed. Therefore the whole thing is achieved by contrast, 
namely, by an accidental concretion. And yet I ask everyone if from 
such a landscape he does not get the impression of a rural area in 
general, and if this category has not stayed with him from childhood. 
In the days of childhood, we had such enormous categories that they 
now almost make us dizzy, we clipped out of a piece of paper a man 
and a woman who were man and woman in general in a more rigorous 
sense than Adam and Eve were. A landscape artist, whether he strives 
for effect by faithful representation or by ideal reproduction, perhaps 
leaves the individual cold, whereas a print like that produces an inde-
scribable effect, since we do not know whether to laugh or to cry, and 
the whole effect depends upon the observer’s mood. (SKS 4:33 / R 158)
I am unaware of any extant Nürnberg print of “a landscape depicting a rural 
area in general.”14 The closest I have come, so far, to Kierkegaard’s exam-
ple is The Entombment from 1847, a mirror image copied from a German 
Nürnberg original, inspired by Raphael (figure 7). Note the template- like 
landscape in the background, where it is left to us, the observers, and our 
imagination, to create a landscape that we can see, feel, and smell. There are 
numerous references to Nürnberg prints in Kierkegaard’s writings, where, in 
accordance with the custom of the time, the word is used as a general des-
ignation of the German woodcuts, copperplate prints, and lithographs that 
increasingly flooded into the Danish market in the first half of the 1800s and 
dominated it from around 1840. These German prints originally came from, 
and hence were named after, Neuruppin and Nürnberg. Their most striking 
aspect is the colors, which children found appealing. Sometimes, the pictures 
are in reverse perspective, so that the figures step out of the surface instead of 
moving into the picture. The picture- signs, or those elements in the pictures 
that are rendered as abstractions, sometimes resembling pictographs, were 
easily replaceable. It was only necessary to cut the block a little (if it was a 
woodcut, as in this case), replace the poplars with a beech or pine tree, and 
voilà, a new location and new images would appear. The structural lines are 
rough and the paint appears to be slapped on and seems almost too bright. 
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The lack of shadowing contributes to flattening everything in this picture. 
There is no rounding— that is, no synesthetic dimension— to grasp and no 
space to enter. But also the relationship between image and imaged is uncer-
tain and left to us to determine.
The connoisseur’s appraising gaze, which admiringly absorbs the perfectly 
completed landscape painting, leaves the connoisseur cold. However, in the 
view of another of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, the Nürn-
berg print of “a landscape depicting a rural area in general” will “turn the 
observer’s gaze inward into himself” (SKS 7:328 / CUP 1:359), so that it is 
possible for the observer to “thrust him[self] away” (SKS 7:328 / CUP 1:359) 
and continue to work on the half- finished or unfinished “images.” With this 
pictorial approach, Kierkegaard in many ways anticipates what is today 
the common approach, which focuses on art’s performative or performing 
dimension. The German art critic Dorothea von Hantelmann’s poststructur-
alist and very inclusive definition of the concept is relevant to our purpose:
Figure 7. Laterally reversed copy of a German lithograph probably printed in Nürnberg ca. 
1830. The original source is Raphael, The Entombment, woodcut, 1507. Printed in Denmark 
by Th. Petersen, ca. 1847. V. E. Clausen, Copenhagen.
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The notion of performativity, as I relate to it, centers around the pos-
sibilities and limits of productivity— the ability to produce a meaning, 
to provide an experience or to create a situation. We all know, for 
example, the meaning of a door: you enter or leave a room through it. 
But asking about the performativity of this door points to the situa-
tion it produces, which might be integrative, segregative or exclusive. 
Or towards the actions that can take place with or through this 
door, like slamming it and thereby performing a certain culturally 
coded convention of arguing. So, in a nutshell, performativity leads 
us towards a situational understanding of culture, to a situational 
aesthetics.15
In art history, performativity theorists focus on the “in- between” between 
the observer and the object of analysis, where both the work’s significance 
and the observer’s subjectivity are created. Despite all differences, it is such a 
middle space and such a “situational aesthetic” that Kierkegaard projects in 
his alternative to the beautiful image.
Irony in Art as a Controlled Element versus Socratic or Romantic Irony
In his Master of Arts dissertation, The Concept of Irony (1841), Kierkegaard 
distinguishes between Romantic and controlled irony. He reminds us several 
times that K. W. F. Solger, one of the standard- bearers of German Romanti-
cism, in his Vorlesungen über Aesthetik (1829, Lectures on Aesthetics) and 
Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel (1826, Posthumous Writings and 
Correspondence), describes how any artistic creation must be ironic if it is to 
be art: “It has already been pointed out in the foregoing that in his lectures 
on esthetics Solger makes irony the condition for every artistic work” (SKS 
1:325 / CI 324). Kierkegaard does not refer to Solger as an example to be 
followed; quite the contrary. For Kierkegaard, Romantic irony is both specu-
lative and metaphysical.
Unfortunately, Solger does not distinguish between the individual art 
forms. One can ask oneself how an “irony” painting or picture from the 
1840s, when Naturalism dominated, would look. Are we referring to the way 
the painting or picture interprets its subject or to a figure that reflects upon its 
own form? I choose the latter option, as does Kierkegaard.
Let us take The Concept of Irony in reverse order and begin where Kierke-
gaard ends, the section in which he describes irony as a controlled element and 
the truth of irony. The irony described here is the irony that we should strive 
for. For Kierkegaard, irony is about our approach to actuality, but thereby 
also to ourselves. As a controlled element, irony “limits, finitizes, and circum-
scribes and thereby yields truth, actuality, content; it disciplines and punishes 
and thereby yields balance and consistency” (SKS 1:355 / CI 326). Irony as a 
controlled element is also “a guide” (SKS 1:355 / CI 327) and “the way” (SKS 
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1:356 / CI 327), a “way” that leads to “actuality” (SKS 1:354 / CI 325). As 
such, irony is closely related to doubt, for the way shown by irony is not “the 
way whereby someone fancying himself to have the achievement comes to 
possess it, but the way along which the achievement deserts him” (SKS 1:356 / 
CI 327– 28). The actuality Kierkegaard describes is the historical actuality of 
existence, where time is lived and people are born and die. Irony as a con-
trolled element makes people human (SKS 1:357 / CI 329), as it teaches us “to 
actualize actuality” (SKS 1:356 / CI 328). When irony constitutes a controlled 
element, it does not cause either the ironic or actuality to be carried away.
Fifth Appropriation: Napoleon Haunting His Grave
The Concept of Irony, which among other things seeks to describe the dif-
ference between Plato’s and Socrates’s uses of irony, is concerned with the 
contrast between the inner and the outer, being (or noumenon, in Kant’s 
sense of the term) and phenomenon. For Kierkegaard, furthermore, irony is 
determined as absolute negativity and, it can be said, “scoops out the ker-
nel” (SKS 1:106 / CI 45). The model for Kierkegaard’s “controlled irony” is 
Socratic irony. This is not surprising since Socrates plays a central role in all 
of Kierkegaard’s literary works and in his perception of the nature of philoso-
phy. A deeper understanding of Socratic irony, as Kierkegaard reads it, can be 
gained from familiarity with the trick picture he apparently had before him 
as he wrote. Socratic irony is like the picture’s “Napoleon” (the empty space 
between the trees; see figure 8), where “ ‘nothing’ becomes almost visible” 
(SKS 1:113 / CI 52), a negative picture:
The more Socrates tunneled under existence [Existentsen], the more 
deeply and inevitably each single remark had to gravitate toward an 
ironic totality, a spiritual condition that was infinitely bottomless, 
invisible, and indivisible. . . . Allow me to illustrate what I mean by 
a picture [Billede]. There is a work that represents Napoleon’s grave. 
Two tall trees shade the grave. There is nothing else to see in the 
work, and the unsophisticated observer sees nothing else. Between 
the two trees there is an empty space; as the eye follows the outline, 
suddenly Napoleon himself emerges from this nothing, and now it is 
impossible to have him disappear again. Once the eye has seen him, 
it goes on seeing him with an almost alarming necessity. So also with 
Socrates’ rejoinders. One hears his words in the same way one sees 
the trees; his words mean what they say, just as the trees are trees. 
There is not one single syllable that gives a hint of any other interpre-
tation, just as there is not one single line that suggests Napoleon, and 
yet this empty space, this nothing, is what hides that which is most 
important. (SKS 1:80– 81 / CI 19)
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The trick picture gives us an understanding not only of Kierkegaard’s per-
ception of Socratic irony, which reappears, reworked, in his diagnosis of 
controlled irony, but also of the manifestation of the relation between the 
dialogue partners that the controlled irony takes as its premise: co- acting, co- 
creating, producing, and, in brief, performing. If we transplant the traits and 
abilities of the trick picture, and the perception of the reception process that 
determines its design, there appears to be a relation between Kierkegaard’s 
opting for the popular pictorial culture and the controlled irony.
Romantic Irony— or a Controlled Ironic Approach 
to a Painting Loved by Romanticism
Kierkegaard more than hints at the relation between mimetic pictorial art 
and Romantic irony through an association he draws while working on 
his dissertation’s section on Plato. Unexpectedly, he suddenly draws a cop-
perplate into his discussion. With exquisite irony, he alludes to copperplate 
Figure 8. Anonymous, Napoleon Haunting His Grave, engraving, ca. 1820. Royal Library, 
Copenhagen.
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etchings in conjunction with a critique of Friedrich Ast’s book Platon’s 
Leben und Schriften (1816, Plato’s Life and Writings), in which Ast argues 
that Socrates’s defense is written neither by Plato nor by Socrates himself, 
but by someone unknown. Kierkegaard finds Ast’s viewpoint absurd and— 
(Romantically) ironic.
Sixth Appropriation: Raphael’s Sistine Madonna
This concerns a description of a presumably colored reproduction of Rapha-
el’s Sistine Madonna from 1512– 14 (figure 9), one of the the most popular 
icons of Kierkegaard’s time, reproduced, described, and copied over and over 
by artists both at home and abroad. The passage reads, “There is an etching 
of the ascension of the Madonna. In order to raise heaven as high as possible, 
there is drawn across the bottom a dark line, over which two angels peek up 
at her. Similarly, by quoting Ast’s words in the text, I shall elevate his words 
Figure 9. Raphael, The Sistine Madonna, oil on canvas, 270 × 201 cm., 1513– 14, 
Gemäldegalerie, Dresden.
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as high as possible, and in order to heighten his pathos even more, I shall 
draw a line over which at times irony’s roguish face will be allowed to peek” 
(SKS 1:146 / CI 90). The irony in relation to Ast is obvious in terms of the 
use of the etching and the repetition of the word “high” and images of height. 
Kierkegaard will “elevate his [Ast’s] words” as high as possible and in order 
to “heighten his pathos,” and so forth. It is also obvious when he turns the 
angels into “irony’s roguish face.” Kierkegaard’s treatment of the picture is, 
to put it diplomatically, quite unimpressed and creative.
The picture presents not the Madonna’s ascension but her appearance 
among us mortals. It would also be quite unfortunate if she were to rise to 
heaven with the Christ child before he could become an adult and a main 
protagonist in the New Testament. The painting is of the Madonna with 
child, and the two saints, Sixtus and Barbara. The figures stand on a bed of 
clouds and are framed by heavy curtains that are each pulled aside. Mary is 
descending from the heavenly skies and seems to continue her progress out of 
the picture, to enter the “actual” space in which the painting is hanging. This 
effect is due to the painting’s focal point, Mary’s left knee, which is bent as if 
she is walking. The attention of St. Sixtus and St. Barbara is on the faithful, 
who we imagine are standing in front of the balustrade raised at the lower 
edge of the picture. The two cherubs who are resting their arms on the bal-
ustrade are “within” or behind it, and thus in the picture’s imaginary space, 
which is in fine harmony with their nature. There, they appear now as angels 
and now as cupids— that is, as creatures on the cusp between immanence 
and transcendence. The tiara placed on the top of the balustrade functions 
as a visual and symbolic link between the “actual” Church of Rome and the 
imaginary, transcendent space.
Kierkegaard seems at play here, like a street urchin, and it seems unlikely 
that he imagined he was faced with a heavenly ascension. His use of this 
picture almost besmirches its iconic status and Christian significance. Even 
though Kierkegaard was not a great scholar of the classical art history tradi-
tion, this pictorial interpretation is governed by a (controlled) ironic view.
Postscript
One of the small aphorisms that introduces Either/Or and gives us a first 
taste of “A’s” psychological profile reads, “My life achievement amounts to 
nothing at all, a mood, a single color. My achievement resembles the paint-
ing by that artist who was supposed to paint the Israelites’ crossing of the 
Red Sea and to that end painted the entire wall red and explained that the 
Israelites had walked across and that the Egyptians were drowned” (SKS 
2:37 / EO 1:28). Many have sought to identify the picture for this diapsalma, 
which is based on Exodus 14:21– 31, but the solution is clear. According to 
the record of the auctioneer who sold his library, Kierkegaard owned a copy 
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of [Underlig og selsom] Historie om Tiile Ugelspegel (The Strange and Curi-
ous Story of Owlglass), from which the story originates.16 Uglspil (Owlglass) 
was so popular at that time that, in a Copenhagen entertainment magazine, 
people could read about “the most favorable moment for the painter [det 
gunstige øieblik for maleren],” the moment that made his task easy:
A prank by Owlglass is related, that is almost too witty for him. 
Owlglass pretended to be a painter, and offered his services to some 
monks who wished to have a wall painted in one of the rooms of 
their monastery. They bargained with him about this, and required 
him to paint the Red Sea that the Children of Israel crossed with dry 
feet, while the Pharaoh and all of his army were drowned. Owlglass 
took on this task, and got to work straight away, simply by covering 
the entire wall with red paint. After completing the work in less than 
half a day, he came to demand his payment. When the monks saw 
the work, they were not pleased, and the Father Superior complained 
that one could not see the Children of Israel crossing the Red Sea, 
and asked why they were omitted. “There is a good reason for that,” 
said Owlglass: “They have already crossed to the other side, so you 
Figure 10. Anonymous, Owlglass, woodcut, from the 1515 edition of Eulenspiegel. The 
woodcut is printed on the front page. Presumably published by Johannes Grüninger.
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cannot see them.” “But where are the Pharaoh and his riders?” asked 
the monks. “You cannot see them,” the painter replied, “because they 
are on the bottom of the sea.”17
If we juxtapose the diapsalma with this version of one of Owlglass’s pranks, 
we get a picture of “A”/Johannes!
Seventh Appropriation: Owlglass’s Owl and Mirror
Owlglass is often depicted with an owl in one hand and a mirror in the other, 
which is a literal visualization of his name (in High German, Eulenspiegel). 
Kierkegaard may have known of editions of the book in which the prankster 
Eulenspiegel is seen with owl and mirror in his hands (figure 10; Strassburg 
edition 1515, reprinted in 1885). He may have just played with the name. 
At any rate, “A” and Johannes the Seducer are incarnations of both images. 
The reflective “A”/Johannes is the owl and the constantly image- forming “A”/
Johannes is the mimetic mirror.
Notes
1. Elsewhere in his authorship, including the works published under his own 
name, there is reflection on sight and the interconnectedness of the Christian 
message and the way we look at our neighbor and at ourselves (compare Christ’s 
all- embracing look in Works of Love) and on its liberating potential to create 
new opportunity (compare, e.g., The Concept of Anxiety).
2. Lasse Horne Kjældgaard and Isak Winkel Holm have convincingly shown 
how Kierkegaard deliberately undermines the Lessing dictum with “animated 
tableaux” (my expression) that enroll movement and change in the linguistic met-
aphors. See Lasse Horne Kjældgaard, “Bevægelser og stillinger: Om det hvilende 
og det bevægelige i Kierkegaards tableauer” (Movements and Postures: On the 
Resting and Moving in Kierkegaard’s Tableaux), in Tableau: Det sublime øjeblik 
(Tableau: The Sublime Moment), ed. Elin Andersen and Karen Klitgaard Pov-
lsen (Aarhus: Klim, 2001), 177– 94; Isak Winkel Holm, “Unpregnant Moments,” 
unpublished paper presented at the international research- school seminar “Non- 
linear Narrative in Twentieth and Twenty- first Century Artistic Practices,” 
Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2008. However, these studies by 
Kjældgaard and Holm do not affect the thesis of my essay.
3. The myth was resuscitated around 1800 by the Romantics in Northern 
Europe and Denmark. Two paintings might illustrate this. In 1811 C. W. Eck-
ersberg painted Malerkunstens fødsel (The Birth of Painting). The painting is 
reproduced in Kasper Monrad and Peter Michael Hornung, C. W. Eckersberg: 
Dansk malerkunsts fader (C. W. Eckersberg: The Father of Danish Pictorial Art) 
(Copenhagen: Palle Fogtdal, 2005), 92. Around 1830, Heinrich Eddelien com-
pleted his painting Malerkunstens oprindelse (The Origin of Painting), Statens 
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Museum for Kunst (National Gallery of Denmark), Copenhagen. The painting is 
reproduced in Mogens Nykjær, Kundskabens billeder: Motiver i dansk kunst fra 
Eckersberg til Hammershøi (Images of Knowledge: Subjects in Danish Art from 
Eckersberg to Hammershøi) (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1991), 123, fig. 
64. I am implying not that Kierkegaard knew these paintings but rather that the 
myth was part and parcel of the horizon of the Romantics and their critics.
4. This blind track (!) in my interpretation of Pliny is inspired by Jacques Der-
rida, Mémoires d’aveugle: L’autoportrait et autres ruines (Paris: Réunion des 
musées nationaux, 1990), 54– 56; Memoirs of the Blind: The Self- Portrait and 
Other Ruins, trans. Pascale- Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993), 49– 51.
5. It is very hard to say which picture this actually concerns. There are countless 
depictions of Romeo and Juliet (paintings, graphics, book illustrations, theater 
posters, pictures celebrating illustrious actors and actresses playing the loving 
couple, bilderbogen, etc.). A review of the (German) works of Shakespeare owned 
by Kierkegaard (see ASKB) has not yielded any result. The work catalogued as 
ASKB 1882, namely, Vierzig Kunstblätter zu Shakespeare’s dramatischen Werken 
(in Stahl grawirt) (Forty Art Sheets to Shakespeare’s Dramatic Works [Engraved in 
Steel]) (Stuttgart, 1840), which does not register anywhere, must be Nachträge zu 
Shakspeare’s Werken von Schlegel und Tieck: mit 40 Stahlstichen zu Shakspeare’s 
Werken (Postscript to Shakespeare’s Works by Schlegel and Tieck: With Forty 
Engravings to Shakespeare’s Works), 4 vols., ed. Ernst Ortlepp (Stuttgart: L. J. 
Rieger, 1840). The only scene from Romeo and Juliet depicted in the Nachträge is 
the one that takes place in the burial vault, represented in outline. It has been sug-
gested by some (e.g., Howard and Edna Hong) that the lithograph Kierke gaard 
refers to is Ferdinand Piloty’s (1786– 1844) The Kiss; see SLW 703n129. The 
Hongs mention the picture without source and do not reproduce it. Fortunately, 
Eric Ziolkowski has followed up on their suggestion and referred me to his book 
The Literary Kierkegaard (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 
where he reproduces The Kiss as the frontispiece. It was originally reproduced 
in Shakespeare’s Romeo und Julia (Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet), ed. A. W. 
Schlegel (Berlin: G. Grote 1875), facing p. 75 (new edition 1889, facing p. 75). We 
have no knowledge of how this picture circulated in Kierkegaard’s lifetime. He 
might have encountered it in Copenhagen or Berlin— or he might not. Although 
it must be a conjecture that Kierkegaard is writing about exactly this picture, it 
perfectly fits his description and helps us understand how Kierkegaard enlivens 
and freezes his pictures because, to paraphrase Goethe, he looks with a touch-
ing eye and a seeing hand; see J. W. Goethe, Römische Elegien (Roman Elegies) 
(1788; Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1980), 6:93.
6. Kierkegaard is not alone in associating the picture with death. The family 
resemblance is also apparent from Blanchot, for example, and in a way that, 
notwithstanding all the differences, resembles Kierkegaard’s. For Blanchot the 
comparison serves to “de- ontologize” the picture; see Maurice Blanchot, “Les 
deux versions de l’imaginaire,” in L’Espace littéraíre (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 
345– 59; “The Two Versions of the Imaginary,” in The Space of Literature, trans. 
Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 254– 63.
7. The commentary in SKS K3:245 also states that in 1842 there were two 
“photo” studios in Copenhagen: the Austrian portrait painter Joseph Weninger’s 
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in Bredgade and M. Alstrup’s in a pavilion in Kongens Have. At the opening of 
Tivoli in 1844, one more studio was established. About this and the Bertel Thor-
valdsen daguerreotype portrait, see, e.g., Marie Louise Berner, Bertel Thorvaldsen: 
A Daguerreotype Portrait from 1840 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Press, 
2005).
8. See Mette Mortensen, “Kampen om ansigtet: Fotografi og identification” 
(The Battle Surrounding the Face: Photography and Identification), Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Copenhagen, 2006, 51. Balzac’s conceptions of the 
daguerreotype are developed in his novel from 1847, Le cousin Pons (Paris: Book-
ing International, 1993), 144. Felix Nadar in 1899 described Balzac’s attitudes 
toward daguerreotypes in Quand j’etais photographe (When I Was a Photogra-
pher) (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 9– 18.
9. There is a vast body of literature on the nature of photography as the bound-
ary between life and death, presence and absence. Here, reference is solely made 
to Roland Barthes’s now classic La chambre claire: Note sur la photographie 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1980); Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. 
Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); and to David Freedberg’s 
study of the fear of the vitalizing look, the “living” images, and the picture’s 
demonic powers, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of 
Response (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10. The parallels between Kierkegaard’s “making Regine an image,” as shown 
by the correspondence retained from the engagement period, and “A”/Johannes 
the Seducer are a trail I cannot pursue here.
11. See P.  F. A. Nitsch, Neues mythologisches Wörterbuch für studirende 
Jünglinge, angehende Künstler und jeden Gebildeten überhaupt (New Mytho-
logical Dictionary for Studying Young People, Future Artists and Every Educated 
Man), 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Leipzig: F. Fleischer, 1821), 1:310. Kierkegaard prob-
ably writes on the basis of the description alone. I have found the illustrations 
in Le pitture antiche d’Ercolano e contorni incise con qualche spiegazione (The 
Ancient Paintings of Herculaneum and Engraved Outlines with Some Expla-
nation), 5 vols. (Naples: Regia Stamperia, 1757– 79), 2 (1760): 91, 97 (plates 
14, 15). (The British Museum Catalog and WorldCat identify Ottavio Antonio 
Baiardi [1694– 1764] and Pasquale Carcani [1721– 83] as the editors of Le pitture 
antiche d’Ercolano.— Ed.) Unfortunately, the SKS commentary volume to Either/
Or includes only one of the ekphrasis’s two (model) pictures.
12. Kierkegaard’s indisputable fascination with children’s and folk art’s predi-
lection for the bright unmixed primary colors— red, yellow, and blue— might also 
be one of his many ways to get at Hegel. In his Aesthetics, Hegel writes about the 
choice of colors among “barbarians”: “Barbarians in general take their pleasure 
in simple and vivid colours like red and blue etc.” G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik, 3 vols. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986), 3:85; A 2:851. For 
Hegel, to bring forth the shimmer (das Schein) of live spirituality, the colors need 
to be mixed either on the palette or by using glazed colors that fuse with the 
refraction of light. As Hegel sees it, the use of primary colors symbolizes a bygone 
stage in the history of art and is a thing of the barbaric past.
13. Quite remarkably, we see how pictorial artists are concerned with folk art 
and its bright, glaring colors (often primary colors: blue, red, and yellow); with its 
resemblance to the synthesizing, flattened, and simplified expression of a child’s 
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drawing (how large is the most important, no matter how large in reality); and 
with the eye folk art has for materiality and texture— that is, for the visual and 
tactile rather than the intellectual. See Meyer Schapiro, “Courbet and Popular 
Imagery: An Essay on Realism and Naïveté,” in Modern Art: 19th and 20th Cen-
turies (London: Chatto and Windus, 1978), 47– 85. In Denmark, a professor at 
the Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, C. W. Eckersberg, in a popular engraved 
sheet, chooses a loud yellow to fill out a scene before a lottery booth. See Monrad 
and Hornung, C. W. Eckersberg (n. 3 above).
14. See also the essay by Martijn Boven in the present volume, where this same 
Nürnberg print is discussed as an example of kitsch.— Ed.
15. Quoted by Camilla Jalving, Værk som handling: Performativitet, kunst og 
metode (The Work of Art as Action: Performativity, Art and Method) (Copen-
hagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2011), 54. (See also the discussion of 
Kierkegaard and performativity in Boven’s essay in this volume.— Ed.)
16. Cf. ASKB 1469. The sales record does not identify any publisher or pub-
lishing house but does state that the book was probably published between 1812 
and 1842. The work is known in about twenty editions from the nineteenth 
century, of which a number are from the first half of the century. It is thus not 
possible to state which edition Kierkegaard used.
17. “The Most Favorable Moment for the Painter” (“Det gunstige Øieblik for 
Maleren”), Kiøbenhavns Moerskabsblad indeholdende Alvor og Skjemt (Copen-
hagen Amusement Magazine on Serious and Jesting Matters), no. 84 (1831): 335.
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Kierkegaard’s Concept of Inherited Sin
A Cinematic Illustration
Ronald M. Green
The doctrine of hereditary sin is not one of the more fashionable Christian 
teachings today. Modern people find it hard to believe that we can inherit sin 
and guilt from our ancestors all the way back to Adam and Eve, the parents 
of the human race. They find it even harder to believe that such sin can be 
transmitted from our forebears to us through sexual intercourse, as some 
classical Christian theologians have held.
Nevertheless, aspects of a doctrine of hereditary sin were strongly 
defended in the nineteenth century by Søren Kierkegaard. In what follows I 
want to do two things. First, I want to offer a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s 
position. This is developed in several of his writings, notably in sections of 
his early work Either/Or (1843) and his subsequent book The Concept of 
Anxiety (1844). Second, I want to provide a very modern illustration, and 
defense, of some of Kierkegaard’s key points. I will do this by looking closely 
at scenes from the 2010 Academy Award nominee for best foreign language 
film, Incendies, by the Quebec director Denis Villeneuve.1 Incendies (Fires) 
is based on an extraordinary play of the same title by the Lebanese play-
wright Wajdi Mouawad,2 but Villeneuve’s film version is a work of art in its 
own right.
Here I must issue a spoiler alert. Incendies is a surprising, shocking film. 
As I discuss scenes from the film, I am going to give away some of these sur-
prises, so if you wish to see the film in its entirety, please stop reading now 
and return after viewing the film.
Let me begin by summarizing the main ideas conveyed by the penetrating 
analyses of hereditary sin and guilt by several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms.3
First, there is the idea that none of us is born without a deep relation-
ship to our past. Although we are free to choose our paths in life, we do 
not do so in a vacuum. We are “situated freedoms,” unavoidably shaped by 
the deeds of those who went before us: our parents, other family members, 
our communities, even the whole human race. As Vigilius Haufniensis, the 
pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety, puts it, “Each individual 
begins in an historical nexus” (SKS 4:376 / CA 73).4 Vanessa Rumble is thus 
right when she says of Kierkegaard, “The ‘father of existentialism,’ while 
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affirming the importance of the individual’s decisions, not only dismissed the 
notion of a liberum arbitrium but also displayed an overweening interest in 
those aspects of personality and milieu which may prove fateful for the indi-
vidual.”5 Drawing on an observation by Gregor Malantschuk, Rumble adds, 
“The task facing humans is not to withdraw themselves from the historically 
determined conditions of heredity or environment but somehow to accept 
those conditions in freedom and thus bring them under the domain of human 
responsibility.”6
This understanding is more intensively expressed in Either/Or by Judge 
William, one of the work’s leading figures, who urges his protégé, an aes-
thetically inclined young man, to abandon his drifting, moody existence and 
“choose himself.” But even as the judge calls the young man to exercise his 
freedom to define a life course, he reminds him that he is not absolutely free 
to become the person he would like to be. Each of us inherits from our fore-
bears many things that define us and condition our choice. Let me quote the 
judge as he describes someone choosing himself:
Now he discovers that the self he chooses has a boundless multi-
plicity within itself inasmuch as it has a history, a history in which 
he acknowledges identity with himself. This history is of a different 
kind, for in this history he stands in relation to other individuals 
in the race and to the whole race, and this history contains painful 
things, and yet he is the person he is only through this history. That 
is why it takes courage to choose oneself, for at the same time as he 
seems to be isolating himself most radically he is most radically sink-
ing himself into the root by which he is bound up with the whole. 
(SKS 3:207 / EO 2:216)
For the judge, this painful element in the choice of oneself as a situated being 
stems from the fact that we are in some ways implicated in and responsible 
for the deeds of our parents and ancestors. We benefit from their courage 
and their achievements, but we also enjoy the fruits of their misdeeds and 
wrongful acts. We cannot ignore the misdeeds of those before us because 
those misdeeds, as well as their positive accomplishments, have made us what 
we are. Thus, we must become aware of their misdeeds and be prepared to 
accept some measure of responsibility for them. Using religious terminology, 
Judge William makes this point as he continues to describe the process by 
which a person chooses himself:
When the passion of freedom is aroused in him . . . he chooses him-
self and struggles for this possession as for his salvation, and it is his 
salvation. He can give up nothing of all this, not the most painful, not 
the hardest, and yet the expression for this struggle, for this acquir-
ing, is— repentance. He repents himself back into himself, back into 
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the family, back into the race, until he finds himself in God. Only on 
this condition can he choose himself. . . . 
And even though it was the father’s guilt that was passed on to 
the son by inheritance, he repents of this, too, for only in this way 
can he choose himself, choose himself absolutely. (SKS 3:207– 8 / EO 
2:216–17)
What Judge William is trying to say here about participating in our parents’ 
and forebears’ guilt and repenting for their sins is given even more focused 
attention in a long essay in the first part of Either/Or, an essay ostensibly 
written by another one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors, the aesthete 
“A.” This essay is entitled “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the 
Tragic in Modern Drama” (SKS 2:137– 62 / EO 1:137–64).
The essay focuses largely on Sophocles’s drama Antigone. To the heroine 
of that drama, whom he terms the “Greek” Antigone, “A” juxtaposes a hero-
ine shaped by Christian culture. He calls this second heroine the “modern” 
Antigone. The Greek Antigone is a tragic figure. She belongs to an ill- fated 
lineage, being the fruit of the union of Oedipus and his mother Jocasta, 
whom Oedipus has wed after killing his father. Because of Antigone’s ances-
tors’ deeds and her own choices, she is fated to sorrow and suffer. In “A’s” 
words, the Greek Antigone suffers partly as a result of her father’s guilt, but 
for her this guilt is an “external fact.” She is not personally involved with it. It 
is, as “A” interjects in Latin, “quod non volvit in pectore [something she does 
not turn over in her heart]” (SKS 2:159 / EO 1:160).
“But for our [modern] Antigone,” the essay writer continues, “it is dif-
ferent.” Oedipus is dead, but “even when he was alive, Antigone knew this 
[family] secret but did not have the courage to confide in her father. By her 
father’s death, she is deprived of the only means of being liberated from her 
secret” (SKS 2:159 / EO 1:161). The essayist continues, “She loves her father 
with all her soul, and this love draws her out of herself into her father’s guilt. 
As the fruit of such a love, she feels alien to humankind. She feels her guilt 
the more she loves her father; only with him can she find rest; as equally 
guilty, they would sorrow with each other” (SKS 2:161 / EO 1:161). Some 
Kierkegaard scholars may see here shadows of Kierkegaard’s own relation to 
the sexual transgressions of his father. But we need not go into Kierkegaard’s 
biography to appreciate his essayist’s point: parents and children are con-
nected, through guilt and blame. Emotionally and morally charged silences 
permeate their relationships.
None of this means that we are fated or determined in our life choices 
by our familial inheritances. Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms avoid 
any deterministic interpretation of the classic Christian idea of inher-
ited sin, and he rejects the idea that we are predestined to sin (SKS 
4:332  / CA 62). Adam and Eve’s free choice of sin may be the prototype 
of all sinning, “the first sin” (SKS 4:297– 306  / CA 25– 34), but each of us 
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participates in the sinfulness of our forebears only by freely replicating their 
choices.
Kierkegaard’s third and final point about hereditary sin is that it is inti-
mately connected with our nature as sexual beings. Sexuality evidences our 
tense positioning between embodiment and finite creatureliness on the one 
hand, and our transcendent spiritual possibilities on the other. In The Con-
cept of Anxiety, Vigilius Haufniensis tells us that sexuality and procreation 
express the tension between the finite and transcendent aspects of our natures, 
between the “physical” and “psychical” components of our being. The chal-
lenge of “spirit” is to unite these, but this challenge is a source of anxiety, and 
anxiety furnishes the opportunity for sin. “Anxiety,” says Vigilius Haufnien-
sis, “is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit 
the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of 
finiteness to support itself” (SKS 4:331 / CA 61).
Vigilius Haufniensis is clear that sensuousness and sexuality per se are not 
sinful: “Sensuousness is not sinfulness but an unexplained riddle that causes 
anxiety” (SKS 4:335 / CA 65). While he says that conception and childbirth 
are moments “furthest away” from spirit, Kierkegaard is not repeating the 
centuries- old Christian disparagement of sex. His point instead is that human 
physical existence, which sexuality epitomizes, creates the existential tension 
that, with anxiety as its first expression, provides the ground for the free but 
wrongful choices that are sin.
Drawing on and developing Kierkegaard’s insights, we can see that sexuality 
is a realm where anxiety can easily become sinfulness through the use of other 
persons, where love can lie close to cruelty, where gender roles can become an 
excuse for domination or self- abandonment, and where our most private and 
intimate acts express themselves concretely in the creation of another human 
being. No wonder, then, that hereditary sin as the sin of family lines most read-
ily evidences itself in connection with our sexual and gendered lives.
I have launched a barrage of difficult and challenging ideas. I could con-
tinue developing each of them, but I want to devote the remainder of this 
discussion to intensively illustrating their meaning by exploring their pres-
ence in the film Incendies.
I should note that it is entirely fitting that a film be used to illustrate 
Kierkegaard’s ideas. Kierkegaard was a pioneer in the use of fictional materi-
als, including operas, plays, and novels, for the development of philosophical 
and theological ideas. The first part of Either/Or offers four extended essays 
dealing with fictional or theatrical pieces: “The Immediate Erotic Stages or 
the Musical Erotic,” which focuses on Mozart’s Don Giovanni; “The First 
Love,” a treatment of Scribe’s play of the same name; “Silhouettes,” which 
deals with several different fictional pieces, including Goethe’s Faust; and 
our present concern, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic 
in Modern Drama.” At a deeper level, many of Kierkegaard’s writings, from 
“The Seducer’s Diary” in Either/Or to the lengthy Stages on Life’s Way, have 
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a deliberate fictional or theatrical quality, while other works, such as Rep-
etition, actively muse about the meaning of theater for human existence.7 
Kierkegaard was a thinker for whom fiction was often a medium for dense 
philosophical and religious reflection. Indeed, this is one of the more distin-
guishing features of his authorship that he handed on to later existentialist 
writers such as Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus. If Kierkegaard were alive today, 
there is no doubt in my mind that he would be entranced with contempo-
rary cinema and that Incendies, if he viewed it, would be among the creative 
works that would draw his interest.
Before turning to Incendies, let me briefly recapitulate the three major 
points that Kierkegaard’s writings make about hereditary sin. One is the idea 
that we are situated freedoms. Though we are always free to shape our own 
destiny, in choosing ourselves we are inevitably influenced by our past and 
by the choices of those who went before us. Second, we participate in and 
are responsible for the deeds and misdeeds of our forebears. In choosing our-
selves, therefore, we must acknowledge and repent for the wrongs they have 
done. Third and finally, our moral and psychological ties to our parents and 
forebears are unavoidably intertwined with sexuality. Although sexuality is 
not itself sinful, it is a domain that expresses the deep tensions in our physical 
and psychical nature. Our forebears’ life choices were intensively expressed 
in their sexual conduct and their gendered self- understandings. We are the 
result of that conduct and those self- understandings, which we are prone to 
replicate in our own sexual choices and gendered behaviors.
Now, Incendies.
The film begins with four central characters. The first is Nawal Marwan, 
an aging woman who is an immigrant to Montreal from an unnamed Middle 
Eastern nation (based on Lebanon) and who has worked as a secretary in a 
notary’s office. The next two are her two adult children, the twins Jeanne and 
Simon. Finally there is the notary Jean Lebel, Nawal’s employer and fam-
ily friend. In French- speaking cultures like Quebec, notaries are almost the 
equivalent of lawyers.8
As the film begins, Nawal visits a public swimming pool with Jeanne. 
When Jeanne emerges from the pool, she finds her mother seated in a chair, 
catatonic. Nawal’s apparent stroke soon leads to her death, but before dying 
she manages to dictate a will to her employer and friend, Jean Lebel.
Lebel summons Jeanne and Simon to his office to read them their mother’s 
will. The will begins with Nawal’s request that she be buried naked, face 
down, with no prayers and no name on the stone marking her grave. “No 
epitaph,” she says, “for those who don’t keep their promises.” The will con-
tinues with her further requests.
Lebel hands the twins two sealed envelopes. He explains that one is to be 
delivered to their father, whom the twins up to then believed had died long 
ago in their mother’s home country. The second is to be delivered to their 
brother. They never knew that they had another sibling.
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From its start, the film keeps shifting between the present- day world of 
Nawal’s two children as they try to fulfill their mother’s strange requests and 
the events of Nawal’s youth in the tumultuous civil war in her home country 
during the 1970s.
After Lebel reads the conditions of Nawal’s will to the twins, an angry 
Simon stalks out, declaring, “I’ll bury my mother normally. For once in her 
life she’ll have acted normally. End of discussion.” As Jeanne regards her 
mother’s youthful photo in an old passport that was among her papers, Lebel 
tells her, “I know it’s very unusual. But your mother wasn’t crazy, Jeanne.”
Outside in the street Simon continues fulminating. He quips, “We’re a 
big family now. She ever mention a dog? Big families always have a dog. Do 
we have to find it now, too?” His mother, he says, is “fucking crazy,” and he 
wants nothing to do with her request. He will talk to Lebel about burying 
her normally. “You feel guilty about everything,” he tells Jeanne. “I don’t feel 
guilty.” Jeanne shouts back, “Do you realize what we just heard?” Simon 
replies, “She’s gone, Christ! It’s over. Peace at last.” Angrily kicking the side 
of his pickup truck, he shouts, “I feel so fucking peaceful.” Throughout the 
film, unless pressed, Simon repeatedly resists cooperating with his sister in 
this quest.
The film now shifts back in time to the unnamed Middle Eastern country 
in late 1969 and to a rocky, tree- marked hillside beneath a small Christian 
village. A young Nawal runs to meet her lover, a Muslim (perhaps Palestin-
ian) refugee, named Wahab, but their meeting is abruptly interrupted by two 
of Nawal’s brothers. One shoots Wahab dead and is about to shoot Nawal 
for “staining” the family honor by being with a Muslim, when their grand-
mother’s voice interrupts from the village to save Nawal’s life.
Back in the house Nawal reveals to her grandmother that she is pregnant. 
The grandmother wails that Nawal has cast the family into “blackness.” She 
asks Nawal to promise that after the child is born, she will leave the village 
and get an education in order to escape their condition of misery.
Months later, Nawal delivers the child. She watches as her grandmother 
tattoos three small spots, one on top of the other, on the boy’s heel. Just 
before the child is taken away from her to an orphanage, Nawal holds him 
and says, “I will find you again one day, I promise you, my love.”
Nawal leaves for studies in Daresh (a fictional city in the north of the 
country), where she has an uncle who runs a progressive newspaper.
The film shifts back to today. Jeanne travels to Daresh, carrying a photo 
from Nawal’s university years. Writing on the wall behind Nawal in the 
photo permits an older professor to identify it as taken at Kfar Ryat, a prison 
“in the south.”
The scene shifts back again to the events of what we can presume to be 
the Lebanese civil war that raged for fifteen years beginning in the mid- 
1970s. We see Nawal as a university student. At the start of a bloody conflict 
between right- wing Christian Nationalist militias and Muslim refugees in the 
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south, the militias shut down the university. Although Nawal is a Christian, 
she opposes the war.
Nawal is now desperate to find her son. She journeys south, negotiating 
roadblocks, hitchhiking, and proceeding on foot to the orphanage of Kfar 
Khout, where her son had been sent, but she finds it burned to the ground, 
the children gone, perhaps taken to a Muslim refugee camp farther south. 
Concealing the cross she wears on a necklace and donning a shawl to cover 
her head like a Muslim woman, Nawal boards a southbound bus. The scene 
that follows gives the film its name.
Boarding the bus, Nawal seats herself across from a young mother who is 
holding her child in her lap. Nawal falls asleep, only to be awakened when the 
bus is stopped by a contingent of Christian militia. When the driver tries to 
persuade them to let the bus continue he is shot dead and a volley of bullets 
riddles the bus, killing many of the passengers. Amid the bodies, Nawal and 
the young Muslim woman and her child cower on the floor. When a militiaman 
climbs to the top of the bus and begins pouring gasoline through the ceiling 
hatches, a terrified Nawal crawls to the door, holds out her cross and cries, “I’m 
Christian, I’m Christian.” A militiaman signals her to come out. Looking back, 
she sees the Muslim mother and her child at the bus door. She turns, and after 
an instant in which the two women exchange a glance, she takes the child from 
the woman’s arms. But the child won’t cooperate. As Nawal runs from the 
bus, the child wriggles in her arms and, looking backward, screams “Mama, 
Mama.” A militiaman wrenches the child from Nawal, and as the child runs 
back to the bus she is felled by a single bullet. Another volley aimed at the bus 
causes it to burst into flames. The scene closes when the militiamen drive away, 
and a stunned Nawal, on her hands and knees, stares at the conflagration.
We shift back to the present. Jeanne locates her mother’s childhood vil-
lage. Meeting with female relatives to explain her visit, she identifies herself 
as the daughter of Nawal Marwan and is abruptly told that she is not wel-
come there.
Back amid the civil war, Nawal continues her search for her son. Travel-
ing south to the Muslim refugee camp, she finds nothing but devastation and 
pools of blood. Traumatized by the vicious behavior of the Christian militias 
she has witnessed, she offers her assistance to a Muslim warlord, Chamsed-
dine, explaining to one of his aides that she has abandoned her previous 
pacifist position and wants to teach her enemy, the Christian Nationalists, 
what life has taught her. She adds that she has “nothing to lose.”
At Chamseddine’s behest, Nawal gains access to the family of the leader 
of the Christian Nationalist movement by serving as a French tutor for his 
children. Concealing a gun in her briefcase, she assassinates him. Brutally 
dragged off to the Kfar Ryat prison, she undergoes fifteen years of torture at 
the hands of her coreligionists.
Back in the present, Jeanne, with her mother’s photo in hand, travels to 
Kfar Ryat. No one at the prison recognizes the woman in the photo, but 
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Jeanne is directed to an elderly custodian in a hillside grade school not far 
away. She shows him the picture, but he remains silent. When she tells him 
that the woman in the picture is her mother, he speaks: “She is ‘La femme qui 
chante’ [the Woman Who Sings], ‘Number 72.’ ”
The custodian explains that he had watched this woman for thirteen of her 
fifteen years in prison. He says that they did everything to break her, but she 
looked them straight in the eye and “never bent.” Finally, they sent in Abou 
Tarek, a specialist in torture. He repeatedly tortured and raped her. Nawal 
became pregnant by him, and after giving birth she was released. The jani-
tor says that the midwife who delivered Nawal now lives in Daresh. Jeanne 
phones Simon in Montreal, insisting that he join her now in the search for 
their brother, this child of rape, and Simon reluctantly agrees. Lebel joins him.
Along with Lebel and a local notary friend who serves as translator, the 
twins visit the hospital where the midwife lies gravely ill. She speaks in Ara-
bic, only part of which is translated. The scene is one of the more remarkable 
ones in the film. The midwife is awakened. A nurse introduces them as com-
ing from Canada and as the children of Nawal Marwan. The midwife pulls 
herself up in the bed, excitedly gestures to the twins to come to her, and 
repeatedly calls out to them, “Sarwan, Janaan, Alhamdulillah [Thank God]!” 
Not comprehending, Simon says, “Madame, we’re looking for the child she 
had in jail, can you help us?” The midwife continues her excited talking as the 
nurse translates. “She worked in Kfar Ryat prison. She assisted the Woman 
Who Sings during her delivery. She safeguarded the babies, and returned 
them to her on her release.” The scene ends with the midwife once again 
reaching out to Jeanne and Simon, crying “Sarwan! Janaan!” as the nurse, 
with the camera on the stunned faces of Simon and Jeanne, adds, “Nawal 
Marwan had twins.”
Simon and Jeanne have learned that they are the offspring of torture and 
rape and that their father is the torturer Abou Tarek. But they still don’t 
know who their brother is and what has become of him. At Label’s urging 
they continue their search. The Lebanese notary has found records indicating 
that a child was born to Nawal in May 1970 and was taken to the orphanage 
of Kfar Khout, which was burned down by the Muslim warlord Chamsed-
dine. The child was given the name Nihad of May. The notary believes that 
Chamseddine may know what happened to the boy. In scenes from those 
years, we learn that Nihad was raised by the warlord’s men and during the 
war became a pitiless sniper, often killing other children.
Because the world to the south is so patriarchal, it is now up to Simon 
to take the lead. He must travel to a Muslim refugee camp in search of his 
brother. He is finally taken, blindfolded, to a meeting with the aged warlord 
Chamseddine.
The warlord confirms that he had spared Nihad and the other Christian 
children when, after a revenge attack on the Christian foes, he burned down 
the orphanage of Kfar Khout. He had raised Nihad to be a fighter in their 
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cause, and Nihad became a “fou de guerre,” crazed with war. Above all, 
Nihad wanted to find his mother, at one point offering to become a martyr 
in the hope that his mother would see his picture on walls across the country. 
Chamseddine refused this request. When “the enemy” invaded the country, 
Nihad was captured, but only after killing seven of the foes. He was turned 
once again and sent to the Kfar Ryat prison— as a torturer. Simon asks, “With 
my father?” “No,” Chamseddine replies, “he didn’t work with Abou Tarek, 
your father.” As the camera moves from the face- to- face exchange of the 
two men to scan a dark and twisted forest scene, Chamseddine’s voice- over 
explanation continues. “When he became a torturer, your brother changed 
names. He became Abou Tarek. Nihad of May is Abou Tarek.” Chamseddine 
concludes by saying that Abou Tarek eventually moved to Canada, where he 
is living under the name of Nihad Harmanni.
Put yourself for a moment in the shoes of either Jeanne or Simon. They 
have learned that they are not only the fruit of rape and torture, but of incest. 
Like Antigone, they are the offspring of a union between their mother and 
her own son.9
We return to the public swimming pool in Montreal prior to Nawal’s stroke. 
We see Nawal swimming to the edge of the pool. A man’s heel looms before 
her. On it is a tattoo with three rising dots, the same tattoo inscribed on the 
heel of her infant child. Climbing out of the pool, she approaches the man she 
knows is her son. He is Abou Tarek, her torturer. This identification— or, as 
Aristotle might say regarding Greek tragedy, this recognition (anagnorisis)— 
causes the stroke and Nawal’s death, with which the film began.
So here we have the very “modern tragedy” of which Kierkegaard speaks. 
The twins issue from a primal deed of incest and violence. This misdeed 
hangs like a dark cloud over their present. But unlike the Greek Antigone, 
who merely suffers her fate and sorrows over it, the twins, like Kierkegaard’s 
“modern Antigone,” must regard themselves as culpably involved, as some-
how tragically complicit in this dreadful family history.
Consider. The twins know that they bear within them— in their blood and 
DNA— traits of their torturer father. Here we see a literal sharing of family 
characteristics that can be a source of profound psychological discomfort 
and anxiety. To what extent, for example, are Simon’s truculence, his anger 
at his mother, and his resistance to respecting her will a continuation of the 
misogynistic brutality of his biological father? Although neither Simon nor 
Jeanne can be blamed for their inherited characteristics, these characteris-
tics are a source of psychological unease— the anxiety of which Kierkegaard 
speaks— and they become a source of guilt if they are allowed to shape an 
individual’s choices.
And then there are the behaviors and choices for which the twins must 
clearly feel both responsibility and guilt. To what extent is their ignorance 
about their mother’s past a wrongful ignorance? Did they ever ask her about 
her past? Were they even interested? All their lives, the twins relied on and 
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took for granted their mother’s love, without imagining, without even think-
ing to suspect the agony that their very presence in the world may have 
caused her. And now Nawal is dead, beyond any solace they might offer her, 
beyond any plea they might make for understanding or forgiveness. As is true 
in the case of Kierkegaard’s modern Antigone, culpable silence permeates this 
family drama. Compared to the Greek Antigone, the twins’ sorrow is less, but 
their pain is greater. It is a pain sharpened by their own willed involvement 
and by a family history that looks back to an unpremeditated incestuous act 
and a willed history of torture and rape.
Incendies, of course, depicts an extreme situation. But in some ways, it 
also depicts the universal human condition. Its background is the Christian- 
Muslim violence of Lebanon’s civil war and the Middle East in general, 
where groups of ethnically similar people— literally brothers and sisters, 
mothers and fathers— have tortured, raped, and slaughtered one another for 
generations. Abou Tarek’s crime, and Nawal’s experience, are our human 
experience. We must all ask to what extent, by accepting, affirming, and 
sexually reproducing our identities within warring families, ethnicities, and 
communities, we are complicit in the crimes of our ancestors. This, I think, is 
one of Kierkegaard’s basic points in his exploration of hereditary sin.
But it is not Kierkegaard’s final point. Kierkegaard does not believe that sin 
is the last word on our human condition. That last word is love: our love for 
one another and God’s love for us despite our sinfulness. In a journal entry of 
February 16, 1839, Kierkegaard writes, “Fear and trembling . . . is [sic] not the 
primus motor [the prime mover or primary driving force] in the Chr. [Chris-
tian] life.” That primary force, he says, is love (SKS 18:14, EE:25 / KJN 2:9).
This, too, is the message of Incendies. I want to direct attention to the very 
end of the film. The twins have located their father- brother, Nihad Harmanni, 
in Montreal, where he is working at a menial job. They approach him on 
the street outside his apartment and hand him an envelope containing both 
letters.
Harmanni retreats into the hall of the building and opens the first letter. 
It begins, “I’m shaking as I write. I recognized you. You didn’t recognize me. 
It’s magnificent, a miracle. I am your number 72.” The letter continues, “Our 
children will deliver this. You won’t recognize them for they are beautiful, but 
they know who you are.” Harmanni runs out to the street, but the twins are 
gone. Returning to the hallway he continues reading. “Through them, I want 
to tell you that you are still alive. Soon you’ll turn silent . . . I know. For all 
are silent before the truth. Signed, Whore 72.”
Harmanni retreats to the privacy of his apartment. Hands shaking, he 
opens the second letter:
I speak to the son, not to the torturer. Whatever happens, I’ll always 
love you, I promised you that when you were born, my son. Whatever 
happens, I’ll always love you. I looked for you all my life. I found 
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you. You couldn’t recognize me. You’ve a tattoo on your right heel. I 
saw it. I recognized you. You are beautiful. I wrap you in tenderness, 
my love. Take solace, for nothing means more than being together. 
You were born of love. So your brother and sister were born of love, 
too. Nothing means more than being together. Your mother, Nawal 
Marwan, Prisoner No. 72.
The scene now shifts to Lebel’s office, where the notary informs the twins 
of their mother’s wish now that “the silence will be broken, a promise kept,” 
that a stone be placed on her grave and on it her name engraved in the sun. 
He hands the twins a letter addressed to them: “My loves, where does your 
story begin? At your birth? If so, it begins in horror. At the birth of your 
father? Then it begins in a great love story. But I say your story begins with a 
promise to break the chain of anger. Thanks to you, today I have finally kept 
it. The chain is broken. Finally I can take the time to cradle you, to gently sing 
a lullaby to console you. Nothing means more than being together. I love you. 
Your mother, Nawal.”
As the final music of the film sounds, we see a graveyard and Nawal’s 
stone. Standing before it, head bowed, is Harmanni/Abou Tarek.
“Nothing means more than being together.”
This remark that weaves throughout the film is Nawal’s reply to the brutal 
fratricide that scarred her life and the lives of those before her for count-
less generations. She tells her children, “Your story begins with a promise to 
break the chain of anger.” That chain is broken by a mother’s love.
I think Kierkegaard understood this. For him, as for this film, hereditary 
sin is only the first part of the human story. The full story includes and is 
concluded by God’s love, the overarching and unconditional love of which a 
mother’s love is an expression.
It may seem odd to bring Kierkegaard’s religious sensibility into connec-
tion with the themes of Incendies, because on the surface Incendies does 
not seem to be a religious film at all. The primary role religion plays in the 
narrative is as a source of hatred and division. However, one moment in the 
film suggests something else. As Nawal takes her seat in the bus in the scene 
leading to the conflagration that gives the movie its name, she looks across 
the aisle to the mother and to the child whose life she ultimately fails to 
save. The Muslim woman wears a diaphanous headscarf. Cradling the child 
against her bosom, the image is that of a traditional portrait of the Madonna. 
The film thus signals the religious importance of maternal love. It is precisely 
here that we find the unconditional and unwavering love that Christian faith 
always attributed to God, to God’s son, and to Mary, the mother of God. 
Remarkably, the Maronite (Lebanese) Christian Church to which Nawal pre-
sumably belongs has always claimed a special devotion to Mary, who is also 
the patron saint of Lebanon.10 Thus, religiously understood, maternal love 
permeates Incendies. It can even be said that Nawal Marwan is the modern 
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suffering Madonna of her own Christian tradition. (In tragic counterpoint, 
a Christian militiaman who sprays the bus with gunfire and sets it alight is 
shown to bear a small iconic portrait of Mary on the stock of his gun.)11
Of course, Kierkegaard as a Lutheran had little interest in the importance 
of Marian devotion, and, as a nineteenth- century male, he also had as little 
regard for the religious or spiritual significance of women and women’s expe-
rience. In a journal entry, he explicitly rejects maternal love as a suitable 
expression of selfless Christian love. “Maternal love,” he states, “is simply 
self- love raised to a higher power, and thus the animals also have it.” At the 
same time, however, he adds that maternal love has qualities that render it a 
“beautiful metaphor” for divine love (SKS 22:192, NB12:92, n.d. 1849 / KJN 
6:192). In Works of Love, he comments on the “strength” of maternal love 
and its willingness to “endure all things” for the beloved child (SKS 9:213 / 
WL 221).
Understanding maternal love not as Christian love per se, which for 
Kierkegaard always exhibits selflessness, but as a “figure” or metaphor for 
God’s love allows us to value a mother’s intense and unconditional bonding 
with her child at birth, as is the case for Nawal. Certainly, Nawal’s love for 
her child is the force that breaks the cycle of hatred and violence. Thus, close 
attention to Incendies may help us update and sharpen Kierkegaard’s own 
accounts of hereditary sin. If sexuality and procreation can be an impor-
tant medium for perpetuating and accentuating human sin, they also provide 
us unique insights into the possibility of overcoming sin through uncondi-
tional love.
Kierkegaard’s writings and this remarkable film are explorations of the 
ways in which, as embodied, familial, and sexual beings, we alienate and 
mutilate one another across generations. However, both the film and Kierke-
gaard’s writings also point to the spiritual resources and insights that we must 
call on to break the chain of human anger and mutual destruction. Above all, 
they point to the understanding that we are not foes but members of one 
family; not hostile strangers, but brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers.
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The Moravian Origins of Kierkegaard’s 
and Blake’s Socratic Literature
James Rovira
Alastair Hannay asserts in his introduction to Kierkegaard and Philosophy, 
“Not everyone looks for philosophy in Kierkegaard, let alone arguments. 
And if they do look, especially if they are philosophers like me trained in 
the Anglo- American analytic tradition, they will be hard put to find either.”1 
Kierkegaard’s “psychological acuity” and “huge literary talent” are to blame 
in Hannay’s account, as he wryly apologizes for discussing Kierkegaard in a 
philosophical context before explaining his own project. Hannay’s difficulties 
originate of course in the demands of the analytic tradition, for Kierkegaard’s 
literary qualities come from the Socratic nature of his philosophical task, 
which favors dialogic contemplation of significant questions over the system-
atic, discursive presentation of conceptual truths. More advanced forms of 
a Socratic methodology represent philosophical points of view in characters 
who embody them, which requires not only dialogue but character develop-
ment as well. This essay attempts to illuminate the significance of the literary 
qualities of Kierkegaard’s authorship by comparing him to the English poet 
and printmaker William Blake (1757– 1827), who was similarly engaged in 
a Socratic project, and then demonstrates how their view of Socrates was 
particularly inflected by Moravianism through Zinzendorf. This compari-
son of both authors’ approach to Socrates via their Moravian backgrounds 
accounts for many details of their deeply ambivalent relationships both with 
Plato’s works and with their own state churches.
Kierkegaard’s books (as opposed to his letters or journals and papers) are 
typically divided into two groups: works that he signed with his own name, 
such as Concept of Irony and Works of Love, and works attributed to pseu-
donyms, such as Either/Or, Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Sickness unto Death, Repetition, and 
Fear and Trembling. These pseudonymous works are conceptually sophis-
ticated and often linguistically dense prose considerations of philosophical 
subjects, so it may seem odd to refer to them as “literature” rather than “phi-
losophy.” However, Kierkegaard himself very often referred to these works as 
forming his “poetic” authorship, primarily because he does not identify him-
self as their author. Employing an older definition of “poetic” that is closer in 
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meaning to the word “fictional” today, he presents himself instead as having 
created fictional characters representing different points of view, and these 
fictional characters are the authors of these works. And since later works 
draw from, critique, and develop ideas in earlier works, all of them together 
form an extensive Socratic dialogue in which different characters are speak-
ing to one another, but only one of them is Kierkegaard. It is in this sense that 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship might be thought of as “literature” 
comparable to the poetry and mythology of Blake, a point I will develop in 
more detail.
In addition to sharing literary form, the two authors shared literary influ-
ence. Any elaboration of Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s shared intellectual history 
could emphasize Kierkegaard’s engagement with European Romanticism in 
general and English Romanticism particularly, which may well have included 
Blake. Blake could not have been familiar with Kierkegaard, who had only 
turned fourteen the year of Blake’s death, but Crabb Robinson’s brief essay 
about Blake, accompanied by a selection of Blake’s poetry, had been avail-
able to German audiences since 1811. Unfortunately, there is no indication 
in Kierkegaard’s writings that he was familiar with Blake’s works. He seems 
not to have encountered Robinson’s translation during his time in Germany, 
or if he did, it did not make enough of an impression for him to comment 
on it. Kierkegaard had read Shakespeare, Byron, Shelley, and Edward Young 
in German translations, the last being particularly significant because Blake 
illustrated an edition of Young’s Night Thoughts, so Kierkegaard did find 
British literature appealing and fertile. The figure of Socrates and the writings 
of Plato are, however, much more important to both Blake and Kierkegaard 
than were any of Blake’s Romantic contemporaries or literary predecessors.
Blake and Kierkegaard are mutually illuminating figures not only because 
they similarly appropriated Socratic thought but also because their works 
respond to very similar, and mutually influential, cultural milieux.2 Because 
both were raised by Moravian parents, it is likely that their views of the 
figure of Socrates are partially if not profoundly influenced by the founder 
of the modern configuration of the Moravian Church, Nikolaus Ludwig 
von Zinzendorf (1700– 1760),3 who fashioned himself a Socratic figure in 
a series of early pamphlets. So after situating Zinzendorf within the history 
of Moravian religion, I will describe the conception of the figure of Socrates 
that emerges from his pamphlets and extend this history to the connections 
that both Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s families had to the Moravian Church. 
However, our understanding of each author’s approach to Socrates must be 
nuanced by the observation that their religious backgrounds also resulted in 
some ambivalence about the figure of Socrates, an ambivalence that I will 
later define as a form of Kierkegaardian anxiety.
Understanding each author’s Moravian background, therefore, is neces-
sary to understanding the religious component of each author’s thought as 
well as the profile of Socrates in their thinking.
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Kierkegaard, Blake, and the Moravian Church
The Moravian Church, in brief, traditionally divides its history into three eras: 
the “ ‘Ancient Church,’ from the year 1457 to 1656 . . . that of the ‘Hidden 
Seed’ . . . from the year 1656 to 1722 . . . [and] the ‘Renewed Church’ from 
the year 1722 to the present.”4 J. Taylor Hamilton, however, in his account of 
Moravian Church history for the introduction to third edition of The Mora-
vian Manual, begins in 863 c.e. with Prince Ratislaw’s request of Emperor 
Michael to send for Cyril and Methodius of Constantinople to preach the 
Gospel in Moravia. In 871 Boriwoj, the Prince of Bohemia, and his wife, 
Ludmilla, visited the Moravian court and converted to Christianity as well. 
Cyril and Methodius spent some time preaching around Moravia and Bohe-
mia, developing local rituals and, most important, translating the Bible into 
Slavonic. This early missionary work established regionally specific forms of 
Christianity that were significant predecessors to the Protestant Reformation 
and resistant to Roman Catholic impositions of uniformity even though the 
area became officially Roman Catholic in 1080. Jan Hus (1369– 1415) origi-
nated in southern Bohemia; his religious consciousness was formed in part by 
this social and religious milieu.
However, divisions among these local Christianities soon forced the Breth-
ren to practice their faith secretly, alongside and within state- recognized 
churches. The followers of Hus divided into two groups: the Calixtines, 
who eventually won legal recognition after their acceptance of the Coun-
cil of Basel in 1431, and the Taborites, who rejected the Council of Basel. 
The Calixtines came to constitute the national church of Bohemia. In 1457, 
reform- minded followers of Hus from both groups composed a formal dec-
laration of principles, establishing an association called the Unitas Fratrum, 
or Unity of the Brethren, often shortened to “the Brethren.”5 They did not 
seek at that time to establish a separate church but rather to “form a society 
within the National Church,”6 one dedicated to reform and to an emphasis 
on Scripture as the principal guide for faith and practice over twenty years 
before the birth of Martin Luther. As early as 1461, however, persecutions 
against the Brethren began, but they managed to thrive until the Smalcaldic 
wars (1546– 47), when persecution became more intensely targeted against 
those who were neither Roman Catholic nor Calixtine. The rise of Counter- 
Reformation activity in this area specifically targeted evangelical groups, 
so that by 1627 “the evangelical party in Moravia and Bohemia ceased to 
exist.”7
The Brethren found another opportunity to surface publicly with the rise of 
Philipp Jakob Spener in Germany, who as the author of Pia Desideria (1675) 
is often identified as the father of the Pietist movement. This movement was 
not initially separatist but rather viewed its members as “little churches within 
the church,”8 specifically the Evangelical Church of Germany. Spener empha-
sized an orientation against intellectualism in religious belief and practice, 
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criticism of the state church, and sincere faith defined by an inwardness that is 
manifested in action and decision. One of Spener’s disciples was the Baroness 
von Gersdorf, who married Count von Zinzendorf, giving birth to Nikolaus 
Ludwig in May 1700. Nikolaus Ludwig became the Zinzendorf who, work-
ing with like- minded clergyman, resuscitated the Brethren when he agreed to 
donate part of his estate in Berthelsdorf to a settlement of Brethren. These 
Brethren had been gathered together by a working- class Moravian evange-
list named Christian David when he converted from Roman Catholicism to 
pietist Christianity. That settlement grew into Herrnhut; within five years, over 
three hundred people occupied it. Internal divisions in the new community led 
Zinzendorf to retire from court, acquire documents and literature from a more 
active period of the Brethren’s history, and then settle disputes by meeting 
with community leaders and drawing up statutes. By the age of twenty- seven, 
Zinzendorf was the figurehead and leader of the revived Unitas Fratrum.
George Forell calls Zinzendorf the “most influential German theologian 
between Luther and Schleiermacher.”9 Similar in stature to John and Charles 
Wesley in England or Grundtvig in Denmark, Zinzendorf helped revive and 
eventually lead the movement that was continuous with a nine- hundred- year 
tradition of Christianity at the borderlands of traditional structures, some-
times practicing freely, sometimes working within existing structures, and 
sometimes suppressed by them, but never comfortable and often adopting a 
stance of principled critique and reform from within. Zinzendorf’s followers 
in both England and Denmark, like those of the Wesleys in England (who 
helped establish the first Moravian mission in England), were encouraged to 
practice their religion both as members of the Unitas Fratrum and as mem-
bers of state- recognized congregations.
Joakim Garff explains that Kierkegaard’s family had been associated with 
a congregation of Brethren at Stormgade in Copenhagen that was estab-
lished in 1739, following Zinzendorf’s Herrnhut model.10 Michael Pedersen 
Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s father, had a leading role in rebuilding the meet-
ing hall to accommodate the congregation’s growth in the early nineteenth 
century. The Moravian community in Denmark lived the same history there 
that it did elsewhere, existing outside the state church and occasionally suf-
fering persecution. However, Kierkegaard’s family, again consistent with 
Moravian patterns, participated simultaneously in Moravian and state- 
recognized Danish Lutheran religious services. Bruce Kirmmse explains that 
Michael Pedersen, “while retaining his rural pietist connection to the Herrn-
hut Congregation of Brothers,” also “made Jacob Peter Mynster his pastor.”11 
Mynster eventually rose to the position of Bishop and became the leading fig-
ure for the socially mobile Danish Lutheran rationalism of the day. Kirmmse 
observes that by “attending the Herrnhut congregation for evening prayer 
during the week and Mynster’s Church of Our Lady on Sunday mornings, 
Michael Pedersen expressed the tension between independent peasant reli-
giousness and respectable Copenhagen piety.”12
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Kirmmse elsewhere describes this tension as “a tension in the religious 
life— and certainly in the social self- understanding as well— of the Kierke-
gaard family, a tension between rural and urban religion, between peasant 
pietism and Golden Age oratory.”13 Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous 
author of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, reflects this divi-
sion as he considers his audience: “What is developed here by no means 
pertains to the simple folk, whom the god will preserve in their lovable sim-
plicity (although they sense the pressure of life another way), the simplicity 
that feels no great need for any other kind of understanding, or, insofar as it 
is felt, humbly becomes a sigh over the misery of this life, while this sigh hum-
bly finds comfort in the thought that life’s happiness does not consist in being 
a person of knowledge” (SKS 7:158n1 / CUP 1:170n). Climacus (and most 
likely Kierkegaard) did not consider the reflective complexity of his work rel-
evant to Denmark’s rural population; instead, he leveled his critique at urban 
Copenhageners who imbibed Danish Hegelianism from pulpits and periodi-
cals and who were therefore alienated from their roots of rural simplicity. 
But Climacus’s description of his audience is rife with tensions. At the same 
time that a simple faith is being idealized, it is treated condescendingly (as a 
“lovable simplicity”). Furthermore, this dichotomy between urban and rural 
subjectivity is not the whole issue. Kierkegaard extends A. G. Rudelbach’s 
contention that the state church contributed to the rise of the modern prole-
tariat in a moral direction: “What is unchristian and ungodly is to base the 
state on a substratum of people whom one totally ignores, denying all kin-
ship with them— even if on Sundays there are moving sermons about loving 
‘the neighbor’ ” (SKS 22:217– 18, NB12:124 / KJN 6:124). It is not coinciden-
tal that Kierkegaard used the language of kinship in this passage, which was 
written in the year of Denmark’s transition to a constitutional monarchy, as 
these divisions existed within the home of his birth.
Blake’s Moravian background follows many of the same patterns. Keri 
Davies and Marsha Keith Schuchard have succinctly summarized previ-
ous assumptions about Blake’s religious background and the history of 
and evidence for the actual Moravian background of Blake’s family.14 Both 
Schuchard and Davies took Nancy Bogan’s 1968 suggestion that “Blake and 
his family were Anglicans and at the same time maintained a connection with 
the Moravian Church”15 seriously enough to seek out archival support for 
this claim, which they found. Schuchard and Davies report that the Mora-
vian Church in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
occupied an unusual position, being “recognized by an Act of Parliament as 
an episcopal church and therefore a sister of the church of England” but still 
“required to have their places of worship licensed as Dissenting chapels,” so 
that they both “were and then again were not Dissenters.”16
The Moravian Church in England, furthermore, encouraged its members 
to maintain their Anglican membership and identity while still participating 
in Moravian services, so that “one could be an Anglican and a Moravian at 
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the same time— and it turns out that a majority of the English Brethren were 
and remained loyal members of the Church of England.”17 Schuchard’s and 
Davies’s archival work reveals that Blake’s mother and her first husband were 
members of the same Fetter Lane church in London that Zinzendorf visited 
on more than one occasion, their petition to join falling between Zinzen-
dorf’s visits of the late 1830s and early 1850s. Schuchard later asserts that 
their attendance extended through the 1850s, during at least one of Zinzen-
dorf’s visits. She explains in a follow- up to her 2004 article that while Blake’s 
mother was married to her first husband, Thomas Armitage, it is very likely 
she knew John and James Blake, who were William Blake’s uncle and his 
father, respectively, as James eventually became Catherine’s second husband. 
Because they also attended Fetter Lane at the same time, both sides of Wil-
liam Blake’s family had connections with the Moravian Church in London 
and were directly influenced by Zinzendorf.18
It is not difficult to imagine the place that the figure of Socrates might take 
among Brethren familiar with him, for both critiqued the social structures 
within which they lived, sometimes gathering a following and sometimes suf-
fering persecution. Zinzendorf’s own appropriation of the figure of Socrates 
took place in a series of biweekly pamphlets first published under the name 
“The Socrates of Dresden” and then gathered into book form, more ambi-
tiously, under the title The German Socrates.19 Over thirty of these pamphlets 
were originally distributed in 1725– 26, around the time that Zinzendorf first 
welcomed the earliest community of the Brethren onto his estate. Zinzendorf 
envisions a Socratic figure engaged in socially provocative polemic designed 
to lead his readers and listeners to self- examination. According to August 
Gottleib Spangenberg’s biography of Zinzendorf, “the Count’s object in the 
publication of this periodical work was (to use his own words) ‘to bring, like 
Socrates, his fellow- citizens to reflect upon themselves, and by his example 
to show them the way to the attainment of real and lasting contentment.’ ”20 
Harold Steffe asserts that both “authors [Kierkegaard and Zinzendorf] har-
ness Socrates to inquire into whether and how Chris tianity and philosophy 
can be united, and into the meaning of passion for the understanding,”21 and 
in this union we should observe an emphasis on existential self- reflection. 
Both Zinzendorf and Kierkegaard also share an early publication history 
in which they concealed their authorship, Zinzendorf initially leaving his 
pamphlets unsigned just as Kierkegaard published his most important early 
philosophical works pseudonymously.
While Spangenberg claims that Zinzendorf’s pamphlets avoid satire and 
irony— that Zinzendorf merely spoke “freely”— they still provoked a rather 
hostile response. By the third issue, according to Spangenberg, “Some were 
enraged at it, and caused the confiscation of the third Number; the reason 
assigned for which was, that the author’s name was not given; until the 
Count at length avowed himself as the author. He continued this publication 
till the thirty- fourth Number.”22 After the last issue, Zinzendorf collected the 
Kierkegaard’s and Blake’s Socratic Literature 245
pamphlets and republished them in book form. Kierkegaard felt similarly 
compelled to step forward and identify himself as the author of his pseudony-
mous philosophical works prior to and including Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript in a signed but unpaginated appendix attached to that book, which 
again warrants a comparison to Zinzendorf’s unpaginated introduction to 
The German Socrates.
However, the most important parallels to Kierkegaard’s thought relate to 
the pseudonymous authorship itself, which comprises a Socratic dialogue 
among different characters around the topics of faith and inwardness. Simi-
larly, Blake’s mythological works, especially the later ones, are not so much 
narrative as dialogue among mythological characters representative of dif-
ferent points of view. Both writers’ commitment to dialogue rather than to a 
systematic presentation of conceptual truths, as we might find in analytic phi-
losophy, commits them likewise to specific literary forms emphasizing either 
character development or, at least, characters engaging one another in some 
type of conflict. Both authors hope to serve maieutic purposes in their works, 
believing that the development of their fictional or mythological characters 
will be paralleled in their readers, bringing to birth a new “soul” in their 
readers, a psychology that de- emphasizes environmental and social influence 
in favor of what Kierkegaard’s Vigilius Haufniensis calls in The Concept of 
Anxiety an “acquired originality.”
Furthermore, Christopher Barnett describes Zinzendorf’s pamphlets as 
seeking “to interrogate a new generation of philosophers, whose elevation of 
reason threatened to reduce Christianity to a series of rational principles.”23 
This task resonates with both Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of the effects 
of rationalism upon Christianity. Thus, the literary form of each author’s 
work is integral to his philosophical task and inherent to its nature. Both 
authors sought to combat intellectual abstractions with personalities embod-
ied in literary dialogues, and perhaps most of all to frustrate reason itself 
with the sheer complexity of their projects, a goal consistent with Spener’s 
marginalization of intellect.24
“Socrates,” however, is not necessarily a single entity for either of these 
authors. Kierkegaard came to the Socratic tradition and its variants through 
his own theological study and his reading in the German Romantics, in 
German philosophy, and in a number of different traditions from the early 
medieval period to his own day, while Blake read a number of figures who 
were themselves influenced by Plato’s writings. Eric Ziolkowski’s The Liter-
ary Kierkegaard begins his review of Kierkegaard and literature with the 
figure of Socrates, reminding his readers that Kierkegaard’s dissertation, The 
Concept of Irony, carefully and complexly negotiates the conflicting portraits 
of Socrates presented by Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon. The presence 
of options means that the figure of Socrates invoked or suggested by Blake’s 
and Kierkegaard’s works is a matter of conscious decision: they not only 
chose to engage in a Socratic task, but they also needed to choose which 
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Socrates to emulate. The nature of this choice will be made apparent in the 
ensuing, brief review of the position that Socrates and Plato’s writings have 
in Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s respective corpuses.
Kierkegaard, Blake, and Socrates
Any review of how each author perceived his Socratic task perhaps best begins 
with Plato’s Seventh Letter, where he describes feeling compelled to revisit 
Sicily to instruct its ruler, Dionysius, in philosophy.25 Dionysius’s character, 
such as it was, would not take no for an answer to his requests that Plato 
return to Sicily. Plato describes Dionysius as a vain character who “made it 
absolutely a point of honor that no one should ever suppose that I had a poor 
opinion of his natural gifts” (Letter 7, 338e– 339a, CDP 1586). Plato further 
questions the motives behind Dionysius’s desire for instruction in philosophy 
and comports himself accordingly, hoping to see whether Dionysius truly 
loved philosophy or was instead “stuffed with secondhand opinions,” having 
“only a superficial tinge of doctrine” (340b, CDP 1588).
Plato’s account of Dionysius is hardly flattering, especially as he demeans 
Dionysius for composing a philosophical “handbook of his own” (341b, 
CDP 1588) following Plato’s first visit. In Plato’s opinion, those who sys-
tematically organize the philosophy of others into written handbooks have 
“no real acquaintance with the subject [of philosophy]” (341c, CDP 1589) 
because the insights provided by philosophy cannot be communicated directly 
through language. Only after “a long period of attendance on the subject” 
does acquaintance with the insights of philosophy ignite “like a blaze kin-
dled by a leaping spark [which] is generated in the soul and at once becomes 
self- sustaining” (341d, CDP 1589). This process is necessary, Plato argues, 
because of the fundamental difference between any reality and the words or 
images used to describe it. Direct instruction presents words and images to the 
learner but can never present the reality itself. At best, instruction can only be 
the occasion through which individuals perceive the truth for themselves after 
a long period of their own contemplation and reflection. Plato therefore ideal-
izes a dialectical and dialogic philosophical method rather than a systematic 
and expository one. The dialogue communicates philosophical truth indirectly 
by articulating several points of view without being exclusively devoted to any 
single one, prompting reflection and engagement on the part of the listener.
But perhaps the most significant aspect of Plato’s Seventh Letter is that he 
defines the personality of Dionysius by his engagement with a text: those who 
seek to produce systematic expositions are vain and shallow, while those who 
inwardly contemplate are truly philosophical. Plato’s Seventh Letter develops 
ideas considered by Socrates in the Phaedo, in which he defines the goal of 
philosophy as separation of the soul from the body, drawing a sharp dis-
tinction between those who “regard the body with the greatest indifference 
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and spend their lives in philosophy” (68c, CDP 51) and those incapable of 
philosophy, whose souls are “permeated by the corporeal, which fellowship 
and intercourse with the body will have ingrained in its very nature through 
constant association and long practice” (81c, CDP 64). Plato believes that 
Dionysius’s vanity drives his misunderstanding of philosophy, as his think-
ing seems to proceed from a bodily incursion upon the soul rather than a 
philosophically attained freedom from the body. The bodily person in Plato’s 
thought believes that truth lies in the text; the philosophical person finds 
truth within her soul. The text may prompt the philosopher’s discovery of 
soul truth but cannot instruct the soul directly.
By the time of Origen (ca. 185– 254), the ideas circulating in Plato’s dia-
logues and letters had developed into an informal taxonomy of personality 
types intimately associated with hermeneutic strategies, a development Origen 
reflects in book 4 of On First Principles (ca. 215 c.e.): “One must therefore 
pourtray [sic] the meaning of the sacred writings in a threefold way upon 
one’s own soul, so that the simple man may be edified by what we may call 
the flesh of the scripture, this name being given to the obvious interpretation; 
while the man who has made some progress may be edified by its soul, as it 
were; and the man who is perfect . . . may be edified by the spiritual law. . . . 
For just as man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in the same way does the 
scripture.”26 If human beings exist as body, soul, and spirit, so does Scripture, 
therefore an interpreter’s hermeneutics reflect the state of his or her soul in 
its preference for one approach to a text rather than another. Socrates makes 
a similar but less differentiated judgment in the Phaedrus, advising Phaedrus 
to have a “discernment of the nature of the soul, discover the type of speech 
appropriate to each nature, and order and arrange your discourse accord-
ingly, addressing a variegated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the 
whole gamut of tones, and a simple soul in a simple style” (277c, CDP 523).
One might see this progression in Plato’s allegory of the cave in a move-
ment from a bodily existence whose knowledge is compared to the sight 
of shadows on a wall, to a soulish existence whose light is represented by 
a humanly generated fire, and finally to a spiritual existence whose light 
is represented by the sun (Republic 7.514a–520e, CDP 747– 52). And one 
might see the same progression in the Symposium in Diotima’s description 
of the different ways men seek immortality— through the body (procre-
ation), through the soul (social institutions and one’s place in community), 
and through the spirit (the self alone before God; 206e– 212a, CDP 558– 63). 
More important, the body, soul, and spirit relationship in this tradition does 
not imply a fixed self but rather makes possible different phenomenologies, 
some oriented toward the body, some toward soul, and some toward spirit. 
These phenomenologies give rise to potentially conflicting hermeneutics that 
in Origen become distinct markers of one’s spiritual development. Origen 
associates literal or obvious interpretations with the body and spiritual inter-
pretations with spirit, placing between them a soulish interpretation.27
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Kierkegaard appropriated this model, with all of its assumptions, start-
ing with the two parts of Either/Or and its two basic personality types, the 
Socratic- ethical and the Romantic- aesthetic. As he proceeded through his 
career, he published his best- known philosophical works under pseudonyms 
representing a variety of personality types and points of view, each author 
quoting, engaging, and exceeding the next. Kierkegaard’s model of existential 
development begins when the author of Either/Or I, an aesthetic personal-
ity identified only as “A” within the text, suggests a developmental pattern 
within aesthetic personalities in an essay titled “The Immediate Erotic Stages.” 
Clearly influenced by Hegelian and other German Idealist models, this essay 
divides the aesthetic sphere of existence into “immediate” and “reflective” 
poles, developing the characteristics of each pole in some detail. “A’s” reader, 
the ethical personality “B,” or Judge William, “reads” “A’s” work and, in true 
Hegelian fashion, “goes beyond” him. Either/Or II is his response, in which 
he argues that there is something more than the aesthetic: the ethical. The 
ethical contains the aesthetic but is higher than it, as the judge argues for the 
aesthetic validity of an ethical relationship: marriage. Following a pattern 
derived from Hegel’s Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812– 16), 
the judge sees the ethical as a synthesis comprising the “negation of the first 
immediate,” which in this case is the aesthetic.
Sometime the following year, Vigilius Haufniensis “read” Either/Or I and 
II, like many other Copenhagen intellectuals, and felt the need to explain 
how a transition from the innocence of the aesthetic sphere to the guilt con-
sciousness of the ethical sphere is possible, casting the question in terms of a 
theological reflection upon the sinlessness of Adam and Eve and their subse-
quent fall, suggesting a psychological answer for this dilemma. He “writes” 
The Concept of Anxiety in response and “publishes” it in 1844. Kierkegaard’s 
Johannes Climacus, encompassing the insights of “A,” “B,” and Haufniensis 
in his reconsideration of his own previous (pseudonymous) work, Philo-
sophical Fragments, completes the work they began in his own Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript by adding a religious sphere, which he divides into 
religiousness A and B. In addition to this pseudonymous activity, Kierke-
gaard published other works bearing his signature at the same time, so that 
his major philosophical works and his signed religious works comprise a vast 
dialogue among his pseudonymous authors in which he himself is engaged. 
This dialogue also illustrates his debt to Hegel, for each author synthesizes 
the insights of the previous ones into a new thesis.
Kierkegaard’s use of a Hegelian model, combined with his attention to 
classical thought, leads his major philosophical works to present a series 
of developmental stages consisting of sequential differentiations of the self 
from its natural environment (or bodily existence), its social environment 
(“the crowd,” or ethical existence), and then facets of its mental environment 
produced by the first two. Kierkegaard calls these stages the aesthetic, the 
ethical (like Schiller), and the religious. Religiousness A is the subjectivity of 
Kierkegaard’s and Blake’s Socratic Literature 249
allegory, seeing through nature to the infinite beyond it, while religiousness 
B is an anagogical subjectivity, or a self that stands alone before the Divine. 
These are existential stances, however, not simple classifications of religious 
thought or hermeneutic strategies: it is possible to identify oneself as a Chris-
tian in belief and upbringing but still be an aesthetic, ethical, or religiousness 
A personality.
The indebtedness of Blake to the Socratic- medieval tradition most clearly 
surfaces in his anagogical study of innocence and experience as states of 
the human soul.28 Blake’s notion of innocence corresponds to Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetic stage, as his innocent characters tend to have bodily and environmen-
tally determined subjectivities, such as Thel. Blake’s experience corresponds 
to Kierkegaard’s ethical stage, as experienced characters have developed a 
social consciousness and an ethical ideal and have subsequently become bit-
ter, as is the case with Blake’s chimney sweep of The Songs of Experience. 
Blake’s visionary subjectivity compares well to features of Kierkegaard’s reli-
giousness A and B, though primarily A: when Blake sees the world in a grain 
of sand, he reveals a religiousness A subjectivity. To illustrate better how 
important the classical tradition was to Blake’s thought, I will examine the 
complex profile Plato’s works have in Blake’s authorship through his direct 
statements about them, recalling also that in Origen hermeneutic strategies 
were closely linked to spiritual maturation and personality development.
At times, Blake seems to validate Platonic idealism with few qualifications, 
as in “A Vision of the Last Judgment,” which presents an explicit condem-
nation of nature as well as Blake’s strongest affirmation of idealism: “This 
World <of Imagination> is Infinite & Eternal whereas the world of Genera-
tion or Vegetation is Finite & [for a small moment] Temporal There Exist 
in that Eternal World the Permanent Realities of Every Thing which we see 
reflected in this Vegetable Glass of Nature.”29 It is very easy to read a Platonic 
idealism into these words: everything has a dual existence, one in the world 
of imaginative vision and the other in the world of generation in which all 
living things experience birth, growth, death, and decay. The “Eternal Image 
& Individuality” of a living thing never dies while its physical form does,30 
requiring that imagination or vision serve as the capacities by which the artist 
sees everything in its eternal form. In addition to his affinities with idealist 
thought, Blake seems to validate Plato’s use of dialogue in his letter to the 
Rev. John Trusler of August 23, 1799, saying, “The wisest of the Ancients 
considered what is not too Explicit as the fittest for Instruction because it 
rouzes the faculties to act. I name Moses Solomon Esop Homer Plato.”31 Like 
Plato, Blake is not so much concerned with a simple presentation of the truth 
as he is with rousing his readers to apprehend the truth for themselves after 
doing the work of reflection.
Blake’s mythology often takes the form of a series of narrative dialogues 
among subjectivities representative of components of human personality, 
so it has a great deal in common with both Plato’s method as explained 
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in the Seventh Letter and Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, described 
above. The Book of Thel, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Visions of the 
Daughters of Albion, The Four Zoas, Milton a Poem, and Jerusalem could 
be described as primarily dialogic works in that a significant proportion of 
their content depicts characters engaged in self- defining dialogue with one 
another. America a Prophecy and Europe a Prophecy might be viewed as 
mixed narrative and dialogic works, while The [First] Book of Urizen, The 
Song of Los, The Book of Los, and other prophecies might be considered pri-
marily narrative mythologies. Even in these cases, however, a single speaker 
often ejaculates a cry of suffering or domination. The Songs of Innocence 
and of Experience at times take on a dialogic nature, “The Tyger” and pos-
sibly “The Fly” responding to “The Lamb,” “The Blossom” possibly being 
answered by “The Sick Rose,” in addition to the presence of both innocence 
and experience versions of the poems “Holy Thursday” and “The Chimney 
Sweeper.”
As S. Foster Damon explains, Blake organizes his mythology around a 
fourfold view of the human person: “Blake identified [the four Zoas] with 
the four fundamental aspects of man: his body (Tharmas— west); his reason 
(Urizen— south); his emotions (Luvah— east); and his imagination (Urthona— 
north).”32 Blake’s divisions represent body, soul, and spirit, emphasizing soul 
as emotion (on the east- west axis with body) and spirit as reason and imagi-
nation (occupying the north- south axis), mirroring the fourfold hermeneutic 
of the medieval period. In his letter of July 6, 1803, to Thomas Butts, Blake 
seems to identify his allegorizing with Plato’s, saying (probably) of Jerusalem 
that he considers “it as the Grandest Poem that This World Contains. Alle-
gory addressed to the Intellectual powers while it is altogether hidden from 
the Corporeal Understanding is My Definition of the Most Sublime Poetry. 
it [sic] is also somewhat in the same manner defind by Plato.”33 Blake quali-
fies his identification with allegory in Plato with the words “somewhat in the 
same manner,” which signals ambivalence toward Plato. Blake feels that his 
allegory shares some features in common with Plato’s, but he does not want 
to identify the mode of his work with Plato’s either.
Blake, like Kierkegaard, emphasizes that Platonic knowledge is recollection 
and considers this knowledge inferior to the Christian or prophetic mode, so 
that both he and Kierkegaard are simultaneously attracted to but disagree 
with Plato. For example, in “A Vision of the Last Judgment,” Blake explicitly 
critiques Platonic allegory, associating the “Hebrew Bible & the Gospel of 
Jesus” with “Eternal Vision or Imagination of All that Exists,” while associ-
ating Greek literature with an inferior “Fable or Allegory” that is really the 
product of memory.34 Plato is particularly and repeatedly condemned for his 
rejection of poets and prophets and his support of the “Moral Virtues.”35 
Blake juxtaposes Platonic idealism against apocalyptic convention in the vein 
of Ezekiel and Revelation, clearly and consistently associating himself with 
the latter in “A Vision of the Last Judgment” and elsewhere.
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A pattern therefore emerges of a mixed or ambivalent vision of Socrates 
in both Blake and Kierkegaard. Blake’s view of Socrates and Plato’s works 
see them both as sublime allegory and as inferior to Christian revelation at 
the same time. Barnett similarly describes Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates, 
specifically as it was influenced by Johann Georg Hamann (who was in turn 
influenced by Zinzendorf): “As ‘the greatest humorist in the world,’ Hamann 
brings Socratic irony to the point where it touches, but does not cross into, 
Christianity. Thus his efforts are commendable, even essential, but not 
ultimate.”36 The very works in which Kierkegaard is most engaged in his 
philosophic project constitute his poetic, but not Christian, authorship. This 
ambivalence toward Socrates closely follows the patterns of Kierkegaardian 
anxiety.
Conclusion: Anxiety and Literary Form
I should begin this section with further consideration of Plato’s own ambiv-
alence about literature, including his famous expulsion of poets from his 
ideal republic, especially Homer. Mirroring the concern of scholars over the 
relationship of Kierkegaard to his pseudonymous writings, one recurring 
question in scholarship on Plato concerns the relationship between Plato and 
his works. The literary form of Plato’s dialogues complicates this question 
for contemporary scholarship in philosophy because the dialogues distribute 
different conceptual possibilities among different characters and, especially 
in the early dialogues, often leave questions unresolved. This structure makes 
it difficult to identify any given concept in Plato’s dialogues with Plato’s own 
position. Kierkegaard’s reading of Plato and of the figure of Socrates in The 
Concept of Irony and Vigilius Haufniensis’s commentary in The Concept of 
Anxiety, for example, assume that while the dialogues present a range of 
conceptual options they also present, intentionally or not, a range of phe-
nomenologies associated with those conceptual structures, so that a dialogue 
not only articulates ideas but creates the kinds of character who would assert 
them. Philosophy in literary form, such as Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s, works 
out individual existential and phenomenological struggles, modeling these 
struggles for its readers, who, as they read along, engage in these struggles 
themselves. Debates about the specific philosophical concepts that are the 
presumed reasons for the dialogue are the stage upon which existential strug-
gle occurs.
Richard Kraut describes Plato’s relationship to his own works in his intro-
duction to the Cambridge Companion to Plato in terms of two possibilities: 
first, Plato wanted to obscure what he believed in order to get readers to 
think for themselves; second, he used the dialogues to express his own beliefs, 
which are voiced by Socrates or other interlocutors.37 This question can serve 
as a starting point for a historicized reading of Plato, as Kraut’s arguments 
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fail to consider a third possibility developed within the Seventh Letter and 
implied by the dialogues themselves. Readers of Plato who assume that the 
point of a dialogue is to work out a conceptual problem will ignore that in 
Plato’s works acquiring truth is an activity of the soul, not just of the mind. 
While this claim may seem like another way of stating Kraut’s first possibility, 
for Plato the word “soul” was not merely a metaphor, so that to understand 
his relationship to his works and to his own philosophy we need to take seri-
ously his developmental model, which is based upon his tripartite view of the 
self, described above.
Members of Plato’s own family were part of the oligarchy that briefly sus-
pended Athenian democracy in 404 b.c.e. at the end of the Peloponnesian 
Wars. Reliance on democratic governance during times of war can be fright-
ening. When the Athenian city- state under a democracy expressed a political 
will or committed to a course of action, it subjected each decision, includ-
ing every court case, to the governing body or to a section of it that had 
to be convinced of the best decision in any given situation. Oratory skills 
therefore grew in importance under Athenian democracy, and with them the 
importance of language generally. In the case of Socrates, the effectiveness 
of oratory was literally a matter of life and death. Within this context, how 
might Plato be positioned in relation to his works? His Republic, a later dia-
logue that many scholars believe employs Socrates as a mouthpiece for Plato’s 
ideas, advocates for an oligarchy in which leaders, who are called “guard-
ians,” are divested of self- interest in their governing. They are not allowed to 
own land, possess wealth, or even have children or families of their own, as 
children among the ruling class are communally raised with no clear iden-
tification of paternity. Leaders who possess great wealth and a lineage, in 
Socrates’s opinion, resemble statues with purple eyes: purple may well be the 
most beautiful color, but as an eye color it is grotesque (Republic 4). Plato’s 
Socrates has rejected democracy but has divested his oligarchy of self- interest, 
so that these new rulers may be philosopher- kings guided by reason in their 
pursuit of the interests of the state. Socrates’s goal for his ideal republic is the 
attainment of the most beautiful form of the state, one in which the whole 
should be made harmonious and beautiful rather than just a part, so that the 
state is one rather than divided into the rich and the poor.
It is not difficult to read these passages in Republic against the background 
of Plato’s life, however speculative that activity may be. He could be read as 
defending the principle of oligarchy while establishing the conditions nec-
essary for it to work. But the most important emphasis of Republic is not 
the efficacy or implementation of such a government; it is the educational 
emphasis of Socrates’s ideal republic and the desired outcomes of that educa-
tional emphasis: “Neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced 
in truth ever adequately preside over a state” (Republic 7.519b– c, CDP 751). 
This passage follows the allegory of the cave, which is the primary educa-
tional allegory in the Platonic corpus and which describes education in terms 
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of different existential orientations, each one creating a different kind of soul. 
In this light, the Socratic irony of Plato’s early dialogues, as well as the pro-
nouncement about Socrates made by the oracle at Delphi, may be implicit 
critiques of democratic governance and of oratory only to be made explicit 
by the later dialogues: if Socrates alone is wise because he alone is aware of 
his ignorance, how can we trust the judgment of a democratic body? Plato’s 
concern for education, therefore, is implicated in his tripartite view of the 
self, and the two of them together are bound up in his conception of the 
ideal republic, all of which converge on his desire to ban poets from his ideal 
republic. All of these ideas seem to be heightened in importance because of 
the succession of two major wars and the stresses upon Athenian democracy 
caused by these wars.
But the place of literature itself in Athens must also be considered. To be 
educated during Plato’s lifetime was to be taught to read Homer, who was 
used as a source text for a variety of subjects, such as knowledge of the gods, 
of government, of war, and of history. Socrates’s complaints about Homer 
and the poets in Republic focus primarily on the bad behavior of Homer’s 
gods and heroes and on their management of emotions, but to Socrates the 
worst element of Homer’s presentation of the gods is its emphasis on feeling 
over reason. Socrates’s argument in Republic therefore criticizes the erotics of 
literature to replace them with rational instruction provided by philosophy, 
as Penelope Murray argues in Plato on Poetry.38 The philosopher’s progres-
sion toward death in Phaedo consists of an increasing separation from the 
body that has been carried out over the course of the philosopher’s entire life, 
while Crito effectively rejects public opinion as a valid repository of truth 
in favor of one’s own rational contemplation of the subject, so that between 
these two dialogues body and soul are rejected in favor of rational spirit 
as the basis of governance. The tripartite view of the soul, therefore, serves 
instrumental and political purposes in Plato’s works. It identifies differing 
elements of the individual in order to establish a hierarchy extensible to the 
organization of a polis: body, then soul (which can be defined as societally 
conditioned thought and feeling), should be subject to spirit (divine reason). 
Only philosophy finally disciplines the body and teaches its adherents to live 
above society to be guided only by divine light, and it is by means of this 
progression that persons attain full individuality. For that reason, only a com-
munity of philosophers who have subjected themselves to continual symbolic 
deaths in the form of the loss of possessions and of family can be trusted to 
govern, and only an educational system that places philosophy above litera-
ture can develop a worthy oligarchy.
Ion establishes the fundamental existential oppositions guiding reading 
practices in Plato against this background. Socrates closely cross- examines 
Ion in order to determine if Ion’s recitations proceed from skill, technē, or only 
from inspiration. The dialogue concludes that Ion does not know what he is 
doing, so he must be reciting Homer only under a kind of divine inspiration. 
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Albert Rijksbaron’s Plato, “Ion,” or: On the “Iliad” suggests that Ion was 
composed around the same time as Republic, that Plato did not anywhere 
express the possibility of a technē of poetry, and that he believed pursuing the 
origins of poetic inspiration was a waste of time.39 The real opposition here, 
I would argue, is between the possibility of a technē opposed to the erotics 
of poetry distributed across appetitive and rational responses to literature. If 
neither Socrates nor Plato desired to establish a technē of poetry, Aristotle’s 
Poetics filled that gap, suggesting uses for the erotics of literature that go 
beyond mere imitation into the management of emotions themselves: both 
aesthetically via catharsis and then, in book 2 of Rhetoric, instrumentally, as 
a tool for functioning effectively in a democracy.
Because Plato’s literary form, the dialogue, exists in a kind of tension or 
anxiety in relationship to literature itself, it should not be surprising that this 
anxiety is reflected in those influenced by his thought. Kierkegaardian anxiety 
involves a simultaneous attraction and repulsion to the same object without 
establishing fixed and opposite poles on a clearly defined spectrum. In Vigilius 
Haufniensis’s words, it is “a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sym-
pathy” (SKS 4:348 / CA 42, emphasis in original). Individuals experiencing 
Kierkegaardian anxiety face a simultaneous attraction to and repulsion from 
each element of the tension, feeling repulsion within their attraction and 
attraction within their repulsion, leaving them in a state of “psychological 
ambiguity” (SKS 4:348 / CA 42). In this case, the same Christian commit-
ments that led each author to see himself as a type of Socrates standing in 
critique of a state church also caused him to distance himself from the figure 
of Socrates, who as a pre- Christian philosopher lacked visionary insight, in 
Blake’s terms, or the apostolic authority of revelation, in Kierkegaard’s.
Anxiety arises when no clear conception of how one’s life could be different 
is possible— when the change involves a leap into a complete unknown— so 
that this unknown future state is only a “possibility of possibility.” We should 
keep in mind that the context of Vigilius Haufniensis’s discussion of anxiety 
and its relationship to freedom in The Concept of Anxiety is a consideration 
of the psychology of the fall from innocence to experience, Adam and Eve 
serving both as ideal paradigms of innocence, being the only two human 
beings in the world with no examples of moral transgression before them 
yet illustrating the pattern that we all must follow. Anxiety, therefore, is a 
particularly heightened reaction to our ignorance of the future and of the 
changes the future may bring. Kierkegaard compared this feeling to the ver-
tigo experienced while standing on the edge of an abyss. This dizziness forces 
decision as those experiencing it feel compelled to cling to an immediately 
available concrete option, something known and understood, thereby pro-
voking a self- defining choice.
This self- defining choice in Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s respective cases 
began with the decision to pursue a Socratically defined task and then to 
choose an image of Socrates as the outsider within, one communicated to 
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them through their Moravian upbringing. Anxiety, in their cases, prompted 
them to grasp a concrete option in the guise of literary form. However, these 
choices were made against the backdrop of unknown possibility in the form 
of a new conception of the human brought to birth by the incursion of con-
temporary thought upon religious faith. In Blake’s case, hostile contemporary 
thought took the form of the mechanical philosophers— Bacon, Newton, and 
Locke— while in Kierkegaard’s case it took the form of Danish Hegelianism. 
So while contemporary philosophy became either speculative or mechanical, 
as did the human beings who followed it, Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s thought 
became humanly concrete.
Danish Hegelianism seems an unlikely phenomenological counterpart to 
the mechanical philosophy in England, as it has little directly in common 
with the empirical sciences. One scholar of Hegel asserts that Hegel’s very 
value lies in his critique of the mechanical philosophers, explaining that he 
believes “Hegel’s general criticism of philosophers such as Descartes, Leib-
niz or Locke to be powerful and insightful; this is one reason why we are 
Hegelians.”40 However, Blake’s and Kierkegaard’s critiques of the mechanical 
philosophers and the Hegelians, respectively, parallel one another by show-
ing that each system provides seemingly transcendent constructs that remove 
the human being to a vantage point outside human existence. In their view, 
transcendent philosophies, whether empirical or speculative, attempt to cir-
cumvent anxiety by falsely positing the human observer as standing outside 
of existence as he or she views it in its entirety through the system.
So Kierkegaard’s Climacus feels compelled to assert that “existence itself 
is a system— for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing [existerende] 
spirit” (SKS 7:114 / CUP 1:118). Similarly, Blake’s mythological works react 
to the social and cultural contexts that he and Kierkegaard held in common 
by consistently assuming the monstrosity of the new human born from these 
interrelated tensions as well as the monstrosity and fallenness of the mytho-
logical creator of these constructs, Urizen. This assumption is in part Blake’s 
critique of Enlightenment conceptions of the human. In response to these 
tensions, both Blake and Kierkegaard appropriated models of personality 
derived, originally, from Plato’s writings in order to counteract the effects of 
the new philosophies upon their contemporaries’ understanding of what it 
meant to be a human being. Since the human being was their subject, so was 
the human being their object, so that their deeply philosophical responses to 
contemporary philosophical currents had to be expressed through characters 
engaged in dialogue, or literary in nature.
The influences of Plato’s works, the figure of Socrates, and Moravian 
religion upon both Blake and Kierkegaard are complex and perhaps over-
determined: each author was influenced directly by Plato as well as by other 
authors who were in turn influenced by Plato, just as each author was influ-
enced by the Moravian movement along with a variety of other religious 
movements and perspectives, some of them contributing to or influenced by 
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Moravianism. However, their respective projects are simultaneously liter-
ary and philosophical, a philosophy presented in literary form. As literature, 
they involve dialogue among characters representative of human faculties 
and developmental stages. As philosophy, they participate in a philosophical 
tradition that emphasizes the growth of the soul through reflection leading to 
enlightenment. As religious authors, they were committed to the Moravian 
goal of reform, a call to a return to a primal Christianity that preexists and 
takes precedence over state- sponsored forms of Christianity, and one that 
specifically invokes the figure of Socrates as a critic and reformer, the outcast 
within our midst who speaks to us about ourselves, showing us the way both 
out of and back to ourselves. These intersecting tensions drew both authors 
to Socrates as a leading figure and repelled them from him at the same time, 
and their response to this anxiety was to grasp the concrete option of literary 
form itself. For that reason theirs is a literary philosophy and a philosophical 
literature. It examines how persons define themselves by their ideas rather 
than explaining persons by a system of ideas— while still confronting the 
humanly created artifact, whether literary or philosophical, in all of its dan-
ger and its allure.
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Don Giovanni and Moses and Aaron
The Possibility of a Kierkegaardian Affirmation of Music
Peder Jothen
The double doors were opened; the effect of the brilliant lighting, 
the coolness that flowed toward them, the spicy fascination 
of the scent, and the tasteful table setting overwhelmed the 
entering guests for a moment, and when at the same time the 
orchestra began playing the dance music from Don Giovanni, 
the forms of those entering were transfigured, and as if in 
deference to an invisible spirit encompassing them, they stood 
still a moment, like someone whom admiration has awakened 
and who has risen in order to admire.
— “In Vino Veritas” (SKS 6:32 / SLW 27)
The relationship between music and religion within Western thought is, in gen-
eral, an ambivalent one. Augustine, in his Confessions, wrote, “When [hymns] 
are sung these sacred words stir my mind to greater religious fervour. . . . But I 
ought not to allow my mind to be paralysed by the gratification of my senses, 
which often leads it astray.”1 Martin Luther, himself an Augustinian monk, 
viewed music as the second best means of revealing the gospel after preaching. 
Lutheran hymnody thus connected music with theological and biblical truth.2 
Though from different presuppositions, both thinkers yet understood music 
as a powerful artistic form that must be carefully restrained by the mind or 
linguistic forms of truth in order to be appropriate within Christianity.
I start this chapter on Søren Kierkegaard’s musical aesthetic by referenc-
ing Augustine and Luther because in many ways, Kierkegaard’s appreciation 
for and mistrust of music overlap Augustine’s and Luther’s musical ambiva-
lence. On the one hand, Kierkegaard makes positive references to music in his 
journals, particularly in relation to Christian hymnody. On the other hand, 
notably through his pseudonym “A” in Either/Or I, he argues that the essence 
of music is sensuous and nontemporal and contradicts the permanence and 
repeatability of word- based, spiritual truth. Here, music has little to no place 
in the Christian life. But as such, like his theological ancestors, his musical 
aesthetic itself is thus deeply ambivalent.
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This essay argues that there are two main reasons for this ambivalence. 
One, Kierkegaard, partially shaped by the Lutheran doctrine of sola scrip-
tura, views the truths that matter for Christian selfhood as being biblically 
revealed and made intelligible through words. As with Luther before him, 
Kierkegaard’s musical aesthetic then arises out of his primary concern about 
making Christian truth, most notably biblical truth, inwardly real for a 
hearer. Even in “A’s” depiction of music as being merely sensuous, making 
the Word of God concrete is a latent presupposition. Second, Kierkegaard’s 
critique is a component of one of the broader aims of his authorship, that of 
provoking his readers to a deep reflection about the form of one’s selfhood. 
As such, rather than a sophisticated musical aesthetic, his musical critique 
establishes the basic contours of the aesthetic stage of existence, one exem-
plary type or form of selfhood. As “In Vino Veritas” relates, music has a 
power that can “transfigure” and lead people to admire the present moment 
rather than strive to become a Christian and truly hear Christian truth. His 
musical aesthetic is, then, less about music itself and more concerned with the 
role music plays in shaping desire, thought, and the overall form of one’s life.
To clarify this argument, this essay makes two movements, each relat-
ing to these Kierkegaardian sensibilities. The first movement develops 
Kierkegaard’s concept of music as an artistic genre. Famously, Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym “A” explores Mozart’s opera Don Giovanni.3 Writing as an 
aesthete, “A” describes music as uniting an aural, sensuous form with the 
existential content of natural passion. Music is then a means of communica-
tion, one that unveils sensuous, abstract immediacy to a listener rather than 
any clear, understandable truth. Yet, within his journals, Kierkegaard stresses 
the importance of music, in particular hymns, as being valuable for his own 
faith life when framed by the gospel and thus connected to the Christian form 
of life. Here, music is an ally for communicating Christian truth and thereby 
helpful to a listener developing a Christian self- consciousness.
The second movement uses Arnold Schoenberg’s opera Moses and Aaron 
(Moses und Aron, first performed in the 1950s)4 in comparison with “A’s” 
critique of Don Giovanni to elucidate this ambivalence. Subverting the har-
monic tradition of someone like Mozart, Schoenberg’s opera uses a wide 
variety of nontraditional musical techniques such as Sprechstimme (literally, 
“spoken- voice”) and dissonance to create an opera in which no word- based 
or idea of truth is ever clear or stable, whether in thought, word, or deed. In 
short, Schoenberg does not view human language as being able to articulate 
the mystery that is the divine. Both music and words fail in this task, and 
his opera thereby reveals the negation of words as able to contain essential 
truths about human existence. Thus, any certainty about a life built out of the 
knowledge of God is ever unstable.
The value of this comparison for understanding Kierkegaard’s musical 
aesthetic is threefold. First, Schoenberg’s playful, creative, and genre- bending 
use of music reveals the limited notion of the genre of music that Kierkegaard 
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uses, notably in Either/Or I. Second, “A’s” critique is valuable more as a treat-
ment of the aesthetic stage than as a musical aesthetic. Third, this comparison 
also supports the claim that even amid the presentation of “A’s” decidedly 
critical view of music, Kierkegaard affirms his sola scriptura roots. Unlike 
Schoenberg’s negation of the power of words to contain ultimate truth, “A’s” 
critique of music implicitly expresses Kierkegaard’s trust of the foundational 
basis for Christian existence, the Bible. When rooted in divinely given words, 
human language concretizes truth. And when paired with music, these words 
can shape one’s Christian existence, the central thrust of Kierkegaard’s 
authorship.
Movement One: Kierkegaard, Don Giovanni, and Music
Kierkegaard never strove for a systematic aesthetic, meaning his concep-
tion of music expresses a jumble of attitudes about the value and purpose 
of music within human existence. Yet he is consistent in giving music sev-
eral important characteristics. For one, in his journals, Kierkegaard relates 
how music can affect his emotional state. Humans are passionate beings, 
and music speaks to this dimension of human existence. For instance, in an 
entry of August 25, 1836, he writes of the romance of hearing street music: 
“Why is hand organ music so often appealing? It is no doubt because of the 
romantic involved [sic] in the mode of its appearance. It is, so to speak, a kind 
of poetry on the street corner. One does not expect music at all, and suddenly 
[the organist] begins to play” (SKS 27:144, Papir 175 / JP 3:3812). Music as 
“romantic” here relates to human emotions and sensuality; a listener experi-
ences a surprising shift in mood in response to the appealing scene that music 
creates on the street. Music has a transformative power on human mood. It 
speaks to human passion and desire.
And it is possible for this affective power to be tethered to existential con-
tent. In particular, Kierkegaard shows an affinity for the power of hymnody. 
For instance, in 1850, he writes, “The 8th of September! The gospel: No one 
can serve two masters (my beloved gospel)! My favorite hymn: ‘Commit Thy 
Way’ [a German hymn by Paul Gerhardt, no. 42 in Roskilde- Konvents Psalm-
ebog], which Kofoed- Hansen [the curate at Frelsers Church] chose today!” 
(SKS 23:478, NB20:160 / KJN 7:486). By implication, music, when it accom-
panies words, serves an important function for Kierkegaard: it can relay 
Christian truth to a hearer. As it did for Luther, in hymnody, human thinking 
about existence, grounded in words given by God, allies with music’s power 
to affect passion and desire as a result.
The broader point here is that in both instances, Kierkegaard affirms the 
experiential relevance and vitality of music in human existence. On the one 
hand, music has a transformative power that alters one’s mood; it affects 
desires and passions. On the other, and in relation to his own faith, music can 
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actually help him to “hear” the gospel better. This connection between words 
and music, as well as between thought and passion, is thus vital to the role 
that Kierkegaard creates for music within the Christian life.
Yet, though Kierkegaard offers such a space for music in his own life, his 
pseudonym “A’s” development of music as a sensuous, erotic, abstract, and 
immediate artistic medium in “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical- 
Erotic” sees music as a distraction from leading an examined, intentional 
life.5 Masked by his pseudonym, he provocatively develops the basic struc-
ture of the Kierkegaardian suspicion of music in the Christian life: music is 
the “demonic” and thus moves one away from Christian becoming. With this 
idea of becoming, I suggest, Kierkegaard stresses a view of human existence 
in which one’s moral, religious, psychological, and intellectual formation is 
a lifelong process. His authorship thus seeks to provoke his readers to the 
recognition that one is never a fully integrated, true self but is always in pro-
cess toward this end. Such a form or shape of selfhood is the highest task for 
a person, and Christianity offers each individual the means to rightly orient 
one’s becoming toward the true, divinely given vision of human existence.
Indeed, the essential nature of music is the opposite of the spirit of Chris-
tianity, even though Christianity, ironically, divorced music from spiritual 
experience. Whereas in ancient Greece, music was harmoniously intertwined 
with sensuality and spirituality within religious expression, in Hegelian fash-
ion, “A” argues that Christianity postulated sensuality, with music as the 
proper medium for its expression, as separate from spirituality. This sepa-
ration establishes the concept of the spiritual, the opposite of the sensual. 
The spiritual has its roots in words and also makes music into essentially 
a sensuous mode of expression, for “A” stresses how it overwhelms words. 
In this positing, Christianity excludes music “from itself” as the means to 
emphasize God’s Word as the source of spiritual truth (SKS 2:71 / EO 1:64). 
Foundational to this argument, music conceptually unites a sensuous form 
with erotic content, expresses abstract immediacy, and cannot communi-
cate word- based truth concretely. It is this conception of music that serves 
as the primary locus for developing Kierkegaard’s musical aesthetic, for it 
affirms the general outline of Kierkegaard’s own view: music can be an ally to 
Christian selfhood when intertwined with word- based, Christian truth. Yet, 
without such a frame, music pulls a listener away from Christian existence.
Form and Content
As David Gouwens succinctly puts it, “Mozart, supremely in Don Giovanni, 
achieves a perfect union of form and content, wherein absolutely musical 
subject matter (the Don Juan myth) is united with the absolutely musical 
form that reflects it.”6 This perfect permeation of form and content makes 
certain types of artistic endeavors “classic,” unable to be copied. And “A” 
views Mozart’s Don Giovanni as such a musical work.7 “The subject matter 
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permeates the form and also . . . the form permeates the subject matter— this 
mutual permeation, this like- for- like in the immortal friendship of the clas-
sic” makes a work like Mozart’s inimitable (SKS 2:60 / EO 1:52– 53). This 
form and content “permeation” makes this opera a classic.
Music’s form is aural sensuality. “A” argues that music is prereflective 
and that it uses the immediate, natural sense world as its structure. “Music 
always expresses the immediate in its immediacy” (SKS 2:76 / EO 1:70). It is 
momentary, alive only in the immediate present, full of sensuous energy that 
then lacks a past and has no future; it is nonrepeatable as such. This mere 
presentness means that it has a temporal indeterminacy, for only by having a 
past and a future does an artwork have a history, a trail of a legacy that lasts 
and a future that engenders a responsibility for its continued aliveness.
With this formal power, “A” affirms, Mozart’s music is the sensual artifact 
par excellence. Don Giovanni unveils sensuality through time and sound. 
Because music is performed and heard, music has its own time: different 
performances perform the music at a particular point in time and may use 
different tempos, rhythms, and so forth. Music has meter and rhythm that 
structure sound temporally. “Music does not exist except in the moment it is 
performed, for even if a person can read notes ever so well and has an ever 
so vivid imagination, he still cannot deny that only in a figurative sense does 
music exist when it is being read” (SKS 2:75 / EO 1:68). But music expresses 
time only metaphorically as it does not take place within the strict demands 
of a set, ordered, clock- based chronological time; it plays with time rather 
than follows the strict demands of the human experience of the endless tick- 
tock of temporality. Music also is directed at the ear, the most sensuous of 
the sense organs. As heard, music, and in particular Don Giovanni, creates 
a sensual tickle within the ear as the most sensible of the human ways of 
perceiving.
Don Giovanni unites this sensual form with a similar content: the Don’s 
story of seduction and erotic love. It is an existential content, as Don Giovan-
ni’s life exemplifies a natural power: erotic desire is what gives him life and 
vitality. He is unconcerned about both his past (i.e., a history that makes 
him guilty for his actions) and a future (i.e., being responsible for his present 
actions); he lives merely in the immediate present, guided by his never- ending 
desire for erotic conquest: “It is the energy of desire, the energy of sensuous-
ness of desire” (SKS 2:103 / EO 1:100). This power can be expressed only by 
music: “This power in Don Giovanni, this omnipotence, this life, only music 
can express, and I know no other predicate to describe it than: it is exuberant 
gaiety” (SKS 2:105 / EO 1:101).
“A” provides examples of the development of sensuous desire. The Page in 
Figaro exemplifies the first level. The Page’s desire lacks any clarity about its 
own desire; a dream- like consciousness, it flits about rather than intention-
ally focusing upon an object to possess. “Desire possesses what will become 
the object of its desire but possesses it without having desired it and thus does 
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not possess it” (SKS 2:81 / EO 1:75– 76). Papageno in Mozart’s The Magic 
Flute exemplifies the second level. Desire in this case leads a self to intend 
toward an object. As “A” puts it, “This awakening in which desire awakens, 
this jolt, separates desire and its object, gives desire an object” (SKS 2:85 / 
EO 1:79). But in the process, one recognizes not one object to desire but 
rather a multitude of things to desire in the world.
Don Giovanni exemplifies the third and highest level. Natural, innate 
desire rules his life, and he fully desires an object in its particularity. Desire, 
rather than self- reflective thought, is the principle of action, the power that 
moves him to act. He then is a “downright seducer,” a person who acts in 
the world through sensual love, a form of love that essentially is “totally 
faithless; it loves not one but all— that is, it seduces all. It is indeed only in 
the moment” (SKS 2:98 / EO 1:94). The Don expresses natural, unrestrained 
erotic passion that can never commit to loving one particular person. Such 
passion is amoral, as it is unaware of any ethical axioms because any aware-
ness of moral codes would negate the vitality and power of desire. It cares 
only about the immediate present and nothing about the consequences of 
past acts or future possibilities. And being sensual, a passion for things in 
the world rather than spiritual love and the love of the unseen, it can never 
be oriented toward God, as such an orientation would negate its immediate, 
amoral character.
Mozart’s opera, through its musical form, instantiates as its existential 
content the Don’s eroticism. “In elemental sensuous- erotic originality, music 
has its absolute theme” (SKS 2:71 / EO 1:65).8 This opera, in its originality, 
is the perfection of the sensuous union between form and content, making it 
“demonic.” As Sylvia Walsh notes, “It is ‘demonic,’ being a medium for the 
expression of that which lies outside the realm of spirit.”9 It is demonic not in 
the sense of revealing demons but rather in the sense of being the opposite of 
the spiritual life of Christianity. Where Christianity calls one to hear and live 
by the Word of God, the language of the spirit, music calls one to hear and 
live by sensuous desire, natural inclinations, and unreflective immediacy. And 
it is this demonic calling that Don Giovanni perfects.
Idea Mediation
Another essential feature of “A’s” musical critique is how well music medi-
ates or expresses ideas. He thus develops music as a type of language. For 
“A,” language has two distinct forms: of words and of nonwords. A language 
of words expresses ideas, or as “A” calls it, “reflection,” in space and time: 
words, systematized into a language, determinately express ideas clearly and 
intelligibly. “A” calls this quality of determinacy “concretization.” Nonverbal 
languages include music, which can “legitimately [be] called a language,” as 
they also express ideas in the temporal sphere (SKS 2:73 / EO 1:67). Yet it is 
only words that can clearly articulate spiritual and existential ideas because 
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word- based “language, regarded as medium, is the medium absolutely quali-
fied by spirit, and it is therefore the authentic medium of the idea” (SKS 2:73 / 
EO 1:67). In short, in heavily Hegelian terms, “A” argues that words authen-
tically mediate spiritual truth.10 However, music revels in sensuality, which 
dissipates when faced with reflection and cognition. It thus lacks the formal 
ability to express ideas clearly; sensuality always saturates words within its 
own presentness, overwhelming their power to reveal any clear idea.
Underneath this view lies the conceptual distinction between abstraction 
and concretion. To make something “concrete” is to determine its meaning 
clearly. It is to make X be understood as meaning X within time (as past- 
present- future), space, and the human senses. And as concrete, the idea can 
be repeated, as “the more concrete and thus the richer the idea and likewise 
the medium, the greater the possibility of a repetition” (SKS 2:62 / EO 1:54). 
In its repeatability, a self becomes responsible for appropriating the idea; 
an intelligible idea accordingly expresses existential truth as understandable, 
one that can determine how one exists. So, like Hegel, “A” esteems word- 
based language as the most spiritually valuable medium as it states the idea 
most intelligibly.11
However, musical language, as typified by Don Giovanni, can express 
abstract ideas only in a prereflective, immediate language. “Reflection is fatal 
to the immediate,” meaning, “in other words, the immediate is the indeter-
minate” (SKS 2:76 / EO 1:70). In its ability to convey energy, vitality, and 
natural desire, music itself is what it mediates: eros. Being demonic, it is itself 
abstract, immediate, desirous energy that bubbles forth for a listener rather 
than any concrete, repeatable, and intelligible spiritual truth. Although there 
are other types of truths that music may express, “this is its absolute theme” 
(SKS 2:77 / EO 1:71). Sensuous desire is the highest, truest form of music, 
which Don Giovanni instantiates as both its form and content.
Consequently, even in “A’s” affirmation of sensuous music lies a presup-
position about the primacy for words for clarity about one’s existence. Words 
make ideas concrete; music only reveals abstraction. This point pushes us 
to recognize that at play in Kierkegaard’s thought is the Lutheran theologi-
cal pillar of sola scriptura as the determining mark for both theological and 
existential thinking. In Kierkegaard’s wider authorship, especially his period 
of direct communication (1848–51), several of his texts detail the existential 
relevance of the Bible. For instance, For Self-Examination (1851) states that 
like a love letter from a beloved, “God’s Word is just as precious to you as this 
letter is to the lover” (SKS 13:54 / FSE 26). We also see this in his affirmation 
of hymnody in his journals. Words matter, and not just any words, as “The 
Seducer’s Diary” in Either/Or I demonstrates; instead, only God’s love letter 
reveals the words that truly matter for existence.
Ever underneath “A’s” aesthetic lies Kierkegaard’s stress on the absolute 
need for clarity about the sinful yet saintly existence of being human, a clarity 
possible only through the Bible. Indeed, in his journals, he criticizes biblical 
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scholarship: “We have invented scholarship in order to evade doing God’s 
will. This much we certainly do understand— that face to face with God and 
his obviously understood will to say ‘This I will not do’— this no one dares 
to do. We do not dare do it that way, so we protect ourselves by making it 
seem as if it were very difficult to understand and that therefore we— he must 
indeed be flattered by this and regard it as praiseworthy in us— study and 
investigate etc., that is, we protect ourselves by hiding behind big books” 
(SKS 27:620, Papir 490, n.d. 1854 / JP 3:3597). Words matter for who we are 
to become, specifically words of Christian truth.
Existence-Communication
As the perfect union of sensuous form and erotic content amid the media-
tion of abstract immediacy, “A’s” musical aesthetic reveals to listeners a 
conception of existence in which ethical responsibility, moral reflection, and 
theological truth play no part. “A’s” critique plays a part in the notion of 
“existence-communication” that Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus develops 
in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (SKS 7:74– 84 / CUP 70– 85). Through-
out his authorship, his dominant concern is to provoke each person to care 
about the ethical form and content of his or her life.12 In short, what makes 
a person act? What does one love? What does one imagine being a “good” 
self might be?
“A,” and Either/Or I as a whole, thus are vital for Kierkegaard’s indirect 
communication of the aesthetic stage of existence. The aesthetic stage is a 
concept (along with the ethical and religious stages) that provides a heuristic 
device for a reader to reflect on the values, actions, and relations that make 
the reader a particular person. An aesthete is someone who is unconcerned 
with ethical codes and a life of faith. One lives for worldly beauty; one fears 
boredom, critical thought, and ethical responsibility. And music, as “A” devel-
ops it, communicates this model of existence.
As an aesthete, “A” seduces a reader into two understandings about music, 
both of which indirectly ask one to examine the values, commitments, and 
relationship within one’s form of life. First, “A” describes how Don Giovanni 
enacts a musical seduction within the opera itself. Music, as the highest mode 
of immediacy, is the stage for an operatic example of erotic seduction between 
the characters. The music itself here exemplifies unexamined, natural desire. 
“A’s” underlying impulse is that any listener will be captivated and become an 
“admirer” of the Don’s life, as Kierkegaard states in “In Vino Veritas.” Being 
accessible to anyone, “A” erotically seduces one into inhabiting the world of 
this sensual- erotic opera.
As a consequence, “A” seduces readers into the Don’s existence. He strives 
to have readers connect their passion with the Don’s musical desire that 
imaginatively asks them to fall in love with the erotic shape of the Don’s way 
of life. “A” celebrates such sensuality and immediacy. He wants readers to 
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imagine existing through natural passion and the vitality of sensuous desire, 
a form of life modeled by the Don.
“A” thus plays a vital role in developing the archetypical shape of the 
aesthetic stage within the Kierkegaardian corpus by presenting this erotic 
Don, ever ignorant of developing an ethical or faithful self- consciousness. 
And this existential seduction suggests that “A’s” ironic concern is that some-
one listening to Don Giovanni might then realize the emptiness and abstract 
nature of the sensuous- erotic. Though seemingly exhilarating, erotic desire is 
neither repeatable nor peaceful, for sensuality has an endless supply of things 
to desire. There is always another Zerlina around the corner. Like musical 
immediacy, the Don lacks any self- integrity as he lives merely in the present 
moment; his desire causes him constantly to flit from one object and rela-
tionship to another. “A’s” ironic aim in this musical seduction is to leave the 
reader wanting more, especially of a type of life in which the emptiness and 
endless nature of desire is reshaped (or “qualified,” in “A’s” words) to desire 
true, spiritual things.
The vacuity of “A’s” depiction of the Don’s life calls upon the reader to 
desire a more reflective, responsible life. One particularly relevant example 
is the ethical life developed in, among other places, Kierkegaard’s Either/
Or II, written under the pseudonym Judge William. Indeed, “A’s” argument 
is not a solitary critique but rather part of an either/or choice related to the 
existence stages: either the Don’s aesthetic life or the Judge’s ethical life. “A” 
thus links the lower, sensual life with ethical life by creating a musical jux-
taposition between spirit and sensuality by arguing that music’s sensuality is 
always qualified, always intertwined with spirit. As posited by Christianity, 
sensuality is always connected to the spiritual; as a body and a spirit, one is 
ever amid a both/and rather than an either/or (as in either a natural body or 
an infinite spirit). “That is, it is qualified by spirit and therefore is power, life, 
movement, continual unrest, continual succession. But this unrest, this suc-
cession, does not enrich it; it continually remains the same; it does not unfold 
but incessantly rushes forward as if in a single breath” (SKS 2:77 / EO 1:71). 
A listener of Don Giovanni hears the erotic amid a complexity of relations, 
and in particular between sensuality and spirituality. There is no pure sensu-
ality as such, as even music is infused with spirit.
Yet, by implication, to hear music in the right manner requires that a 
listener intentionally respond to music as an existential either/or: either it 
is mere sensuality, imaginatively snatching the listener away from ethical 
responsibility (and into the aesthetic stage of life) or it is both sensuous and 
spiritual, requiring the listener’s consciousness to “qualify” it as an existen-
tially formative experience (and thereby to be snatched into the ethical and 
religious stages). When placed in this existential frame, the choice “A” pre-
sents is not either music or not- music but rather a call for the listener to hear 
music rightly, notably its sensuous elements, as ever intertwined with spiritu-
ality. As such, hearing rightly means hearing it as ennobling a passion for the 
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world, becoming ethical, and affirming spiritual truth (as in rightly knowing 
God). But hearing it wrongly means accepting the consequences of living a 
life like the Don’s.
Consequently, “A’s” musicality overlaps with the existential either/or that 
Kierkegaard enacts between the two types of existence forms exemplified by 
the Don and the Judge. Reading Either/Or I is ever juxtaposed to the form of 
life offered by William in Either/Or II; the aesthete “A” is ever in conversation 
with William. To best understand the outlines of “A’s” argument, one must 
read William’s life, and vice versa. Through “A’s” erotic seduction, Kierke-
gaard is thus challenging readers to a deeper consciousness about how one 
lives as he uses the mask of “A” to ironically affirm the sensuous- erotic life.
This view gains depth when understood in relation to several other caveats 
to “A’s” critique. For one, Mozart’s Don Giovanni was widely adapted and 
altered during Kierkegaard’s lifetime. Compared to the premiere in Prague 
in 1787, the opera Kierkegaard heard most likely had a number of modi-
fications. Elisabete de Sousa observes, “Besides adding dramatic material 
borrowed from Molière, [translator Laurids Kruse] not only suppressed all 
recitatives in favor of spoken dialogue, but altered the structural development 
of the scenes and omitted the scene ultima, the whole following the structural 
pattern of the Singspiel.”13 The omission of the scene ultima is particularly 
significant for “A’s” view. The final scene follows the Don’s fiery death and 
descent to hell as a result of his lack of repentance. Here, the characters sing 
about the consequences of sinful actions with lines such as “This is the end 
which befalls evildoers. And in this life scoundrels always receive their just 
deserts!”14 Kruse likely omitted these scenes because he “disapproved of the 
use of recitatives and looked suspiciously on opera as a dramatic genre, on 
ethical and on aesthetical grounds.”15 Had this scene been included, “A’s” 
argument that Don Giovanni reveals only sensuous desire would have been 
more difficult to support, to say the least, what with the ethical ending.
Additionally, Kierkegaard admits the possibility that the music could have 
been different. Two years before the publication of Either/Or, Kierkegaard 
writes in his journals, “Precisely because he has been presented musically, D. 
Giovanni’s natural genius has clearly been accentuated; if one so wished, one 
could present a more reflective D.G. by way of recourse to the arbitrary. thus 
[sic] he seduces a girl not because he finds himself at all affected by her, but 
she awakens a pleasant memory; as a pastime he will see if it can be made 
real; or she arouses a pleasant memory,— [which will] always remain beyond 
his grasp” (SKS 19:238, Notesbog 8:41, n.d. 1841 / KJN 3:232). This entry 
implies that there could have been a more reflective, thoughtful Don; the Don 
could have been less erotic. But by implication, “A’s” suggestion that music is 
essentially sensual is a false claim, a possibility that Kierkegaard does incor-
porate into “A’s” argument, however.
Consequently, “A” writes as an aesthete in order to develop an aesthetic 
form of existence: the unreflective life, a life lived through natural passion 
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and erotic desire, a life ungrounded in the spiritual. Developing a clear musi-
cal aesthetic is thus not the primary concern. Placed alongside Either/Or II 
and the ethical deliberations of Judge William, Mozart’s Don Giovanni is 
the means to help readers think about how they live their lives. His view 
brilliantly captures in words, ironically, the sensuous and aural beauty of 
Mozart, but largely with an aim of moving readers into a deeper engagement 
with ways of being in the world. Music can then become a component of 
an examined life rather than just a part of life caused by the admiration and 
affirmation of sensuous desire.
Movement Two: Schoenberg’s Moses and Aaron
Yet, despite these deeper presuppositions, “A’s” development of an opposition 
between musical sensuality and the spiritual is frequently taken as reflect-
ing Kierkegaard’s view. For instance, Hans Urs von Balthasar writes that 
Kierkegaard, as well as Karl Barth, “warn us against overstepping the estab-
lished boundaries [of music], saying that, if we attempt this nonetheless, we 
are doomed either to naïve banalities or to irrelevant abstractions.”16 As a 
result, prima facie, “A’s” musical aesthetic challenges any clear affirmation of 
the inclusion of music within the Christian life.
Such views read Kierkegaard as using “A” to develop a musical aesthetic 
rather than primarily as the means to communicate one model of existence. 
One means by which to deepen this argument is to compare “A’s” argument 
with another musical frame of reference. Doing so enables Kierkegaard’s 
affirmation of the power of words to contain truth, a claim at the heart of 
“A’s” negative critique of music as well as exemplified in his journals, to 
emerge more clearly. It can also then reveal the polemical yet limited idea of 
the nature of music that Kierkegaard works through “A” to present a model 
of an aesthetic existence. Schoenberg’s Moses and Aaron is one such musi-
cal work.
Why? For one, both Don Giovanni and Moses and Aaron are operas 
and therefore have a connection to human words and thought as well as 
music. For another, both works develop their insights by focusing on the 
communicative power of music, especially about the effectiveness of music 
in clarifying word- based ideas. Finally, both see human desire as part of the 
content expressed in and moved by music. Yet, where this comparison is 
most fruitful is in the underlying concept of music. Whereas “A” sees in Don 
Giovanni the perfection of the sensual- erotic that is the essence of music, 
Schoenberg crafts Moses and Aaron to destabilize the power of words to 
mediate truth. Both then, though in different ways, relate to ideas about the 
nature of theological and ethical claims; “A” offers a playful exploration of 
Don Giovanni that is framed by Kierkegaard’s work to upbuild his readers, 
while Moses and Aaron toys with the inability to articulate God and the 
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difficulties inherent in living out such a reality. This comparison suggests that 
“A’s” argumentative presuppositions, alongside Kierkegaard’s appreciation 
of hymnody, can give further impetus to opening a space for a positive role 
for music to play in Christian becoming within his thought.
Schoenberg composed Moses and Aaron between 1930 and 1932. It has 
three acts, only loosely based on Exodus, as little attention is given to the 
liberation of the Israelites. Though ethnically Jewish, Schoenberg was a con-
vert to Protestantism, so his source text was the Lutheran Bible rather than 
the Buber- Rosenzweig German translation of the Hebrew Bible. In the first 
act, God calls Moses to lead the Israelites out of Egypt, with Aaron as his 
tongue.17 Moses lacks the conviction that he can truly speak for the “one, 
infinite, omnipresent, unperceived and unrepresentable God,” the true libera-
tor.18 The second act details Moses’s reception of the Ten Commandments as 
Aaron sets up a golden calf for the restless Israelites, ever desiring a visible 
symbol of God. The third act, for which the music was never completed, 
depicts a trial scene where Moses judges Aaron for his idolatry.
The primary theme of the opera is the impossibility of representing the 
divine in thought, word, or material object. By implication, one made most 
clearly in the depiction of Moses’s view of the Ten Commandments as being 
an idol, visions of a life grounded in claims about God are also problematic. 
The opera instantiates this view by having Moses refuse to see in words the 
power to name God’s being, whereas Aaron fluently uses language and exter-
nal things to represent God. Doing so, as Bluma Goldstein puts it, means that 
“the opera attempted to resolve the communicative dilemma of language— of 
word, image, symbol— to transmit the idea” of God as unrepresentable.19 
Connecting the conceptual categories used in the previous section to Moses 
and Aaron shows that the opera unites a dissonant aural form with the 
human desire for, yet the impossibility to clarify, God’s nature as the opera’s 
content. The opera thus mediates the attempt to represent God within the 
finite as both an internal and an external struggle for humanity.
Form and Content
As in Don Giovanni, commentators note the perfection of form and content 
in Moses and Aaron. Adorno states, “The a priori impossibility of sacred art 
today and the problematic nature of skill regarded as something that aspires 
to perfection form a perfect fit in the Moses opera.”20 At the root of this 
perfection is a critique of sensuality; Schoenberg sought to free the musical 
form from an overemphasis on sensual harmony. He developed an “atonal” 
method of composition, known as serialism or twelve- tone music. Unlike the 
sensual, erotic harmonies and the “exuberant gaiety” of Mozart, the music is 
atonal and sparse. “The opera begins with a series of notes that express God’s 
presence at the scene of the burning bush,” observes Lora Batnitzky. “These 
opening notes are the only text- expressive idea or theme dominating the 
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opera. However, with the communication of God’s self to Moses, the notes 
begin to sound distorted.”21 At the formal level, Schoenberg de- sensualizes 
music such that it no longer has the sensual power that “A” finds so moving 
in Don Giovanni.
For instance, traditional operatic form requires that the libretto be sung, 
thereby intertwining the music and words. Yet, Schoenberg deconstructs 
this formal relationship by contrasting words that are sung with words that 
are spoken. Whereas Aaron sings, Moses speaks his own part in the man-
ner known as Sprechstimme. In Elliot Gyger’s words, “Within the norms of 
the operatic world, someone who speaks rather than singing is dealing with 
a great handicap, unable to communicate in a ‘normal’ way with the other 
characters.”22 Aaron, as the singer, is the idolater, believing that operatic 
words, the “normal” operatic form of expression, can concretely represent 
God. Schoenberg is playing with the musical form such that it breaks down 
because it itself has become an idol, a rigid, established set of formulaic rules.
But as such, unlike “A’s” view that music is about sensual harmony and 
erotic desire, Moses and Aaron’s orchestration uses abrasive instruments and 
orchestration to assault the senses. For example, in the second act’s orgy 
scene, the orchestration moves from relatively quiet strings to an agitated 
drum- and brass- filled explosion of wild drunkenness. The scene has no 
tonal, harmonic center, and like its subject material, the overall musical effect 
is itself of desire gone haywire, lost. Ironically, this scene would work well 
with “A’s” linkage of music with the aesthetic stage, for it is a desire for 
human bodies and sensual pleasure.
Working with this thematic, Schoenberg presents humans as being desir-
ous creatures, and, in particular, the opera suggests that they fundamentally 
have a desire for clarity about the nature of God. To repeat an expression 
from more than one earlier quotation, this is the “absolute theme” of the 
opera, and thus its existential content. So whereas “A” views music as an 
erotic power, thereby linking sensuous form with an ethical content rooted in 
natural passion, Schoenberg connects music’s sensuous form with a negative 
content: the human desire for, yet the impossibility of, the articulation of a 
decisive foundation to know God and a life rooted in this truth.
Idea Mediation
But as a result, Schoenberg’s work suggests the impossibility of concretizing 
truth, whether linguistically or mentally. For instance, within the libretto, 
which Schoenberg composed, this impossibility is enacted in the dialogue 
between Moses and Aaron. Whereas Moses desires but is unable to speak 
or to find sensual expression of the divine, Aaron speaks in order to find a 
sensual image. Indeed, Moses eventually destroys the tablets of the moral 
law after he realizes that they too are idolatrous, full of finite, vague words; 
even ethical ideals are unstable. The climax of the opera is at the end of act 
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2, when Moses says, “O word, thou word, that I lack” (MA 60). This utter-
ance is in reaction to Aaron’s claim, amid the creation of the golden calf, 
that no one can “worship what one dare not even represent” (MA 27). Any 
human expression of God, and the existential ideals rooted in knowledge of 
the divine, is thus abstract, only a partial truth at best. Any attempt even at 
delimiting a representation of God fails, what with the finite, limited nature 
of human speaking and thinking.
Schoenberg’s musical orchestration mediates this perspective. For example, 
in act 1, scene 1, Moses sees God as the burning bush, but says, “My tongue is 
not flexible: thought is easy; speech is laborious” (MA 25). Although Moses 
finds thinking “easy,” one commentator even argues that all of Moses’s lines 
are actually thoughts and that, in the end, his thoughts shade into the realm 
of idolatry and impossibility. God has a full voice; Schoenberg uses singers 
(both adults and children), wood instruments, and speakers (both adults and 
children) to depict God when calling Moses through the burning bush. Musi-
cally representing God thus requires using all the forms of operatic utterance 
available as a means to juxtapose the transcendent divine nature with the 
temporal nature of humans. In opposition to this full musical expression 
lies Moses’s attempt to express verbally the idea of God. As Gyger puts it, 
Moses’s “opening words delimit his idea of God, which he will adhere to 
for the rest of the opera.”23 Such a delimitation is limited, merely human, 
and thus always a failure in relationship to any true understanding of God. 
Unlike “A’s” underlying affirmation of the power of words to concretize truth, 
in Schoenberg’s view, human words, thoughts, and deeds all fail to concretize 
God, and the vision of life that follows is thus itself unstable.
If anything, Schoenberg uses music to mediate not abstract immediacy 
but rather desire, truth, and impossibility. He connects human thinking with 
conceptual ideas, revealing the idolatrous nature of our ideas about ultimate 
things. The opera mixes the profane with the sacred, the sensuous with the 
spiritual, suggesting that there is no pure position, no confident founda-
tion upon which to speak or think about transcendent matters. What then 
becomes clear is not a representation of God but a deeper insight about the 
human condition: the desire for precision about the truths we live by, yet the 
very impossibility of such truth.
It is this mediacy that offers a profound challenge to “A’s” musical con-
ception, for it speaks to the power of music to provoke self- reflection in 
the mind of a listener. “A,” while never making an explicit claim about the 
divine, nonetheless stresses that words make ideas and spirit concrete. But 
as such, he affirms the possibility of concretizing the idea of God, something 
Schoenberg suggests is impossible. This comparison then gives greater depth 
to the claim that underneath “A’s” view is Kierkegaard’s affirmation of sola 
scriptura. Even for “A,” words about God flow out from the clarity offered in 
the Word of God; there is thus a reliable foundation for thinking about God 
and the human- divine relationship.
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Existence-Communication
The clearest difference between “A’s” aesthetic and Schoenberg’s work lies 
in the shape of the relationship between the music and listener or performer. 
Rather than enveloping one in a harmonious bubble of sensuous- erotic love, 
Moses and Aaron communicates the pain and frustration that comes with 
desiring clarity about the divine. This type of communication arises because, 
as Adorno puts it, Schoenberg’s opera communicates an “absolute metaphys-
ical content,” one that places the opera in the realm of other great works 
of art that are “destroyed in the process and their broken outlines survive 
as the ciphers of a supreme unnamable truth.”24 The opera deals with the 
impossibility of naming transcendence in the finite realm; it deconstructs the 
possibility about being certain about the nature of God. Like Moses’s rec-
ognition of the idolatry inherent even in the moral law, a life grounded in 
confidence in one’s view of God is a form of idolatry.
In Schoenberg’s hands, music expresses the impurity of human thinking 
when it comes to divine things, and the impossibility of the communica-
tion of God’s essence. “He uses the distortion of the notes,” writes Batnitzky, 
“which reaches its height in the character of Aron, to reflect the implicit 
tension that arises in the finite human’s desire to know the infinite God. . . . 
The point is that the problem of idolatry and representation is one intrinsic 
to the relationship between the human and God.”25 The finite cannot contain 
the infinite; in Moses and Aaron, neither music nor words can concretize the 
divine. This leads another scholar to conclude, “In the end, perhaps all music 
is contaminated and compromised by its very audibility, its motility, its lack 
of changelessness.”26 Words and thought are contaminated as well. In this 
end, it is this frustration that the opera communicates, leading listeners into 
their own dialectical web of possibility and impossibility to see the failure of 
human words.
Consequently, Moses and Aaron seductively plays with both the human 
desire to think of God and also, nonetheless, the reflective awareness that 
such concretization is impossible. Words and music work together to express 
the desire for reflection and clarity as such, but both fail in the process. 
Whereas “A” sees a life based on natural desire inherent in music’s sensuality, 
Schoenberg uses dissonance such that there is little to no pleasing harmonic 
sensuality. In Moses and Aaron, sensuality hurts the ear, and a listener is not 
seduced into further sensual desire but left amid the tension of saying some-
thing yet nothing about God.
In fact, rather than a seduction into sensual desire, the opera negates har-
monious sensuousness as the means to confuse and frustrate the listener into 
an awareness about the impossibility of naming transcendence. The form of 
desire enacted by Schoenberg’s opera is the desire to surpass human limits 
and to know God. But this desire in the end is futile; it fails, and like Moses, 
the listener must acknowledge that any and all worldly representations of 
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God are themselves idols. Rather than the desire for endless erotic conquests 
and an aesthetic life, Schoenberg’s desire leads to the frustrating and painful 
understanding that the human desire to find certainty about the ineffable is 
a doomed project.
While “A” suggests that music such as Don Giovanni is mere immediate 
presentness within the temporal scheme, Schoenberg’s opera makes the lis-
tener a part of the very problematic tension he is exploring. The listener is 
listening to an idol, experiencing the frustration of wanting to say something 
positive about God yet being unable to do so. As a result, here music calls one 
to become not an erotically driven Don Juan but a frustrated Moses.
Some Kierkegaardian Implications
This comparison clarifies a number of implications about Kierkegaard’s view 
of music. For one, in relation to “A’s” critique, Schoenberg’s work is a helpful 
reminder of the narrow frame through which “A” defines music. “A’s” expli-
cation focuses on only a certain kind of music, one exemplified by Mozart’s 
opera, rather than a grand musical theory that can encompass all forms of 
music. “A’s” view of music even runs counter to Kierkegaard’s affirmation of 
hymnody in his journals.
Second, because of this narrow focus, when placed within Kierkegaard’s 
broader existential authorship, “A” in reality uses this particular musical 
work to paint a seductive picture of the aesthetic life. His aim is to con-
struct music as instantiating an existence driven by erotic desire and sensual 
immediacy. And Mozart’s music expresses this sensuous, abstract desire to 
perfection. The words the Don sings, combined with the music, brim with 
eroticism rather than any spiritual truth. As a result, “A’s” musical aesthetic 
is limited; he chooses one particular example and uses that to explore the 
aesthetic life rather than develop a robust conception of music itself.
Finally, and more important, considering “A” and Kierkegaard along-
side of Schoenberg adds greater depth to the argument that Kierkegaard 
believes there is a stable foundation on which to understand God (even in 
the paradoxical form of Christ) as well as human life: the Bible. Music, when 
linked to such truths, can affirmatively impact Christian becoming. Whereas 
Schoenberg destabilizes word- grounded truth, “A” presents music as an alter-
native to verbal language, one rooted in eroticism and desire. But to do so 
he yet remains confident in the power of words to express truths that matter 
to moral formation. This claim gains further depth in recognizing that in 
Kierkegaard’s own life, music, especially when connected to biblical truth, 
positively shaped his relationship to the world and his own self- development.
Don Giovanni, in “A’s” presentation of it, is then an antihymn. It tears a per-
son away from attending to the true words that matter: biblically expressed, 
Christian truth. It also speaks to the passionate, desirous dimensions of a self 
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in such a way that it charms one away from concern over being intentional 
about the type of life one lives. Music, with its power to affect human emo-
tions and desires, when allied with Christian truth, can positively shape a self 
in its growth in the Christian life. But the opposite effect is possible as well; 
music can thus be an ally of Christian truth; it is never an end in itself but 
always a dimension of becoming a Christian subject.
This essay has used the comparison between “A’s” argument and Moses and 
Aaron as a means to develop a better picture of Kierkegaard’s musical aes-
thetic. A variety of larger questions yet remain. For instance, are hymns the 
only type of genuinely Christian music? Can Don Giovanni ever be redeemed 
and appreciated within the Christian life? Can there ever be nonword- based 
Christian music? Yet, the overall shape of Kierkegaard’s musical aesthetic 
suggests that these questions arise from an incorrect foundational assump-
tion. Rather than a thoughtful elaboration of music itself, his attention is 
on how one hears and interprets music amid the highest task of existing as 
a Christian. Kierkegaard’s overall point is that any act of listening to music 
must be framed or “qualified” by the divinely given words that shape Chris-
tian existence. Thus, listening to music is ever a part of one’s ethical and 
religious development.
In fact, music, like other arts, is a relative project in the process of becom-
ing a Christian. His authorship as a whole, full of beautiful twists and turns, 
offers a rhetorically beautiful example of just this aim. He uses his pen to pro-
voke his readers to care about the type of person they are becoming. Music 
too is a form of “existence- communication” amid the cacophony of every-
day life. And like writing, in this subjective task, music, particularly when 
linked to words that mediate Christian truth, can actually aid an individual 
in the provocative, self- reflective practices prominently featured throughout 
his authorship. But it can also tear one away from deeply reflecting on and 
enacting a higher form of existence. As a result, what matters most is how 
one listens to music in the never- ending process of becoming a true, Christian 
subject.
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Kierkegaard, Dylan, and Masked and 
Anonymous Neighbor- Love
Jamie A. Lorentzen
Although the lyrics of Bob Dylan (b. 1941) offer evidence of his familiarity 
with many philosophers and poets, it is unclear if he has read any works by 
Søren Kierkegaard. Still, the two thinkers have more in common than thin 
legs, big hair, and an appreciation for the power of both sacred and pro-
fane music. Among other things, they are poets of mighty opposites, both 
dialectical and paradoxical. They are earnestly funny while simultaneously 
qualifying as unorthodox penitents. They also respect the other (the neigh-
bor) in the development of each individual’s full humanity— and they prefer 
to pay their respects in great part in disguise.
Regarding his respect for the neighbor, Dylan writes in 2004 about some-
thing he read in the early 1960s: “I came across one of [Arthur Rimbaud’s] 
letters called ‘Je est un autre’ [I is an other]. . . . When I read those words bells 
went off. It made perfect sense.”1 Characteristically, Dylan does not elaborate 
on how the nineteenth- century French poet’s words made “perfect sense” to 
him then. He writes about it later in his career, however, like an epiphany, like 
a destiny that tolled for him: “Bells went off.”2
As a bell- ringing epiphany, “I is an other” calls home Dylan’s apparently 
disparate body of work, particularly the lion’s share of his songs that treat 
love in its many forms, especially romantic- erotic love, friendship, neighbor- 
love, and divine love. Just as Rimbaud’s “I is an other” offers some direction 
home to Dylan’s thought and vision, Kierkegaard’s sense about I and other 
(self and neighbor) helps pave the way: “The concept ‘neighbor’ is actually the 
redoubling of your own self; ‘the neighbor’ is what thinkers call ‘the other,’ 
that by which the selfishness in self- love is to be tested” (SKS 9:29 / WL 21). 
In this context, “I is an other” is what Kierkegaard would call the Archime-
dean point for Dylan, or that point at which individual genius may move the 
world (see, e.g., SKS 19:200, Notesbog 6:24, n.d. 1840 / KJN 3:196). “I is 
an other” informs Dylan’s corpus as a whole, bringing it all back home. The 
phrase alone allies seemingly antipathetic aspects of Dylan’s aesthetic, ethi-
cal, and religious personae in the same way Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Judge 
William sees how aesthetic, ethical, and religious aspects of a person must be 
allied to make life meaningful (SKS 3:145 / EO 2:147).
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Aesthetics and Poetic Freedom
Kierkegaard speaks through hundreds of imaginative constructions he con-
jures by his own masked and pseudonymous voices and characters. Of his 
formidable pseudonymity and poet- communication, he writes that they have 
“not had an accidental basis in my person . . . but an essential basis in the 
production itself.” Consequently, Kierkegaard is “impersonally or personally 
in the third person a souffleur [prompter] who has poetically produced the 
authors. . . . Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by 
me” (SKS 7:569– 70 / CUP 1:625–26).
Similarly, “I is an other” offers Dylan aesthetic license to form narrative 
voices, characters, and stage personae that people his own mosaic of the world. 
With or without inlay of his own opinions, values, or beliefs, Dylan populates 
his world by first imaginatively walking in the shoes of one character or narra-
tor after another. “I is an other” offers Dylan the means by which he may cast a 
kind of “infinite sweep of humanity” that he saw cast in the work of folk musi-
cian Woody Guthrie (1912–1967),3 that is, the organizing principle to compose, 
with succinct words and phrases, hundreds of highly individualized characters.
With a gifted imagination and a powerful associative memory, Dylan’s 
own poet- communication engenders a vast progeny of human portraits and 
voices: a girl with a leopard- skin pillbox hat, a lone pilgrim, a one- eyed 
midget, a politician with jogging shoes, a lonesome organ grinder crying, 
Charles Darwin trapped out there on Highway 5, a guilty undertaker sighing, 
a tambourine man, Miss Lonelies, a dreamer of St. Augustine, a not- so- dear 
landlord, poor immigrants, lonesome hoboes, scores of babies and sweethearts 
and ladies and mommas and wanted men and minstrel boys— a seemingly 
never- ending tour of humanity. (The peripatetic Kierkegaard equally drew a 
vast and multifaceted portrait of so many human beings he acutely observed 
on his own virtually never- ending tour of humanity along the streets and side 
streets of Copenhagen.)
Nor would Dylan avoid responsibly claiming his villainous, saintly, inno-
cent, experienced offspring. You may call him Terry, Timmy, Bobby, Zimmy, 
R.J., Ray, Jack Fate, Whiteface, and even Lucky or Boo Wilbury, just as you 
may unwittingly or surreptitiously call Kierkegaard by some sixteen or so 
pseudonyms. No matter what you say, the responsive, responsible Dylan is 
gonna have to serve somebody. It may be the devil of Faustian faces or it may 
be the Lord of poignantly human voices, but he’s gonna have to serve some-
body. He knows it. He wrote the song (“Gotta Serve Somebody”).
Aesthetics and Personhood
Masks also help protect Dylan from those attempting (to paraphrase from 
Dylan’s “To Ramona”) to hype him or type him or make him feel that he 
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must be exactly like them. In this context, Dylan is not only aesthetically but 
also existentially solid, a man masking his personal self to reveal the authen-
tic literary- musical self that is his renown and legacy. Of the metaphysics 
of personhood and the fundamental roles that appearances and masks play, 
Kierkegaard scholar Howard Hong has song- and- dance men like Dylan 
in mind:
The Latin persona means a mask used by actors to identify the char-
acter represented and as an aid in projecting the voice. The word 
itself is derived from per, meaning “through” and sonare, “to sound.” 
Therefore a person is the one who sounds through the mask or the 
various masks seen by others. The person is not the mask of function, 
type, class, or social- economical- political relations but is the agent, 
the responder, the thinker, one who acts . . . one who bears the exter-
nal mask or masks that others see. The mask is indeed the person’s 
mask but the person is not synonymous with the mask and is not 
exhausted by the aggregate of his masks.4
Kierkegaard, along with several of his pseudonyms, repeatedly cites the 
French statesman Talleyrand as allegedly having said “Man did not acquire 
speech in order to reveal his thoughts but in order to conceal them” (SKS 
1:292  / CI 253; see also SKS 4:409– 10  / CA 108; SKS 6:315  / SLW 339; 
SKS 18:208, JJ:212, n.d. 1844 / KJN 2:191; Pap. V B 115:2, n.d. 1844 / JP 
3:2322; SKS 26:283, NB33:42, n.d. 1854  / JP 4:3870). Words and speech 
equally prove revelatory to listeners of Dylan’s characters and narrators. And 
understanding language is, according to Hong, “our best means to get behind 
the masks.”5
The artist formerly known as Robert Zimmerman thereby has, like every-
body else (including the man in his “Man in the Long Black Coat”), “a face 
like a mask.” Dylan’s narrator in “Abandoned Love” makes this opacity 
transparent: “Everybody’s wearing a disguise / To hide what they’ve got left 
behind their eyes.” But his literary persona— Bob Dylan— is equally transpar-
ent: “But me, I can’t cover what I am / Wherever the children go I’ll follow 
them.”6 Wherever, that is, the progeny of his fecund imagination (his songs) 
go, he will follow them, for Dylan finds “the religiosity and philosophy in the 
music” and nowhere else. “Songs like ‘Let Me Rest on a Peaceful Mountain’ 
or ‘I Saw the Light’— that’s my religion. I don’t adhere to rabbis, preachers, 
evangelists, all of that. I’ve learned more from the songs than I’ve learned 
from any of this kind of entity. The songs are my lexicon. I believe the songs.”7
At the 1964 Halloween Night Carnegie Hall concert, Dylan informed the 
audience that he was wearing his Bob Dylan mask. Before that, the young 
folk singer spun creation myths of being in places he had never been (like 
jail) and doing things he had never done (like joining the circus).8 The title of 
his 2003 film, Masked and Anonymous, directed by Larry Charles, confirms 
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Dylan’s reliance over time on not so much demonic concealment but what 
Kierkegaard would call “pious fraud.” Along with Kierkegaard, Dylan can 
say, “In a sense I began my activity as an author with a falsum [deception] or 
with pia fraus [pious fraud]” (SKS 21:19, including 19m:1– 2, NB6:21, n.d. 
1848 / KJN 5:16, including 16m:1). Even back then he knew his back pages: 
that he “who sings with his tongue on fire” must always protect it from “the 
rat race choir” and “society’s pliers” (“It’s Alright, Ma [I’m Only Bleeding]”). 
Not only was Dylan older then, he was younger then, too, existing in a sort 
of Kierkegaardian second ignorance behind and beyond his rightful time (see, 
e.g., SKS 10:37– 39 / CD 25– 27).
There is, then, reason in the rhyme of Dylan’s aesthetic foundation that 
Kierkegaard would endorse: “An author certainly must have his private per-
sonality as everyone has, but this must be his ἄδῠτον [inner sanctum] . . . as 
the entrance to a house is barred by stationing two soldiers with crossed 
bayonets” (SKS 8:94 / TA 99). By not protecting an inwardness out of which 
black and bright truths in song may be sung, Dylan might not know his song 
well before he starts singing (see “A Hard Rain’s A- Gonna Fall”). His falsum 
or pia fraus installs footings of a healthy self- love that preserves a genius and 
founds a towering literary- musical edifice. Not preserving such privacy amid 
the world’s “mixed- up confusion” could have killed at least the poet in him. 
“There’s too many people and they’re all too hard to please” (“Mixed- Up 
Confusion”).
Ethics and Social Justice
Born Jewish in a predominantly Christian American culture, Duluth native 
Robert Zimmerman was heavily influenced by American folk and gospel 
music and their Christian themes. The songs’ messages likely lay the ground-
work for his late- 1970s conversion to Christianity. His 1962 debut album 
includes arrangements of two Christian gospel songs, “In My Time of Dyin’ ” 
and “Gospel Plow.” Since then, scholars have inventoried and investigated 
hundreds of biblical references and Christian allusions in his canon.
The period that produced Dylan’s evangelical albums (Slow Train Coming, 
1979; Saved, 1980; and Shot of Love, 1981) shows him proclaiming Chris-
tianity and the need to love God. For a convert, this proclamation reasonably 
responds to the first of the two love commandments on which, according to 
Matthew 22:34– 40, hang all laws and prophets. Along the line of Kierke-
gaard’s indirect forms of communication, however, the more nuanced pathos 
of Dylan’s religiosity, philosophy, and ethics takes stage before and after this 
period. These pre- and postevangelical sets spotlight the second love com-
mandment (love your neighbor as yourself) through lyrical expressions of so 
many human actions that lack neighbor- love amid civil unrest, restless loves, 
and restive mobs.
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Despite (or perhaps because of) his musical upbringing and conversion, 
Dylan learned early that humans regularly fall short of and are in need of 
voices with messages that run deeper than either the longing for requited 
romantic love or oaths of friendship in which most pop songs find their 
themes— voices with messages of neighbor- love that echo the civil rights, 
protest, and gospel songs of Woody Guthrie and other folk artist greats. 
Neighbor- love especially informs many of Dylan’s love songs by subordinat-
ing romantic- erotic love and friendship. It also blows the whistle on unruly 
crowds.
“I is an other” subsequently takes on ethical qualifications, including a 
compassionate and egalitarian sense of social justice that enlists the self, the 
I, to move toward the other, the lowly, the needy, the down- trodden, the 
disenfranchised, the outcast. Here, “I is an other” neither appeals to quid pro 
quo nor offers much room for reciprocal- based romance and friendship (i.e., 
preferential, like- for- like, possessive, mine- thine relationships by which the 
selfishness in self- love is tested). Writes Kierkegaard:
Erotic love [Elskov] and friendship . . . contain no moral task. . . . 
Erotic love is defined by the object; friendship is defined by the 
object; only love for the neighbor is defined by love [Kjerlighed]. . . . 
Love [Kjerlighed] is a matter of conscience and thus is not a mat-
ter of [erotic] drives and inclination, or  .  .  . feeling. (SKS 9:57, 73, 
145 / WL 50–51, 66, 143, emphasis in original)
This is perhaps why, before abandoning a romantic love in “Abandoned 
Love,” the narrator claims, “I march in the parade of liberty / But as long as 
I love you I’m not free.” Such abandoned romantic- erotic love and friendship 
ennoble Dylan’s neighbor- love message to inform songs of protest and social 
justice.
Ethical bells ringing for justice chime, for instance, when “I is an other” 
tolls with compassion for the other in Dylan’s “Chimes of Freedom.” Here, 
“majestic bells” of lightning bolts strike “shadows in the sounds” that seem 
“to be the chimes of freedom flashing.” Such bells toll for all, including
warriors whose strength is not to fight . . . 
refugees on the unarmed road of flight
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
the mistreated, mateless mother, the mistitled prostitute . . . 
the misdemeanor outlaw, chased an’ cheated by pursuit.
Elsewhere, in “Thunder on the Mountain,” the narrator sings, “Gonna forget 
about myself for a while, gonna go out and see what others need.” In “With 
God on Our Side,” Dylan’s song about religious self- righteousness that deigns 
to justify wars, the narrator’s name, “it ain’t nothing,” and his age, “it means 
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less.” Focus is not on the needs of a singer but on the needy in the song, not 
on the messenger but on the message. Such narrators mold masks of ano-
nymity from a solid ethical cast of actuality that Kierkegaard would humbly 
applaud: “Would that you in silence might forget yourself, what you yourself 
are called, your own name, the famous name, the wretched name, the insig-
nificant name” (SV1 11:21 / WA 18–19).
Ethics and Romantic- Erotic Love
Kierkegaard advises the multitudes who may see themselves as prima donnas, 
lovers, and friends who naturally and regularly try to upstage neighbor- love 
at every turn: “The love commandment . . . simply says, ‘You shall love your 
neighbor.’ Just as this commandment will teach everyone how to love oneself, 
so it also will teach erotic love and friendship genuine love; in loving yourself, 
preserve love for the neighbor; in erotic love and friendship, preserve love for 
the neighbor” (SKS 9:69  / WL 61–62, emphases added). Similarly, Dylan’s 
treatment of neighbor- love’s attention to the unknown and disenfranchised 
never loses sight of attending to the known beloved in romantic- erotic love or 
friend in friendship. Instead of actually disowning or abandoning romantic 
love and friendship to take up the banner of some righteous cause, Dylan 
(like Kierkegaard) relegates romantic love and friendship to second fiddle. 
Romantic- erotic love and friendship are not ejected from the band but are 
directed to back up the lead, which is neighbor- love.
For instance, as much as the enmeshed, overly dependent Babe in Dylan’s 
“It Ain’t Me, Babe” wants the narrator to “die for [her] and more” (empha-
sis added), the narrator knows that such love is not real, hence his answer: 
“It ain’t me, babe.” Or when the beloved in Dylan’s “Don’t Think Twice, 
It’s Alright” wants the lover’s soul, Dylan’s lover- narrator knows to give 
the beloved no more than his heart. By offering only his temporal roman-
tic love and not his eternal being, Dylan’s poet- narrator instinctively knows 
what Kierkegaard knows, namely, that “lovers no doubt think that in erotic 
love they have the highest.” By knowing this, Dylan’s poet- narrators on the 
whole shed selfish masks of romantic- erotic love and don the ethical mask 
of neighbor- love, for, as Kierkegaard writes, “the [romantically inclined] poet 
promises the lovers immortality . . . but who then is the poet, what good is his 
vouching, he who cannot vouch for himself?” (SKS 9:68 / WL 61).
In other Dylan love songs,9 relationships that could blossom into erotic 
love or friendship are instead “abandoned” for expressions of love that are 
more real, expressions that do not beg for something in return. Narrators 
speak not to curry romantic- erotic favor but to help others understand and 
see through the world’s deceptions and individuals’ self- deceptions, to help 
them become more inward, human, rounded, and less porcelain, dependent, 
and flat. In “Trust Yourself,” for instance, the narrator advises, “Don’t trust 
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me to show you love / When my love may only be lust / If you want some-
body you can trust, trust yourself.”
That said, Dylan has written touchingly romantic- erotic love songs.10 
Most if not all of these kinds of songs, however, either admit to limits or 
failures of romantic love and friendship, or their narrators generally see the 
beloved as consenting adults instead of vulnerable prey.11
Other responses to vicissitudes of romantic- erotic love include “Love 
Sick,” in which the narrator is “sick of love” while concurrently under 
its spell (love sick). In “When the Deal Goes Down,” the narrator knows 
“transient joys . . . are not what they seem.” In two songs, Dylan hilariously 
de- romanticizes even Romeo and Juliet’s love affair, making the invocations 
serve as speed bumps to possessive, impatient backseat lovers:
In comes Romeo, he’s moaning
“You belong to me I believe”
And someone says, “You’re in the wrong place my friend
You better leave.” (“Desolation Row”)
Romeo, he said to Juliet, “You got a poor complexion
It doesn’t give your appearance a very youthful touch!”
Juliet said back to Romeo, “Why don’t you just shove off
If it bothers you so much.” (“Floater [Too Much to Ask]”)
(Kierkegaard, by the way, would cheer on Dylan’s sucker punches to starry- 
eyed romantic Romeo. According to Eric Ziolkowski, “Kierkegaard  .  .  . 
suggests that these two lovers’ emotions belong on stage” because such 
romanticized emotions have “no place in ‘practical life’ ” [SKS 21:164, 
NB8:43, n.d. 1848 / KJN 5:171].)12
Then there are playful songs of romantic- erotic love on the brink of 
neighbor- love, where the beloved is loved despite obvious limitations and 
because of unseen possibilities. In Dylan’s “Ugliest Girl in the World,” the nar-
rator does not know why he loves her, but he just can’t stop loving her. (The 
only physically attractive thing about her is her sweet breath— suggestive, of 
course, of inward beauty trumping outward imperfection.) On Dylan’s debut 
album, the first lines of his first song, “She’s No Good,” tell of a darkly funny 
romantic- love turned neighbor- love: “Well I don’t know why I love ya like 
I do / Nobody in the world can get along with you.” What arguably may be 
Dylan’s sweetest (least possessive) love song, “Love Minus Zero / No Limit” 
portrays a woman impervious to being hyped or typed:
She doesn’t have to say she’s faithful
Yet she’s true, like fire, like ice . . . 
Valentines can’t buy her . . . 
She knows too much to argue or to judge.
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Yet even this extraordinary Love is no romanticized dovelike lovebird, but 
“like some raven / At my window with a broken wing.” “Humanly speaking,” 
Kierkegaard would add, “the truly loving one, the sacrificing, the self- giving 
one who loves, totally self- denying in all things, is . . . the injured one, the 
most injured of all . . . by continually giving [her]self” (SKS 9:267 / WL 268).
So Dylan writes touching romantic- erotic love songs, too, but his narra-
tors generally remain weary of romantic- erotic love’s ephemeral qualities.
Ethics and Friendship
As for friendship, Dylan’s narrator in “Buckets of Rain” says it straight: 
“Friends will arrive, friends will disappear.” Like romantic- erotic love, friend-
ship traffics in partisanship, preference, reciprocity, quid pro quo— not pro 
bono, nonpreferential neighbor- love. Arguable exceptions in the playlist 
include the playful desire to want just to be “friends” with a lover in “All I 
Really Want to Do,”13 or suffering loss of friends in songs like “Ballad for a 
Friend,” or the nearest thing to sentimentality in Dylan’s decidedly unsenti-
mental songbook, “Bob Dylan’s Dream,” in which the narrator wishes “in 
vain . . . to sit . . . again” amid his “first few friends.”
Generally, however, friends are what Dylan’s narrator in “Gates of Eden” 
calls “other strangers,” who conceal more than reveal so as to take as much 
of whatever their “friends” have. Other examples include:
You do the work of the devil, you got a million friends
They’ll be there when you got something,
they’ll take it all in the end. (“You Changed My Life”)
My best friend, my doctor
Won’t even say what it is I’ve got. (“Just Like Tom Thumb’s Blues”)
You got a lotta nerve
To say you are my friend
When I was down
You just stood there grinning. (“Positively 4th Street”)
Dylan even anticipates the worst fear of friends on Facebook and other 
social media:
Now I got a friend who spends his life
Stabbing my picture with a bowie knife
Dreams of strangling me with a scarf
When my name comes up he pretends to barf
I’ve got a million friends! (“I Shall Be Free No. 10”)
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Ethics and They
Dylan’s and Kierkegaard’s critiques of romantic- erotic love and friendship, 
however, pale before their relentless assaults upon that which Kierkegaard 
calls the crowd or the rabble and Dylan calls They, namely, the demonic 
legion from which so much of an individual’s sorrow stems. More than lovers 
or friends, They makes one feel that one must be exactly like Them. Subse-
quently, Dylan’s antipathies toward the machinations of the mob- like They 
throw into greatest relief his sympathies toward relationally integrated and 
concrete individuals (I and you) whom he, like Kierkegaard (and Jewish phi-
losopher Martin Buber),14 champions.
Despite a shared sense of egalitarianism, Dylan and Kierkegaard are ever 
skeptical of groups, members of which are forever compelled to be unreflec-
tive rank- and- file partisans. Seeking accountability for wrong action from 
They is difficult, however, because They is an oceanic abstraction into which 
individuals quickly dissolve. The concept of They also erodes individual con-
sciences, compelling Kierkegaard to write, “If everyone in truth loved the 
neighbor as himself, then perfect equality would be achieved uncondition-
ally. . . . Everyone who, even if he confesses, as I do, that his striving is weak 
and imperfect, is still aware that the task is to love the neighbor. . . . I have 
never read in Holy Scripture this commandment: You shall love the crowd” 
(SKS 16:91 / PV 111). Here, Kierkegaard describes the essentially egalitar-
ian relationship between self and neighbor and reminds the reader that the 
egalitarian cannot forget from whence it came, namely, the personal— lest 
the egalitarian turn totalitarian. Which is why in “It’s Alright Ma (I’m Only 
Bleeding),” Dylan’s narrator notes that “even the president of the United 
States sometimes must have to stand naked.” Similarly, in Dylan’s “Masters 
of War,” demonically masked war sponsors and purveyors are singled out as 
individuals for purposes of indictment:
You that hide behind walls
You that hide behind desks
I just want you to know
I can see through your masks.
Kierkegaard’s and Dylan’s critiques of They subsequently have their stron-
gest foothold in the context of an at- large culture’s conflict of They versus I 
(society versus the individual) more than in partisan politics’ conflict of They 
versus We (We merely being another variant of They). “For it is only a great 
man who speaks, not a party,” Kierkegaard writes. “It is only a solitary voice, 
not a party voice” (SKS 14:43 / Cor. 7). If individuals who make up They 
were honest with themselves, individuals in Dylan songs like “Who Killed 
Davey Moore?,” “Only a Pawn in Their Game,” and “The Lonesome Ballad 
of Hattie Carroll” would have reason to bury their faces in rags and cry, for 
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individuals know that They is manmade, man- killing, and They will stone 
you “when you’re tryin’ to be so good . . . / just a- like they said they would.” 
And then They will stone you
when you’re tryin’ to go home . . . 
when you’re there all alone . . . 
when you’re tryin’ to make a buck . . . 
and then they’ll say, “good luck.”
And then They will stone you again “and they’ll say that it’s the end . . . / and 
then they’ll come back again . . . / and then say you are brave.” And then They 
will stone you “when you are set down in your grave” (“Rainy Day Women 
#12 & 35”). Despite the mayhem portrayed in what is one of Dylan’s most 
recognizable songs, however, the second line of the two- line refrain— “But 
I would not feel so all alone  / Everybody must get stoned”— sucks all the 
oxygen out of the room, rendering the song the presumptive anthem of the 
drug culture.
But if Everybody must get stoned is the song’s essential message, it is also 
essential to recognize that the bulk of the song critiques the message. A casual 
inspection of the lyrics yields narrative concern for two dangers: the loneli-
ness an individual faces if he or she does not give in to They’s daunting peer 
pressure, and the power wielded by They to make the individual be governed 
by an enforced insanity that incrementally and absolutely kills the song’s You 
and I.
Instead of the narrator abdicating because he feels so all alone, what listen-
ers might hope the narrator would say is what Dylan’s narrator of “Standing 
in the Doorway” says: “I know I can’t win, / But my heart just won’t give in.” 
This assertion at least affirms innate goodness and bravery within the indi-
vidual despite knowledge of a collective force’s ultimate usurpation. What 
listeners of “Rainy Day Women #12 & 35” instead hear, however, is the nar-
rator’s sad surrender to the crowd by disclaiming the good and the brave 
by at least quoting if not internalizing They’s message: Everybody must get 
stoned. In addition, the refrain— presumably uttered affirmatively by You 
and I— seems mismanaged with great skill by They. If You or I object— for 
instance, at a Dylan concert— the objection would likely be drowned out by 
the crowd gleefully yelling en masse the only line that registers: Everybody 
must get stoned.
What also cannot be denied is that Everybody must get stoned may be a 
masked and anonymous acoustical illusion by Dylan to show the force of 
They to the nameless faces of They, as if to channel to each individual face 
what the narrator in Dylan’s “Things Have Changed” knows: “All the truth 
in the world adds up to one big lie.” In the end, the refrain Everybody must 
get stoned exploits crowd madness that happily consigns everybody to the 
Final Solution: dehumanization before annihilation of the very goodness and 
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bravery with which all individuals are endowed. Everybody must get stoned 
is the mantra for a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde version of “I is an other”: out- of- body, 
mind- altered, lacking in deliberation and conscience. Commensurate with 
ethics to which Dylan subscribes throughout his canon, the twenty lines of 
the thirty- line “Rainy Day Women #12 & 35” that begin by essentially pros-
ecuting They read like so many upbuilding Kierkegaardian thoughts that, by 
their indirection, ethically wound from behind (see, e.g., SKS 10:167–252 / 
CD 161–246). As masked and anonymous indirect communicator extraor-
dinaire, in other words, Dylan knows that if you invite a listener to receive 
a message upon the message’s baseline aesthetic- sensuous- immediate level, 
then— after the listener begins really to hear the meaning of the message— 
the listener is confronted by its ethical or ethical- religious demands.15 At that 
point the listener must either deny and reject the message’s deeper ethical 
meaning by yielding to the sensuous sway of the aesthetic or accept Dylan’s 
unorthodox art of helping the other that has just played out on a higher ethi-
cal level.
If, as Dylan’s narrator claims in “Gates of Eden,” “there are no truths out-
side [Eden’s] gates,” then all communication of truth, as Kierkegaard claims, 
must necessarily begin with an untruth. Such communication necessarily 
requires a mask. “Ethical communication in character always begins with 
placing a ‘deception’ in between,” Kierkegaard writes, “and the art consists 
in enduring everything while remaining faithful to character in the deception 
and faithful to the ethical” (SKS 27:411, Papir 368:10, n.d. 1847 / JP 1:653, 
p. 288, my emphasis)— which may be why the “Gates of Eden” narrator pref-
aces the above remark by noting, “At times I think there are no words / But 
these [read: masked, arcane, metaphorical words] to tell what’s true.”
Ethics, They, and Mundus vult decipi
“What, then, does it mean ‘to deceive’ [into the truth]?” Kierkegaard asks. 
“It means that one does not begin directly with what one wishes to commu-
nicate but begins by taking the other’s delusion at face value” (SKS 16:36 / 
PV 54). Dylan, too, knows to begin by taking the crowd’s delusions at face 
value (in the present case, illicit drugs’ short- term value), then building up the 
individual listeners’ ethical or ethical- religious imagination. “If one is truly 
to succeed in leading a person to a specific place, one must first and foremost 
take care to find him where he is and begin there,” Kierkegaard writes. “This 
is the secret in the entire art of helping” (SKS 16:271 / PV 45).
That said, how is this song about getting stoned— of all songs— so ethically 
good?16 Its original and most enduring audial version, after all, conjures up 
a carnival atmosphere in which both Dylan and his backup vocals sing amid 
toxic laughs. Then there is the problem of any performing artist’s, even Dylan’s, 
need to self- promote. One of Kierkegaard’s (unpublished) pseudonyms writes, 
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“Every juggler always and immediately makes a hit, because he simply wants 
to deceive; thus he wants what the times demand— Mundus vult decipi [the 
world wants to be deceived]” (Pap. VIII2 B 12 59fn. / BA 171fn.).
Who can thereby blame the world? Is it not true that everybody, as Dylan’s 
narrator sings in “Quinn the Eskimo,” is “in despair, ev’ry girl and boy”? Is it 
also not true that, as Dylan’s narrator sings in “High Water (For Charlie Pat-
ton),” it is “tough out there . . . rough out there . . . bad out there. High water 
everywhere”? Even Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Frater Taciturnus seems sym-
pathetic to the world (if not cynically, ironically so): “Mundus vult decipi; 
my relationship to the environment that I must call my world can hardly be 
more definitely expressed. In fact, I believe that in a wider sense it is the best 
that has been said about the world. Thus speculators should not cudgel their 
brains trying to fathom what the times demand, for it has been essentially 
the same since time immemorial: to be tricked and bamboozled. If one just 
says something silly and drinks . . . with humanity en masse, then one comes 
to be . . . loved and esteemed by the whole congregation” (SKS 6:316 / SLW 
340). After the smoke clears, however, other masks of Dylan and Kier kegaard 
reveal themselves, masks that condemn They for prohibiting individuals from 
living deliberately, reflectively, compassionately, and empathetically, alone 
and together. In a discourse he entitles “Becoming Sober,” Kierkegaard writes, 
“The world wants to be deceived; not only is it deceived— ah, then the mat-
ter would not be so dangerous!— but it wants to be deceived. Intensely, more 
intensely, more passionately perhaps than any witness to the truth has fought 
for the truth, the world fights to be deceived; it most gratefully rewards with 
applause, money, and prestige anyone who complies with its wish to be 
deceived. And perhaps the world has never needed to become sober as much 
as it does today” (SKS 16:192– 93 / JFY 139– 40). Meanwhile, Dylan’s narra-
tor in “Ain’t Talkin’ ” talks:
The world is filled with speculation
The whole wide world which people say is round
They will tear your mind away from contemplation
They will jump on your misfortune when you’re down.
An authentic self thus becomes, according to Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Anti- Climacus, “the last thing the world cares about and the most danger-
ous thing of all for a person to show signs of having” (SV1 11:148 / SUD 
32)— dangerous because it is only within such a self that the ethical and the 
ethical- religious find a voice. “The good person,” Kierkegaard writes, “must 
get people separated as individuals. The same people, who as individuals are 
able to will the good in truth, are immediately corrupted as soon as they unite 
and become many, and therefore the good person will neither try to have a 
crowd for help in splitting up the crowd nor try to have a crowd behind him 
while he is splitting up the crowd in front of him” (SKS 8:200 / UDVS 96).
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It is no wonder that action figures like Kierkegaard and Dylan come with 
masks. As with Superman, Batman, and the Lone Ranger, what more compel-
ling means than masks do they have to “spare the defeated . . . speak to the 
crowd . . . preach peace to the conquered [and] tame the proud” (“Lonesome 
Day Blues”)?
Which is where masked and anonymous You and I come in. For “the last 
thing I would surrender is my faith in individual human beings,” Kierkegaard 
writes. “And this is my faith, that however much confusion and evil and 
contemptibleness there can be in human beings as soon as they become the 
irresponsible and unrepentant ‘public,’ ‘crowd,’ etc.— there is just as much 
truth and goodness and lovableness in them when one can get them as single 
individuals” (SV1 13:499 / PV 10–11).
Religiousness and You and I
In Dylan’s “All Along the Watchtower,” a desperate “joker,” exasperated by 
feeling no relief from worldly chaos and a sense of worthlessness, confides in 
his friend— a consoling (if not humorously chastising) thief:
“No reason to get excited,” the thief he kindly spoke,
“There are many here among us who think that life is but a joke.
But you and I, we’ve been through that, and this is not our fate;
So let us not talk falsely now, the hour is getting late.”
The lines are not from the only hit song Dylan sings in apocalyptic terms.17 
Nor is it the only song in which its narrator implores the need to avoid talk-
ing falsely to oneself and others while seeking what Kierkegaard (invoking 
Socrates) calls an “honest distrust of oneself, to treat oneself as a suspicious 
character” (SKS 13:70 / FSE 44).18
An honest distrust of one’s self means coming clean— becoming sober— 
even in the eleventh hour. Here is where the I begins to see the other, the 
neighbor identified as You, as essential to becoming fully human: namely, 
becoming itself, the ethically self- loving I, the relational phenomenon striving 
ethically to relate itself to itself, to others, and to the power that established 
it (see SKS 11:129– 30 / SUD 13–14). Here is where the I sees the neighbor as 
“the other you . . . the first you” (SKS 9:60, 64 / WL 53, 57). Here is where 
the I’s self- love sheds the thick skins of egoism and narcissism, metamorphos-
ing into its better angel, one that presupposes better angels in others. Here is 
where the stage is really set— with love, according to Kierkegaard, being the 
only thing that presupposes itself: “The one who loves presupposes that love 
is in the other person’s heart and by this very presupposition builds up love 
in him” (SKS 9:219 / WL 216–17). Here is where the task of self- love is ethi-
cally “to be [critically] objective in relation to oneself and [sympathetically] 
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subjective in relation to all others” instead of being “subjective toward [one-
self] and objective toward all others” (SKS 20:164, NB2:57, n.d. 1847 / KJN 
4:162). Here is where the self’s meaningful relation with itself exists when 
the self is in an ethical relation with the other, the neighbor. Here is where 
moving to accept— even favor— eccentricities of the neighbor by altering 
one’s own eccentricities requires ever more inward self- love, love that moves 
toward (not away from) one’s better angels by routinely challenging (instead 
of being smugly satisfied with) one’s own eccentricities. Here is where becom-
ing human becomes more difficult, yet, for all that, more meaningful.
Great difficulty arises because moving toward that which is not naturally 
preferred is anathema to romantic- erotic love and friendship, both of which lead 
a person to embrace only what is like or similar to that person. In this context, 
what Dostoevsky’s rational egoist Ivan Karamazov says about neighbor- love 
seems not so outlandish. “I must make an admission,” Ivan explains to his 
youngest brother. “I never could understand how it’s possible to love one’s 
neighbors. In my opinion, it is precisely one’s neighbors that one cannot pos-
sibly love. Perhaps if they weren’t so nigh.”19 Natural instincts and acts of will 
based upon rational egoism to which Ivan aspires embrace only that which is 
like or similar to one’s own self. Ethics, on the other hand, generally indicates 
the opposite as counterweight to impulsive and unreflective tribal instincts. 
This is why Kierkegaard calls the neighbor “the other you,” compelling You to 
consider the neighbor as essentially more like than unlike You.
If becoming fully human has something to do with developing the self- 
as- relational- phenomenon, then becoming fully human has something to do 
with relating well with others, which implies ethically moving toward the 
other, the neighbor, the other you. Only by moving toward the neighbor (who 
may not be dear to You but who is nonetheless near to You) will You come 
to embody You. You must find the other, according to Kierkegaard, “lovable 
despite and with his weaknesses and defects and imperfections,” for “the 
task is not to develop one’s fastidiousness but to transform oneself and one’s 
taste” (SKS 9:158– 59 / WL 158)— all for the love of the other. Here is where 
becoming human becomes meaningful: You, choosing to love the neighbor, 
may be the only way You can love itself, can live in and with itself well. Here 
is where the other is far more like You than unlike You, no matter what You 
might say. Which is perhaps why, in “What Good Am I?,” Dylan sings
What good am I if I’m like all the rest
If I just turn away, when I see how you’re dressed
If I shut myself off so I can’t hear you cry . . . ?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What good am I then to others and me
If I’ve had every chance and yet still fail to see
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If my hands are tied must I not wonder within
Who tied them and why and where must I have been?
Here is where knowing the neighbor as the other you is “I is an other” at 
its best. It is where “I is an other” is the Archimedean point at which the 
self ethically moves itself in ways that may ethically move the neighbor, the 
other, the one whom I cannot choose, the one who may just as well be an 
enemy, because “The thing that scared me most was when the enemy came 
close / And I saw that his face looked just like mine” (“John Brown”). And 
if You can love the enemy from within and without, then here is where You 
can move the world, for here is where neighbor- love begins, where it is ulti-
mately up to You. All that is left to do is don the mask with which You is 
fundamentally endowed: the responsive and responsible mask, the authentic 
persona, neither selfish nor childish— the genuine mask of I that befits the 
genuine mask of You, wherein “I is an other” ultimately makes perfect bell- 
ringing sense.
According to Kierkegaard,
It is a mark of childishness to say: Me wants, me— me; a mark of 
adolescence to say: I— and I— and I; the sign of maturity . . . is to will 
to understand that this I has no significance unless it becomes the you 
[in] . . . you shall, you shall, you shall. Youthfulness wants to be the 
only I in the whole world; maturity is to understand this you person-
ally, even if it were not addressed to a single other person. You shall, 
you shall love the neighbor. O my listener, it is not you to whom I am 
speaking; it is I to whom eternity says: You shall. (SKS 9:95 / WL 90)
Likewise, Dylan knows that the perfect sense of “I is an other” is up to him— 
his mature, ethical I. Which is why, in his “Up to Me,” Dylan is the perfect 
master thief of love: “The old Rounder in the iron mask slipped me the mas-
ter key / Somebody had to unlock your heart, he said it was up to me.”
In the end, Dylan and Kierkegaard accept the varied masks they wear 
outside Eden’s gates, masks that emit sounds and illumine visions that lure us 
toward the kind of self- love that neighbor- love presupposes. Through these 
ethically derived and Janus- like masks, they show life forward by looking 
back to some forgotten home (back to the soul’s gate behind and beyond 
which essential Being resides) rather than, homesick and blue, looking away 
and down so many lonesome roads again.
Coda: Kierkegaard on Dylan’s Music (A Thought Experiment)
As mentioned at the outset, Dylan and Kierkegaard share an appreciation for 
the power of both sacred and profane music. Had Kierkegaard heard Dylan, 
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how might the former (for whom music was so important to convey vari-
ous dimensions of the spirit) respond to the latter’s musical, compositional, 
and performing skills? At the least, how might a Kierkegaardian ear regard 
Dylan’s music?20
In the paean to Mozart’s Don Giovanni in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or I 
(“The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical- Erotic”), pseudonym “A” does 
not claim musical expertise: “I am well aware that I do not understand music; 
I readily admit that I am a layman. I do not hide the fact that I do not belong 
to the chosen tribe of music experts, that at most I stand in the doorway 
as a gentile convert drawn from afar to this place by a strange, irresistible 
impulse— but no further” (SV 1:48 / EO 1:65). Here, “A’s” disclaimer may 
comport with Kierkegaard’s own understanding of music, although Kierke-
gaard might broaden his own sphere of ignorance beyond the musicological 
to the philosophical.21 On the title page of his Either/Or I chapter on Mozart’s 
Don Giovanni, for instance, Kierkegaard writes, “What Homer says of music 
is true: οἶον ἀκούομεν, οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν [we only hear, we know nothing]. Iliad, II, 
468. One hears it, but he does not know it, does not understand it” (Pap. IV 
A 222, n.d., 1843 / JP 1:147). That said, Kierkegaard’s extraordinary exposi-
tions of music, lyrical- musical voice, and the ethics of music and voice read 
like a fitting critique of Dylan.
Writing about the overture to Don Giovanni, for instance, “A” offers a 
compact aesthetic description of the kind of music toward which Dylan 
aspires: “It is powerful like a god’s idea, turbulent like a world’s life, harrow-
ing in its earnestness, palpitating in its desire, crushing in its terrible wrath, 
animating in its full- blooded joy; it is hollow- toned in its judgment, shrill in 
its lust; it is ponderous, ceremonious in its awe- inspiring dignity; it is stirring, 
flaring, dancing in its delight” (SKS 2:129 / EO 1:127). And earlier:
If you cannot get an idea of Don Giovanni by hearing him, then you 
never will. . . . Just as the lightning is discharged from the darkness 
of the thunderclouds, so he bursts out of the abyss of earnestness, 
swifter than the lightning’s flash, more capricious than lightning and 
yet just as measured. Hear how he plunges down into the multiplicity 
of life, how he breaks against its solid embankment. Hear these light, 
dancing . . . notes, hear the intimation of joy, hear the jubilation of 
delight, hear the festive bliss of enjoyment. Hear his wild flight; he 
speeds past himself, ever faster, never pausing. Hear the unrestrained 
craving of passion, hear the sighing of erotic love, hear the whisper 
of temptation, hear the vortex of seduction, hear the stillness of the 
moment— hear, hear, hear. (SKS 2:106– 7 / EO 1:103)
In an ethical context, Kierkegaard’s abiding fascination with the medieval 
troubadour speaks not only to Kierkegaard’s intent to shape a lyrical- ethical 
voice for himself but also to Dylan’s own musical- ethical intent to serve as 
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a performing artist qua modern troubadour.22 In reading notes he made of 
Friedrich Diez’s 1829 Die Poesie der Troubadours (The Poetry of Trouba-
dours) under the heading “The Sirvente” (the moral or religious song of the 
Provençal troubadours satirizing social vices), Kierkegaard writes, “With 
this genre the troubd. began to influence life, making some impact upon the 
princes and the powerful. . . . Troubd. sang the exploits of the well- born but 
undertook also to reprove them for their faults” (SKS 17:72, BB:2, April 22, 
1836 / KJN 1:66). Many of Dylan’s musical scores speak to the song of the 
Sirvente that troubadours of yore sang.
In a religious context, a journal entry of October 30, 1838, by Kierkegaard 
may offer a critique of Dylan’s ethical and ethical- religious music and musical 
performances, especially of concerts given during his evangelical period. In 
the entry, Kierkegaard imaginatively addresses “D.L.” (“devout listeners” of, 
presumably, the sermon he sketches out in the entry), and he considers what 
seers and hearers of John the Baptist preaching in the desert might expect 
to hear and see versus what John actually offers them: “My talk shall be 
like wild honey— its clothing like the woolen shirt J. the Baptist wore, rough 
and sharp, perhaps to many a severe talk” (SKS 17:268m:22– 26, DD:164 / 
KJN 1:259m:10– 14). Here, Kierkegaard essentially claims an unvarnished if 
not prophetic voice that Dylan himself appropriates throughout his career, 
especially in so many of his ethical and ethical- religious songs. (Kierke-
gaard’s words might also go so far as to justify what many of Dylan’s more 
musicological sophisticates maintain as Dylan’s “rough and sharp” singing 
voice— words that also warn that attention to the accident of physical voice 
should never eclipse the spirit in which the song is delivered and its lyrical 
meaning. Kierkegaard writes elsewhere that “everything that is said and sung 
in church should be true, not that it should be beautiful, great, glorious, rav-
ishing, etc.” (SKS 27:558, Papir 452, n.d., 1853–54 / JP 1:829).
In the end, what Kierkegaard’s “A” says of Mozart’s music might also be 
Kierkegaard’s last word on Dylan’s music (one that, in addition, may com-
port with most earnest and flippant Dylan fans’ last words): “A” “usually 
passes the time humming something I do not understand” (SKS 2:56 / EO 
1:49). Nevertheless, “A” knows “that if Mozart ever became entirely compre-
hensible to me, he would then become completely incomprehensible to me” 
(SKS 2:68 / EO 1:61). With Dylan’s music, the same.
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and of Experience, 249–50; “A 
Vision of the Last Judgment,” 





Borges, Jorge Luis, 11
Bouchard, Larry D.: Theater and 
Integrity, 114n23
Bournonville, August, 173n43; and 
Andersen, 171n17; as Balletdigter 
(ballet poet), 151, 153; as dancer, 
155–56, 163, 172n25; on irony, 
152; leap of, 20, 154; life of, 171n4; 
as Mephistopheles, 154; and SK, 4, 
20–21, 152–53, 156–57, 168–69
ballets: Et Folkesagn (A Folktale), 
171n5; Faust, 153–54, 172n25; La 
Sylphide (The Sylph), 153, 171n5, 
171n16, 171n18; Napoli, or The 
Fisherman and His Bride (Napoli 
eller Fiskeren og hans Brud), 153, 
171n5; Undine, 155
See also dance/dancing; demonic
Boven, Martijn, 4, 12, 17–18, 20, 24, 26
Brandes, Georg: Søren Kierkegaard: En 
Kritisk Fremstilling . . . , 39
Brecht, Bertolt: Verfrendungseffekt 
(alienation effect), 17, 112
Bremer, Frederikke, 42
Bruckner, Anton, 13





burlesque, 113n9, 125; and 
carnivalesque, 59; SK’s Aristophanic, 
4. See also farce(s); Posse; vaudeville
Butades: myth of, 200
Byrd, Jonathan: songs inspired by SK 
and Bob Dylan, 299
Byron, Lord (George Gordon), 240; 
Don Juan (poem), 169
Calvin, John, 16
camera. See evil eye
camera obscura, 204
Carlyle, Thomas, 39
Cervantes, Miguel de, 8–9, 11, 56, 167; 
Don Quixote (novel), 9. See also Don 
Quixote
child, 125, 228–31, 233–34; fairytale as, 
76; gaze of, 94; of love, 200; musical 
babbling of, 135; play of, 65; Prefaces 
and, 58; shown image of crucified 
Jesus, 33–34n42, 87–89, 90–91; 
sleeping, 179; soul of, 77. See also 
Christ/Jesus child
children, 27, 75, 80, 157, 229–30, 
232–33, 252, 274, 283; imaginations 
of, 77; of Israel, 218; killing of, 230; 
and parents, 225; predilections of, 
221nn12–13; of rape, 230; stories/
tales for, 11, 40, 77; and theater, 42
choice(s), 157, 186, 255; of Adam 
and Eve, 225–26; of Antigone, 225; 
Bergson and, 64; of colors, 221n12; 
either/or, 269; in Either/Or, 45; ethics 
and, 201; and fate, 225; forced by 
Christ, 118; of forebears, 227; of 
individual, 231, 235n4; of oneself, 
269; self-defining, 254; and Socrates, 
245–46; wrongful, 226
Christ/Jesus, 79, 86, 90, 250; as abased 
one, 86; choice forced by, 118; 
contemporaneity with, 91; crucified, 
15, 34; decision for or against, 49; 
feet anointed by woman, 183; God 
in paradoxical form of, 276; as God-
man, 118; ideal form of, 184; image/
picture of, 15, 34n42, 87–89, 93–95, 
182, 279n16; imitation of, 182; 
as incognito, 118; look of, 219n1; 
mercy of, 184; modern individual 
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Christ/Jesus, continued
 and, 14, 85, 92; as object of faith, 
118; as offensive, 118; as redeemer/
savior, 79, 86; resurrected, 198; 
and sinful woman, 184; suffering 
of, 87, 91, 182, 197; Thorvaldsen’s 
statue of, 6, 33n42, 41; veil bearing 
likeness of, 198. See also apostles (of 
Christ); Christ/Jesus child; God-man; 
Haidt, Johann Valentin; prototype; 
Veronica’s Veil
Christ/Jesus child, 217; presented in 
Temple, 183
Christendom, 95, 181; pseudo-
Christian’s upbringing in, 15; SK 
against, 5, 25, 71
Christian(s): ideal picture of, 188; in 
New Testament sense, 25
Christian art, 94–95, 140; danger with, 
182
Christianity, 182, 261, 266; of Anti-
Climacus, 95; appeal of, 105; 
doctrines of, 79; Don Juan and, 140; 
Bob Dylan’s conversion to, 284; 
ethical claim of, 155; music excluded 
from, 19, 140, 145, 264; as mystery, 
105; pietist, 242; primal, 256; and 
rationalism, 245; regional forms 
of, 241; rigorousness of, 74; and 
sensuality, 134, 136, 140, 264, 269; 
SK’s association of religion with, 10; 
as soft, 82n6; and Socratic irony, 251; 
spiritual life of, 266; state-sponsored, 
256
church(es), 7, 48, 263, 297; of Bohemia, 
241; early, 198; of England, 243–44; 
established/national/state, 5, 71, 
73, 151, 239, 241–43, 254, 298n7; 
false assurance/security of, 61, 73; 
Maronite, 233; Moravian, 240–43, 
258n20; music of, 142; of Rome, 217; 
SK’s struggle with, 93; and theater, 7;
Church of our Lady (Vor Frue Kirke), 5, 
51n13, 74; SK’s discourses in, 6
cinema/film/moving pictures, 3; 
invention/development of, 25, 
34–35n47; modernity of, 24
Clara Raphael (novel by Mathilde 
Fibiger): SK’s notes on, 40, 46, 51n10
comedy: in classic sense, 84n25
comic, the (category): and contradiction, 
104, 118; and fairy tale, 14, 75; and 
infinite demand, 63; and mime, 60; 
SK’s use of, 84n25; style of, 161, 
173n39
Commendatore (character in Don 
Giovanni), 19, 138–39, 141–42
communication, 48, 99; direct, 100, 
267; doubly reflected, 8; effective, 
73; ethical, 291; external, 100, 111, 
117; of faith, 71; of God’s self, 273; 
indirect, 250, 268, 284; music as, 
262; performative, 117, 128n5; 
of truth, 291. See also existence-
communication; poet-communication
communism, 6
Cordelia (victim of Johannes the 
Seducer), 22, 167, 189, 206–8; in 
mirror, 180–81
Corsair, The (Corsaren): SK and, 5, 74
cosmos: as theater, 16
crowd(s), 26, 61, 248, 285, 290–93; love 
of, 289. See also rabble
crucifixion: horrors of, 87–89, 91
Cyril and Methodius, Sts., 241
daguerreotype, 26, 195, 199–200, 206, 
221n8; and superstition/Satanism, 
204; of Thorvaldsen, 204–5, 205 
figure 3, 221n7
Damon, S. Floster, 250
dance/dancing, 3–4, 20; as art form, 
149; comic/grotesque style of, 161; 
in Either/Or, 170n1; freedom of, 
168; and infinity, 162; SK’s attitudes 
toward, 149–74; SK’s metaphors 
of, 157–66; as social practice, 149; 
theatrical, 170n3. See also ballet; 
ballroom (dancing); Bournonville, 
August; dancer(s); entrechat; Galeotti, 
Vincenzo; social dance/dancing; 
tightrope dancer(s); Vestris, Auguste
dancer(s), 164–65, 170n3; Bournonville 
as, 155–56, 163, 172n25; Climacus’s 
self-comparison, 157–58; effort of, 
159; in Either/Or, 170n1; Johannes 
the Seducer as, 167; as knight of 
infinity, 21; leap(ing) by, 21, 162; 
male, 150–51, 154, 168, 173nn43–44; 
panting of, 158–59; SK/pseudonyms 
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on, 149; SK’s ambivalence as/towards, 
166, 169–70; tightrope, 160–62; 
twisted, 149; uniting music and dance, 
172n31. See also ballet; ballroom 
(dancing); Bournonville, August; 
dance/dancing; entrechat; Galeotti, 
Vincenzo; social dance/dancing; 
tightrope dancer(s); Vestris, Auguste
Dante Alighieri, 11, 56




Deleuze, Gilles, 17, 119
demonic, 39, 221n9; Bournonville and, 
154–55; concealment, 284; Don 
Juan as, 20, 132–33, 136–40, 142; 
Faust as, 132; and image formation, 
206; leap(s) as, 154–55; legion, 289; 
Mephistopheles as, 20; Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni as, 266; music as, 23, 140, 
149, 194, 264, 266–67, 278n7; as 
sensuous, 132; SK’s concept of, 256n2
Derrida, Jacques, 220n4
Descartes, René, 47, 188
despair, 187, 292; anxiety and, 73, 115; 
of infinitude, 186; misrelation of, 186; 
torments of, 156
devil(s), 19; of Blake, 258n27; of 
Faustian faces, 282; soul sold to, 62
devil’s work, 288; music as, 140; pact 
of, 145; sensual erotic as, 19
Diez, Friedrich: Die Poesie der 
Troubadours (The Poetry of 
Troubadours), 297
Dinesen, Isak (pseud. for Karen Blixen, 
née Dinesen), 56
Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, 46, 113nn15–16
Diogenes the Cynic, 123–24
Dionysius, 246–47
Dissanayake, Ellen: notion of homo 
aestheticus, 9–11
Don Giovanni (character of Mozart), 
20, 23, 141–44, 199; aesthetic life of, 
269; caricaturing mockery of, 139; as 
demonic, 23, 194; and desire, 266; vs. 
Don Juan, 145; idea of, 296; as music, 
144, 194; and musical seduction, 268; 
natural genius of, 290; power in, 265; 
self-intoxication of, 144; as sensuous/
sensuality, 19, 195; unpaintability 
of, 195. See also Don Juan; Mozart, 
Wolfgang Amadeus
Don Giovanni (opera). See Mozart, 
Wolfgang Amadeus
Don Juan, 11; and ballet, 155–56; 
and Christianity, 140; as demonic, 
20, 132–33, 136–40, 142; vs. Don 
Giovanni, 145; musical immanence, 
278n7; myth of, 132, 264; as seducer 
without strategy, 137; as sensuous, 
132, 141; SK’s early study on, 40. See 
also Angiolini, Gasparo; Byron, Lord; 
Don Giovanni; Liszt, Franz; Molière; 
Molina, Tirso de
Donna Elvira (Mozart’s character), 24, 
196, 199
Don Quixote (character of Cervantes): 
as homo litterarius, 11; SK compared 
to, 167–68. See also Cervantes, 
Miguel de
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 11, 39; The Idiot, 
12; Ivan Karamazov (character, 
quoted), 294
drama(s), 19, 25, 78, 104–5, 107, 
109, 112, 139, 146n11, 225; “A’s” 
understanding of, 18, 137–40; 
existential, 5; family, 232; historical 
costume, 44; and music, 132–40, 145; 
noble, 42; vs. opera, 138; of Plato, 
56; SK and, 4, 11, 40, 45, 131; SK’s 
life as, 5–7; SK’s notions of, 131; 
SK’s Postscript as (not), 99, 108, 
112; written by deity, 16. See also 
Aristophanes; Brecht, Bertolt; farce(s); 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von; 
Holberg, Ludvig; mime(s); Molière; 
Posse; Scribe, Augustin Eugène; 
Shakespeare, William; Sophocles; 
Sophron; theater; vaudeville
Dreyer, Carl Theodor, 25, 177; Ordet 
(film), 34n45
Dylan, Bob (né Robert Zimmerman): 
and Buber, 289; Christian conversion 
of, 284; ethics of, 284, 291; 
evangelical song albums of, 284; 
Masked and Anonymous (film), 283; 




songs: “Abandoned Love,” 283, 
285; “Ain’t Talkin’,” 292; “All 
Along the Watchtower,” 293; “All 
I Really Want to Do,” 288; “Ballad 
for a Friend,” 288; “Bob Dylan’s 
Dream,” 288; “Buckets of Rain,” 
288; “Chimes of Freedom,” 285; 
“Desolation Row,” 287; “Don’t 
Think Twice, It’s Alright,” 286; 
“Floater [Too Much to Ask],” 287; 
“Gates of Eden,” 291; “Gotta Serve 
Somebody,” 282; “A Hard Rain’s 
A-Gonna Fall,” 284; “High Water 
(For Charlie Patton),” 292; “In My 
Time of Dyin’,” 284; “I Shall Be 
Free No. 10,” 288; “It Ain’t Me, 
Babe,” 286; “It’s Alright Ma (I’m 
Only Bleeding),” 284, 289; “Just 
Like Tom Thumb’s Blues,” 288; 
“The Lonesome Ballad of Hattie 
Carroll,” 289; “Lonesome Day 
Blues,” 293; “Love Minus Zero / No 
Limit,” 287; “Love Sick,” 287; love 
songs, 286–88; “Man in the Long 
Black Coat,” 283; “Masters of War,” 
289; “Mixed-Up Confusion,” 284; 
“Only a Pawn in Their Game,” 289; 
“Positively 4th Street,” 288; “Quinn 
the Eskimo,” 292; “Rainy Day 
Women #12 & 35,” 290–91; “She’s 
No Good,” 287; “Standing in the 
Doorway,” 290; “To Ramona,” 282; 
“Things Have Changed,” 290; “The 
Times They Are a-Changin’,” 29; 
“Thunder on the Mountain,” 285; 
“Trust Yourself,” 286–87; “Ugliest 
Girl in the World,” 287; “Up to Me,” 
295; “What Good Am I?,” 294–95; 
“When the Deal Goes Down,” 287; 
“Who Killed Davey Moore?,” 289; 
“With God on Our Side” 285–86; 
“You Changed My Life,” 288
See also Byrd, Jonathan
Eckersberg, C. W., 51n15
Eliade, Mircea, 5; notion of homo 
religiosus, 9–10
Eliot, George (pseud. of Mary Anne 
Evans): Middlemarch, 58
Ellis, Jack C., 25–26




ethics, 289; actuality and, 103; vs. 
aesthetics, 153; vs. beauty, 178; and 
choice, 201; as critique of pictorial, 
200–201; of Bob Dylan, 284, 
291; and friendship, 288; of Judge 
Williams, 200–201; of music, 296; 
and romantic-erotic love, 286; and 
social justice, 284; vs. tribal instincts, 
294
Evans, C. Stephen, 10, 185–86
Evans, Mary Anne. See Eliot, George
Eve. See Adam and Eve
existence-communication, 71, 
268; music as, 277. See also 
communication; poet-communication
evil: vs. aesthetic, 177; doers of, 270; 
God triumphs over, 153; good and, 
76, 152, 178; in humans, 293
evil eye: camera associated with, 205
fairy tale(s) (Märchen): Climacus and, 
78; and comic, 14, 75; SK on, 77; SK’s 
authorship as, 14, 75; Tieck and, 76, 
81. See also Undine
faith, 14, 74, 76, 83n13, 157, 178, 198, 
243, 255; Abrahamic, 10; anguish 
of, 61; of Anna and woman who 
was a sinner, 187, 189; artistry and, 
71; beauty and, 43, 185; Christian, 
184, 233; communication of, 71; 
demanded by incognito, 118; dialectic 
of, 160; difficulties of, 80; flux of, 
21, 160; God and, 78; icons of, 
180; ideality and actuality of, 13; 
illusions about, 73; and inwardness, 
245; intrinsic value of, 71; Jesus as 
object of, 118; of Job, 122; leap of, 
21, 150, 163; life of, 82, 187, 268; 
of Moravians, 241–42; music and, 
262–63; as risky, 75; of SK, 293; 
stories about, 72–73. See also faith; 
knight of faith
Faraday, Michael: Wheel of Life, 34n47
farce(s), 126–27; as paradigm of 
subjectivity, 125; Fear and Trembling 
Index 309
as, 59; in Philosophical Fragments, 
78; of Johann Nestroy, 40. See also 
burlesque; Posse
fascism, 6
Faust, 11; as demonic, 132; idea of, 
132; pact of, 145; SK’s early study 
on, 40. See also Bournonville, August; 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von; Mann, 
Thomas
Fellini, Federico: La Strada, 14, 83n11
Ferrari, Reto: coinage of homo 
litterarius, 32n26
Ferreira, Jamie, 58
Fibiger, Mathilde. See Clara Raphael
film. See cinema/film/moving pictures
Fiskvik, Anne Margrete, 4, 20–21, 26
Flaubert, Gustave, 11, 39
folk art, 210, 221–22nn12–13
folk literature, 11, 40. See also 
Bildungsroman
form, notion of, 146–147n11
freedom, 55, 57, 61, 120, 122–23, 
186, 194, 223–24, 226–27, 254, 





Garff, Joakim, 4–5, 14–16, 20–21, 177, 
242
Gautier, Théophile: Giselle, 172n23
Gendarmenmarkt (Berlin), xiv, 7, 18, 27. 
See also Strahlheim, Carl
Gil Parra, Diego: notion of homo 
litterarius, 10–11, 32n26
Gluck, Christoph Willibald, 173n18
God, 93, 157, 178, 183, 189, 225, 
255, 263, 270, 275–76; absolute 
veiledness of, 179; beauty leading to, 
187; and Being, 188; Christian, 82; 
and crucifixion, 91; and dance, 67; 
vs. evil, 153; face to face with, 268; 
and faith, 78, 122; human inferiority 
before, 80; human worshipping, 
184; impersonated by Hegelian, 105; 
inarticulability, 271; the King, 80–81; 
knowledge of, 262, 275; love letter of, 
267; love of, 232–34; Mary as mother 
of, 233; of metaphysics, 190; nature 
of, 272–73, 275; need to love, 284; of 
New Testament, 15; ordeal imposed 
by, 123; and pagan(s), 184; possession 
of, 94; and power, 79, 81; and self, 90, 
108–9; self/selves before, 71, 74–75, 
247; in servant form, 95; servant of, 
31n12; SK’s reflections on, 71; son 
of, 233; as spectator, 17, 106–7; as 
unrepresentable, 272, 274; vantage of, 
16; will of, 268; without incognito, 
118; Word of, 262, 264, 266–67, 274, 
277n7; world-historical perspective 
of, 104, 106
God-man: of Gospels, 79; and disciples, 
81; paradox of, 105; performative 
structure of, 118. See also Christ/Jesus
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 8, 41, 44, 
56, 220n5; Clavigo, 196; color theory 
of, 210; Egmont, 43; Faust, 132, 226; 
Wilhelm Meister (Wilhelm Meister), 
15, 47. See also Margaret; Marie 
Beaumarchais
golden age: of Danish painting, 51n15; 
of Denmark, 40–45; of theater, 42; 
oratory of, 243
Goldstein, Bluma, 272
Gouwens, David, 264, 278n12
Governance (i.e., providence), 93–94, 
103, 185
Greek tragedy, 90
Green, Ronald M., 12, 24–30
Grundtvig, Nikolai Frederik Severin, 
100, 242
Gschwandtner, Christina M., 188
Guadalquivir (river in Spain; spelled 
Guadalquibir by SK): SK compares 
himself to, 8–9
Guadiana (river in Spain), 9




Gyllembourg(-Ehrensvärd, née Buntzen), 
Thomasine Christine: Tales of 
Everyday Life, 48; Two Ages (To 
Tidsaldre), 40, 44, 46, 48
Haidt, Johann Valentin: Christ Scourged 
(painting), 182
Hamann, Johann Georg, 8, 47, 251
310 Index
Hamilton, Andrew: Sixteen Months in 
the Danish Isles, 52n24
Hamilton, J. Taylor, 241
Hamlet (protagonist of Shakespeare), 
51n12, 109, 110; passionate struggle 
of, 107; soliloquy of, 79, 114n17
hand organ music: as poetry on street 
corner, 52, 263
Hannay, Alastair, 60; Kierkegaard and 
Philosophy, 239
Hantelmann, Dorothea von, 212–13
Hartman, I. P. E., 172n29
Hauch, Carsten, 42
Hebrew Bible: Buber-Rosenzweig 
German translation of, 272. See also 
Bible
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 6–7, 
46, 48, 85, 100–103, 122, 124, 197, 
255; “A” likened to, 267; “end of art” 
thesis of, 44; philosophy of spectacle, 
110; theatricality of, 107; world-
historical spectacle of, 106
works: Aesthetics (Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik), 43–44, 
221n12, 278nn10–11; Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History 
(Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Geschichte), 16, 100, 110; 
Philosophy of Mind [or Spirit] 
(Phänomenologie des Geistes), 110; 
Science of Logic (Wissenschaft 
der Logik), 248. See also Berlin; 
Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye; theater
Hegelian(s), 255; as absent-minded 
professor, 104; as actor(-like), 103, 
105, 111; audience of Climacus, 
79–80; as comical, 104; Danish, 100, 
113n13; Heiberg as, 51n11, 73, 78, 
100, 131; hypocrisy of, 16, 103–5; 
illusion(s) of, 105, 112; playing/
impersonating God, 105; as spectator 
at playhouse, 102; as theatrical, 
16–17, 104
Hegelianism: Climacus’s opposition to, 
16–17, 99–111; Danish, 108, 243, 
255; as offensive, 111; right-wing 
or conservative, 73; as Schattenspiel 
(shadow play), 16, 99, 101; SK’s 
opposition to, 51
Hegelian system, 104–5, 108, 111
Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, 5, 40, 47, 
52n26, 73–74; “Det astronomiske 
Aar” (“The Astronomical Year”), 
129n8; free version of Molière’s Don 
Juan, 19, 136–37, 139; as Hegelian, 
51n11, 73, 78, 100, 131; and musical 
comedies, 44; and Scribe’s The First 
Love, 46, 51n20, 113n13, 131; 
treated roughly by SK, 51n11
Heiberg, Johanne Luise (née Hanne 
Pätges), 46, 100, 110; in role of Juliet, 
42; stagecraft of, 40–42
Heidegger, Martin, 49, 53n43, 56, 119, 
143, 190
Heine, Heinrich, 8
Hertz, Henrik Heyman, 42
history: as play, 16. See also universal 
history
Høedt, Frederik Ludvig, 153
Hoerner, William George: invention of 
Daedalum, 35n47
Hoffmann, E. T. A. (Ernst Theodor 
Amadeus), 8, 19, 135
Holberg, Ludvig, 40–43
Holm, Isak Winkel, 219n2
Homer, 11, 249; Iliad, 133, 278n8; on 
music, 278n8, 295; Plato’s expulsion 
of, 251; Socrates’s complaints about, 
253
homo aestheticus. See Dissanayake, 
Ellen
homo litterarius. See Don Quixote; 
Ferrari, Reto; Gil Parra, Diego
homo religiosus. See Eliade, Mircea
Hong, Howard V., 283
Horace: influence on SK, 40
Hostrup, J. C.: The Neighbors 
(Gjenboerne), 43
Hugh of St. Victor, 16, 21, 259n27




hymns/hymnody, 277; gospel-related, 
29; Lutheran, 261; Luther on, 263; 
Moravian, 257n14; SK on, 262–63, 
267, 272, 276, 298n7. See also 
antihymn
Ibsen, Henrik, 8, 39, 52n26, 56, 114n23
Index 311
icon(s), 216; aesthetics of, 21–22, 177, 
179, 188–90; Anna as, 183; Christian, 
187; of faith, 180, 183; Mynster 
and Martensen as, 5; Veronica’s 
Veil as, 197; youth and, 94. See 
also acheiropoieta; idol(s); Marion, 
Jean-Luc
idol(s), 22, 179–80, 182, 188–89; 
(representations of) God as, 118, 276; 
musical form as, 273; Socrates as, 66; 
Ten Commandments as, 272. See also 
icon(s); Marion, Jean-Luc
idolatry, 188–90, 274; Aaron’s, 272; 
defined, 187; inherent in law, 275; 
Qur’ān against, 22
illusion(s): acoustical, 290; in church, 7; 
cultured ease in, 74; about faith, 73; 
Hegelian, 105, 112; optical, 25–26; of 
romantic love, 199–200; in/of theater, 
7, 101–3
image(s), 16, 22–23, 40, 65, 67, 75, 
89–94, 166; abstract, 186; vs. actual 
person, 204; aesthetic, 180; of Anna 
(from Bible), 185, 189; of Ariadne, 
207; beautiful, 22, 194–98, 210, 213; 
biblical heroes as, 182; concept and, 
85; concept/idea of, 179–80, 188; 
concrete, 193–94; of confession, 196; 
of Cordelia, 180–81, 206–7; creation 
of, 200; of dance/dancing, 149, 155, 
157, 166, 170; danger of, 22, 189; 
and death, 203; of demonic, 155; 
dialectic of, 14; of Don Giovanni 
intoxicated, 144; discontinuous, 27; 
of eternal, 184; female, 206; finished 
and unfinished, 212; formation/
forming, 89, 200, 206–8, 219; of 
height, 217; of holiness, 22; and idol, 
188; of illusory thought, 101; and 
imaged, 212; imaginary, 92; inner and 
outer, 196; of Jesus, 34n42, 86–87, 
94, 182, 279n16; living, 221n9; 
lure of, 187; of Madonna, 233; 
materialized, 203; mirror, 206–7, 211; 
of perfection, 90–91, 93; popular, 
209; and reality, 181; Regine Olsen 
made into, 221n10; of sacred, 183; 
sensual, 273; of sinful woman (from 
Bible), 184–85, 189; of Socrates, 
254; static/still, 26; theatrical, 103; 
theologically useful, 21–22; of 
tightrope dancer(s), 160, 162; of 
Veronica’s Veil, 197–98; of worship, 
184; and word(s), 246, 272. See also 
Billede; visualizing Bildungsroman
imagery: aesthetic, 22, 179, 189; SK’s 
use of, 71; with ethical purpose, 14
imitation, 94, 254; of Christ, 182; 
Christ’s representation transposed 
into, 93; of music, 136; vs. 
observation, 184. See also mimesis
Incendies. See Villeneuve, Denis
incognito, 126, 129n6; Christ as, 118; 
God without his, 118
individual: as actor, 17; as spectator, 17
infinite/infinity/infinitude: and eternal, 
249; crossing over into, 160; dance 
as metaphor for, 162; demand, 63; 
despair of, 186; dissimilarity, 184; 
finite and, 186, 275; God, 272, 275; 
knight(s) of, 21, 162–63; and nature, 
249; possibility, 59; spirit, 269; sweep 
of humanity, 282
inverse: concept of, 124, 129n10
inwardness, 103, 179, 194, 197, 284; 
faith and, 245; isolation of, 99; 
manifest in action and decision, 242; 
and outwardness, 204; of self, 111; of 
subjectivity, 108; and time, 203
irony, 48, 198; “A’s” use of, 198; 
Bournonville on, 152; cold, 79; 
concept of, 151; controlled, 213–15; 
roguish face of, 217; Romantic, 213, 
215–16; SK’s use of, 151–52, 180, 
193; Socratic, 48, 213–15, 251, 253; 
as transitional existential phase, 9; 
in visual art, 213–14; Zinzendorf’s 
avoidance of, 244
“I Saw the Light” (song by Hank 
Williams): as Bob Dylan’s “religion,” 
283
Jean Paul (pseud. of Johann Paul 
Friedrich Richter), 8; humorous 
novels of, 47
Jesus. See Christ/Jesus
Jesus’s apostles. See apostles
Job (biblical figure): repetition in life of, 
122–23





Juliet (character of Shakespeare): 
Johanne Luise Heiberg in role of, 42; 
Romeo and, 24, 201–2, 220n5, 287. 
See also Piloty, Ferdinand
Jürgensen, Knud Arne, 151–52
Kafka, Franz, 8, 11, 39, 56
Kant, Immanuel, 7, 101, 214; Critique 
of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft; 
third critique), 85; Critique of Pure 
Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft; 
first critique), 8, 61; Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics, 61
Kierkegaard, Michael Pedersen (father 
of Søren), 242
KIERKEGAARD, SØREN AABYE: “A” 
likened to, 203; artistry of, 75; and 
ballroom (dancing), 4, 149, 158, 166–
70; Berlin trips/sojourns, xiv, 5–7, 12, 
18, 43, 51n15, 151–52, 173n41, 220; 
as child of absolute monarchy, 138; 
and children’s and folk art, 221n12; 
vs. Christendom/Church, 5, 48; as 
Christian poet and thinker, 187; and 
comic, 84n.25; concert-going of, 5; 
and creative writing, 4; as dialectical/
dialectician, 74, 82, 185; as doctor of 
dread, 61; as dramatist of religious, 
114n21; endeared to postmodernists, 
8; “end of art” thesis of, 44; as enfant 
terrible, 61; existential contribution 
of, 63; faith of, 293; family of, 242; 
as “father of existentialism,” 223; as 
flaneur, 41; as foppish Quasimodo, 5; 
as guardian of Christian orthodoxy, 
185; as graphomaniac, 5; Heiberg 
treated roughly by, 51n11; and hymns, 
298n7; hypergraphia of, 5; and 
imagery, 71; indirect communication 
of, 250; as individualist, 185; and 
irony, 151–52, 180, 193; as jester, 74; 
and leaps, 154; as literary philosopher, 
3, 55; literary use of novels, 25, 226; 
literature by, 6–7, 66, 239, 256; as 
manipulator, 75; as master of style, 
208; as midwife, 57; as misfit, 61; 
musical understanding of, 142; and 
Mynster, 151; mythic pattern of 
life of, 5; as not a dramatist, 13; as 
not a man of letters, 68n20; as not 
categorizable as novelist, 4; novel(s) 
of, questioned, 56, 89; “people baths” 
(daily walks) of, 5; as peripatetic, 282; 
personal drama of, 7; as philosophical 
littérateur, 3, 55; as (“a kind of” or 
“only a”) poet, 4, 56–57, 74–75, 82, 
185; and poetic living, 67n7; and 
poetic methods and modalities, 3; as 
poet of religious, 187; as postmodern 
deconstructionist, 185; primitive 
drawing/caricatures by, 45; prolixity/
verbosity of, 5–6; as provocateur, 
3, 55; as puppeteer, 75; religion 
associated with Christianity by, 10; 
represented in theater, 43; revelation 
of, 254; and satire, 13, 47–48, 108, 
146n4; seriousness urged by, 48; 
as “S.K.,” 86; as “S. Kierkegaard,” 
109; as social commentator, 185; as 
social dancer, 169–70; as Socratic, 55, 
64–67, 74–75; Socratic irony of, 48; 
Socratic motivations of, 60; as Søren 
Kirk/Torp (parody of SK in Hostrup’s 
The Neighbors), 43; statue of, 5; styles 
and genres of, 48; Sweden trip, 5; 
theater criticism of, 131; theater-going 
of, 5, 41; as troubadour, 74; trust in 
Bible, 263, 276; as writer, 4, 45–49
compared to/associated with: “A” 
(pseudonym), 138; Achilles, 5; Blake, 
28, 239–56, 256n2; dramatic poet, 
99; Bob Dylan, 28–30, 281–97; 
Don Quixote, 11, 167–68; Robert 
Frost, 58; Guadalquivir (spelled 
Guadalquibir by SK), 8–9; Hegel, 
44; Johannes the Seducer, 203; Mona 
Lisa’s riddle, 56; opera, 131–33, 137–
45; Pascal, 6; Phister, 117; Rimbaud, 
6; Schoenberg, 28; Socrates, 55–57, 
63–64, 69n24; souffleur, 8, 99, 110, 
282; street urchin, 217; Wittgenstein, 
58; Zinzendorf, 244–45
views on and/or relation to: 
aesthetics, 177–90, 194; art(s), 20, 
40–45, 94; ballet and ballet dancers, 
149, 156–57; balletic plots, 153–55; 
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biblical scholarship, 267–68; British 
literature, 240; Christendom, 5, 25, 
71; crowd, 26; dance and dancers, 
20, 149–74, 149, 166, 169–70; 
demonic, 256n2; drama, 131–48; 
fairy tales, 77; Hegel/Hegelianism, 
7, 44, 48, 51n11, 99–100, 102–3, 
107–9, 248, 255, 278n10; Heiberg, 
5, 40, 44, 46–47, 51n11, 73–74, 
100, 110, 113n13, 131, 139, 146n1; 
hereditary sin, 223–27, 232–34; 
hymns/hymnody, 262–63, 267, 272, 
276, 298n7; literature, 3–4, 9, 11–13, 
16, 30, 39–50, 55, 89, 116, 240, 
245; Martensen, 5–6, 31n12, 73–74, 
78, 100; Moravianism, Moravian 
Brethren, Moravian Church, 28, 182, 
239–40, 242–43, 254–56; music, 3–4, 
11, 18, 23, 28–29, 39, 45, 131–45, 
149, 156, 261–77, 278nn7–8, 281, 
296–97; Mynster, 5, 46, 82n6, 
151, 153; opera, 11–12, 25, 45, 
131–45, 278n7, 226; painting, 23, 
45, 200, 206, 213; poetry, 45, 67, 71; 
present age, 12, 44, 48, 178; “rabble 
barbarianism,” 26; Romantics, 19, 76, 
245; Socrates, 28, 239–40, 244–46, 
251, 254–56; theater, 4–5, 16, 18, 
20, 26, 41–45, 116, 131–32, 138; 
visual culture, 22–23, 193–222. See 
also Byrd, Jonathan; Corsair, The; 
drama(s); stages of existence
Kierkegaard’s journals, notes, and 
papers, 4, 8, 76, 263; “Begrepet 
Angest” (Concept of Anxiety; notes of 
1844), 155; and biblical scholarship, 
267–68; and Clara Raphael (note for 
review), 40; dialogue between Socrates 
and Hegel in, 46; on Don Juan 
(note), 40; encounter with Corsair, 
46; on Faust (note), 40; Faustian 
letters (so-called), 52n34; on German 
translation of Antigone (notes), 43; 
Gilleleie Journal (so-called), 52n34; 
on Goethe’s Egmont (note), 43; and 
“great earthquake,” 51n12; on Hegel’s 
Aesthetics (notes), 43; on Holberg 
comedy (note), 43; on nature of 
color (notes), 41; on preaching (entry 
of 1845), 86; primitive drawing/
caricatures in, 45; on Scribe’s plays 
(notes), 42–43; on troubadours 
(notes), 40; on Wandering Jew 
(notes), 40
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Kierkegaard’s letters: from Frederikke 
Bremer (Brev 308–9), 42; to 
Frederikke Bremer (Brev 310), 42
KIERKEGAARD’S PSEUDONYMS, 
208, 210; connection to SK, 278n5; 
literary and artistic concerns of, 3; not 
speaking for SK, 193; SK distancing 
himself from, 8–9
specific pseudonyms: as fictitious 
characters, 203
“A,” 20, 23–24, 47, 131–45, 155–56, 
193–96, 198–201, 203–4, 206, 
210, 217, 225, 248; address to 
Symparanekromenoi (Fellowship 
of the Dead), 203–4; aesthetic(s) 
of, 19, 139, 275–76, 296; blamed 
by “B,” 204; as child of absolute 
monarchy, 138; on Don Giovanni 
cf. Schoenberg’s Moses and Aaron, 
29, 271–73, 276–77; drama 
understood by, 18, 137–40; as 
dreamy poetic type, 43; vs. early 
Romantics, 135; Hegelian manner 
of, 264, 267; humming, 297; and 
irony, 198; and jokes, 19; likened to 
painting, 199; likened to SK, 138, 
203; as mimetic mirror, 219; on 
music, 261–77; musical aesthetic/
understanding, 142, 262-63, 268; 
on music and language, 18, 134, 
140; as nonentity, 30; on opera, 
137–45, 146n3, 147n12, 268–77; 
on painting, 198; psychological 
profile of, 217; sensuality/
sensuousness of, 29, 199, 268; on 
theater, 132–40, 145
Anti-Climacus, 6, 15–16, , 
21, 33n42, 68n11, 72–73, 
86–87, 90–91, 93–95, 118; on 
Christendom, 181; Christianity of, 
95, 181–82, 186–87, 208–10; on 
painting, 209
“B,” 193, 200, 205, 248; blaming “A,” 
204
Climacus. See Johannes Climacus
Constantin Constantius, 6–7, 
17–18, 40, 68n11, 75, 116, 121–
28, 163–64, 210; Berlin trips/
sojourns of, 27, 52n21, 119–20, 
125–26, 164; on farce, 78; on 
theater, 164–65
Frater Taciturnus, 292; theory of 
psychological experiment, 118, 
129n7
Inter et Inter, 23
Johannes Climacus (a.k.a. J.C.), 
58, 61–63, 88, 99–112, 118, 
173n40, 212, 243, 248, 255; anti-
Hegelianism of, 16–17, 99–100, 
102, 108–10, 111; as antitheatrical, 
17, 100; as crank, 80; as dialectical 
poet, 14, 77; and existence-
communication, 268; on Hamlet, 
114n17; Hegelian audience of, 
79–80; king and maiden story 
of, 77–82; as logician-humorist, 
71–72; as onstage masked actor, 
110; private theater of, 106; self-
comparison to dancer, 157–58; 
as shallow, 111; as souffleur 
(prompter); as storyteller, 14, 
77–78, 80; subjective thinker of, 
105; on theater, 16–17, 99–112; as 
witty, 47
Johannes de Silentio, 21, 27, 58, 67n6, 
68n11, 118, 153, 157–60, 162–63, 
170; as freelancer, 57; as tightrope 
dancer, 160
Johannes the Seducer, 22–23, 30, 166–
67, 180–82, 186, 189, 194–95, 199, 
206–8; as dancer, 167; as metaphor, 
206; likened to painter, 208; likened 
to painting, 199; as mimetic mirror, 
219; mirror of, 207; as sensuous, 
199; as shadow, 206
Judge William (Assessor Vilhelm), 24, 
26, 30, 49, 195, 200–204, 224–25, 
269–71, 281; on the ethical, 203; 
ethical life of, 269; ethics of, 
200–201; on painting, 200; reading 
and going beyond “A’s” work, 248; 
seriousness urged by, 48
Nicolaus Notabene, 58
Procul, 116
Victor Eremita, 68n11, 193–94, 196
Vigilius Haufniensis, 25, 27, 68n11, 
90, 118, 172n28, 223, 226, 245, 




AUTHORSHIP/OEUVRE: as appeal 
to posterity and beyond, 53n44; on 
Billede (image, picture), 179; and 
Christian existence, 263; as Christo-
Socratic theater, 75; as explorations 
of our alienating tendencies, 234; as 
fairy tale, 14, 75; as funhouse, 14, 
75; on hereditary sin, 227; as joke, 
13, 18; as kaleidoscope, 7, 11–12, 
39, 50; as literature, 240, 256; as 
magic theater, 14, 75; as marionette 
theater, 14, 75; as monstrous, 47; and 
Napoleon complex, 66; as novels, 4; 
poetic nature of, 177; cf. poetry and 
mythology, 240; as polyphonous, 71; 
as prolix, 6, 31n12; Socrates in, 214, 
245; as theater of ideas, 4, 12, 17–18, 
115, 117, 127; as vain attempt to 
assuage guilt, 65–66
polemical articles and pamphlets: 
against Christendom (1854–55) 
(MLW), 25, 71; articles of 1855 in 
Fædrelandet, 180; early, 71; “Public 
Confession” (1842; included in Cor.), 
289; “My Task,” 69n24; “Short and 
Sharp” (or “Brief and to the Point”), 
53n40
published writings—pseudonymous: 
cf. Blake’s poetry and mythology, 
240; as literature, 239–40; SK’s 
relationship to, 251, 282; theatrical 
form of, 4
Concept of Anxiety, The (CA), 20, 
25, 27, 61, 90, 94, 154, 219n1, 
223, 225–26, 239, 245, 248, 251, 
254, 256n2, 283; resemblance to 
academic treatise, 46
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
(CUP), 8, 10, 14, 16, 20, 47, 58–63, 
71–72, 74, 79–82, 212, 239, 243, 
245, 248, 255, 268, 282; as anti-
Hegelian drama, 14, 99–114; as 
antitheatrical, 14, 16–17, 99–100, 
105, 110–111; and Socrates, 61; 
(sub)title of, 59–61, 68n16, 108–9, 
114n21; theatricality of, 17, 108; 
unscholarly, 68n17. sections: 
“A First and Last Explanation,” 
99–100, 109; “The Subjective 
Issue” (section title), 99; part 2 of, 
101; “An Understanding with the 
Reader,” 108–9
Crisis and a Crisis in the Life 
of an Actress, The (CCLA), 
40–41; addressing categories of 
performativity, 128n4
Either/Or (EO), xiv, 16, 20–21, 
23, 39, 44, 46–47, 49, 51n15, 
58, 76, 151, 223, 239, 278n10; 
as Bildungsroman, 4, 47; choice 
offered by, 45; contemporary/
early reviews of, 45, 50n1; 
dance and dancers in, 170n1; as 
“monster”/“monstrous,” 5, 47
parts:
part (volume) I: 193–200, 217, 
268–70, 296–97; addressing 
categories of performativity, 
128n4. sections: 
“Diapsalmata,” 47, 210; “The 
First Love” (on Scribe’s The First 
Love), 40–41, 46, 226; “The 
Immediate Erotic Stages or The 
Musical Erotic” (essay on Don 
Giovanni/Don Juan), 18–19, 23, 
39–41, 68n20, 131–32, 136, 140, 
145, 155–56, 226, 248, 261–77, 
296; “The Seducer’s Diary,” 47, 
56, 166–68, 180–81, 206–7, 226, 
267; “Silhouettes” (delivered 
before Symparanekromenoi), 
23–24, 195–96, 198–99, 203, 
206, 226; “The Tragic in Ancient 
Drama Reflected in the Tragic 
in Modern Drama,” 24–25, 43, 
51n12, 225–26; “The Unhappiest 
One,” 203
part (volume) II: 29–30, 177, 
200–201, 204–6, 224–25, 248, 
269–71; “The Balance between 
the Esthetic and the Ethical in the 
Development of the Personality,” 
24
Fear and Trembling (FT), iv, 20–21, 
27, 47, 57, 90, 151, 153–54, 157–
60, 163, 166, 170, 172n22, 239; as 
attunement, 59; as dialectical lyric, 
59; as farce and joke, 59; as horror-
show spectacle, 67n6
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Philosophical Fragments (or 
Philosophical Crumbs) (PF), 14, 20, 
59, 77–82, 84n23, 88, 95n5, 99, 
157, 248; concision of, 53n41; farce 
in, 78; as ridiculous pamphlet, 78; 
theatrical structure of, 47
“Phister as Captain Scipio” (“PCS”), 
40–41, 46; and performativity, 
116–17, 128n4
Practice in Christianity (PC), 6, 
20, 33–34n42, 44, 72, 118, 
181–82, 209; as Bildungsroman, 
4, 14–16, 21, 85–95; “Christian 
Development” (category, section 
title), 86, 91; third section of, 86, 
90–91
Prefaces (P), 47, 58–58, 61; likened to 
Socrates, 61; likened to talking with 
child, 58; as wisecrack, 59
Repetition (R), xiv, 6–7, 17, 27, 47, 
75, 78, 90, 113n9, 115–23, 151, 
163–66, 173n40, 210–11, 239; 
as theater, 4, 17–18, 123–28; 
performativity in, 12, 17, 115–23, 
127, 128nn3–5; subtitle of, 123; on 
theater, 227; young man in, 90, 92, 
120–23, 173n40, 224
Sickness unto Death, The (SUD), 
71–74, 90, 186–88, 239, 258n27, 
292–93; as spoof, 48
Stages on Life’s Way (SLW), 47, 
53n42, 56, 118, 226, 283, 292. 
sections: “‘Guilty?’/‘Not Guilty?’” 
(a.k.a. Quidam’s Diary), 47; “In 
Vino Veritas,” 52n35, 261–62, 268; 
“Some Reflections on Marriage . . . 
By a Married Man,” 201–3
published writings—signed: 
upbuilding discourses (general) of, 90
Christian Discourses (CD), 24, 73, 
80–81, 284, 291; “Watch Your Step 
When You Go to the house of the 
Lord,” 51n13
Concept of Irony, The (M.A. 
dissertation) (CI), 41, 46, 73, 
76–77, 81, 213–14, 216–17, 239, 
245, 283; on Plato, 215, 251
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 
(EUD), 183, 203
For Self-Examination (FSE), 267, 293
From the Papers of One Still Living 
(review of Andersen’s Only a 
Fiddler) (in EPW), 40, 46, 180
Judge for Yourself! (JFY), 292
Lily of the Field and the Bird of the 
Air, The (1849; in WA), 52n29, 
53n41, 286
Point of View, The (PV), 4, 26, 41, 49, 
73–75, 77–78, 85, 289, 291, 293; 
as essay, 68n20
Three Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays (in WA), 6; “The Woman 
Who Was a Sinner,” 183–84
Three Discourses on Imagined 
Occasions: “At a Graveside,” 48
Two Ages: A Literary Review (review 
of Gyllembourg’s Two Ages) (TA), 
12, 44, 46, 48, 74, 178, 284
Two Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays (in WA), 4; “Love Will 
Hide a Multitude of Sins” (1843 
discourse), 183
Upbuilding Discourse, An (in WA), 
184
Upbuilding Discourses in Various 
Spirits (UDVS), 13, 53n45, 151, 
292; “What We Learn from the 
Lilies of the Field and from the 
Birds of the Air,” 53n45
Works of Love (WL), 20, 203, 219n1, 
234, 239, 285–86, 288, 293–95; 
manuscript of, 158; “Love Abides,” 
165; “Second Series” of, 165
unpublished writings: “Book on 
Adler” (BA), 15, 21; “The Conflict 
between the Old and New Soap-
Cellar” (in ), 45–47, 108; essay on 
how to tell stories to children, 40; 
sketches (by Constantin Constantius) 
responding to Heiberg’s “Det 
astronomiske Aar,” 129n8; Writing 
Sampler, 47
King Cophetua and beggar maid 
(medieval English tale), 79–80
Kirmmse, Bruce, 171n7, 242–43
kitsch, 18, 125, 127
Kjældgaard, Lasse Horne, 219n2




Königstädter Theater (Berlin), 18, 
52n21, 126, 164, 173n41




Langer, Suzanne: “philosophy in a new 
key,” 47
La Strada. See Fellini, Federico
leap(s): ballet, 10, 149, 162–63; 
Bournonville’s, 20, 154; dancer’s, 21, 
162; as demonic/diabolical, 154–55; 
disorderly, 164; of faith, 21, 150, 163; 
of Mephistopheles, 154; as metaphor, 
165; SK intrigued by, 154; trampoline, 
160; into unknown, 254
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 198, 219n2; 
Laocoon (Laokoon), 24, 29, 44, 
196–97
“Let Me Rest on a Peaceful Mountain” 
(song by Ralph Stanley): as Bob 
Dylan’s “religion,” 283
leveling, 73
Linnet, Ragni, 4, 11, 14, 18, 23–24, 26, 
29, 51n15
literary genius, 67n4
literature, 3, 22, 28, 150; edifying, 49, 
53n43; erotics of, 253; evolutionary 
history of, 56; Greek, 250; as mirror 
to its time, 50; Plato’s attitude toward, 
254; SK and, 3–4, 9, 11–13, 16, 30, 
39–50, 55, 89, 116, 240, 245; SK’s 
production of, 6–7, 66, 239, 256; 
upbuilding, 187. See also Kierkegaard’s 
writings/authorship/oeuvre; poetry
Liszt, Franz: Réminiscences de 
[Mozart’s] Don Juan (piano fantasy), 
147n14
lithograph(s), 211. See also Piloty, 
Ferdinand
Løgstrup, K. E., 19; Skabelse og 
Tilintetgørelse (Creation and 
Annihilation), 143
Lorentzen, Jamie A., 28–29
love, 24, 66–67, 73, 82, 94, 120, 166–67, 
173n40, 178, 196, 208, 225–26, 228, 
268; art as child of, 200; Christ (“the 
prototype”) as, 88; Christian, 74, 234; 
of Church, 298n7; of crowd, 289; 
Bob Dylan and, 295; divine, 78, 234, 
279n16, 281; of enemy, 295; erotic/
sensual/romantic, 79–81, 199–202, 
206, 265–66, 275, 281, 285–89, 294, 
296; ethics and, 286; of God, 232–34; 
idealization of, 167; illusions of, 
199–200; and La Sylphide, 171n18; 
as lenient interpreter, 65; lost, 21, 165, 
298n11; marital, 201–2; maternal, 
233–34; metaphors of, 165; of 
Narcissus, 182; of neighbor (neighbor-
love), 28, 30, 281, 284–89, 294–95; as 
primary force, 232; of self (self-love), 
281, 284, 286, 293, 295; soul in, 62; 
spiritual, 266; unconditional, 234; 
unrequited, 164, 195
love commandment(s), 284, 286, 289. 
See also love
love letter: God’s word likened to, 267. 
See also love
Løvenskiold, Herman Severin, 171n18
love songs. See Dylan, Bob
Lowrie, Walter, 53n42
Lundbye, Johan Thomas, 51n15; 
Søbyvang, 209 figure 6
Luther, Martin, 179, 241, 242, 262–63, 
277n2; on hymns, 263; musical 
ambivalence of, 261
Madonna: traditional portrait of, 233; 
painting of, 217. See also Mary; 
Raphael




Mann, Thomas, 148n28; Doctor 
Faustus (Doktor Faustus), 39, 145
Märchen. See fairy tale
Marey, Étienne-Jules: invention of fusil 
photographique, 34n47
Margaret (Goethe’s character), 24, 196, 
199
Marie Beaumarchais (Goethe’s 
character), 24, 196, 199
Marino, Gordon, 61
Marion, Jean-Luc: God without Being 
(Dieu sans l’être), 188; icon/idol 
distinction, 22, 180, 189
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marionettes, 160; SK’s pseudonyms 
compared to, 75
marionette theater: SK’s writings as, 14, 
75
Maritain, Jacques, 3
Martensen, Hans Lassen, 5–6, 31n12, 
73–74, 78, 100
Marx, Karl, 6
Mary (mother of Jesus): descending 
from heavenly skies, 217; devotion 
to, 233–34; iconic portrait of, 234; 
as mother of God, 233. See also 
Madonna
Melberg, Arne, 129n10
Mendelssohn, Felix: music to Antigone 
production, 43
Mephistopheles, 172n28; Bournonville 
as, 154; as demonic, 20; leap of, 154
metaphor(s): of bodily movements, 
hardships, and frustrations, 163–64; 
dancing leap(s) as, 165; for going in 
circles, 164; for infinity, 162; of knight 
of faith, 160–63; of knight of infinity, 
21; of love and loss, 165–66; shadow 
as, 203; of unrepeatable, 164–65
metaphysics: god of, 190; idolatry of, 
188; of personhood, 283; of presence, 
210
metatheater, 114n23
Methodius. See Cyril and Methodius, 
Sts.
Miles, Thomas, 40
mime(s), 114n19; ancient, 108; 
engagement of comic, 60
mimesis, 93, 198, 203. See also imitation
mirror, 83n19; Cordelia eyed in, 
180–81; image-forming view of, 
206–7; Johannes the Seducer as, 219; 
literature as, 50; Owlglass’s Owl and, 
219; shadow compared to, 203
Mishima, Yukio: The Temple of the 
Golden Pavilion (Kinkakuji), 22–23
“modern Antigone.” See Antigone
Molière: Don Juan, 19, 132–33, 136–40, 
142, 172n31, 270
Molina, Tirso de: author of first known 
Don Juan play, 142
Møller, Paul Martin, 47
Mooney, Edward F., 3–4, 7–8, 11, 13, 
18–19, 21
Moravianism, Moravian Brethren, 
Moravian Church, 241; Blake and, 
182, 239–40, 243–44, 254–56, 
257n14; SK and, 28, 182, 239–40, 
242–43, 254–56
Morgenstern, Karl, 15
Moses: in Schoenberg’s opera, 272–76
Moses and Aaron (Moses und Aron; 
opera of Schoenberg), 28, 261, 275; 
compared with “A’s” critique of Don 
Giovanni, 29, 271–73, 276–77. See 
also Moses
Mouawad, Wajdi: Incendies (Scorched; 
drama), 25, 223
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 4, 
13, 44, 135; beauty of, 271; as 
comprehensible/incomprehensible, 
297; and examined life, 271; Don 
Giovanni (a.k.a. Don Juan), 19, 29, 
68n20, 131–33, 136, 138–45, 177, 
226, 262, 264–73, 296; gaiety of, 272; 
The Magic Flute, 266; The Marriage 
of Figaro, 265; sensuous and aural 
beauty of, 271. See also antihymn; 
Commendatore; Don Giovanni; 
Donna Elvira; Liszt, Franz; sensuality/
sensuous(ness)
Muḥammad (Muslim prophet), 22
Murray, Penelope: Plato on Poetry, 253
music, 3, 11, 13, 52n28, 131, 146n11, 
171n18, 177, 233, 278nn7–8, 281; 
“A” on, 19, 29, 132–45, 147n14, 
156, 261–77; and biblical truth, 
276; as Christian, 145, 277; as 
communication, 262, 277; and 
dance, 150, 172–73n31, 190, 261; 
as demonic, 23, 140, 149, 194, 264, 
266–67, 278n7; as devil’s work, 
140; and drama, 132–40, 145; as 
erotic power, 273; ethics of, 296; 
excluded from Christianity, 19, 140, 
145, 264; and faith, 262–63; of flute, 
167; as idol, 273; imitation of, 136; 
as knowledge, 145; and language/
words, 18–19, 132–36, 140, 264, 
273, 275–76; in performance, 265; 
power to affect human emotions, 
277; and religion, 261; Romantics 
on, 135; sacred and profane, 295; 
as sensuality/sensuousness, 18–19, 
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29, 131, 134, 140–42, 144, 261–67, 
269, 273, 275; and Socrates, 58; 
transformative power of, 263; 
twelve-tone, 272. See also Adorno, 
Theodor; aesthetics; Augustine of 
Hippo; Barber, Samuel; Beethoven, 
Ludwig van; Don Giovanni; Don 
Juan; Dylan, Bob; hand organ music; 
Heiberg, Johan Ludvig; hymns/
hymnody; Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye; 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms; Luther, 
Martin; Mendelssohn, Felix; Moses 
and Aaron; music drama; musical 
theater; Nietzsche, Friedrich; opera(s); 
Schoenberg, Arnold
musical theater: SK’s ideas on, 12, 
113n9. See also drama(s); music 
drama; opera(s); theater
music drama, 144; “A’s criteria for, 132. 
See also musical theater; opera(s)
Muybridge, Eadweard: and series 
photography, 34n47; Zoögyroscope 
of, 34n47
Mynster, Jakob Peter, 5, 46, 82n6, 153, 
242; Observations on the Doctrines 
of the Christian Faith (Betragtninger 
over de christelige Troeslærdomme), 
181–90; on preaching, 52n31; SK’s 
attack on, 151
Nagel, Ivan, 137–38
Napoleon: 34n42; trick picture of, 41, 
87, 214–15, 215 figure 8





Newman, John Henry, 3
New Testament, 7, 217; as SK’s lexicon, 
298n7; God of, 15; narrative of, 
15, 90; sense of, 25. See also Bible; 
Christian(s); God; Scripture
Niépce, Nicéphore: invention of 
heliography, 26
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 39, 49, 52n28, 60, 




Nitsch, P. F. A.: Neues mythologisches 
Wörterbuch (New Mythological 
Dictionary), 207
Novalis, 8
novel(s), 15, 22–23, 39–40, 46–47, 
57, 93, 145, 221; generic flexibility 
of, 45; polyphonic potentialities of, 
12; and SK’s literary production, 
56, 89; SK’s literary use of, 25, 226; 
SK’s pseudonymous writings as, 
4; women’s, 44. See also Bakhtin, 
Mikhail; Bildungsroman; visualizing 
Bildungsroman
novella(s), 61, 76; Either/Or likened to, 
56
Noverre, Jean-Georges, 172n31
Nürenbach, Martin (tightrope dancer), 
162
Nürnberg print(s) (Neuruppiner 
Bilderbogen or Nürnbergs), 18, 24, 






Old Testament. See Bible
Olsen, Regine, 5, 151, 167, 298n13; 
made into image, 221n10
opera(s), 3, 18–19, 226, 262, 265–66; 
“A” on, 137–45, 146n3, 147n12, 268–
77; bourgeois, 138; vs. drama, 138; 
SK’s engagement in/experience of, 11, 
45; SK’s ideas on, 12, 131–45, 278n7; 
SK’s literary employment of, 25, 226. 
See also Moses and Aaron; Mozart, 
Wolfgang Amadeus; musical theater; 
music drama; Schoenberg, Arnold
Origen, 249, 259n27; On First 
Principles, 247
Ortega y Gasset, José, 56
Overskou, Thomas, 42
Owlglass (Eulenspiegel, Ugelspegel, 
Uglspil), 218–19, 218 figure 10
painting(s), 21, 24, 181, 207, 210–12, 
219–20n3; academic, 199, 208–9; and 
“A,” 198, 199; aesthete as, 195; Anti-
Climacus on, 209; of Ariadne and 
Theseus, 24, 207–8, 208 figures 4 and 
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painting(s), continued
 5; assigned to sphere of Resurrection, 
198; born from love, 200; of Christ, 
94, 182; Danish, 51n15; idealistic, 
23, 193; irony in, 213; Johannes the 
Seducer as, 199; Judge William on, 
200; of Madonna, 217; mimetic, 195; 
sentimental, 125; SK’s literary use 
of, 206; SK and, 23, 45, 200, 213; 
transition from sculpture to, 29. See 
also Haidt, Johann Valentin; Lundbye, 
Johan Thomas; Raphael; Rothko, 
Mark
Pascal, Blaise, 6
Pattison, George, 3–4, 7, 11–14, 21, 
26, 71–72, 131, 139, 178–79, 181, 
279n16
performativity, 12, 17, 115–19, 121, 
127, 128nn3–5, 209, 213, 128n4. See 
also repetition
Petersen, Nils Holger, 12, 18–19, 29
philosophical theater: Repetition as, 
123–28. See also drama(s); theater
Phister, J. L.: as Captain Scipio, 40–41, 
46, 116–17
photograph(s), 26, 204; life-death 
relationship in, 205
photography, 204; development of, 26, 
34n47, 199; as life/death boundary, 
221n9. See also Alstrup, Mads; 
Weninger, Joseph
Pickett, Howard, 4, 7, 14, 16–17, 20, 26
pictorial art, 11, 23–24, 193–219
Piloty, Ferdinand: lithograph of Romeo 
and Juliet’s Farewell Kiss, 24, 201, 
202 figure 2; 220
Plateau, Joseph: invention of 
Phenakistoscope, 34n47
Plato, 7–8, 46–47, 49, 56–58, 79, 121, 
215–16, 245, 249, 255; cave allegory 
of, 101, 247; Crito, 253; dialogues 
of, 114n19, 251–53; expulsion of 
poets by, 57, 250–51; Ion, 253–54; 
on literature, 254; Phaedo, 246, 
253; Phaedrus, 247; Republic, 101, 
206, 247, 252–54; Seventh Letter 
of, 246, 249–50, 252; Socrates of, 
55; Symposium, 56, 247. See also 
Murray, Penelope; Rijksbaron Albert; 
Socrates
Pliny, 220n4; Natural History, 200
poet-communication, 282
poetry, 47, 61, 67n7, 135, 168, 201, 
250; Danish, 40; dialectical/dialogical, 
72, 78, 80; as highest of all arts, 29; 
Lessing on, 196; and motion, 24, 96; 
not by SK, 45; and philosophy, 57–58; 
Plato on, 254; SK’s appreciation of, 
45; of SK’s writing, 67, 71; Tieck on, 
76. See also Diez, Friedrich; hand 
organ music; Murray, Penelope; 
troubadours; troubadour tradition
Poole, Roger, 6
Posse (farce, burlesque), 18, 113n9, 
125, 127. See also burlesque; farce(s); 
vaudeville
postmodernists, 8
present age: aesthetic as ground of, 
49; art and, 178; Christendom in, 
178; reflection embraced by, 178; 
and single form / great idea, 44; SK’s 
experience of, 48; and SK’s writings, 
12
Prince Myshkin (character of 
Dostoevsky), 12
prompter. See souffleur
prototype (forbillede): Anna (biblical) 
as, 184; (implicitly) Jesus as, 87–88, 




Qur’ān: (13:13), 22; (31:13), 22; against 
shirk (idolatry), 22
rabble, 26, 289. See also crowd(s)
Rahbek, Knud Lyne, 132
Raphael: The Entombment (1847 copy), 
211, 212 figure 7; Sistine Madonna, 
24, 216–17, 216 figure 9
Regine. See Olsen, Regine
religion: distinguished from art, 9
Renan, Ernest, 39
Rennie, Bryan, 32n23
repetition, 17–18; as category of 
performativity, 119–23; experience of, 
27; subjectivity as, 18, 119, 123
Reynaud, Charles Émile: invention of 
Praxinoscope, 35n47
Index 321
Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich. See Jean 
Paul
Rijksbaron Albert: Plato, “Ion,” or: On 
the “Iliad”, 254
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 8, 56
Rimbaud, Arthur, 281, 297n2; SK 
compared to, 6
Rix, Robert, 257n14
Robinson, Crabb: essay on Blake, 240
Robinson, Marcia C., 13–14
Rocca, Ettore, 19, 140–41
Roget, Peter Mark, 25
Romanticism, 39–40, 215; English, 
240; European, 240. See also irony; 
Romantics
Romantics, 219–20n3; “A” on, 135; 
German, 8, 245; on music, 135; 
SK on, 19, 76; valorization of art/
aesthetics, 10, 43, 179. See also irony; 
Romanticism
Romeo (character of Shakespeare): 
and Bob Dylan, 287; and Juliet, 24, 
201–2, 220n5, 287. See also Piloty, 
Ferdinand
Rothko, Mark: paintings of, 177
Rougemont, Denis de, 6
Rovira, James, 28
Royal Danish Theater (Copenhagen), 
41–43, 74, 106, 109, 116, 131, 151, 
172n24, 177
Rudelbach, A. G., 243
Rumble, Vanessa, 223–24
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 56, 227
satire, 244; SK’s use of, 13, 47–48, 108, 
146n4
Schattenspiel. See Hegelianism; 
shadow(s); shadow play




Schneitzhoeffer, Jean-Madeleine,  
171n18
Schoenberg, Arnold, 148n28; SK and, 
28; twelve-tone system of, 145. See 
also Moses and Aaron
Schubert, Franz, 13
Schuchard, Marsha Keith, 243
Scott, Nathan A., Jr., 3
Scribe, Augustin Eugène, 43, 51n20, 
105, 154, 172n23; The First Love, 
40–41, 46, 113n13, 131, 226; Fra 
Diavolo, 42. See also Heiberg, Johan 
Ludvig
Scripture, 241, 247, 259n27, 289; four 
levels of, 259n33. See also Bible; New 
Testament
sculpture: transition to painting from, 
29. See also Thorvaldsen, Bertel
Second World War, 7
self-love. See love
sensuality/sensuous(ness): and spirit/
spirituality, 139, 269, 274; of “A,” 
29, 199, 268; as abstract idea, 133; 
as anxiety-producing riddle, 226; and 
Christianity, 134, 136, 140, 147, 264, 
269; demonic (qualified) as, 132; of 
Don Giovanni/Don Juan (character), 
19, 132, 141, 195; and erotic, 264, 
268–70; excluded by Christianity, 
140; idea of, 137; of Johannes the 
Seducer, 199; and Mozart’s Don 
Giovanni, 265, 269–70; music as 
(medium of), 18–19, 29, 131, 134, 
140–42, 144, 261–67, 269, 273, 275; 
negation of, 146n6; in Schoenberg’s 
Moses and Aaron, 272, 275; as sinful, 
132
sensuous desire, 267, 269–71, 276
shadow(s): boxing, 165; and camera 
obscura, 204; and daguerreotypes, 
204; in death, 203; Johannes the 
Seducer as, 206; as metaphor, 203; 
and mirror, 203; in picture, 182; 
in Plato’s cave allegory, 247; and 
puppets in Schattenspiel, 101–2; in 
sounds, 285; subject as, 111
shadow play (Schattenspiel Hegelian), 
16–17, 99, 100; of world history, 103
Shakespeare, William, 8, 41, 44, 80, 
107, 240; comedies of, 79; Hamlet 
(tragedy), 109, 110. See also Hamlet; 
Juliet; Piloty, Ferdinand; Romeo
Shchyttsova, Tatiana, 30
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 240
sin: hereditary/inherited, 24, 27, 223–27, 
232–34
sinful woman. See woman who was a 
sinner
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Sixtus and Barbara, Sts., 217
social dance/dancing, 170n3, 174n45
Socrates, 7, 46, 56, 58, 61, 66, 216, 
239–40, 244–47, 251–56, 293; 
conflicting portraits of, 245; as critic 
and reformer, 256; existential heroism 
of, 55; and Homer, 253; idolized, 79; 
and irony, 214; as less than serious, 
69n26; as ordinary man, 79; Prefaces 
compared to, 61; SK as, 55–57, 
63–64, 66n24; SK on, 28, 239–40, 
244–46, 251, 254–56; in SK’s literary 
works, 214. See also irony; Plato; 
Zinzendorf, Nikolaus Ludwig; as 
sophist, 68n18; on truth, 79
Socratic irony. See irony
sola scriptura, 29, 262–63, 267, 274
Solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand: 
Nachgelassene Schriften und 
Briefwechsel (Posthumous Writings 
and Correspondence), 213; 
Vorlesungen über Aesthetik (Lectures 
on Aesthetics), 213




souffleur (theater stage prompter), 7, 
111–12; SK likened to, 8, 99, 110, 
282
Sousa, Elisabete de, 270
Spangenberg, August Gottlieb: 
biography of Zinzendorf, 244, 
258n22
Spener, Philipp Jakob, 241–42, 245; Pia 
Desideria, 241
spirit/spirituality: and sensuousness, 
139, 269, 274, 269, 274
spoken theater: distinguished from 
opera and musical theater, 131–32, 
137–38. See also drama(s); theater
stages of existence (as construed by SK/
pseudonyms)
aesthetic (esthetic), 3, 9, 248, 269; and 
evil, 177; as ground of present age, 
49; and music, 273; religious and, 
185–88; sensuous sway of, 291; 
and theater, 7
ethical, 3, 9; and Schiller, 248; 
immortality and eternal life in, 101
religious, 3, 9, 248; dialectic between 
aesthetic and, 185–88
religiousness a: as subjectivity of 
allegory, 248–49
religiousness b, 248; as anagogical 
subjectivity, 249




storytelling, 13; faith-oriented, 14, 73; 
and human nature, 72–73; Socratic in, 
77; Tieck on, 76–77
Strahlheim, Carl: engraving of 
Gendarmenmarkt, xiv, 31n16. See 
also Gendarmenmarkt
subjectivity, 67, 101, 103, 106, 110, 
118, 126, 213; of allegory, 248–49; 
anagogical, 249; of Blake, 249; and 
farce, 125; and freedom, 122–23; 
inwardness of, 108, 112; and 
objectivity, 61, 111; philosophy of, 111; 
of reader, 17, 116–18, 120; religious, 
179; as repetition, 18, 119, 123; self 




(Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι, Fellowship of 
the Dead): “A’s” address to, 203–4
Taglioni, Filippo, 171n5, 171n18
Taglioni, Marie, 171n5
Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice 
de, 283
Tell, William: image of, 87
theater, 3, 11, 128nn3–4, 168; action 
orientation of, 106–7; aesthetic 
existence and, 7; “A” on, 132–40, 145; 
and Augustine, 102; and children, 
42; Christo-Socratic, 75; church and, 
7; Climacus on, 16–17, 99–112; 
conclusiveness of, 104–6; Constantin 
Constantius on, 164–65; contagion 
of, 103; cosmos as, 16; Danish, 42, 
51n20; detached spectator of, 102–3; 
etymological connection to theory, 
113n12; golden age of, 42; and 
Hegel, 100, 105–12; hypocrisy of, 
103–4, 106; of ideas, 4, 12, 17–18, 
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115, 117, 127; illusion of, 7, 101–2; 
individual’s ethical development as, 
17; outwardness and hypocrisy of, 
103–4; and Philosophical Fragments, 
47; and possibility, 102; private, 106, 
108; and Repetition, 227; serious, 
127; SK on, 16, 18, 20, 26, 41, 44, 
131–32, 138; SK represented onstage 
in, 43; SK’s attendance at, 5, 41–43, 
45, 116, 173n41; SK’s kinship 
with/predilection for, 4, 43, 116; 
strenuousness and inconclusiveness 
of, 107–9; of world, 16, 100, 103, 
109. See also Bentley, Eric; drama(s); 
metatheater; musical theater; 
philosophical theater; Souffleur; 
spoken theater; theater criticism
theater criticism, 131, 145. See also 
drama(s); theater
Theseus. See Ariadne and Theseus
Thomas, R. S., 39
Thomas Aquinas. See Aquinas
Thoreau, Henry David, 60, 67n67
Thorvaldsen, Bertel, 6, 41–42; 
daguerreotype of, 204–5, 205 figure 
3, 221n7; his statues of Christ and 
apostles, 6, 33n42, 41
Thorvaldsen Museum, 74
Thust, Martin, 75, 114n21
Tieck, Johann Ludwig, 8, 14, 77, 135; 
Das alte Buch und die Reise ins Blaue 
hinein (The Old Book and the Voyage 
into the Blue), 76; and fairy tales, 76, 
81; Kater Murr, 47; Phantasus, 76
tightrope dancer(s), 149, 161–62, 
173n37; and faith, 160; Johannes 
de Silentio as, 160. See also dance/
dancing; Nürenbach, Martin








twelve disciples. See apostles
Two Ages (novel by Mme Gyllembourg). 
See Gyllembourg(-Ehrensvärd, née 
Buntzen), Thomasine Christine
Undine (ballet, based on fairy 
tale), 172n29; choreographed by 
Bournonville, 155
Unitas Fratrum (Unity of the Brethren), 
241–42. See also Moravianism, 
Moravian Brethren, Moravian Church
universal history, 16, 100. See also 
history
Updike, John, 8, 56
vaudeville, 18, 44, 125. See also 
burlesque; farce; Posse
Veil of Veronica. See Veronica’s Veil
Vernoy de Saint-Georges, Jules-Henri: 
Ludovic, 44
Veronica’s Veil, 24, 194, 197–98, 204; 
as acheiropoieton (“made without 
hand”) or icon, 197
Vestris, Auguste, 150
Villeneuve, Denis: Incendies (film), 12, 
25, 27, 29, 223, 226–34
visual art(s), 3–4, 14, 21, 23, 28; and 
eternally objective ideas, 198; vs. 
religion, 9; SK and, 11, 40. See also 
cinema/film/moving pictures; irony; 
painting(s); sculpture
visualizing Bildungsroman 
(or image formation novel, 
billeddannelsesroman): Practice in 
Christianity as, 15–16, 21, 89–94. See 
also Bildungsroman
von Balthasar, Hans Urs. See Balthasar, 
Hans Urs von
Vor Frue Kirke. See Church of Our Lady
Wackenroder, Wilhelm Heinrich, 
19; Herzensergießungen eines 
Kunstliebenden Klosterbruders 
(Confessions from the Heart of an 
Art-loving Friar), 135
Wagner, Richard, 13, 39, 52n28
Walsh, Sylvia, 10, 187, 266
Wandering Jew, 11; SK’s early study on, 
40
Weber, Samuel, 17; on theatricality, 
113nn8–9
Webern, Anton, 148n28; twelve-tone 
system of, 145
Weninger, Joseph: photo studio of, 
220–21n7
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Wesley, John and Charles, 242
Westfall, Joseph, 128n3
Wieland, C. M.: Geschichte des Agathon 
(The Story of Agathon), 15
Winter, Marian Hanna, 160
Winther, Christian, 40, 51n7
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 56, 58, 64,  
68n19
woman who was a sinner (sinful 
woman; biblical character), 22, 180, 
183–85; faith of, 187, 189
Xenophon, 245
Young, Edward: Night Thoughts, 240
Zinzendorf, Nikolaus Ludwig, 239–40, 
242, 251, 256–57n3, 258n20, 
258n22; The German Socrates, 244–
45; and irony, 244; as “Socrates of 
Dresden,” 244; as Socratic, 28, 240; 
cf. SK, 244–45. See also Spangenberg, 
August Gottlieb
Ziolkowski, Eric, 40, 114n18, 158, 167, 
220, 245, 256n3, 287
Zoögyroscope. See Muybridge, 
Eadweard
